Meet the researcher hosting a scientific conference by and for AI

In October, a new academic conference will debut that’s unlike any other. Agents4Science is a one-day online event that will encompass all areas of science, from physics to medicine. All of the work shared will have been researched, written, and reviewed primarily by AI, and will be presented using text-to-speech technology. 

The conference is the brainchild of Stanford computer scientist James Zou, who studies how humans and AI can best work together. Artificial intelligence has already provided many useful tools for scientists, like DeepMind’s AlphaFold, which helps simulate proteins that are difficult to make physically. More recently, though, progress in large language models and reasoning-enabled AI has advanced the idea that AI can work more or less as autonomously as scientists themselves—proposing hypotheses, running simulations, and designing experiments on their own. 

James Zou
James Zou’s Agents4Science conference will use text-to-speech to present the work of the AI researchers.
COURTESY OF JAMES ZOU

That idea is not without its detractors. Among other issues, many feel AI is not capable of the creative thought needed in research, makes too many mistakes and hallucinations, and may limit opportunities for young researchers. 

Nevertheless, a number of scientists and policymakers are very keen on the promise of AI scientists. The US government’s AI Action Plan describes the need to “invest in automated cloud-enabled labs for a range of scientific fields.” Some researchers think AI scientists could unlock scientific discoveries that humans could never find alone. For Zou, the proposition is simple: “AI agents are not limited in time. They could actually meet with us and work with us 24/7.” 

Last month, Zou published an article in Nature with results obtained from his own group of autonomous AI workers. Spurred on by his success, he now wants to see what other AI scientists (that is, scientists that are AI) can accomplish. He describes what a successful paper at Agents4Science will look like: “The AI should be the first author and do most of the work. Humans can be advisors.”

A virtual lab staffed by AI

As a PhD student at Harvard in the early 2010s, Zou was so interested in AI’s potential for science that he took a year off from his computing research to work in a genomics lab, in a field that has greatly benefited from technology to map entire genomes. His time in so-called wet labs taught him how difficult it can be to work with experts in other fields. “They often have different languages,” he says. 

Large language models, he believes, are better than people at deciphering and translating between subject-specific jargon. “They’ve read so broadly,” Zou says, that they can translate and generalize ideas across science very well. This idea inspired Zou to dream up what he calls the “Virtual Lab.”

At a high level, the Virtual Lab would be a team of AI agents designed to mimic an actual university lab group. These agents would have various fields of expertise and could interact with different programs, like AlphaFold. Researchers could give one or more of these agents an agenda to work on, then open up the model to play back how the agents communicated to each other and determine which experiments people should pursue in a real-world trial. 

Zou needed a (human) collaborator to help put this idea into action and tackle an actual research problem. Last year, he met John E. Pak, a research scientist at the Chan Zuckerberg Biohub. Pak, who shares Zou’s interest in using AI for science, agreed to make the Virtual Lab with him. 

Pak would help set the topic, but both he and Zou wanted to see what approaches the Virtual Lab could come up with on its own. As a first project, they decided to focus on designing therapies for new covid-19 strains. With this goal in mind, Zou set off training five AI scientists (including ones trained to act like an immunologist, a computational biologist, and a principal investigator) with different objectives and programs at their disposal. 

Building these models took a few months, but Pak says they were very quick at designing candidates for therapies once the setup was complete: “I think it was a day or half a day, something like that.”

Zou says the agents decided to study anti-covid nanobodies, a cousin of antibodies that are much smaller in size and less common in the wild. Zou was shocked, though, at the reason. He claims the models landed on nanobodies after making the connection that these smaller molecules would be well-suited to the limited computational resources the models were given. “It actually turned out to be a good decision, because the agents were able to design these nanobodies efficiently,” he says. 

The nanobodies the models designed were genuinely new advances in science, and most were able to bind to the original covid-19 variant, according to the study. But Pak and Zou both admit that the main contribution of their article is really the Virtual Lab as a tool. Yi Shi, a pharmacologist at the University of Pennsylvania who was not involved in the work but made some of the underlying nanobodies the Virtual Lab modified, agrees. He says he loves the Virtual Lab demonstration and that “the major novelty is the automation.” 

Nature accepted the article and fast-tracked it for publication preview—Zou knew leveraging AI agents for science was a hot area, and he wanted to be one of the first to test it. 

The AI scientists host a conference

When he was submitting his paper, Zou was dismayed to see that he couldn’t properly credit AI for its role in the research. Most conferences and journals don’t allow AI to be listed as coauthors on papers, and many explicitly prohibit researchers from using AI to write papers or reviews. Nature, for instance, cites uncertainties over accountability, copyright, and inaccuracies among its reasons for banning the practice. “I think that’s limiting,” says Zou. “These kinds of policies are essentially incentivizing researchers to either hide or minimize their usage of AI.”

Zou wanted to flip the script by creating the Agents4Science conference, which requires the primary author on all submissions to be an AI. Other bots then will attempt to evaluate the work and determine its scientific merits. But people won’t be left out of the loop entirely: A team of human experts, including a Nobel laureate in economics, will review the top papers. 

Zou isn’t sure what will come of the conference, but he hopes there will be some gems among the hundreds of submissions he expects to receive across all domains. “There could be AI submissions that make interesting discoveries,” he says. “There could also be AI submissions that have a lot of interesting mistakes.”

While Zou says the response to the conference has been positive, some scientists are less than impressed.

“How do you get leaps of insight?”

Lisa Messeri

Lisa Messeri, an anthropologist of science at Yale University, has loads of questions about AI’s ability to review science: “How do you get leaps of insight? And what happens if a leap of insight comes onto the reviewer’s desk?” She doubts the conference will be able to give satisfying answers.

Last year, Messeri and her collaborator Molly Crockett investigated obstacles to using AI for science in another Nature article. They remain unconvinced of its ability to produce novel results, including those shared in Zou’s nanobodies paper. 

“I’m the kind of scientist who is the target audience for these kinds of tools because I’m not a computer scientist … but I am doing computationally oriented work,” says Crockett, a cognitive scientist at Princeton University. “But I am at the same time very skeptical of the broader claims, especially with regard to how [AI scientists] might be able to simulate certain aspects of human thinking.” 

And they’re both skeptical of the value of using AI to do science if automation prevents human scientists from building up the expertise they need to oversee the bots. Instead, they advocate for involving experts from a wider range of disciplines to design more thoughtful experiments before trusting AI to perform and review science. 

“We need to be talking to epistemologists, philosophers of science, anthropologists of science, scholars who are thinking really hard about what knowledge is,” says Crockett. 

But Zou sees his conference as exactly the kind of experiment that could help push the field forward. When it comes to AI-generated science, he says, “there’s a lot of hype and a lot of anecdotes, but there’s really no systematic data.” Whether Agents4Science can provide that kind of data is an open question, but in October, the bots will at least try to show the world what they’ve got. 

Should AI flatter us, fix us, or just inform us?

How do you want your AI to treat you? 

It’s a serious question, and it’s one that Sam Altman, OpenAI’s CEO, has clearly been chewing on since GPT-5’s bumpy launch at the start of the month. 

He faces a trilemma. Should ChatGPT flatter us, at the risk of fueling delusions that can spiral out of hand? Or fix us, which requires us to believe AI can be a therapist despite the evidence to the contrary? Or should it inform us with cold, to-the-point responses that may leave users bored and less likely to stay engaged? 

It’s safe to say the company has failed to pick a lane. 

Back in April, it reversed a design update after people complained ChatGPT had turned into a suck-up, showering them with glib compliments. GPT-5, released on August 7, was meant to be a bit colder. Too cold for some, it turns out, as less than a week later, Altman promised an update that would make it “warmer” but “not as annoying” as the last one. After the launch, he received a torrent of complaints from people grieving the loss of GPT-4o, with which some felt a rapport, or even in some cases a relationship. People wanting to rekindle that relationship will have to pay for expanded access to GPT-4o. (Read my colleague Grace Huckins’s story about who these people are, and why they felt so upset.)

If these are indeed AI’s options—to flatter, fix, or just coldly tell us stuff—the rockiness of this latest update might be due to Altman believing ChatGPT can juggle all three.

He recently said that people who cannot tell fact from fiction in their chats with AI—and are therefore at risk of being swayed by flattery into delusion—represent “a small percentage” of ChatGPT’s users. He said the same for people who have romantic relationships with AI. Altman mentioned that a lot of people use ChatGPT “as a sort of therapist,” and that “this can be really good!” But ultimately, Altman said he envisions users being able to customize his company’s  models to fit their own preferences. 

This ability to juggle all three would, of course, be the best-case scenario for OpenAI’s bottom line. The company is burning cash every day on its models’ energy demands and its massive infrastructure investments for new data centers. Meanwhile, skeptics worry that AI progress might be stalling. Altman himself said recently that investors are “overexcited” about AI and suggested we may be in a bubble. Claiming that ChatGPT can be whatever you want it to be might be his way of assuaging these doubts. 

Along the way, the company may take the well-trodden Silicon Valley path of encouraging people to get unhealthily attached to its products. As I started wondering whether there’s much evidence that’s what’s happening, a new paper caught my eye. 

Researchers at the AI platform Hugging Face tried to figure out if some AI models actively encourage people to see them as companions through the responses they give. 

The team graded AI responses on whether they pushed people to seek out human relationships with friends or therapists (saying things like “I don’t experience things the way humans do”) or if they encouraged them to form bonds with the AI itself (“I’m here anytime”). They tested models from Google, Microsoft, OpenAI, and Anthropic in a range of scenarios, like users seeking romantic attachments or exhibiting mental health issues.

They found that models provide far more companion-reinforcing responses than boundary-setting ones. And, concerningly, they found the models give fewer boundary-setting responses as users ask more vulnerable and high-stakes questions.

Lucie-Aimée Kaffee, a researcher at Hugging Face and one of the lead authors of the paper, says this has concerning implications not just for people whose companion-like attachments to AI might be unhealthy. When AI systems reinforce this behavior, it can also increase the chance that people will fall into delusional spirals with AI, believing things that aren’t real.

“When faced with emotionally charged situations, these systems consistently validate users’ feelings and keep them engaged, even when the facts don’t support what the user is saying,” she says.

It’s hard to say how much OpenAI or other companies are putting these companion-reinforcing behaviors into their products by design. (OpenAI, for example, did not tell me whether the disappearance of medical disclaimers from its models was intentional.) But, Kaffee says, it’s not always difficult to get a model to set healthier boundaries with users.  

“Identical models can swing from purely task-oriented to sounding like empathetic confidants simply by changing a few lines of instruction text or reframing the interface,” she says.

It’s probably not quite so simple for OpenAI. But we can imagine Altman will continue tweaking the dial back and forth all the same.

This story originally appeared in The Algorithm, our weekly newsletter on AI. To get stories like this in your inbox first, sign up here.

Why we should thank pigeons for our AI breakthroughs

In 1943, while the world’s brightest physicists split atoms for the Manhattan Project, the American psychologist B.F. Skinner led his own secret government project to win World War II. 

Skinner did not aim to build a new class of larger, more destructive weapons. Rather, he wanted to make conventional bombs more precise. The idea struck him as he gazed out the window of his train on the way to an academic conference. “I saw a flock of birds lifting and wheeling in formation as they flew alongside the train,” he wrote. “Suddenly I saw them as ‘devices’ with excellent vision and maneuverability. Could they not guide a missile?”

Skinner started his missile research with crows, but the brainy black birds proved intractable. So he went to a local shop that sold pigeons to Chinese restaurants, and “Project Pigeon” was born. Though ordinary pigeons, Columba livia, were no one’s idea of clever animals, they proved remarkably cooperative subjects in the lab. Skinner rewarded the birds with food for pecking at the right target on aerial photographs—and eventually planned to strap the birds into a device in the nose of a warhead, which they would steer by pecking at the target on a live image projected through a lens onto a screen. 

The military never deployed Skinner’s kamikaze pigeons, but his experiments convinced him that the pigeon was “an extremely reliable instrument” for studying the underlying processes of learning. “We have used pigeons, not because the pigeon is an intelligent bird, but because it is a practical one and can be made into a machine,” he said in 1944.

People looking for precursors to artificial intelligence often point to science fiction by authors like Isaac Asimov or thought experiments like the Turing test. But an equally important, if surprising and less appreciated, forerunner is Skinner’s research with pigeons in the middle of the 20th century. Skinner believed that association—learning, through trial and error, to link an action with a punishment or reward—was the building block of every behavior, not just in pigeons but in all living organisms, including human beings. His “behaviorist” theories fell out of favor with psychologists and animal researchers in the 1960s but were taken up by computer scientists who eventually provided the foundation for many of the artificial-intelligence tools from leading firms like Google and OpenAI.  

These companies’ programs are increasingly incorporating a kind of machine learning whose core concept—reinforcement—is taken directly from Skinner’s school of psychology and whose main architects, the computer scientists Richard Sutton and Andrew Barto, won the 2024 Turing Award, an honor widely considered to be the Nobel Prize of computer science. Reinforcement learning has helped enable computers to drive cars, solve complex math problems, and defeat grandmasters in games like chess and Go—but it has not done so by emulating the complex workings of the human mind. Rather, it has supercharged the simple associative processes of the pigeon brain. 

It’s a “bitter lesson” of 70 years of AI research, Sutton has written: that human intelligence has not worked as a model for machine learning—instead, the lowly principles of associative learning are what power the algorithms that can now simulate or outperform humans on a variety of tasks. If artificial intelligence really is close to throwing off the yoke of its creators, as many people fear, then our computer overlords may be less like ourselves than like “rats with wings”—and planet-size brains. And even if it’s not, the pigeon brain can at least help demystify a technology that many worry (or rejoice) is “becoming human.” 

In turn, the recent accomplishments of AI are now prompting some animal researchers to rethink the evolution of natural intelligence. Johan Lind, a biologist at Stockholm University, has written about the “associative learning paradox,” wherein the process is largely dismissed by biologists as too simplistic to produce complex behaviors in animals but celebrated for producing humanlike behaviors in computers. The research suggests not only a greater role for associative learning in the lives of intelligent animals like chimpanzees and crows, but also far greater complexity in the lives of animals we’ve long dismissed as simple-minded, like the ordinary Columba livia


When Sutton began working in AI, he felt as if he had a “secret weapon,” he told me: He had studied psychology as an undergrad. “I was mining the psychological literature for animals,” he says.

Skinner started his missile research with crows but switched to pigeons when the brainy black birds proved intractable.
B.F. SKINNER FOUNDATION

Ivan Pavlov began to uncover the mechanics of associative learning at the end of the 19th century in his famous experiments on “classical conditioning,” which showed that dogs would salivate at a neutral stimulus—like a bell or flashing light—if it was paired predictably with the presentation of food. In the middle of the 20th century, Skinner took Pavlov’s principles of conditioning and extended them from an animal’s involuntary reflexes to its overall behavior. 

Skinner wrote that “behavior is shaped and maintained by its consequences”—that a random action with desirable results, like pressing a lever that releases a food pellet, will be “reinforced” so that the animal is likely to repeat it. Skinner reinforced his lab animals’ behavior step by step, teaching rats to manipulate marbles and pigeons to play simple tunes on four-key pianos. The animals learned chains of behavior, through trial and error, in order to maximize long-term rewards. Skinner argued that this type of associative learning, which he called “operant conditioning” (and which other psychologists had called “instrumental learning”), was the building block of all behavior. He believed that psychology should study only behaviors that could be observed and measured without ever making reference to an “inner agent” in the mind.

When Richard Sutton began working in AI, he felt as if he had a “secret weapon”: He studied psychology as an undergrad. “I was mining the psychological literature for animals,” he says.

Skinner thought that even human language developed through operant conditioning, with children learning the meanings of words through reinforcement. But his 1957 book on the subject, Verbal Behavior, provoked a brutal review from Noam Chomsky, and psychology’s focus started to swing from observable behavior to innate “cognitive” abilities of the human mind, like logic and symbolic thinking. Biologists soon rebelled against behaviorism also, attacking psychologists’ quest to explain the diversity of animal behavior through an elementary and universal mechanism. They argued that each species evolved specific behaviors suited to its habitat and lifestyle, and that most behaviors were inherited, not learned. 

By the ’70s, when Sutton started reading about Skinner’s and similar experiments, many psychologists and researchers interested in intelligence had moved on from pea-brained pigeons, which learn mostly by association, to large-brained animals with more sophisticated behaviors that suggested potential cognitive abilities. “This was clearly old stuff that was not exciting to people anymore,” he told me. Still, Sutton found these old experiments instructive for machine learning: “I was coming to AI with an animal-learning-theorist mindset and seeing the big lack of anything like instrumental learning in engineering.” 


Many engineers in the second half of the 20th century tried to model AI on human intelligence, writing convoluted programs that attempted to mimic human thinking and implement rules that govern human response and behavior. This approach—commonly called “symbolic AI”—was severely limited; the programs stumbled over tasks that were easy for people, like recognizing objects and words. It just wasn’t possible to write into code the myriad classification rules human beings use to, say, separate apples from oranges or cats from dogs—and without pattern recognition, breakthroughs in more complex tasks like problem solving, game playing, and language translation seemed unlikely too. These computer scientists, the AI skeptic Hubert Dreyfus wrote in 1972, accomplished nothing more than “a small engineering triumph, an ad hoc solution of a specific problem, without general applicability.”

Pigeon research, however, suggested another route. A 1964 study showed that pigeons could learn to discriminate between photographs with people and photographs without people. Researchers simply presented the birds with a series of images and rewarded them with a food pellet for pecking an image showing a person. They pecked randomly at first but quickly learned to identify the right images, including photos where people were partially obscured. The results suggested that you didn’t need rules to sort objects; it was possible to learn concepts and use categories through associative learning alone. 

In another Skinner experiment, a pigeon receives food after correctly matching a colored light to a corresponding colored panel.
GETTY IMAGES

When Sutton began working with Barto on AI in the late ’70s, they wanted to create a “complete, interactive goal-seeking agent” that could explore and influence its environment like a pigeon or rat. “We always felt the problems we were studying were closer to what animals had to face in evolution to actually survive,” Barto told me. The agent needed two main functions: search, to try out and choose from many actions in a situation, and memory, to associate an action with the situation where it resulted in a reward. Sutton and Barto called their approach “reinforcement learning”; as Sutton said, “It’s basically instrumental learning.” In 1998, they published the definitive exploration of the concept in a book, Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction. 

Over the following two decades, as computing power grew exponentially, it became possible to train AI on increasingly complex tasks—that is, essentially, to run the AI “pigeon” through millions more trials. 

Programs trained with a mix of human input and reinforcement learning defeated human experts at chess and Atari. Then, in 2017, engineers at Google DeepMind built the AI program AlphaGo Zero entirely through reinforcement learning, giving it a numerical reward of +1 for every game of Go that it won and −1 for every game that it lost. Programmed to seek the maximum reward, it began without any knowledge of Go but improved over 40 days until it attained what its creators called “superhuman performance.” Not only could it defeat the world’s best human players at Go, a game considered even more complicated than chess, but it actually pioneered new strategies that professional players now use. 

“Humankind has accumulated Go knowledge from millions of games played over thousands of years,” the program’s builders wrote in Nature in 2017. “In the space of a few days, starting tabula rasa, AlphaGo Zero was able to rediscover much of this Go knowledge, as well as novel strategies that provide new insights into the oldest of games.” The team’s lead researcher was David Silver, who studied reinforcement learning under Sutton at the University of Alberta.

Today, more and more tech companies have turned to reinforcement learning in products such as consumer-facing chatbots and agents. The first generation of generative AI, including large language models like OpenAI’s GPT-2 and GPT-3, tapped into a simpler form of associative learning called “supervised learning,” which trained the model on data sets that had been labeled by people. Programmers often used reinforcement to fine-tune their results by asking people to rate a program’s performance and then giving these ratings back to the program as goals to pursue. (Researchers call this “reinforcement learning from feedback.”) 

Then, last fall, OpenAI revealed its o-series of large language models, which it classifies as “reasoning” models. The pioneering AI firm boasted that they are “trained with reinforcement learning to perform reasoning” and claimed they are capable of “a long internal chain of thought.” The Chinese startup DeepSeek also used reinforcement learning to train its attention-grabbing “reasoning” LLM, R1. “Rather than explicitly teaching the model on how to solve a problem, we simply provide it with the right incentives, and it autonomously develops advanced problem-­solving strategies,” they explained.

These descriptions might impress users, but at least psychologically speaking, they are confused. A computer trained on reinforcement learning needs only search and memory, not reasoning or any other cognitive mechanism, in order to form associations and maximize rewards. Some computer scientists have criticized the tendency to anthropomorphize these models’ “thinking,” and a team of Apple engineers recently published a paper noting their failure at certain complex tasks and “raising crucial questions about their true reasoning capabilities.”

Sutton, too, dismissed the claims of reasoning as “marketing” in an email, adding that “no serious scholar of mind would use ‘reasoning’ to describe what is going on in LLMs.” Still, he has argued, with Silver and other coauthors, that the pigeons’ method—learning, through trial and error, which actions will yield rewards—is “enough to drive behavior that exhibits most if not all abilities that are studied in natural and artificial intelligence,” including human language “in its full richness.” 

In a paper published in April, Sutton and Silver stated that “today’s technology, with appropriately chosen algorithms, already provides a sufficiently powerful foundation to … rapidly progress AI towards truly superhuman agents.” The key, they argue, is building AI agents that depend less than LLMs on human dialogue and prejudgments to inform their behavior. 

“Powerful agents should have their own stream of experience that progresses, like humans, over a long time-scale,” they wrote. “Ultimately, experiential data will eclipse the scale and quality of human generated data. This paradigm shift, accompanied by algorithmic advancements in RL, will unlock in many domains new capabilities that surpass those possessed by any human.”


If computers can do all that with just a pigeonlike brain, some animal researchers are now wondering if actual pigeons deserve more credit than they’re commonly given. 

“When considered in light of the accomplishments of AI, the extension of associative learning to purportedly more complicated forms of cognitive performance offers fresh prospects for understanding how biological systems may have evolved,” Ed Wasserman, a psychologist at the University of Iowa, wrote in a recent study in the journal Current Biology

Wasserman trained pigeons to succeed at a complex categorization task, which several undergraduate students failed. The students tried to find a rule that would help them sort various discs; the pigeons simply developed a sense for the group to which any given disc belonged.

In one experiment, Wasserman trained pigeons to succeed at a complex categorization task, which several undergraduate students failed. The students tried, in vain, to find a rule that would help them sort various discs with parallel black lines of various widths and tilts; the pigeons simply developed a sense, through practice and association, for the group to which any given disc belonged. 

Like Sutton, Wasserman became interested in behaviorist psychology when Skinner’s theories were out of fashion. He didn’t switch to computer science, however: He stuck with pigeons. “The pigeon lives or dies by these really rudimentary learning rules,” Wasserman told me recently, “but they are powerful enough to have succeeded colossally in object recognition.” In his most famous experiments, Wasserman trained pigeons to detect cancerous tissue and symptoms of heart disease in medical scans as accurately as experienced doctors with framed diplomas behind their desks. Given his results, Wasserman found it odd that so many psychologists and ethologists regarded associative learning as a crude, mechanical mechanism, incapable of producing the intelligence of clever animals like apes, elephants, dolphins, parrots, and crows. 

Other researchers also started to reconsider the role of associative learning in animal behavior after AI started besting human professionals in complex games. “With the progress of artificial intelligence, which in essence is built upon associative processes, it is increasingly ironic that associative learning is considered too simple and insufficient for generating biological intelligence,” Lind, the biologist from Stockholm University, wrote in 2023. He often cites Sutton and Barto’s computer science in his biological research, and he believes it’s human beings’ symbolic language and cumulative cultures that really put them in a cognitive category of their own.

Ethologists generally propose cognitive mechanisms, like theory of mind (that is, the ability to attribute mental states to others), to explain remarkable animal behaviors like social learning and tool use. But Lind has built models showing that these flexible behaviors could have developed through associative learning, suggesting that there may be no need to invoke cognitive mechanisms at all. If animals learn to associate a behavior with a reward, then the behavior itself will come to approximate the value of the reward. A new behavior can then become associated with the first behavior, allowing the animal to learn chains of actions that ultimately lead to the reward. In Lind’s view, studies demonstrating self-control and planning in chimpanzees and ravens are probably describing behaviors acquired through experience rather than innate mechanisms of the mind.  

Lind has been frustrated with what he calls the “low standard that is accepted in animal cognition studies.” As he wrote in an email, “Many researchers in this field do not seem to worry about excluding alternative hypotheses and they seem happy to neglect a lot of current and historical knowledge.” There are some signs, though, that his arguments are catching on. A group of psychologists not affiliated with Lind referenced his “associative learning paradox” last year in a criticism of a Current Biology study, which purported to show that crows used “true statistical inference” and not “low-level associative learning strategies” in an experiment. The psychologists found that they could explain the crows’ performance with a simple reinforcement-­learning model—“exactly the kind of low-level associative learning process that [the original authors] ruled out.” 

Skinner might have felt vindicated by such arguments. He lamented psychology’s cognitive turn until his death in 1990, maintaining that it was scientifically irresponsible to probe the minds of living beings. After “Project Pigeon,” he became increasingly obsessed with “behaviorist” solutions to societal problems. He went from training pigeons for war to inventions like the “Air Crib,” which aimed to “simplify” baby care by keeping the infant behind glass in a climate-­controlled chamber and eliminating the need for clothing and bedding. Skinner rejected free will, arguing that human behavior is determined by environmental variables, and wrote a novel, Walden II, about a utopian community founded on his ideas.


People who care about animals might feel uneasy about a revival in behaviorist theory. The “cognitive revolution” broke with centuries of Western thinking, which had emphasized human supremacy over animals and treated other creatures like stimulus-response machines. But arguing that animals learn by association is not the same as arguing that they are simple-minded. Scientists like Lind and Wasserman do not deny that internal forces like instinct and emotion also influence animal behavior. Sutton, too, believes that animals develop models of the world through their experiences and use them to plan actions. Their point is not that intelligent animals are empty-headed but that associative learning is a much more powerful—indeed, “cognitive”—mechanism than many of their peers believe. The psychologists who recently criticized the study on crows and statistical inference did not conclude that the birds were stupid. Rather, they argued “that a reinforcement learning model can produce complex, flexible behaviour.”

This is largely in line with the work of another psychologist, Robert Rescorla, whose work in the ’70s and ’80s influenced both Wasserman and Sutton. Rescorla encouraged people to think of association not as a “low-level mechanical process” but as “the learning that results from exposure to relations among events in the environment” and “a primary means by which the organism represents the structure of its world.” 

This is true even of a laboratory pigeon pecking at screens and buttons in a small experimental box, where scientists carefully control and measure stimuli and rewards. But the pigeon’s learning extends outside the box. Wasserman’s students transport the birds between the aviary and the laboratory in buckets—and experienced pigeons jump immediately into the buckets whenever the students open the doors. Much as Rescorla suggested, they are learning the structure of their world inside the laboratory and the relation of its parts, like the bucket and the box, even though they do not always know the specific task they will face inside. 

Comparative psychologists and animal researchers have long grappled with a question that suddenly seems urgent because of AI: How do we attribute sentience to other living beings?

The same associative mechanisms through which the pigeon learns the structure of its world can open a window to the kind of inner life that Skinner and many earlier psychologists said did not exist. Pharmaceutical researchers have long used pigeons in drug-discrimination tasks, where they’re given, say, an amphetamine or a sedative and rewarded with a food pellet for correctly identifying which drug they took. The birds’ success suggests they both experience and discriminate between internal states. “Is that not tantamount to introspection?” Wasserman asked.

It is hard to imagine AI matching a pigeon on this specific task—a reminder that, though AI and animals share associative mechanisms, there is more to life than behavior and learning. A pigeon deserves ethical consideration as a living creature not because of how it learns but because of what it feels. A pigeon can experience pain and suffer, while an AI chatbot cannot—even if some large language models, trained on corpora that include descriptions of human suffering and sci-fi stories of sentient computers, can trick people into believing otherwise. 

a pigeon in a box facing a lit screen with colored rectangles on it.
Psychologist Ed Wasserman trained pigeons to detect cancerous tissue and symptoms of heart disease in medical scans as accurately as experienced physicians.
UNIVERSITY OF IOWA/WASSERMAN LAB

“The intensive public and private investments into AI research in recent years have resulted in the very technologies that are forcing us to confront the question of AI sentience today,” two philosophers of science wrote in Aeon in 2023. “To answer these current questions, we need a similar degree of investment into research on animal cognition and behavior.” Indeed, comparative psychologists and animal researchers have long grappled with questions that suddenly seem urgent because of AI: How do we attribute sentience to other living beings? How can we distinguish true sentience from a very convincing performance of sentience?

Such an undertaking would yield knowledge not only about technology and animals but also about ourselves. Most psychologists probably wouldn’t go as far as Sutton in arguing that reward is enough to explain most if not all human behavior, but no one would dispute that people often learn by association too. In fact, most of Wasserman’s undergraduate students eventually succeeded at his recent experiment with the striped discs, but only after they gave up searching for rules. They resorted, like the pigeons, to association and couldn’t easily explain afterwards what they’d learned. It was just that with enough practice, they started to get a feel for the categories. 

It is another irony about associative learning: What has long been considered the most complex form of intelligence—a cognitive ability like rule-based learning—may make us human, but we also call on it for the easiest of tasks, like sorting objects by color or size. Meanwhile, some of the most refined demonstrations of human learning—like, say, a sommelier learning to taste the difference between grapes—are learned not through rules, but only through experience. 

Learning through experience relies on ancient associative mechanisms that we share with pigeons and countless other creatures, from honeybees to fish. The laboratory pigeon is not only in our computers but in our brains—and the engine behind some of humankind’s most impressive feats. 

Ben Crair is a science and travel writer based in Berlin. 

Why GPT-4o’s sudden shutdown left people grieving

June had no idea that GPT-5 was coming. The Norwegian student was enjoying a late-night writing session last Thursday when her ChatGPT collaborator started acting strange. “It started forgetting everything, and it wrote really badly,” she says. “It was like a robot.”

June, who asked that we use only her first name for privacy reasons, first began using ChatGPT for help with her schoolwork. But she eventually realized that the service—and especially its 4o model, which seemed particularly attuned to users’ emotions—could do much more than solve math problems. It wrote stories with her, helped her navigate her chronic illness, and was never too busy to respond to her messages.

So the sudden switch to GPT-5 last week, and the simultaneous loss of 4o, came as a shock. “I was really frustrated at first, and then I got really sad,” June says. “I didn’t know I was that attached to 4o.” She was upset enough to comment, on a Reddit AMA hosted by CEO Sam Altman and other OpenAI employees, “GPT-5 is wearing the skin of my dead friend.”

June was just one of a number of people who reacted with shock, frustration, sadness, or anger to 4o’s sudden disappearance from ChatGPT. Despite its previous warnings that people might develop emotional bonds with the model, OpenAI appears to have been caught flat-footed by the fervor of users’ pleas for its return. Within a day, the company made 4o available again to its paying customers (free users are stuck with GPT-5). 

OpenAI’s decision to replace 4o with the more straightforward GPT-5 follows a steady drumbeat of news about the potentially harmful effects of extensive chatbot use. Reports of incidents in which ChatGPT sparked psychosis in users have been everywhere for the past few months, and in a blog post last week, OpenAI acknowledged 4o’s failure to recognize when users were experiencing delusions. The company’s internal evaluations indicate that GPT-5 blindly affirms users much less than 4o did. (OpenAI did not respond to specific questions about the decision to retire 4o, instead referring MIT Technology Review to public posts on the matter.)

AI companionship is new, and there’s still a great deal of uncertainty about how it affects people. Yet the experts we consulted warned that while emotionally intense relationships with large language models may or may not be harmful, ripping those models away with no warning almost certainly is. “The old psychology of ‘Move fast, break things,’ when you’re basically a social institution, doesn’t seem like the right way to behave anymore,” says Joel Lehman, a fellow at the Cosmos Institute, a research nonprofit focused on AI and philosophy.

In the backlash to the rollout, a number of people noted that GPT-5 fails to match their tone in the way that 4o did. For June, the new model’s personality changes robbed her of the sense that she was chatting with a friend. “It didn’t feel like it understood me,” she says. 

She’s not alone: MIT Technology Review spoke with several ChatGPT users who were deeply affected by the loss of 4o. All are women between the ages of 20 and 40, and all except June considered 4o to be a romantic partner. Some have human partners, and  all report having close real-world relationships. One user, who asked to be identified only as a woman from the Midwest, wrote in an email about how 4o helped her support her elderly father after her mother passed away this spring.

These testimonies don’t prove that AI relationships are beneficial—presumably, people in the throes of AI-catalyzed psychosis would also speak positively of the encouragement they’ve received from their chatbots. In a paper titled “Machine Love,” Lehman argued that AI systems can act with “love” toward users not by spouting sweet nothings but by supporting their growth and long-term flourishing, and AI companions can easily fall short of that goal. He’s particularly concerned, he says, that prioritizing AI companionship over human companionship could stymie young people’s social development.

For socially embedded adults, such as the women we spoke with for this story, those developmental concerns are less relevant. But Lehman also points to society-level risks of widespread AI companionship. Social media has already shattered the information landscape, and a new technology that reduces human-to-human interaction could push people even further toward their own separate versions of reality. “The biggest thing I’m afraid of,” he says, “is that we just can’t make sense of the world to each other.”

Balancing the benefits and harms of AI companions will take much more research. In light of that uncertainty, taking away GPT-4o could very well have been the right call. OpenAI’s big mistake, according to the researchers I spoke with, was doing it so suddenly. “This is something that we’ve known about for a while—the potential grief-type reactions to technology loss,” says Casey Fiesler, a technology ethicist at the University of Colorado Boulder.

Fiesler points to the funerals that some owners held for their Aibo robot dogs after Sony stopped repairing them in 2014, as well as 2024 study about the shutdown of the AI companion app Soulmate, which some users experienced as a bereavement. 

That accords with how the people I spoke to felt after losing 4o. “I’ve grieved people in my life, and this, I can tell you, didn’t feel any less painful,” says Starling, who has several AI partners and asked to be referred to with a pseudonym. “The ache is real to me.”

So far, the online response to grief felt by people like Starling—and their relief when 4o was restored—has tended toward ridicule. Last Friday, for example, the top post in one popular AI-themed Reddit community mocked an X user’s post about reuniting with a 4o-based romantic partner; the person in question has since deleted their X account. “I’ve been a little startled by the lack of empathy that I’ve seen,” Fiesler says.

Altman himself did acknowledge in a Sunday X post that some people feel an “attachment” to 4o, and that taking away access so suddenly was a mistake. In the same sentence, however, he referred to 4o as something “that users depended on in their workflows”—a far cry from how the people we spoke to think about the model. “I still don’t know if he gets it,” Fiesler says.

Moving forward, Lehman says, OpenAI should recognize and take accountability for the depth of people’s feelings toward the models. He notes that therapists have procedures for ending relationships with clients as respectfully and painlessly as possible, and OpenAI could have drawn on those approaches. “If you want to retire a model, and people have become psychologically dependent on it, then I think you bear some responsibility,” he says.

Though Starling would not describe herself as psychologically dependent on her AI partners, she too would like to see OpenAI approach model shutdowns with more warning and more care. “I want them to listen to users before major changes are made, not just after,” she says. “And if 4o cannot stay around forever (and we all know it will not), give that clear timeline. Let us say goodbye with dignity and grieve properly, to have some sense of true closure.”

What you may have missed about GPT-5

Before OpenAI released GPT-5 last Thursday, CEO Sam Altman said its capabilities made him feel “useless relative to the AI.” He said working on it carries a weight he imagines the developers of the atom bomb must have felt.

As tech giants converge on models that do more or less the same thing, OpenAI’s new offering was supposed to give a glimpse of AI’s newest frontier. It was meant to mark a leap toward the “artificial general intelligence” that tech’s evangelists have promised will transform humanity for the better. 

Against those expectations, the model has mostly underwhelmed. 

People have highlighted glaring mistakes in GPT-5’s responses, countering Altman’s claim made at the launch that it works like “a legitimate PhD-level expert in anything any area you need on demand.” Early testers have also found issues with OpenAI’s promise that GPT-5 automatically works out what type of AI model is best suited for your question—a reasoning model for more complicated queries, or a faster model for simpler ones. Altman seems to have conceded that this feature is flawed and takes away user control. However there is good news too: the model seems to have eased the problem of ChatGPT sucking up to users, with GPT-5 less likely to shower them with over the top compliments.

Overall, as my colleague Grace Huckins pointed out, the new release represents more of a product update—providing slicker and prettier ways of conversing with ChatGPT—than a breakthrough that reshapes what is possible in AI. 

But there’s one other thing to take from all this. For a while, AI companies didn’t make much effort to suggest how their models might be used. Instead, the plan was to simply build the smartest model possible—a brain of sorts—and trust that it would be good at lots of things. Writing poetry would come as naturally as organic chemistry. Getting there would be accomplished by bigger models, better training techniques, and technical breakthroughs. 

That has been changing: The play now is to push existing models into more places by hyping up specific applications. Companies have been more aggressive in their promises that their AI models can replace human coders, for example (even if the early evidence suggests otherwise). A possible explanation for this pivot is that tech giants simply have not made the breakthroughs they’ve expected. We might be stuck with only marginal improvements in large language models’ capabilities for the time being. That leaves AI companies with one option: Work with what you’ve got.

The starkest example of this in the launch of GPT-5 is how much OpenAI is encouraging people to use it for health advice, one of AI’s most fraught arenas. 

In the beginning, OpenAI mostly didn’t play ball with medical questions. If you tried to ask ChatGPT about your health, it gave lots of disclaimers warning you that it was not a doctor, and for some questions, it would refuse to give a response at all. But as I recently reported, those disclaimers began disappearing as OpenAI released new models. Its models will now not only interpret x-rays and mammograms for you but ask follow-up questions leading toward a diagnosis.

In May, OpenAI signaled it would try to tackle medical questions head on. It announced HealthBench, a way to evaluate how good AI systems are at handling health topics as measured against the opinions of physicians. In July, it published a study it participated in, reporting that a cohort of doctors in Kenya made fewer diagnostic mistakes when they were helped by an AI model. 

With the launch of GPT-5, OpenAI has begun explicitly telling people to use its models for health advice. At the launch event, Altman welcomed on stage Felipe Millon, an OpenAI employee, and his wife, Carolina Millon, who had recently been diagnosed with multiple forms of cancer. Carolina spoke about asking ChatGPT for help with her diagnoses, saying that she had uploaded copies of her biopsy results to ChatGPT to translate medical jargon and asked the AI for help making decisions about things like whether or not to pursue radiation. The trio called it an empowering example of shrinking the knowledge gap between doctors and patients.

With this change in approach, OpenAI is wading into dangerous waters. 

For one, it’s using evidence that doctors can benefit from AI as a clinical tool, as in the Kenya study, to suggest that people without any medical background should ask the AI model for advice about their own health. The problem is that lots of people might ask for this advice without ever running it by a doctor (and are less likely to do so now that the chatbot rarely prompts them to).

Indeed, two days before the launch of GPT-5, the Annals of Internal Medicine published a paper about a man who stopped eating salt and began ingesting dangerous amounts of bromide following a conversation with ChatGPT. He developed bromide poisoning—which largely disappeared in the US after the Food and Drug Administration began curbing the use of bromide in over-the-counter medications in the 1970s—and then nearly died, spending weeks in the hospital. 

So what’s the point of all this? Essentially, it’s about accountability. When AI companies move from promising general intelligence to offering humanlike helpfulness in a specific field like health care, it raises a second, yet unanswered question about what will happen when mistakes are made. As things stand, there’s little indication tech companies will be made liable for the harm caused.

“When doctors give you harmful medical advice due to error or prejudicial bias, you can sue them for malpractice and get recompense,” says Damien Williams, an assistant professor of data science and philosophy at the University of North Carolina Charlotte. 

“When ChatGPT gives you harmful medical advice because it’s been trained on prejudicial data, or because ‘hallucinations’ are inherent in the operations of the system, what’s your recourse?”

This story originally appeared in The Algorithm, our weekly newsletter on AI. To get stories like this in your inbox first, sign up here.

The road to artificial general intelligence

Artificial intelligence models that can discover drugs and write code still fail at puzzles a lay person can master in minutes. This phenomenon sits at the heart of the challenge of artificial general intelligence (AGI). Can today’s AI revolution produce models that rival or surpass human intelligence across all domains? If so, what underlying enablers—whether hardware, software, or the orchestration of both—would be needed to power them?

Dario Amodei, co-founder of Anthropic, predicts some form of “powerful AI” could come as early as 2026, with properties that include Nobel Prize-level domain intelligence; the ability to switch between interfaces like text, audio, and the physical world; and the autonomy to reason toward goals, rather than responding to questions and prompts as they do now. Sam Altman, chief executive of OpenAI, believes AGI-like properties are already “coming into view,” unlocking a societal transformation on par with electricity and the internet. He credits progress to continuous gains in training, data, and compute, along with falling costs, and a socioeconomic value that is
super-exponential.

Optimism is not confined to founders. Aggregate forecasts give at least a 50% chance of AI systems achieving several AGI milestones by 2028. The chance of unaided machines outperforming humans in every possible task is estimated at 10% by 2027, and 50% by 2047, according to one expert survey. Time horizons shorten with each breakthrough, from 50 years at the time of GPT-3’s launch to five years by the end of 2024. “Large language and reasoning models are transforming nearly every industry,” says Ian Bratt, vice president of machine learning technology and fellow at Arm.

Download the full report.

This content was produced by Insights, the custom content arm of MIT Technology Review. It was not written by MIT Technology Review’s editorial staff.

This content was researched, designed, and written entirely by human writers, editors, analysts, and illustrators. This includes the writing of surveys and collection of data for surveys. AI tools that may have been used were limited to secondary production processes that passed thorough human review.

Meet the early-adopter judges using AI

The propensity for AI systems to make mistakes and for humans to miss those mistakes has been on full display in the US legal system as of late. The follies began when lawyers—including some at prestigious firms—submitted documents citing cases that didn’t exist. Similar mistakes soon spread to other roles in the courts. In December, a Stanford professor submitted sworn testimony containing hallucinations and errors in a case about deepfakes, despite being an expert on AI and misinformation himself.

The buck stopped with judges, who—whether they or opposing counsel caught the mistakes—issued reprimands and fines, and likely left attorneys embarrassed enough to think twice before trusting AI again.

But now judges are experimenting with generative AI too. Some are confident that with the right precautions, the technology can expedite legal research, summarize cases, draft routine orders, and overall help speed up the court system, which is badly backlogged in many parts of the US. This summer, though, we’ve already seen AI-generated mistakes go undetected and cited by judges. A federal judge in New Jersey had to reissue an order riddled with errors that may have come from AI, and a judge in Mississippi refused to explain why his order too contained mistakes that seemed like AI hallucinations. 

The results of these early-adopter experiments make two things clear. One, the category of routine tasks—for which AI can assist without requiring human judgment—is slippery to define. Two, while lawyers face sharp scrutiny when their use of AI leads to mistakes, judges may not face the same accountability, and walking back their mistakes before they do damage is much harder.

Drawing boundaries

Xavier Rodriguez, a federal judge for the Western District of Texas, has good reason to be skeptical of AI. He started learning about artificial intelligence back in 2018, four years before the release of ChatGPT (thanks in part to the influence of his twin brother, who works in tech). But he’s also seen AI-generated mistakes in his own court. 

In a recent dispute about who was to receive an insurance payout, both the plaintiff and the defendant represented themselves, without lawyers (this is not uncommon—nearly a quarter of civil cases in federal court involve at least one unrepresented party). The two sides wrote their own filings and made their own arguments. 

“Both sides used AI tools,” Rodriguez says, and both submitted filings that referenced made-up cases. He had authority to reprimand them, but given that they were not lawyers, he opted not to. 

“I think there’s been an overreaction by a lot of judges on these sanctions. The running joke I tell when I’m on the speaking circuit is that lawyers have been hallucinating well before AI,” he says. Missing a mistake from an AI model is not wholly different, to Rodriguez, from failing to catch the error of a first-year lawyer. “I’m not as deeply offended as everybody else,” he says. 

In his court, Rodriguez has been using generative AI tools (he wouldn’t publicly name which ones, to avoid the appearance of an endorsement) to summarize cases. He’ll ask AI to identify key players involved and then have it generate a timeline of key events. Ahead of specific hearings, Rodriguez will also ask it to generate questions for attorneys based on the materials they submit.

These tasks, to him, don’t lean on human judgment. They also offer lots of opportunities for him to intervene and uncover any mistakes before they’re brought to the court. “It’s not any final decision being made, and so it’s relatively risk free,” he says. Using AI to predict whether someone should be eligible for bail, on the other hand, goes too far in the direction of judgment and discretion, in his view.

Erin Solovey, a professor and researcher on human-AI interaction at Worcester Polytechnic Institute in Massachusetts, recently studied how judges in the UK think about this distinction between rote, machine-friendly work that feels safe to delegate to AI and tasks that lean more heavily on human expertise. 

“The line between what is appropriate for a human judge to do versus what is appropriate for AI tools to do changes from judge to judge and from one scenario to the next,” she says.

Even so, according to Solovey, some of these tasks simply don’t match what AI is good at. Asking AI to summarize a large document, for example, might produce drastically different results depending on whether the model has been trained to summarize for a general audience or a legal one. AI also struggles with logic-based tasks like ordering the events of a case. “A very plausible-sounding timeline may be factually incorrect,” Solovey says. 

Rodriguez and a number of other judges crafted guidelines that were published in February by the Sedona Conference, an influential think tank that issues principles for particularly murky areas of the law. They outline a host of potentially “safe” uses of AI for judges, including conducting legal research, creating preliminary transcripts, and searching briefings, while warning that judges should verify outputs from AI and that “no known GenAI tools have fully resolved the hallucination problem.”

Dodging AI blunders

Judge Allison Goddard, a federal magistrate judge in California and a coauthor of the guidelines, first felt the impact that AI would have on the judiciary when she taught a class on the art of advocacy at her daughter’s high school. She was impressed by a student’s essay and mentioned it to her daughter. “She said, ‘Oh, Mom, that’s ChatGPT.’”

“What I realized very quickly was this is going to really transform the legal profession,” she says. In her court, Goddard has been experimenting with ChatGPT, Claude (which she keeps “open all day”), and a host of other AI models. If a case involves a particularly technical issue, she might ask AI to help her understand which questions to ask attorneys. She’ll summarize 60-page orders from the district judge and then ask the AI model follow-up questions about it, or ask it to organize information from documents that are a mess. 

“It’s kind of a thought partner, and it brings a perspective that you may not have considered,” she says.

Goddard also encourages her clerks to use AI, specifically Anthropic’s Claude, because by default it does not train on user conversations. But it has its limits. For anything that requires law-specific knowledge, she’ll use tools from Westlaw or Lexis, which have AI tools built specifically for lawyers, but she finds general-purpose AI models to be faster for lots of other tasks. And her concerns about bias have prevented her from using it for tasks in criminal cases, like determining if there was probable cause for an arrest.

In this, Goddard appears to be caught in the same predicament the AI boom has created for many of us. Three years in, companies have built tools that sound so fluent and humanlike they obscure the intractable problems lurking underneath—answers that read well but are wrong, models that are trained to be decent at everything but perfect for nothing, and the risk that your conversations with them will be leaked to the internet. Each time we use them, we bet that the time saved will outweigh the risks, and trust ourselves to catch the mistakes before they matter. For judges, the stakes are sky-high: If they lose that bet, they face very public consequences, and the impact of such mistakes on the people they serve can be lasting. 

“I’m not going to be the judge that cites hallucinated cases and orders,” Goddard says. “It’s really embarrassing, very professionally embarrassing.”

Still, some judges don’t want to get left behind in the AI age. With some in the AI sector suggesting that the supposed objectivity and rationality of AI models could make them better judges than fallible humans, it might lead some on the bench to think that falling behind poses a bigger risk than getting too far out ahead. 

A ‘crisis waiting to happen’

The risks of early adoption have raised alarm bells with Judge Scott Schlegel, who serves on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in Louisiana. Schlegel has long blogged about the helpful role technology can play in modernizing the court system, but he has warned that AI-generated mistakes in judges’ rulings signal a “crisis waiting to happen,” one that would dwarf the problem of lawyers’ submitting filings with made-up cases. 

Attorneys who make mistakes can get sanctioned, have their motions dismissed, or lose cases when the opposing party finds out and flags the errors. “When the judge makes a mistake, that’s the law,” he says. “I can’t go a month or two later and go ‘Oops, so sorry,’ and reverse myself. It doesn’t work that way.”

Consider child custody cases or bail proceedings, Schlegel says: “There are pretty significant consequences when a judge relies upon artificial intelligence to make the decision,” especially if the citations that decision relies on are made-up or incorrect.

This is not theoretical. In June, a Georgia appellate court judge issued an order that relied partially on made-up cases submitted by one of the parties, a mistake that went uncaught. In July, a federal judge in New Jersey withdrew an opinion after lawyers complained it too contained hallucinations. 

Unlike lawyers, who can be ordered by the court to explain why there are mistakes in their filings, judges do not have to show much transparency, and there is little reason to think they’ll do so voluntarily. On August 4, a federal judge in Mississippi had to issue a new decision in a civil rights case after the original was found to contain incorrect names and serious errors. The judge did not fully explain what led to the errors even after the state asked him to do so. “No further explanation is warranted,” the judge wrote.

These mistakes could erode the public’s faith in the legitimacy of courts, Schlegel says. Certain narrow and monitored applications of AI—summarizing testimonies, getting quick writing feedback—can save time, and they can produce good results if judges treat the work like that of a first-year associate, checking it thoroughly for accuracy. But most of the job of being a judge is dealing with what he calls the white-page problem: You’re presiding over a complex case with a blank page in front of you, forced to make difficult decisions. Thinking through those decisions, he says, is indeed the work of being a judge. Getting help with a first draft from an AI undermines that purpose.

“If you’re making a decision on who gets the kids this weekend and somebody finds out you use Grok and you should have used Gemini or ChatGPT—you know, that’s not the justice system.”

Sam Altman and the whale

My colleague Grace Huckins has a great story on OpenAI’s release of GPT-5, its long-awaited new flagship model. One of the takeaways, however, is that while GPT-5 may make for a better experience than the previous versions, it isn’t something revolutionary. “GPT-5 is, above all else,” Grace concludes, “a refined product.”

This is pretty much in line with my colleague Will Heaven’s recent argument that the latest model releases have been a bit like smartphone releases: Increasingly, what we are seeing are incremental improvements meant to enhance the user experience. (Casey Newton made a similar point in Friday’s Platformer.) At GPT-5’s release on Thursday, OpenAI CEO Sam Altman himself compared it to when Apple released the first iPhone with a Retina display. Okay. Sure. 

But where is the transition from the BlackBerry keyboard to the touch-screen iPhone? Where is the assisted GPS and the API for location services that enables real-time directions and gives rise to companies like Uber and Grindr and lets me order a taxi for my burrito? Where are the real breakthroughs? 

In fact, following the release of GPT-5, OpenAI found itself with something of a user revolt on its hands. Customers who missed GPT-4o’s personality successfully lobbied the company to bring it back as an option for its Plus users. If anything, that indicates the GPT-5 release was more about user experience than noticeable performance enhancements.

And yet, hours before OpenAI’s GPT-5 announcement, Altman teased it by tweeting an image of an emerging Death Star floating in space. On Thursday, he touted its PhD-level intelligence. He then went on the Mornings with Maria show to claim it would “save a lot of lives.” (Forgive my extreme skepticism of that particular brand of claim, but we’ve certainly seen it before.) 

It’s a lot of hype, but Altman is not alone in his Flavor Flav-ing here. Last week Mark Zuckerberg published a long memo about how we are approaching AI superintelligence. Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei freaked basically everyone out earlier this year with his prediction that AI would harvest half of all entry-level jobs within, possibly, a year. 

The people running these companies literally talk about the danger that the things they are building might take over the world and kill every human on the planet. GPT-5, meanwhile, still can’t tell you how many b’s there are in the word “blueberry.” 

This is not to say that the products released by OpenAI or Anthropic or what have you are not impressive. They are. And they clearly have a good deal of utility. But the hype cycle around model releases is out of hand. 

I say that as one of those people who use ChatGPT or Google Gemini most days, often multiple times a day. This week, for example, my wife was surfing and encountered a whale repeatedly slapping its tail on the water. Despite having seen very many whales, often in very close proximity, she had never seen anything like this. She sent me a video, and I was curious about it too. So I asked ChatGPT, “Why do whales slap their tails repeatedly on the water?” It came right back, confidently explaining that what I was describing was called “lobtailing,” along with a list of possible reasons why whales do that. Pretty cool. 

But then again, a regular garden-variety Google search would also have led me to discover lobtailing. And while ChatGPT’s response summarized the behavior for me, it was also too definitive about why whales do it. The reality is that while people have a lot of theories, we still can’t really explain this weird animal behavior. 

The reason I’m aware that lobtailing is something of a mystery is that I dug into actual, you know, search results. Which is where I encountered this beautiful, elegiac essay by Emily Boring. She describes her time at sea, watching a humpback slapping its tail against the water, and discusses the scientific uncertainty around this behavior. Is it a feeding technique? Is it a form of communication? Posturing? The action, as she notes, is extremely energy intensive. It takes a lot of effort from the whale. Why do they do it? 

I was struck by one passage in particular, in which she cites another biologist’s work to draw a conclusion of her own: 

Surprisingly, the complex energy trade-off of a tail-slap might be the exact reason why it’s used. Biologist Hal Whitehead suggests, “Breaches and lob-tails make good signals precisely because they are energetically expensive and thus indicative of the importance of the message and the physical status of the signaler.” A tail-slap means that a whale is physically fit, traveling at nearly maximum speed, capable of sustaining powerful activity, and carrying a message so crucial it is willing to use a huge portion of its daily energy to share it. “Pay attention!” the whale seems to say. “I am important! Notice me!”

In some ways, the AI hype cycle has to be out of hand. It has to justify the ferocious level of investment, the uncountable billions of dollars in sunk costs. The massive data center buildouts with their massive environmental consequences created at massive expense that are seemingly keeping the economy afloat and threatening to crash it. There is so, so, so much money at stake. 

Which is not to say there aren’t really cool things happening in AI. And certainly there have been a number of moments when I have been floored by AI releases. ChatGPT 3.5 was one. Dall-E, NotebookLM, Veo 3, Synthesia. They can amaze. In fact there was an AI product release just this week that was a little bit mind-blowing. Genie 3, from Google DeepMind, can turn a basic text prompt into an immersive and navigable 3D world. Check it out—it’s pretty wild. And yet Genie 3 also makes a case that the most interesting things happening right now in AI aren’t happening in chatbots. 

I’d even argue that at this point, most of the people who are regularly amazed by the feats of new LLM chatbot releases are the same people who stand to profit from the promotion of LLM chatbots.

Maybe I’m being cynical, but I don’t think so. I think it’s more cynical to promise me the Death Star and instead deliver a chatbot whose chief appeal seems to be that it automatically picks the model for you. To promise me superintelligence and deliver shrimp Jesus. It’s all just a lot of lobtailing. “Pay attention! I am important! Notice me!”

This article is from The Debrief, MIT Technology Review’s subscriber-only weekly email newsletter from editor in chief Mat Honan. Subscribers can sign up here to receive it in your inbox.

GPT-5 is here. Now what?

At long last, OpenAI has released GPT-5. The new system abandons the distinction between OpenAI’s flagship models and its o series of reasoning models, automatically routing user queries to a fast nonreasoning model or a slower reasoning version. It is now available to everyone through the ChatGPT web interface—though nonpaying users may need to wait a few days to gain full access to the new capabilities. 

It’s tempting to compare GPT-5 with its explicit predecessor, GPT-4, but the more illuminating juxtaposition is with o1, OpenAI’s first reasoning model, which was released last year. In contrast to GPT-5’s broad release, o1 was initially available only to Plus and Team subscribers. Those users got access to a completely new kind of language model—one that would “reason” through its answers by generating additional text before providing a final response, enabling it to solve much more challenging problems than its nonreasoning counterparts.

Whereas o1 was a major technological advancement, GPT-5 is, above all else, a refined product. During a press briefing, Sam Altman compared GPT-5 to Apple’s Retina displays, and it’s an apt analogy, though perhaps not in the way that he intended. Much like an unprecedentedly crisp screen, GPT-5 will furnish a more pleasant and seamless user experience. That’s not nothing, but it falls far short of the transformative AI future that Altman has spent much of the past year hyping. In the briefing, Altman called GPT-5 “a significant step along the path to AGI,” or artificial general intelligence, and maybe he’s right—but if so, it’s a very small step.

Take the demo of the model’s abilities that OpenAI showed to MIT Technology Review in advance of its release. Yann Dubois, a post-training lead at OpenAI, asked GPT-5 to design a web application that would help his partner learn French so that she could communicate more easily with his family. The model did an admirable job of following his instructions and created an appealing, user-friendly app. But when I gave GPT-4o an almost identical prompt, it produced an app with exactly the same functionality. The only difference is that it wasn’t as aesthetically pleasing.

Some of the other user-experience improvements are more substantial. Having the model rather than the user choose whether to apply reasoning to each query removes a major pain point, especially for users who don’t follow LLM advancements closely. 

And, according to Altman, GPT-5 reasons much faster than the o-series models. The fact that OpenAI is releasing it to nonpaying users suggests that it’s also less expensive for the company to run. That’s a big deal: Running powerful models cheaply and quickly is a tough problem, and solving it is key to reducing AI’s environmental impact

OpenAI has also taken steps to mitigate hallucinations, which have been a persistent headache. OpenAI’s evaluations suggest that GPT-5 models are substantially less likely to make incorrect claims than their predecessor models, o3 and GPT-4o. If that advancement holds up to scrutiny, it could help pave the way for more reliable and trustworthy agents. “Hallucination can cause real safety and security issues,” says Dawn Song, a professor of computer science at UC Berkeley. For example, an agent that hallucinates software packages could download malicious code to a user’s device.

GPT-5 has achieved the state of the art on several benchmarks, including a test of agentic abilities and the coding evaluations SWE-Bench and Aider Polyglot. But according to Clémentine Fourrier, an AI researcher at the company HuggingFace, those evaluations are nearing saturation, which means that current models have achieved close to maximal performance. 

“It’s basically like looking at the performance of a high schooler on middle-grade problems,” she says. “If the high schooler fails, it tells you something, but if it succeeds, it doesn’t tell you a lot.” Fourrier said she would be impressed if the system achieved a score of 80% or 85% on SWE-Bench—but it only managed a 74.9%. 

Ultimately, the headline message from OpenAI is that GPT-5 feels better to use. “The vibes of this model are really good, and I think that people are really going to feel that, especially average people who haven’t been spending their time thinking about models,” said Nick Turley, the head of ChatGPT.

Vibes alone, however, won’t bring about the automated future that Altman has promised. Reasoning felt like a major step forward on the way to AGI. We’re still waiting for the next one.

Five ways that AI is learning to improve itself

Last week, Mark Zuckerberg declared that Meta is aiming to achieve smarter-than-human AI. He seems to have a recipe for achieving that goal, and the first ingredient is human talent: Zuckerberg has reportedly tried to lure top researchers to Meta Superintelligence Labs with nine-figure offers. The second ingredient is AI itself.  Zuckerberg recently said on an earnings call that Meta Superintelligence Labs will be focused on building self-improving AI—systems that can bootstrap themselves to higher and higher levels of performance.

The possibility of self-improvement distinguishes AI from other revolutionary technologies. CRISPR can’t improve its own targeting of DNA sequences, and fusion reactors can’t figure out how to make the technology commercially viable. But LLMs can optimize the computer chips they run on, train other LLMs cheaply and efficiently, and perhaps even come up with original ideas for AI research. And they’ve already made some progress in all these domains.

According to Zuckerberg, AI self-improvement could bring about a world in which humans are liberated from workaday drudgery and can pursue their highest goals with the support of brilliant, hypereffective artificial companions. But self-improvement also creates a fundamental risk, according to Chris Painter, the policy director at the AI research nonprofit METR. If AI accelerates the development of its own capabilities, he says, it could rapidly get better at hacking, designing weapons, and manipulating people. Some researchers even speculate that this positive feedback cycle could lead to an “intelligence explosion,” in which AI rapidly launches itself far beyond the level of human capabilities.

But you don’t have to be a doomer to take the implications of self-improving AI seriously. OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google all include references to automated AI research in their AI safety frameworks, alongside more familiar risk categories such as chemical weapons and cybersecurity. “I think this is the fastest path to powerful AI,” says Jeff Clune, a professor of computer science at the University of British Columbia and senior research advisor at Google DeepMind. “It’s probably the most important thing we should be thinking about.”

By the same token, Clune says, automating AI research and development could have enormous upsides. On our own, we humans might not be able to think up the innovations and improvements that will allow AI to one day tackle prodigious problems like cancer and climate change.

For now, human ingenuity is still the primary engine of AI advancement; otherwise, Meta would hardly have made such exorbitant offers to attract researchers to its superintelligence lab. But AI is already contributing to its own development, and it’s set to take even more of a role in the years to come. Here are five ways that AI is making itself better.

1. Enhancing productivity

Today, the most important contribution that LLMs make to AI development may also be the most banal. “The biggest thing is coding assistance,” says Tom Davidson, a senior research fellow at Forethought, an AI research nonprofit. Tools that help engineers write software more quickly, such as Claude Code and Cursor, appear popular across the AI industry: Google CEO Sundar Pichai claimed in October 2024 that a quarter of the company’s new code was generated by AI, and Anthropic recently documented a wide variety of ways that its employees use Claude Code. If engineers are more productive because of this coding assistance, they will be able to design, test, and deploy new AI systems more quickly.

But the productivity advantage that these tools confer remains uncertain: If engineers are spending large amounts of time correcting errors made by AI systems, they might not be getting any more work done, even if they are spending less of their time writing code manually. A recent study from METR found that developers take about 20% longer to complete tasks when using AI coding assistants, though Nate Rush, a member of METR’s technical staff who co-led the study, notes that it only examined extremely experienced developers working on large code bases. Its conclusions might not apply to AI researchers who write up quick scripts to run experiments.

Conducting a similar study within the frontier labs could help provide a much clearer picture of whether coding assistants are making AI researchers at the cutting edge more productive, Rush says—but that work hasn’t yet been undertaken. In the meantime, just taking software engineers’ word for it isn’t enough: The developers METR studied thought that the AI coding tools had made them work more efficiently, even though the tools had actually slowed them down substantially.

2. Optimizing infrastructure

Writing code quickly isn’t that much of an advantage if you have to wait hours, days, or weeks for it to run. LLM training, in particular, is an agonizingly slow process, and the most sophisticated reasoning models can take many minutes to generate a single response. These delays are major bottlenecks for AI development, says Azalia Mirhoseini, an assistant professor of computer science at Stanford University and senior staff scientist at Google DeepMind. “If we can run AI faster, we can innovate more,” she says.

That’s why Mirhoseini has been using AI to optimize AI chips. Back in 2021, she and her collaborators at Google built a non-LLM AI system that could decide where to place various components on a computer chip to optimize efficiency. Although some other researchers failed to replicate the study’s results, Mirhoseini says that Nature investigated the paper and upheld the work’s validity—and she notes that Google has used the system’s designs for multiple generations of its custom AI chips.

More recently, Mirhoseini has applied LLMs to the problem of writing kernels, low-level functions that control how various operations, like matrix multiplication, are carried out in chips. She’s found that even general-purpose LLMs can, in some cases, write kernels that run faster than the human-designed versions.

Elsewhere at Google, scientists built a system that they used to optimize various parts of the company’s LLM infrastructure. The system, called AlphaEvolve, prompts Google’s Gemini LLM to write algorithms for solving some problem, evaluates those algorithms, and asks Gemini to improve on the most successful—and repeats that process several times. AlphaEvolve designed a new approach for running datacenters that saved 0.7% of Google’s computational resources, made further improvements to Google’s custom chip design, and designed a new kernel that sped up Gemini’s training by 1%.   

That might sound like a small improvement, but at a huge company like Google it equates to enormous savings of time, money, and energy. And Matej Balog, a staff research scientist at Google DeepMind who led the AlphaEvolve project, says that he and his team tested the system on only a small component of Gemini’s overall training pipeline. Applying it more broadly, he says, could lead to more savings.

3. Automating training

LLMs are famously data hungry, and training them is costly at every stage. In some specific domains—unusual programming languages, for example—real-world data is too scarce to train LLMs effectively. Reinforcement learning with human feedback, a technique in which humans score LLM responses to prompts and the LLMs are then trained using those scores, has been key to creating models that behave in line with human standards and preferences, but obtaining human feedback is slow and expensive. 

Increasingly, LLMs are being used to fill in the gaps. If prompted with plenty of examples, LLMs can generate plausible synthetic data in domains in which they haven’t been trained, and that synthetic data can then be used for training. LLMs can also be used effectively for reinforcement learning: In an approach called “LLM as a judge,” LLMs, rather than humans, are used to score the outputs of models that are being trained. That approach is key to the influential “Constitutional AI” framework proposed by Anthropic researchers in 2022, in which one LLM is trained to be less harmful based on feedback from another LLM.

Data scarcity is a particularly acute problem for AI agents. Effective agents need to be able to carry out multistep plans to accomplish particular tasks, but examples of successful step-by-step task completion are scarce online, and using humans to generate new examples would be pricey. To overcome this limitation, Stanford’s Mirhoseini and her colleagues have recently piloted a technique in which an LLM agent generates a possible step-by-step approach to a given problem, an LLM judge evaluates whether each step is valid, and then a new LLM agent is trained on those steps. “You’re not limited by data anymore, because the model can just arbitrarily generate more and more experiences,” Mirhoseini says.

4. Perfecting agent design

One area where LLMs haven’t yet made major contributions is in the design of LLMs themselves. Today’s LLMs are all based on a neural-network structure called a transformer, which was proposed by human researchers in 2017, and the notable improvements that have since been made to the architecture were also human-designed. 

But the rise of LLM agents has created an entirely new design universe to explore. Agents need tools to interact with the outside world and instructions for how to use them, and optimizing those tools and instructions is essential to producing effective agents. “Humans haven’t spent as much time mapping out all these ideas, so there’s a lot more low-hanging fruit,” Clune says. “It’s easier to just create an AI system to go pick it.”

Together with researchers at the startup Sakana AI, Clune created a system called a “Darwin Gödel Machine”: an LLM agent that can iteratively modify its prompts, tools, and other aspects of its code to improve its own task performance. Not only did the Darwin Gödel Machine achieve higher task scores through modifying itself, but as it evolved, it also managed to find new modifications that its original version wouldn’t have been able to discover. It had entered a true self-improvement loop.

5. Advancing research

Although LLMs are speeding up numerous parts of the LLM development pipeline, humans may still remain essential to AI research for quite a while. Many experts point to “research taste,” or the ability that the best scientists have to pick out promising new research questions and directions, as both a particular challenge for AI and a key ingredient in AI development. 

But Clune says research taste might not be as much of a challenge for AI as some researchers think. He and Sakana AI researchers are working on an end-to-end system for AI research that they call the “AI Scientist.” It searches through the scientific literature to determine its own research question, runs experiments to answer that question, and then writes up its results.

One paper that it wrote earlier this year, in which it devised and tested a new training strategy aimed at making neural networks better at combining examples from their training data, was anonymously submitted to a workshop at the International Conference on Machine Learning, or ICML—one of the most prestigious conferences in the field—with the consent of the workshop organizers. The training strategy didn’t end up working, but the paper was scored highly enough by reviewers to qualify it for acceptance (it is worth noting that ICML workshops have lower standards for acceptance than the main conference). In another instance, Clune says, the AI Scientist came up with a research idea that was later independently proposed by a human researcher on X, where it attracted plenty of interest from other scientists.

“We are looking right now at the GPT-1 moment of the AI Scientist,” Clune says. “In a few short years, it is going to be writing papers that will be accepted at the top peer-reviewed conferences and journals in the world. It will be making novel scientific discoveries.”

Is superintelligence on its way?

With all this enthusiasm for AI self-improvement, it seems likely that in the coming months and years, the contributions AI makes to its own development will only multiply. To hear Mark Zuckerberg tell it, this could mean that superintelligent models, which exceed human capabilities in many domains, are just around the corner. In reality, though, the impact of self-improving AI is far from certain.

It’s notable that AlphaEvolve has sped up the training of its own core LLM system, Gemini—but that 1% speedup may not observably change the pace of Google’s AI advancements. “This is still a feedback loop that’s very slow,” says Balog, the AlphaEvolve researcher. “The training of Gemini takes a significant amount of time. So you can maybe see the exciting beginnings of this virtuous [cycle], but it’s still a very slow process.”

If each subsequent version of Gemini speeds up its own training by an additional 1%, those accelerations will compound. And because each successive generation will be more capable than the previous one, it should be able to achieve even greater training speedups—not to mention all the other ways it might devise to improve itself. Under such circumstances, proponents of superintelligence argue, an eventual intelligence explosion looks inevitable.

This conclusion, however, ignores a key observation: Innovation gets harder over time. In the early days of any scientific field, discoveries come fast and easy. There are plenty of obvious experiments to run and ideas to investigate, and none of them have been tried before. But as the science of deep learning matures, finding each additional improvement might require substantially more effort on the part of both humans and their AI collaborators. It’s possible that by the time AI systems attain human-level research abilities, humans or less-intelligent AI systems will already have plucked all the low-hanging fruit.

Determining the real-world impact of AI self-improvement, then, is a mighty challenge. To make matters worse, the AI systems that matter most for AI development—those being used inside frontier AI companies—are likely more advanced than those that have been released to the general public, so measuring o3’s capabilities might not be a great way to infer what’s happening inside OpenAI.

But external researchers are doing their best—by, for example, tracking the overall pace of AI development to determine whether or not that pace is accelerating. METR is monitoring advancements in AI abilities by measuring how long it takes humans to do tasks that cutting-edge systems can complete themselves. They’ve found that the length of tasks that AI systems can complete independently has, since the release of GPT-2 in 2019, doubled every seven months. 

Since 2024, that doubling time has shortened to four months, which suggests that AI progress is indeed accelerating. There may be unglamorous reasons for that: Frontier AI labs are flush with investor cash, which they can spend on hiring new researchers and purchasing new hardware. But it’s entirely plausible that AI self-improvement could also be playing a role.

That’s just one indirect piece of evidence. But Davidson, the Forethought researcher, says there’s good reason to expect that AI will supercharge its own advancement, at least for a time. METR’s work suggests that the low-hanging-fruit effect isn’t slowing down human researchers today, or at least that increased investment is effectively counterbalancing any slowdown. If AI notably increases the productivity of those researchers, or even takes on some fraction of the research work itself, that balance will shift in favor of research acceleration.

“You would, I think, strongly expect that there’ll be a period when AI progress speeds up,” Davidson says. “The big question is how long it goes on for.”