It’s never been easier to be a conspiracy theorist

The timing was eerie.

On November 21, 1963, Richard Hofstadter delivered the annual Herbert Spencer Lecture at Oxford University. Hofstadter was a professor of American history at Columbia University who liked to use social psychology to explain political history, the better to defend liberalism from extremism on both sides. His new lecture was titled “The Paranoid Style in American Politics.” 

“I call it the paranoid style,” he began, “simply because no other word adequately evokes the qualities of heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy that I have in mind.”

Then, barely 24 hours later, President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas. This single, shattering event, and subsequent efforts to explain it, popularized a term for something that is clearly the subject of Hofstadter’s talk though it never actually figures in the text: “conspiracy theory.”


This story is part of MIT Technology Review’s series “The New Conspiracy Age,” on how the present boom in conspiracy theories is reshaping science and technology.


Hofstadter’s lecture was later revised into what remains an essential essay, even after decades of scholarship on conspiracy theories, because it lays out, with both rigor and concision, a historical continuity of conspiracist politics. “The paranoid style is an old and recurrent phenomenon in our public life which has been frequently linked with movements of suspicious discontent,” he writes, tracing the phenomenon back to the early years of the republic. Though each upsurge in conspiracy theories feels alarmingly novel—new narratives disseminated through new technologies on a new scale—they all conform to a similar pattern. As Hofstadter demonstrated, the names may change, but the fundamental template remains the same.

His psychological reading of politics has been controversial, but it is psychology, rather than economics or other external circumstances, that best explains the flourishing of conspiracy theories. Subsequent research has indeed shown that we are prone to perceive intentionality and patterns where none exist—and that this helps us feel like a person of consequence. To identify and expose a secret plot is to feel heroic and gain the illusion of control over the bewildering mess of life. 

Like many pioneering theories exposed to the cold light of hindsight, Hofstadter’s has flaws and blind spots. His key oversight was to downplay  the paranoid style’s role in mainstream politics up to that point and underrate its potential to spread in the future.

In 1963, conspiracy theories were still a fringe phenomenon, not because they were inherently unusual but because they had limited reach and were stigmatized by people in power. Now that neither factor holds true, it is obvious how infectious they are. Hofstadter could not, of course, have imagined the information technologies that have become stitched into our lives, nor the fractured media ecosystem of the 21st century, both of which have allowed conspiracist thinking to reach more and more people—to morph, and to bloom like mold. And he could not have predicted that a serial conspiracy theorist would be elected president, twice, and that he would staff his second administration with fellow proponents of the paranoid style. 

But Hofstadter’s concept of the paranoid style remains useful—and ever relevant—because it also describes a way of reading the world. As he put it, “The distinguishing thing about the paranoid style is not that its exponents see conspiracies or plots here or there in history, but they regard a ‘vast’ or ‘gigantic’ conspiracy as the motive force in historical events. History is a conspiracy, set in motion by demonic forces of almost transcendent power, and what is felt to be needed to defeat it is not the usual methods of political give-and-take, but an all-out crusade.”

Needless to say, this mystically unified version of history is not just untrue but impossible. It doesn’t make sense on any level. So why has it proved so alluring for so long—and why does it seem to be getting more popular every day?

What is a conspiracy theory, anyway? 

The first person to define the “conspiracy theory” as a widespread phenomenon was the Austrian-British philosopher Karl Popper, in his 1948 lecture “Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition.” He was not referring to a theory about an individual conspiracy. He was interested in “the conspiracy theory of society”: a particular way of interpreting the course of events. 

He later defined it as “the view that an explanation of a social phenomenon consists in the discovery of the men or groups who are interested in the occurrence of this phenomenon (sometimes it is a hidden interest which has first to be revealed), and who have planned and conspired to bring it about.”

Take an unforeseen catastrophe that inspires fear, anger, and pain—a financial crash, a devastating fire, a terrorist attack, a war. The conventional historian will try to unpick a tangle of different factors, of which malice is only one, and one that may be less significant than dumb luck.

The conspiracist, however, will perceive only sinister calculation behind these terrible events—a fiendishly intricate plot conceived and executed to perfection. Intent is everything. Popper’s observation chimes with Hofstadter’s: “The paranoid’s interpretation of history is … distinctly personal: decisive events are not taken as part of the stream of history, but as the consequences of someone’s will.”

A Culture of Conspiracy
Michael Barkun
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS, 2013

According to Michael Barkun in the 2003 book A Culture of Conspiracy, the conspiracist interpretation of events rests on three assumptions: Everything is connected, everything is premeditated, and nothing is as it seems. Following that third law means that widely accepted and documented history is, by definition, suspect and alternative explanations, however outré, are more likely to be true. As Hannah Arendt wrote in The Origins of Totalitarianism, the purpose of conspiracy theories in 20th-century dictatorships “was always to reveal official history as a joke, to demonstrate a sphere of secret influences in which the visible, traceable, and known historical reality was only the outward façade erected explicitly to fool the people.” (Those dictators, of course, were conspirators themselves, projecting their own love of secret plots onto others.)

Still, it’s important to remember that “conspiracy theory” can mean different things. Barkun describes three varieties, nesting like Russian dolls. 

The “event conspiracy theory” concerns a specific, contained catastrophe, such as the Reichstag fire of 1933 or the origins of covid-19. These theories are relatively plausible, even if they can not be proved. 

The “systemic conspiracy theory” is much more ambitious, purporting to explain numerous events as the poisonous fruit of a clandestine international plot. Far-fetched though they are, they do at least fixate on named groups, whether the Illuminati or the World Economic Forum. 

It is increasingly clear that “conspiracy theory” is a misnomer and what we are really dealing with is conspiracy belief.

Finally, the “superconspiracy theory” is that impossible fantasy in which history itself is a conspiracy, orchestrated by unseen forces of almost supernatural power and malevolence. The most extreme variants of QAnon posit such a universal conspiracy. It seeks to encompass and explain nothing less than the entire world.

These are very different genres of storytelling. If the first resembles a detective story, then the other two are more akin to fables. Yet one can morph into the other. Take the theories surrounding the Kennedy assassination. The first wave of amateur investigators created event conspiracy theories—relatively self-contained plots with credible assassins such as Cubans or the Mafia. 

But over time, event conspiracy theories have come to seem parochial. By the time of Oliver Stone’s 1991 movie JFK, once-popular plots had been eclipsed by elaborate fictions of gigantic long-running conspiracies in which the murder of the president was just one component. One of Stone’s primary sources was the journalist Jim Marrs, who went on to write books about the Freemasons and UFOs. 

Why limit yourself to a laboriously researched hypothesis about a single event when one giant, dramatic plot can explain them all? 

The theory of everything 

In every systemic or superconspiracy theory, the world is corrupt and unjust and getting worse. An elite cabal of improbably powerful individuals, motivated by pure malignancy, is responsible for most of humanity’s misfortunes. Only through the revelation of hidden knowledge and the cracking of codes by a righteous minority can the malefactors be unmasked and defeated. The morality is as simplistic as the narrative is complex: It is a battle between good and evil.

Notice anything? This is not the language of democratic politics but that of myth and of religion. In fact, it is the fundamental message of the Book of Revelation. Conspiracist thinking can be seen as an offshoot, often but not always secularized, of apocalyptic Christianity, with its alluring web of prophecies, signs, and secrets and its promise of violent resolution. After studying several millenarian sects for his 1957 book The Pursuit of the Millennium, the historian Norman Cohn itemized some common traits, among them “the megalomaniac view of oneself as the Elect, wholly good, abominably persecuted yet assured of ultimate triumph; the attribution of gigantic and demonic powers to the adversary; the refusal to accept the ineluctable limitations and imperfections of human experience.”

Popper similarly considered the conspiracy theory of society “a typical result of the secularization of religious superstition,” adding: “The gods are abandoned. But their place is filled by powerful men or groups … whose wickedness is responsible for all the evils we suffer from.” 

QAnon’s mutation from a conspiracy theory on an internet message board into a movement with the characteristics of a cult makes explicit the kinship between conspiracy theories and apocalyptic religion.

This way of thinking facilitates the creation of dehumanized scapegoats—one of the oldest and most consistent features of a conspiracy theory. During the Middle Ages and beyond, political and religious leaders routinely flung the name “Antichrist” at their opponents. During the Crusades, Christians falsely accused Europe’s Jewish communities of collaborating with Islam or poisoning wells and put them to the sword. Witch-hunters implicated tens of thousands of innocent women in a supposed satanic conspiracy that was said to explain everything from illness to crop failure. “Conspiracy theories are, in the end, not so much an explanation of events as they are an effort to assign blame,” writes Anna Merlan in the 2019 book Republic of Lies.

cover of Republic of Lies
Republic of Lies: American Conspiracy Theorists and Their Surprising Rise to Power
Anna Merlan
METROPOLITAN PUBLISHERS, 2019

But the systemic conspiracy theory as we know it—that is, the ostensibly secular variety—was established three centuries later, with remarkable speed. Some horrified opponents of the French Revolution could not accept that such an upheaval could be simply a popular revolt and needed to attribute it to sinister, unseen forces. They settled on the Illuminati, a Bavarian secret society of Enlightenment intellectuals influenced in part by the rituals and hierarchy of Freemasonry. 

The group was founded by a young law professor named Adam Weishaupt, who used the alias Brother Spartacus. In reality, the Illuminati were few in number, fractious, powerless, and, by the time of the revolution in 1789, defunct. But in the imaginations of two influential writers who published “exposés” of the Illuminati in 1797—Scotland’s John Robison and France’s Augustin Barruel—they were everywhere. Each man erected a wobbling tower of wild supposition and feverish nonsense on a platform of plausible claims and verifiable facts. Robison alleged that the revolution was merely part of “one great and wicked project” whose ultimate aim was to “abolish all religion, overturn every government, and make the world a general plunder and a wreck.”  

The Illuminati’s bogeyman status faded during the 19th century, but the core narrative persisted and proceeded to underpin the notorious hoax The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, first published in a Russian newspaper in 1903. The document’s anonymous author reinvented antisemitism by grafting it onto the story of the one big plot and positing Jews as the secret rulers of the world. In this account, the Elders orchestrate every war, recession, and so on in order to destabilize the world to the point where they can impose tyranny. 

You might ask why, if they have such world-bending power already, they would require a dictatorship. You might also wonder how one group could be responsible for both communism and monopoly capitalism, anarchism and democracy, the theory of evolution, and much more besides. But the vast, self-contradicting incoherence of the plot is what made it impossible to disprove. Nothing was ruled out, so every development could potentially be taken as evidence of the Elders at work.

In 1921, the Protocols were exposed as what the London Times called a “clumsy forgery,” plagiarized from two obscure 19th-century novels, yet they remained the key text of European antisemitism—essentially “true” despite being demonstrably false. “I believe in the inner, but not the factual, truth of the Protocols,” said Joseph Goebbels, who would become Hitler’s minister of propaganda. In Mein Kampf, Hitler claimed that efforts to debunk the Protocols were actually “evidence in favor of their authenticity.” He alleged that Jews, if not stopped, would “one day devour the other nations and become lords of the earth.” Popper and Hofstadter both used the Holocaust as an example of what happens when a conspiracy theorist gains power and makes the paranoid style a governing principle.

esoteric symbols and figures on torn paper including a witchfinder, George Washington and a Civil war era solder

STEPHANIE ARNETT/MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW | PUBLIC DOMAIN

The prominent role of Jewish Bolsheviks like Leon Trotsky and Grigory Zinoviev in the Russian Revolution of 1917 enabled a merger of antisemitism and anticommunism that survived the fascist era. Cold War red-baiters such as Senator Joseph McCarthy and the John Birch Society assigned to communists uncanny degrees of malice and ubiquity, far beyond the real threat of Soviet espionage. In fact, they presented this view as the only logical one. McCarthy claimed that a string of national security setbacks could be explained only if George C. Marshall, the secretary of defense and former secretary of state, was literally a Soviet agent. “How can we account for our present situation unless we believe that men high in this government are concerting to deliver us to disaster?” he asked in 1951. “This must be the product of a great conspiracy so immense as to dwarf any previous such venture in the history of man.”

This continuity between antisemitism, anticommunism, and 18th-century paranoia about secret societies isn’t hard to see. General Francisco Franco, Spain’s right-wing dictator, claimed to be fighting a “Judeo-Masonic-Bolshevik” conspiracy. The Nazis persecuted Freemasons alongside Jews and communists. Nesta Webster, the British fascist sympathizer who laundered the Protocols through the British press, revived interest in Robison and Barruel’s books about the Illuminati, which the pro-Nazi Baptist preacher Gerald Winrod then promoted in the US. Even Winston Churchill was briefly persuaded by Webster’s work, citing it in his claims of a “world-wide conspiracy for the overthrow of civilization … from the days of Spartacus-Weishaupt to the days of Karl Marx.”

To follow the chain further, Webster and Winrod’s stew of anticommunism, antisemitism, and anti-Illuminati conspiracy theories influenced the John Birch Society, whose publications would light a fire decades later under the Infowars founder Alex Jones, perhaps the most consequential conspiracy theorist of the early 21st century. 

The villains behind the one big plot might be the Illuminati, the Elders of Zion, the communists, or the New World Order, but they are always essentially the same people, aspiring to officially dominate a world that they already secretly control. The names can be swapped around without much difficulty. While Winrod maintained that “the real conspirators behind the Illuminati were Jews,” the anticommunist William Guy Carr conversely argued that antisemitic paranoia “plays right into the hands of the Illuminati.” These days, it might be the World Economic Forum or George Soros; liberal internationalists with aspirations to change the world are easily cast as the new Illuminati, working toward establishing one world government.

Finding connection

The main reason that conspiracy theorists have lost interest in the relatively hard work of micro-conspiracies in favor of grander schemes is that it has become much easier to draw lines between objectively unrelated people and events. Information technology is, after all, also misinformation technology. That’s nothing new. 

The witch craze could not have traveled as far or lasted as long without the printing press. Malleus Maleficarum (Hammer of the Witches), a 1486 screed by the German witch-hunter Heinrich Kramer, became the best-selling witch-hunter’s handbook, going through 28 editions by 1600. Similarly, it was the books and pamphlets “exposing” the Illuminati that allowed those ideas to spread everywhere following the French Revolution. And in the early 20th century, the introduction of the radio facilitated fascist propaganda. During the 1930s, the Nazi-sympathizing Catholic priest and radio host Charles Coughlin broadcast his antisemitic conspiracy theories to tens of millions of Americans on dozens of stations. 

The internet has, of course, vastly accelerated and magnified the spread of conspiracy theories. It is hard to recall now, but in the early days it was sweetly assumed that the internet would improve the world by democratizing access to information. While this initial idealism survives in doughty enclaves such as Wikipedia, most of us vastly underestimated the human appetite for false information that confirms the consumer’s biases.

Politicians, too, were slow to recognize the corrosive power of free-flowing conspiracy theories. For a long time, the more fantastical assertions of McCarthy and the Birchers were kept at arm’s length from the political mainstream, but that distance began to diminish rapidly during the 1990s, as right-wing activists built a cottage industry of outrageous claims about Bill and Hillary Clinton to advance the idea that they were not just corrupt or dishonest but actively evil and even satanic. This became an article of faith in the information ecosystem of internet message boards and talk radio, which expanded over time to include Fox News, blogs, and social media. So when Democrats nominated Hillary Clinton in 2016, a significant portion of the American public saw a monster at the heart of an organized crime ring whose activities included human trafficking and murder.

Nobody could make the same mistake about misinformation today. One could hardly design a more fertile breeding ground for conspiracy theories than social media. The algorithms of YouTube, Facebook, TikTok, and X, which operate on the principle that rage is engaging, have turned into radicalization machines. When these platforms took off during the second half of the 2010s, they offered a seamless system in which people were able to come across exciting new information, share it, connect it to other strands of misinformation, and weave them into self-contained, self-affirming communities, all without leaving the house.

It’s not hard to see how the problem will continue to grow as AI burrows ever deeper into our everyday lives. Elon Musk has tinkered with the AI chatbot Grok to produce information that conforms to his personal beliefs rather than to actual facts. This outcome does not even have to be intentional. Chatbots have been shown to validate and intensify some users’ beliefs, even if they’re rooted in paranoia or hubris. If you believe that you’re the hero in an epic battle between good and evil, then your chatbot is inclined to agree with you.

It’s all this digital noise that has brought about the virtual collapse of the event conspiracy theory. The industry produced by the JFK assassination may have been pseudo-scholarship, but at least researchers went through the motions of scrutinizing documents, gathering evidence, and putting forward a somewhat consistent hypothesis. However misguided the conclusions, that kind of conspiracy theory required hard work and commitment. 

Commuters reading of John F. Kennedy's assassination in the newspaper

CARL MYDANS/THE LIFE PICTURE COLLECTION/SHUTTERSTOCK

Today’s online conspiracy theorists, by contrast, are shamelessly sloppy. Events such as the attack on Paul Pelosi, husband of former US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, in October 2022, or the murders of Minnesota House speaker Melissa Hortman and her husband Mark in June 2025, or even more recently the killing of Charlie Kirk, have inspired theories overnight, which then evaporate just as quickly. The point of such theories, if they even merit that label, is not to seek the truth but to defame political opponents and turn victims into villains.

Before he even ran for office, Trump was notorious for promoting false stories about Barack Obama’s birthplace or vaccine safety. Heir to Joseph McCarthy, Barry Goldwater, and the John Birch Society, he is the lurid incarnation of the paranoid style. He routinely damns his opponents as “evil” or “very bad people” and speaks of America’s future in apocalyptic terms. It is no surprise, then, that every member of the administration must subscribe to Trump’s false claim that the 2020 election was stolen from him, or that celebrity conspiracy theorists are now in charge of national intelligence, public health, and the FBI. Former Democrats who hold such roles, like Tulsi Gabbard and Robert F. Kennedy Jr., have entered Trump’s orbit through the gateway of conspiracy theories. They illustrate how this mindset can create counterintuitive alliances that collapse conventional political distinctions and scramble traditional notions of right and left. 

The antidemocratic implications of what’s happening today are obvious. “Since what is at stake is always a conflict between absolute good and absolute evil, the quality needed is not a willingness to compromise but the will to fight things out to the finish,” Hofstadter wrote. “Nothing but complete victory will do.” 

Meeting the moment

It’s easy to feel helpless in the face of this epistemic chaos. Because one other foundational feature of religious prophecy is that it can be disproved without being discredited: Perhaps the world does not come to an end on the predicted day, but that great day will still come. The prophet is never wrong—he is just not proven right yet

The same flexibility is enjoyed by systemic conspiracy theories. The plotters never actually succeed, nor are they ever decisively exposed, yet the theory remains intact. Recently, claims that covid-19 was either exaggerated or wholly fabricated in order to crush civil liberties did not wither away once lockdown restrictions were lifted. Surely the so-called “plandemic” was a complete disaster? No matter. This type of conspiracy theory does not have to make sense.

Scholars who have attempted to methodically repudiate conspiracy theories about the 9/11 attacks or the JFK assassination have found that even once all the supporting pillars have been knocked away, the edifice still stands. It is increasingly clear that “conspiracy theory” is a misnomer and what we are really dealing with is conspiracy belief—as Hofstadter suggested, a worldview buttressed with numerous cognitive biases and impregnable to refutation. As Goebbels implied, the “factual truth” pales in comparison to the “inner truth,” which is whatever somebody believes it be.

But at the very least, what we can do is identify the entirely different realities constructed by believers and recognize and internalize their common roots, tropes, and motives. 

Those different realities, after all, have proved remarkably consistent in shape if not in their details. What we saw then, we see now. The Illuminati were Enlightenment idealists whose liberal agenda to “dispel the clouds of superstition and of prejudice,” in Weishaupt’s words, was demonized as wicked and destructive. If they could be shown to have fomented the French Revolution, then the whole revolution was a sham. Similarly, today’s radical right recasts every plank of progressive politics as an anti-American conspiracy. The far-right Great Replacement Theory, for instance, posits that immigration policy is a calculated effort by elites to supplant the native population with outsiders. This all flows directly from what thinkers such as Hofstadter, Popper, and Arendt diagnosed more than 60 years ago. 

What is dangerously novel, at least in democracies, is conspiracy theories’ ubiquity, reach, and power to affect the lives of ordinary citizens. So understanding the paranoid style better equips us to counteract it in our daily existence. At minimum, this knowledge empowers us to spot the flaws and biases in our own thinking and stop ourselves from tumbling down dangerous rabbit holes. 

cover of book
The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays
Richard Hofstadter
VINTAGE BOOKS, 1967

On November 18, 1961, President Kennedy—almost exactly two years before Hofstadter’s lecture and his own assassination—offered his own definition of the paranoid style in a speech to the Democratic Party of California. “There have always been those on the fringes of our society who have sought to escape their own responsibility by finding a simple solution, an appealing slogan, or a convenient scapegoat,” he said. “At times these fanatics have achieved a temporary success among those who lack the will or the wisdom to face unpleasant facts or unsolved problems. But in time the basic good sense and stability of the great American consensus has always prevailed.” 

We can only hope that the consensus begins to see the rolling chaos and naked aggression of Trump’s two administrations as weighty evidence against the conspiracy theory of society. The notion that any group could successfully direct the larger mess of this moment in the world, let alone the course of history for decades, undetected, is palpably absurd. The important thing is not that the details of this or that conspiracy theory are wrong; it is that the entire premise behind this worldview is false. 

Not everything is connected, not everything is premeditated, and many things are in fact just as they seem. 

Dorian Lynskey is the author of several books, including The Ministry of Truth: The Biography of George Orwell’s 1984 and Everything Must Go: The Stories We Tell About the End of the World. He cohosts the podcast Origin Story and co-writes the Origin Story books with Ian Dunt. 

Can “The Simpsons” really predict the future?

According to internet listicles, the animated sitcom The Simpsons has predicted the future anywhere from 17 to 55 times. 

“As you know, we’ve inherited quite a budget crunch from President Trump,” the newly sworn-in President Lisa Simpson declared way back in 2000, 17 years before the real estate mogul was inaugurated as the 45th leader of the United States. Earlier, in 1993, an episode of the show featured the “Osaka flu,” which some felt was eerily prescient of the coronavirus pandemic. And—somehow!—Simpsons writers just knew that the US Olympic curling team would beat Sweden eight whole years before they did it.

still frame from The Simpson where Principal Skinner's mother stands next to him on the Olympic podium and leans to heckle the Swedish curling team
After Team USA wins, Principal Skinner’s mother gloats to the Swedish curling team, “Tell me how my ice tastes.”
THE SIMPSONS ™ & © 20TH TELEVISION

The 16th-century seer Nostradamus made 942 predictions. To date, there have been some 800 episodes of The Simpsons. How does it feel to be a showrunner turned soothsayer? What’s it like when the world combs your jokes for prophecies and thinks you knew about 9/11 four years before it happened? 


This story is part of MIT Technology Review’s series “The New Conspiracy Age,” on how the present boom in conspiracy theories is reshaping science and technology.


Al Jean has worked on The Simpsons on and off since 1989; he is the cartoon’s longest-serving showrunner. Here, he reflects on the conspiracy theories that have sprung from these apparent prophecies. 

When did you first start hearing rumblings about The Simpsons having predicted the future?

It definitely got huge when Donald Trump was elected president in 2016 after we “predicted” it in an episode from 2000. The original pitch for the line was Johnny Depp and that was in for a while, but it was decided that it wasn’t as funny as Trump. 

What people don’t remember is that in the year 2000, it wasn’t such a crazy name to pick, because Trump was talking about running as a Reform Party candidate. So, like a lot of our “predictions,” it’s an educated guess. I won’t comment on whether it’s a good thing that it happened, but I will say that it’s not the most illogical person you could have picked for that joke. And we did say that following him was Lisa, and now that he’s been elected again, we could still have Lisa next time—that’s my hope! 

How did it make you feel that people thought you were a prophet? 

Again, apart from the election’s impact on the free world, I would say that we were amused that we had said something that came true. Then we made a short video called “Trumptastic Voyage” in 2015 that predicted he would run in 2016, 2020, 2024, and 2028, so we’re three-quarters of the way through that arduous prediction.

But I like people thinking that I know something about the future. It’s a good reputation to have. You only need half a dozen things that were either on target or even uncanny to be considered an oracle. Or maybe we’re from the future—I’ll let you decide! 

Why do you think people are so drawn to the idea that The Simpsons is prophetic? 

Maybe it slightly satisfies a yearning people have for meaning, certainly when life is now so random.

Would you say that most of your predictions have logical explanations? 

It’s cherry-picking—there are 35 years of material. How many of the things that we said came true versus how many of the many things we said did not come true? 

In 2014, we predicted Germany would win the World Cup in Brazil. It’s because we wanted a joke where the Brazilians were sad and they were singing a sad version of the “Olé, olé” song. So we had to think about who would be likely to win if Brazil lost, and Germany was the number two, so they did win, but it wasn’t the craziest prediction. In the same episode, we predicted that FIFA would be corrupt, which is a very easy prediction! So a lot of them fall under that category. 

In one scene I wrote, Marge holds a book called Curious George and the Ebola Virus—people go, “Oh my God! He predicted that!” Well, Ebola existed when I wrote the joke. I’d seen a movie about it called Outbreak. It’s like predicting the Black Death. 

But have any of your so-called “predictions” made even you pause? 

There are a couple of really bizarre coincidences. There was a brochure in a New York episode [which aired in 1997] that said “New York, $9” next to a picture of the trade towers looking like an 11. That was nuts. It still sends chills down me. The writer of that episode, Ian Maxtone-Graham, was nonplussed. He really couldn’t believe it. 

THE SIMPSONS ™ & © 20TH TELEVISION

It’s not like we would’ve made that knowing what was going to come, which we didn’t. And people have advanced conspiracy theories that we’re all Ivy League writers who knew … it’s preposterous stuff that people say. There’s also a thing people do that we don’t really love, which is they fake predictions. So after something happens, they’ll concoct a Simpsons frame, and it’s not something that ever aired. [Editor’s note: People faked Simpsons screenshots seeming to predict the 2024 Baltimore bridge collapse and the 2019 Notre-Dame fire. Images from the real “Osaka flu” episode were also edited to include the word “coronavirus.”] 

How does that make you feel? Is it frustrating?

It shows you how you can really convince people of something that’s not the case. Our small denial doesn’t get as much attention. 

As far as internet conspiracies go, where would you rate the idea that The Simpsons can predict the future? 

I hope it’s harmless. I think it’s really lodged in the internet very well. I don’t think it’s disappearing anytime soon. I’m sure for the rest of my life I’ll be hearing about what a group of psychics and seers I was part of. If we really could predict that well, we’d all be retired from betting on football. Although, advice to readers: Don’t bet on football. 

THE SIMPSONS ™ & © 20TH TELEVISION

Still, it is a tiny part of a trend that is alarming, which is people being unable to distinguish fact from fiction. And I have that trouble too. You read something, and your natural inclination has always been, “Well, I read it—it’s true.” And you have to really be skeptical about that. 

Can I ask you to predict a solution to all of this?

I think my only solution is: Look at your phone less and read more books.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity. 

Amelia Tait is a London-based freelance features journalist who writes about culture, trends, and unusual phenomena. 

Why do so many people think the Fruit of the Loom logo had a cornucopia?

There is a shirt currently listed on eBay for $2,128.79. It was not designed by Versace or Dior, nor spun from the world’s finest silk. In fact, a tag proudly declares, “100% cotton made in Myanmar”—but it’s a second tag, just below that one, that makes this blue button-down so expensive. 

“I looked at it and I was like, Wow, this is cool,” says Brooke Hermann, the 30-year-old Kentucky-based reseller who bought the top for $1 at a secondhand sale in 2024. “This doesn’t look like any other Fruit of the Loom tag I’ve ever seen.”

Quick question: Does the Fruit of the Loom logo feature a cornucopia? 

Many of us have been wearing the casualwear company’s T-shirts and underpants for decades, and yet the question of whether there is a woven brown horn of plenty on the logo is surprisingly contentious. According to a 2022 poll by the research company YouGov, 55% of Americans believe the logo does include a cornucopia, 25% are unsure, and only 21% are confident that it doesn’t, even though this last group is correct. According to a 2023 post from the company, the Fruit of the Loom logo does not include—and, according to Snopes, has never included—a horn of plenty. (MIT Technology Review could not reach Fruit of the Loom for comment.)


This story is part of MIT Technology Review’s series “The New Conspiracy Age,” on how the present boom in conspiracy theories is reshaping science and technology.


Maybe you’ve come across this fact before, via an internet meme that made you gasp, shrug, or scratch your head. There’s a specific name for what’s happening here: Those who believe the logo used to include the cornucopia are experiencing the “Mandela effect,” or collective false memory, so called because a number of people misremember that Nelson Mandela died in prison. I helped popularize the phenomenon in a viral 2016 New Statesman article about a movie that doesn’t actually exist, and in the time since it’s become something of a household term; TV shows from Saturday Night Live to Black Mirror to The X-Files have explored the Mandela effect.

But whether you remember the brown horn, incorrectly recall Darth Vader saying, “Luke, I am your father,” or believe that a popular children’s book was spelled The Berenstein Bears, you’ve probably moved on with your life. Google searches for “Mandela effect” have plummeted from 2016 highs, and Hermann has had zero bids on the shirt she posted last year—even though, at least to her eyes, it features a cornucopia on the tag. “No one’s really offered anything, and no one’s said anything about it,” she says, “which to me is kind of crazy.” 

And yet while many find it easy to let their unconfirmable beliefs go, others have spent the better part of a decade seeking answers—and vindication. There are commonly more than 170,000 weekly visitors to a Mandela effect subreddit that sees over 1,000 comments on average every day. While a fair share of these commenters are skeptics, plenty more are dedicated believers who are not satisfied with the prevailing explanation that human memory is fallible and instead invest their time into bringing the truth—whatever exactly it may be—to light. 

“I’ve been a bit ostracized from my family ever since I started pushing this thing nine years ago,” says a 51-year-old Massachusetts-based Fruit of the Loom truther who asked to go by the name AJ Booras. “I’m not inclined to simply let this phenomenon fall by the proverbial wayside, even if I’m the last one standing.” 

Some online believe in a fairly straightforward conspiracy: They want Fruit of the Loom to confess that it’s “gaslighting” customers and used to have a cornucopia on its tags. Others speculate that the answer lies in quantum physics: If—as the astrophysicist Neil deGrasse Tyson has said—there’s “better than 50-50 odds” that we’re living in a simulation, then might there be some sort of glitch, lag, or failed software update that means some people see and remember the world differently from others?

“The scientific community isn’t really looking that hard at it—and if they are, they’re always framing it as a memory thing,” says AJ. “It’s a hard barrier to make any headway on.” This is why, AJ says, he’s become “addicted” to researching the phenomenon: “It’s a personal quest for vindication.” 

Will anyone ever believe these believers? There are two options for those who think the Fruit of the Loom logo once had a cornucopia: accept that your memory is wrong, or think that the world is. What makes some people happy with the simple explanation and others determined to seek the more complicated one? 

“The bridge between perception and memory” 

There’s nothing quite as disconcerting as when memory and reality conflict. After all, what is reality—or at least your reality—if not your memory? This is why it can be so satisfying to find concrete evidence that you are irrefutably correct: Here’s an old photo that proves Dad did come on the ’09 trip to Florida and your sister is foolish and wrong. 

In the Mandela effect community, evidence implying that the world used to be different is called “residue.” There is an abundant amount of residue suggesting that the Fruit of the Loom logo once had a cornucopia. 

In the 2006 animated film The Ant Bully, a pair of parodical “Fruit of the Loin” underwear is drawn with a cornucopia on the tag. A similar gag in a 2012 episode of South Park sees a fake clothing brand named “Cornucopia.” In 1973, when the jazz flutist Frank Wess released an album called Flute of the Loom, the cover showed fruit pouring out a cornucopia-shaped flute. When allegedly tracked down by Redditors, the illustrator reportedly said the clothing logo had inspired the design: “Why the hell else would I have used a cornucopia?” 

On top of that, numerous newspaper and magazine articles written from the 1970s to the early 2000s reference the horn of plenty, as does a short play first performed in 1968 and a novel, The Brothers K, published in 1992. New residue is still being discovered: In April 2025, a TikToker shared an old ’90s trivia game in which clues about brands are listed on cards. The card for Fruit of the Loom includes the words “underwear,” “apples and grapes,” and “cornucopia.” 

How can all these people—animators, illustrators, journalists, and writers—have made the same mistake? When I reached out to the author of The Brothers K, David James Duncan, he was adamant that there was no mistake: “My inspiration was the Fruit of the Loom boxer shorts I owned at the time,” he said via email. “I changed nothing in describing the boxers, and yes, they did have a Fruit of the Loom cornucopia on the label in the back of the shorts.” 

Conversely, when I spoke with Billy Cox, a journalist who referenced the cornucopia in a 1994 article in Florida Today, he was less confident. “I have no idea what fueled my initial assumption about the cornucopia. Zero. Zilch-o. Nada,” said Cox, also via email. But he’s prepared to admit that he may have been careless in his reporting: “Even if the internet had been available back then, I doubt I would’ve double-checked the logo’s history.”

It’s an interesting thought: Most of the articles referencing the cornucopia are from a period—the ’70s through the ’90s—when journalists wouldn’t have been able to quickly google the logo. But why would they all misremember it the exact same way

Wilma Bainbridge is an associate psychology professor at the University of Chicago who researches what she calls “the bridge between perception and memory”; she got her PhD in brain and cognitive sciences from MIT in 2016. 

Bainbridge herself first came across the Mandela effect on social media—she was “wowed” when confronted with the true spelling of the Berenstain Bears in the famous American children’s books. In 2022, she published a scientific study on visual Mandela effects and ultimately found that there is consistency in what people misremember. “People’s memories are surprisingly predictable,” she says. 

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WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

The husband-and-wife team of Stanley and Janice Berenstain wrote and illustrated the popular children’s books. More than 300 titles bear the family name.

In one experiment in the study, she found that people who aren’t very familiar with an image can share the same false memories as those who claim to be highly familiar. For example, some Mandela effect experiencers believe that the Monopoly man wore a monocle. In Bainbridge’s study, even people who didn’t know the character well sometimes drew the monocle when they were shown the Monopoly man and were later asked to draw him; this means the mistake was based on recall, not recognition, and could suggest that there’s something intrinsic to certain images that encourages memory errors. 

Scientists have long demonstrated that human memory is inherently fallible. In 1996, psychologists asked people whether they had watched news footage of the 1992 Bijlmer plane crash in Amsterdam, and more than 60% of the participants said yes—even though no recording of the crash exists. Other studies have shown that our memories can be corrupted by our peers and that false memories can be contagious. Arguably, the internet has caused memory contagion when it comes to the Mandela effect: Comparatively very few people googled “Fruit of the Loom cornucopia” between 2004 and 2017, with searches growing more common after a Redditor pointed out what was believed to be the first piece of “residue” in 2016 and (and again spiking dramatically when a TikTok video on the phenomenon was posted in 2023; it’s since earned over 5 million views). 

“Some people make things go viral because they want to believe it,” says Don, a 61-year-old American who has been moderating the Mandela effect subreddit since 2017. (He asked to be identified only by his first name to protect his privacy.) “People want to be part of the experience.”

Still, Bainbridge’s study didn’t land on one definitive reason for the Mandela effect. “I was surprised to find there was no singular explanation,” she says. 

Using a method of monitoring cursor movement that’s analogous to eye-tracking technology, the academic tested whether people made memory errors because they didn’t pay attention to an image or looked at only certain parts of it. She found this wasn’t the case. 

Could it be, then, that people simply fill in the blanks of their memory with archetypes—we remember the Monopoly man with a monocle because we associate the eyepiece with rich old men? 

Bainbridge has found that this explanation—known as the “schema theory”—cannot fully explain the Mandela effect either. In one of her experiments, participants were asked to select the correct Fruit of the Loom logo from three images: one without a cornucopia, one with a cornucopia, and one with a plate. Even though we see fruit on plates far more often than we see it inside cornucopias, more participants selected the horn of plenty than the crockery. 

Bainbridge is drawn to the idea that some images simply cause more false memories than others. “We think the underlying cause will not likely be a single feature—e.g., attractiveness, color—but how these features work together in relation to things already stored in our memory,” she says. “But this work is still in its early stages, so we don’t know exactly what that combination is like.” 

Believers like AJ just aren’t convinced.

“In simulation, anything can happen”

“A lot of people remember looking at this unfamiliar object on their underwear tag,” says AJ, “and asking a parent, ‘Is that a loom?’ and the parents saying, ‘No! That’s what we call a cornucopia.’” 

When he was growing up in the ’70s and ’80s, AJ wore Fruit of the Loom underwear and regularly folded laundry with his mother. “You stack up enough underwear, and you’re seeing that logo over and over and over again,” he says.

As a newly fledged adult around the late ’90s, AJ had to go to the store and buy his own underwear for the first time. “I noticed,” he says, “that the logo had changed, and it was just a pile of fruit.” 

Unperturbed, AJ assumed the company had just rebranded—he didn’t worry about it too much until almost two decades later, when he came across the Mandela effect online and realized the consensus was that there had never been a cornucopia. “We call it the wave of 2016 in the Mandela effect community—it was this huge rush of many, many effects that were being noticed,” he says. 

The first time he heard about the Mandela effect, AJ says, he “actually swooned” because of an “overwhelming existential dread that something was dreadfully wrong with reality itself.” 

Today, AJ believes in numerous instances of the Mandela effect, all of which have been shown to be incorrect but nonetheless have robust believer communities online: that the pizza roll brand used to be called Tostino’s, not Totino’s; that the location of Australia has moved on the world map; that the show Sex and the City was Sex in the City; Froot Loops cereal was formerly Fruit Loops; human organs have shifted positions; the sun changed color from yellow to white …

For him, each is just one part of a larger problem he can’t explain about the universe. At first, AJ says, he sought answers by researching memory science and psychology, but he was left unsatisfied. So instead, he looked to quantum mechanics and metaphysics, specifically ontology—the study of reality. 

In 2003, the philosopher Nick Bostrom—famous for his theories on the threat of AI “superintelligence”—posited that humanity may be living inside a simulation. Almost two decades later, the astronomer David Kipping performed some calculations and put the odds at 50-50. “In simulation, anything can happen,” AJ says. “You could have different servers—one server hasn’t been updated, some people are seeing one version, some people are seeing the other.” It is also possible, AJ argues, that we exist in a multiverse—an idea first floated by the physicist Hugh Everett III in the 1950s. If people are somehow traveling between these parallel universes, then they may have memories from different worlds. Both of these theories are recurrent in the Mandela effect community online.  

And yet AJ doesn’t find these explanations entirely fulfilling: “If we jumped universes, why would there be residue?” Instead, he’s been diving into a combination of the theoretical physicist John Archibald Wheeler’s concept of the Participatory Anthropic Principle (PAP)—which suggests, controversially, that the act of observation creates reality—and the Nobel Prize–winning physicist Eugene Wigner’s “friend” experiment, which theorized that two observers can experience two different realities. AJ believes that physicists’ own work may be affecting the universe: “It’s almost like you’re changing the parameters of reality itself by digging deeper.” 

There is still so much that the experts themselves can’t explain about quantum physics, so it’s no wonder that laypeople get confused. The internet offers myriad rabbit holes to go down, some of them legitimate and some of them less so. Things are complicated further when YouTubers and internet commenters who aren’t well versed in the science take specific, highly complex theories and experiments and try to apply them to other phenomena, even if there is no concrete evidence they’re related. So I set about emailing physicists, simply to see whether they believe it might be remotely possible that quantum physics could, in fact, explain the Mandela effect.

Numerous academics replied telling me they had nothing to say on the topic; Bostrom’s office said he was unavailable. I asked the theoretical physicist Carlo Rovelli—who has been labelled one of the world’s 50 top thinkers—whether he has any thoughts about Mandela effect believers’ quantum-physics-related theories. “Yes, definitely,” he replied. “They are all total bullshit! There are few things about which I am totally convinced. This is one.” 

I contacted the University of Oxford physicist David Deutsch—often called the “father of quantum computing”—and listed the theories believers think may explain the Mandela effect, including parallel universes, simulations, the holographic principle, PAP, and Wigner’s friend idea. “Considered as explanations of the Mandela effect, none of those follow from quantum theory, and none of them constitute a rational speculation beyond it,” he said. Johns Hopkins University professor and physicist Sean M. Carroll concurs: “I cannot imagine how any of those phenomena could be in any way related to the Mandela effect.” 

Melvin Vopson, an associate professor of physics at the University of Portsmouth who has conducted research on the simulation theory, admits he has experienced the Mandela effect himself but doesn’t attribute the phenomenon to glitches in the simulation: That’d be a “cheap explanation,” he says.

Nevertheless, scientists waving away these explanations could have a detrimental effect: In the absence of expert engagement, there are plenty of people online who can bolster believers’ views. AJ is not surprised by these responses: “I just don’t think that physicists have given it a real hard look,” he says, “because they’re already certain that it’s explainable otherwise.” 

Bainbridge, for her part, thinks her study at least disproves the theory that we’ve been jumping between different universes. When she took those study participants who weren’t familiar with certain logos and mascots and showed them the correct version for the first time, she tested their memory by asking them to redraw the image only moments later, and still some drew the Mandela effect version. 

“It’s unlikely we jumped dimensions during that short time span,” she says, “so it seems like the Mandela effect is something more about the shortcuts our memories take, rather than something about parallel worlds.” She hopes her future work will help further elucidate these “shortcuts,” and she is even planning to see whether she can create her own Mandela effects. 

Leaving it all behind

One of the most well-documented memory phenomena is the “misinformation effect.” Since the 1970s, scientists have demonstrated that exposing people to misinformation after an event can alter their memories. If people are asked leading questions—say, “Did you see the broken headlight?” rather than “Did you see a broken headlight?” after witnessing a crash—they are more likely to report seeing something they didn’t. But on the flip side, warning witnesses about the threat of misinformation before they recount an event can increase the accuracy of their memory. 

In short, the way information is presented to us is crucial. This is why it was pretty poor form for YouGov to poll Americans about the Fruit of the Loom logo with a question that was easily open to misinterpretation: “Does the logo for the clothing company Fruit of the Loom have a cornucopia of fruit in it, or not?” It is unclear here which part is in question—the cornucopia or the fruit. But it was also poor form that I didn’t mention this until now—nor did I mention that Neil deGrasse Tyson later changed his mind about simulation theory and is now “convinced” that we do not live in a simulation. 

It was also probably pretty misleading of me to start this article with a link-free reference to Brooke Hermann’s eBay-listed shirt, which she believes features a cornucopia but to my eyes clearly features brown leaves. From the ’60s to the early ’00s, the Fruit of the Loom logo did include brown leaves behind the fruit; they were recolored green in 2003. When I started writing this article, I was certain that my Fruit of the Loom childhood PE kit had a cornucopia on the tag. I’m now convinced that 10-year-old me simply wasn’t looking that closely and thus I’ve misremembered the leaves as a horn. After all, even when I look at the current logo on shirts listed on the Fruit of the Loom website, my eyes still seem to want to make this mistake: From far away, I interpret the crowded cluster as a cornucopia.

current Fruit of the Loom logo in color
Fruit of the Loom line drawing for trade application from 1973

The current Fruit of the Loom logo (left) and the version submitted in their 1973 trademark design application. Neither contain a cornucopia.

It’s as easy as that to convince me my memory was wrong—whether that’s a good thing or a bad thing, I’ll let you decide. I’m clearly at one end of some sort of spectrum here. Other Mandela effect experiencers may believe something stranger is going on but are still prepared to happily get on with their lives. Larry Jung is a thirtysomething musician who was living in New Jersey when he spent hours hunting for Fruit of the Loom residue; in 2019, he even purchased a copy of a 1969 book for around $20 so he could see the cornucopia reference within it. “I did obsess about it for a while in the beginning,” says Jung, who remembers the cornucopia because he mistook it for a croissant as a child. “But then—I don’t know, I just came to this acceptance phase. I just didn’t want it to affect my life in a big way. I didn’t want to bring it up in every discussion.” 

Or, as another erstwhile Mandela effect researcher puts it: “If I just so happened to be living in a computer simulation, and that was my entire reality, what can I do about that?”

Don, the Mandela effect subreddit moderator, has seen waves of people move on while he has stayed active in the community for the better part of a decade (I first spoke to him for my New Statesman article in 2016). “I’ve recruited a lot of moderators, and they come and go pretty quick,” he says. 

Don says he experiences “more than average but less than all” examples of the Mandela effect (he too remembers the cornucopia on his childhood underpants). “They find solutions that they find acceptable,” he says of some people who leave the sub. For others, the cognitive dissonance becomes “too much,” he adds. “It interferes with their ability to function.” Don theorizes that the people who stay are people who experienced the Mandela effect organically, “in the wild,” he says, “before it was a well-known phenomenon”—arguably the antithesis of people jumping on an internet bandwagon.

“I compare it to someone who saw Bigfoot. If you were in the woods and Bigfoot walks into your campground and he scares you and your kids, eight feet tall, smells terrible—you’re not going to forget it.” 

AJ concurs that “anchor memories” like these are key. And yet Jung has a croissant-based anchor memory, and I myself have similar anecdotes about false memories I’ve found easy to let go. Psychologically, why does the Mandela effect affect people in such vastly different ways? Why do some people hold onto their memories while others don’t? 

“We know that most people’s intuitions about memory are wrong; they think of it as an accurate recording device when in fact memory is a reconstructive apparatus that is presenting us with recollections based on very fragmented snippets,” says Stephan Lewandowsky, a cognitive psychologist at the University of Bristol who writes computer simulations of memory to better understand how the mind works. “So most people will have an exaggerated sense of the accuracy of their own memories and will refuse to accept that they could be completely false.”

In recent years, Lewandowsky has studied misinformation and has coauthored The Conspiracy Theory Handbook, and he says that while some people move on from their conspiracy theories, others turn them into their identity. “They will enter a state,” he says, “in which they are extremely difficult to extract from their rabbit hole.” People who become highly committed to conspiracies “tend to be disgruntled and feel left behind by society and are extremely distrustful,” Lewandowsky adds. “Those people also tend to be high in narcissism and often exhibit paranoid thoughts.” 

Shauna Bowes is an assistant psychology professor at the University of Alabama who researches conspiratorial ideation, misinformation, and intellectual humility. Her work has found that people with this last quality—the tendency to acknowledge the limits of your own views—are less likely to believe misinformation. 

“Belief perseverance is when you double down on your beliefs, even if evidence contradicts them,” Bowes says. “There are many reasons why some are willing to change their minds while others do not. Personality traits, childhood experiences, social networks, cognitive styles, and more determine these processes. What we do know is that people who tend to be more cognitively flexible, humble, and generally open-minded also tend to change their minds more in response to evidence.” 

And yet when it comes to the Mandela effect, the question of “evidence” is a complicated one—after all, there’s plenty of cornucopia residue. Part of the trouble with understanding people’s responses to the Mandela effect is that the phenomenon can’t neatly be categorized as misinformation or conspiracy theory. 

Lewandowsky believes the Mandela effect is primarily a social phenomenon. “My take on it is that if many people believe that an event has happened, that becomes a social norm that other people can support by sharing that belief. Social norms are very powerful,” he says, adding that the internet “provides a great amplification machine.”

Creating reality

AJ tells me that even though skeptics have called him “so many derogatory names over the last nine years,” he remains passionate about spreading word of the Mandela effect. He wants to “push a dialogue” so that believers don’t feel afraid to speak out. Mostly, AJ wants scientists to look at the qualitative side of things: the hundreds of autobiographical accounts by people with very specific memories of things that are now officially said not to have happened the way they recall. He wishes scientists would speak to experiencers directly, the same way the once-skeptical astronomer Josef Allen Hynek spoke to UFO eyewitnesses in the mid-20th century. 

“Once upon a time, the UFO phenomenon was considered to be fringe. And now we have multiple world governments that have acknowledged that there is stuff flying around that we don’t know what it is,” AJ says. Overall, “the goal is to get the scientific establishment to at least consider the other side.” 

Of course, AJ is not alone, even if Mandela effect believers do exist on a spectrum. The community holds space for people having fun with the phenomenon, for those committed to just a single example of the effect, for others who dive in on a short-term basis before moving on—and for those who have run the International Mandela Effect Conference in locations across the US since 2019. 

And there’s Don, who is still moderating the subreddit after all these years and has seen believers of every stripe. “The thing that keeps me going is I want to make sure that it’s still here,” he says. “There’s a lot of history here, and I want to keep it around for that reason.” 

Personally, he believes there may be different explanations for different examples of the Mandela effect. It could be as simple as people confusing Fruit of the Loom with a knockoff brand, he says, or as complicated as Fruit of the Loom lying about the cornucopia as free advertising (though he also notes that no one has ever actually discovered an old Fruit of the Loom label with a cornucopia on it). 

Don also wonders whether some people might be guinea pigs caught up in longitudinal studies in which psychologists play with subjects’ memories. He’s considered, too, that nefarious tech bros could be digitally manipulating and deleting data on the internet as a form of social engineering, a possibility he compares to the Cambridge Analytica affair. “It’s something that’s possible. I’m not saying that’s what’s happening,” he says. “But this is the kind of thing that could be being done.” (To be clear: Don shared no evidence that this is being done.) 

Perhaps Don’s most interesting belief is that the Mandela effect is not a phenomenon but an “event”—one that may now in fact be over. In his opinion, there have been no significant or “persuasive” examples discovered since 2019 (when Redditors found that the character Baloo in Disney’s 1967 The Jungle Book never wore a coconut bra). Don believes the community peaked between 2015 and 2018, when people were making new discoveries regularly. “There was a period of time where it was an actual event, like this was an ongoing event,” he says. He compares the whole thing to medieval manias in which people danced themselves to death: “I think the fervor with which the Mandela effect spread will likely be compared to dancing plagues by future generations.”

Toward the end of my second of three calls with AJ, he asked me if I’d also experienced the Mandela effect. I explained that historically I experienced it with Fruit of the Loom, but I’m prepared to believe it was just a false memory. “Yeah, that’s fair,” he said. But I started to wonder if it is. When I wrote about the Mandela effect in 2016, I wanted to write an exciting story with twists and turns, which arguably played up the mystery. Am I responsible for making some people question reality? What are the consequences of writing another article, the one you’re currently reading? How much am I creating reality by observing it?

To be “fair” to AJ, should I tell you that one of memory science’s most famous studies has recently come under fire, and some academics now believe that people aren’t as susceptible to false memories as we once thought? 

Or to be “fair” to you, the reader, should I stress that despite my own desire to believe in the mysteries of the universe, I’ve come away thinking that the biggest mystery of all is the human mind? 

Amelia Tait is a London-based freelance features journalist who writes about culture, trends, and unusual phenomena. 

3 Things Stephanie Arnett is into right now

Dungeon Crawler Carl, by Matt Dinniman

This science fiction book series confronted me with existential questions like “Are we alone in the universe?” and “Do I actually like LitRPG??” (LitRPGwhich stands for “literary role-playing game”is a relatively new genre that merges the conventions of computer RPGs with those of science fiction and fantasy novels.) In the series, aliens destroy most of Earth, leaving the titular Carl and Princess Donut, his ex-girlfriend’s cat, to fight in a bloodthirsty game of survival with rules that are part reality TV and part video game dungeon crawl. I particularly recommend the audiobook, voiced by Jeff Hays, which makes the numerous characters easy to differentiate. 

Journaling, offline and open-source

For years I’ve tried to find a perfect system to keep track of all my random notes and weird little rabbit holes of inspiration. None of my paper journals or paid apps have been able to top how customizable and convenient the developer-­favorite notetaking app Obsidian is. Thanks to this app, I’ve been able to cancel subscription services I was using to track my reading habits, fitness goals, and journalingand I also use it to track tasks I do for work, like drafting this article. It’s open-source and files are stored on my device, so I don’t have to worry about whether I’m sharing my private thoughts with a company that might scrape them for AI.

Bird-watching with Merlin 

Sometimes I have to make a conscious effort to step away from my screens and get out in the world. The latest version of the birding app Merlin, from the Cornell Lab of Ornithology, helps ease the transition. I can “collect” and identify species via step-by-step questions, photos, ormy favoriteaudio that I record so that the app can analyze it to indicate which birds are singing in real time. Using the audio feature, I “captured” the red-eyed vireo flitting up in the tree canopy and backlit by the sun. Fantastic for my backyard feeder or while I’m out on the trail.

Meet the man building a starter kit for civilization

You live in a house you designed and built yourself. You rely on the sun for power, heat your home with a woodstove, and farm your own fish and vegetables. The year is 2025. 

This is the life of Marcin Jakubowski, the 53-year-old founder of Open Source Ecology, an open collaborative of engineers, producers, and builders developing what they call the Global Village Construction Set (GVCS). It’s a set of 50 machines—everything from a tractor to an oven to a circuit maker—that are capable of building civilization from scratch and can be reconfigured however you see fit. 

Jakubowski immigrated to the US from Slupca, Poland, as a child. His first encounter with what he describes as the “prosperity of technology” was the vastness of the American grocery store. Seeing the sheer quantity and variety of perfectly ripe produce cemented his belief that abundant, sustainable living was within reach in the United States. 

With a bachelor’s degree from Princeton and a doctorate in physics from the University of Wisconsin, Jakubowski had spent most of his life in school. While his peers kick-started their shiny new corporate careers, he followed a different path after he finished his degree in 2003: He bought a tractor to start a farm in Maysville, Missouri, eager to prove his ideas about abundance. “It was a clear decision to give up the office cubicle or high-level research job, which is so focused on tiny issues that one never gets to work on the big picture,” he says. But in just a short few months, his tractor broke down—and he soon went broke. 

Every time his tractor malfunctioned, he had no choice but to pay John Deere for repairs—even if he knew how to fix the problem on his own. John Deere, the world’s largest manufacturer of agricultural equipment, continues to prohibit farmers from repairing their own tractors (except in Colorado, where farmers were granted a right to repair by state law in 2023). Fixing your own tractor voids any insurance or warranty, much like jailbreaking your iPhone. 

Today, large agricultural manufacturers have centralized control over the market, and most commercial tractors are built with proprietary parts. Every year, farmers pay $1.2 billion in repair costs and lose an estimated $3 billion whenever their tractors break down, entirely because large agricultural manufacturers have lobbied against the right to repair since the ’90s. Currently there are class action lawsuits involving hundreds of farmers fighting for their right to do so.

“The machines own farmers. The farmers don’t own [the machines],” Jakubowski says. He grew certain that self-sufficiency relied on agricultural autonomy, which could be achieved only through free access to technology. So he set out to apply the principles of open-source software to hardware. He figured that if farmers could have access to the instructions and materials required to build their own tractors, not only would they be able to repair them, but they’d also be able to customize the vehicles for their needs. Life-changing technology should be available to all, he thought, not controlled by a select few. So, with an understanding of mechanical engineering, Jakubowski built his own tractor and put all his schematics online on his platform Open Source Ecology.  

That tractor Jakubowski built is designed to be taken apart. It’s a critical part of the GVCS, a collection of plug-and-play machines that can “build a thriving economy anywhere in the world … from scratch.” The GVCS includes a 3D printer, a self-contained hydraulic power unit called the Power Cube, and more, each designed to be reconfigured for multiple purposes. There’s even a GVCS micro-home. You can use the Power Cube to power a brick press, a sawmill, a car, a CNC mill, or a bioplastic extruder, and you can build wind turbines with the frames that are used in the home. 

Jakubowski compares the GVCS to Lego blocks and cites the Linux ecosystem as his inspiration. In the same way that Linux’s source code is free to inspect, modify, and redistribute, all the instructions you need to build and repurpose a GVCS machine are freely accessible online. Jakubowski envisions a future in which the GVCS parallels the Linux infrastructure, with custom tools built to optimize agriculture, construction, and material fabrication in localized contexts. “The [final form of the GVCS] must be proven to allow efficient production of food, shelter, consumer goods, cars, fuel, and other goods—except for exotic imports (coffee, bananas, advanced semiconductors),” he wrote on his Open Source Ecology wiki. 

The ethos of GVCS is reminiscent of the Whole Earth Catalog, a countercultural publication that offered a combination of reviews, DIY manuals, and survival guides between 1968 and 1972. Founded by Stewart Brand, the publication had the slogan “Access to tools” and was famous for promoting self-sufficiency. It heavily featured the work of R. Buckminster Fuller, an American architect known for his geodesic domes (lightweight structures that can be built using recycled materials) and for coining the term “ephemeralization,” which refers to the ability of technology to let us do more with less material, energy, and effort. 

plans for a lifetrac tractor
The schematics for Marcin Jakubowski’s designs are all available online.
COURTESY OF OPEN SOURCE ECOLOGY

Jakubowski owns the publication’s entire printed output, but he offers a sharp critique of its legacy in our current culture of tech utopianism. “The first structures we built were domes. Good ideas. But the open-source part of that was not really there yet—Fuller patented his stuff,” he says. Fuller and the Whole Earth Catalog may have popularized an important philosophy of self-reliance, but to Jakubowski, their failure to advocate for open collaboration stopped the ultimate vision of sustainability from coming to fruition. “The failure of the techno-utopians to organize into a larger movement of collaborative, open, distributed production resulted in a miscarriage of techno-utopia,” he says. 

lifetrac tractor
With a background in physics and an understanding of mechanical engineering, Marcin Jakubowski built his own tractor.
COURTESY OF OPEN SOURCE ECOLOGY

Unlike software, hardware can’t be infinitely reproduced or instantly tested. It requires manufacturing infrastructure and specific materials, not to mention exhaustive documentation. There are physical constraints—different port standards, fluctuations in availability of materials, and more. And now that production chains are so globalized that manufacturing a hot tub can require parts from seven different countries and 14 states, how can we expect anything to be replicable in our backyard? The solution, according to Jakubowski, is to make technology “appropriate.” 

Appropriate technology is technology that’s designed to be affordable and sustainable for a specific local context. The idea comes from Gandhi’s philosophy of swadeshi (self-reliance) and sarvodaya (upliftment of all) and was popularized by the economist Ernst Friedrich “Fritz” Schumacher’s book Small Is Beautiful, which discussed the concept of “intermediate technology”: “Any intelligent fool can make things bigger, more complex, and more violent. It takes a touch of genius—and a lot of courage—to move in the opposite direction.” Because different environments operate at different scales and with different resources, it only makes sense to tailor technology for those conditions. Solar lamps, bikes, hand-­powered water pumps—anything that can be built using local materials and maintained by the local community—are among the most widely cited examples of appropriate technology. 

This concept has historically been discussed in the context of facilitating economic growth in developing nations and adapting capital-intensive technology to their needs. But Jakubowski hopes to make it universal. He believes technology needs to be appropriate even in suburban and urban places with access to supermarkets, hardware stores, Amazon deliveries, and other forms of infrastructure. If technology is designed specifically for these contexts, he says, end-to-end reproduction will be possible, making more space for collaboration and innovation. 

What makes Jakubowski’s technology “appropriate” is his use of reclaimed materials and off-the-shelf parts to build his machines. By using local materials and widely available components, he’s able to bypass the complex global supply chains that proprietary technology often requires. He also structures his schematics around concepts already familiar to most people who are interested in hardware, making his building instructions easier to follow.

Everything you need to build Jakubowski’s machines should be available around you, just as everything you need to know about how to repair or operate the machine is online—from blueprints to lists of materials to assembly instructions and testing protocols. “If you’ve got a wrench, you’ve got a tractor,” his manual reads.  

This spirit dates back to the ’70s, when the idea of building things “moved out of the retired person’s garage and into the young person’s relationship with the Volkswagen,” says Brand. He references John Muir’s 1969 book How to Keep Your Volkswagen Alive: A Manual of Step-by-Step Procedures for the Compleat Idiot and fondly recalls how the Beetle’s simple design and easily swapped parts made it common for owners to rebody their cars, combining the chassis of one with the body of another. He also mentions the impact of the Ford Model T cars that, with a few extra parts, were made into tractors during the Great Depression. 

For Brand, the focus on repairability is critical in the modern context. There was a time when John Deere tractors were “appropriate” in Jakubowski’s terms, Brand says: “A century earlier, John Deere took great care to make sure that his plowshares could be taken apart and bolted together, that you can undo and redo them, replace parts, and so on.” The company “attracted insanely loyal customers because they looked out for the farmers so much,” Brand says, but “they’ve really reversed the orientation.” Echoing Jakubowski’s initial motivation for starting OSE, Brand insists that technology is appropriate to the extent that it is repairable. 

Even if you can find all the parts you need from Lowe’s, building your own tractor is still intimidating. But for some, the staggering price advantage is reason enough to take on the challenge: A GVCS tractor costs $12,000 to build, whereas a commercial tractor averages around $120,000 to buy, not including the individual repairs that might be necessary over its lifetime at a cost of $500 to $20,000 each. And gargantuan though it may seem, the task of building a GVCS tractor or other machine is doable: Just a few years after the project launched in 2008, more than 110 machines had been built by enthusiasts from Chile, Nicaragua, Guatemala, China, India, Italy, and Turkey, just to name a few places. 

Of the many machines developed, what’s drawn the most interest from GVCS enthusiasts is the one nicknamed “The Liberator,” which presses local soil into compressed earth blocks, or CEBs—a type of cost- and energy-­efficient brick that can withstand extreme weather conditions. It’s been especially popular among those looking to build their own homes: A man named Aurélien Bielsa replicated the brick press in a small village in the south of France to build a house for his family in 2018, and in 2020 a group of volunteers helped a member of the Open Source Ecology community build a tiny home using blocks from one of these presses in a fishing village near northern Belize. 

The CEB press, nicknamed “The Liberator,” turns local soil into energy-efficient compressed earth blocks.
COURTESY OF OPEN SOURCE ECOLOGY

Jakubowski recalls receiving an email about one of the first complete reproductions of the CEB press, built by a Texan named James Slate, who ended up starting a business selling the bricks: “When [James] sent me a picture [of our brick press], I thought it was a Photoshopped copy of our machine, but it was his. He just downloaded the plans off the internet. I knew nothing about it.” Slate described having a very limited background in engineering before building the brick press. “I had taken some mechanics classes back in high school. I mostly come from an IT computer world,” he said in an interview with Open Source Ecology. “Pretty much anyone can build one, if they put in the effort.” 

Andrew Spina, an early GVCS enthusiast, agrees. Spina spent five years building versions of the GVCS tractor and Power Cube, eager to create means of self-­sufficiency at an individual scale. “I’m building my own tractor because I want to understand it and be able to maintain it,” he wrote in his blog, Machining Independence. Spina’s curiosity gestures toward the broader issue of technological literacy: The more we outsource to proprietary tech, the less we understand how things work—further entrenching our need for that proprietary tech. Transparency is critical to the open-source philosophy precisely because it helps us become self-sufficient. 

Since starting Open Source Ecology, Jakubowski has been the main architect behind the dozens of machines available on his platform, testing and refining his designs on a plot of land he calls the Factor e Farm in Maysville. Most GVCS enthusiasts reproduce Jakubowski’s machines for personal use; only a few have contributed to the set themselves. Of those select few, many made dedicated visits to the farm for weeks at a time to learn how to build Jakubowski’s GVCS collection. James Wise, one of the earliest and longest-term GVCS contributors, recalls setting up tents and camping out in his car to attend sessions at Jakubowski’s workshop, where visiting enthusiasts would gather to iterate on designs: “We’d have a screen on the wall of our current best idea. Then we’d talk about it.” Wise doesn’t consider himself particularly experienced on the engineering front, but after working with other visiting participants, he felt more emboldened to contribute. “Most of [my] knowledge came from [my] peers,” he says. 

Jakubowski’s goal of bolstering collaboration hinges on a degree of collective proficiency. Without a community skilled with hardware, the organic innovation that the open-source approach promises will struggle to bear fruit, even if Jakubowski’s designs are perfectly appropriate and thoroughly documented.

“That’s why we’re starting a school!” said Jakubowski, when asked about his plan to build hardware literacy. Earlier this year, he announced the Future Builders Academy, an apprenticeship program where participants will be taught all the necessary skills to develop and build the affordable, self-sustaining homes that are his newest venture. Seed Eco Homes, as Jakubowski calls them, are “human-sized, panelized” modular houses complete with a biodigester, a thermal battery, a geothermal cooling system, and solar electricity. Each house is entirely energy independent and can be built in five days, at a cost of around $40,000. Over eight of these houses have been built across the country, and Jakubowski himself lives in the earliest version of the design. Seed Eco Homes are the culmination of his work on the GVCS: The structure of each house combines parts from the collection and embodies its modular philosophy. The venture represents Jakubowski’s larger goal of making everyday technology accessible. “Housing [is the] single largest cost in one’s life—and a key to so much more,” he says.

The final goal of Open Source Ecology is a “zero marginal cost” society, where producing an additional unit of a good or service costs little to nothing. Jakubowski’s interpretation of the concept (popularized by the American economist and social theorist Jeremy Rifkin) assumes that by eradicating licensing fees, decentralizing manufacturing, and fostering collaboration through education, we can develop truly equitable technology that allows us to be self-sufficient. Open-source hardware isn’t just about helping farmers build their own tractors; in Jakubowski’s view, it’s a complete reorientation of our relationship to technology. 

In the first issue of the Whole Earth Catalog, a key piece of inspiration for Jakubowski’s project, Brand wrote: “We are as gods and we might as well get good at it.” In 2007, in a book Brand wrote about the publication, he corrected himself: “We are as gods and have to get good at it.” Today, Jakubowski elaborates: “We’re becoming gods with technology. Yet technology has badly failed us. We’ve seen great progress with civilization. But how free are people today compared to other times?” Cautioning against our reliance on the proprietary technology we use daily, he offers a new approach: Progress should mean not just achieving technological breakthroughs but also making everyday technology equitable. 

“We don’t need more technology,” he says. “We just need to collaborate with what we have now.”

Tiffany Ng is a freelance writer exploring the relationship between art, tech, and culture. She writes Cyber Celibate, a neo-Luddite newsletter on Substack. 

How Trump’s policies are affecting early-career scientists—in their own words

This story is part of MIT Technology Review’s “America Undone” series, examining how the foundations of US success in science and innovation are currently under threat. You can read the rest here.

Every year MIT Technology Review celebrates accomplished young scientists, entrepreneurs, and inventors from around the world in our Innovators Under 35 list. We’ve just published the 2025 edition. This year, though, the context is pointedly different: The US scientific community finds itself in an unprecedented position, with the very foundation of its work under attack

Since Donald Trump took office in January, his administration has fired top government scientists, targeted universities individually and academia more broadly, and made substantial funding cuts to the country’s science and technology infrastructure. It has also upended longstanding rights and norms related to free speech, civil rights, and immigration—all of which further affects the overall environment for research and innovation in science and technology. 

We wanted to understand how these changes are affecting the careers and work of our most recent classes of innovators. The US government is the largest source of research funding at US colleges and universities, and many of our honorees are new professors and current or recent graduate or PhD students, while others work with government-funded entities in other ways. Meanwhile, about 16% of those in US graduate programs are international students. 

We sent surveys to the six most recent cohorts, which include 210 people. We asked people about both positive and negative impacts of the administration’s new policies and invited them to tell us more in an optional interview. Thirty-seven completed our survey, and we spoke with 14 of them in follow-up calls. Most respondents are academic researchers (about two-thirds) and are based in the US (81%); 11 work in the private sector (six of whom are entrepreneurs). Their responses provide a glimpse into the complexities of building their labs, companies, and careers in today’s political climate. 

Twenty-six people told us that their work has been affected by the Trump administration’s changes; only one of them described those effects as “mostly positive.” The other 25 reported primarily negative effects. While a few agreed to be named in this story, most asked to be identified only by their job titles and general areas of work, or wished to remain anonymous, for fear of retaliation. “I would not want to flag the ire of the US government,” one interviewee told us. 

Across interviews and surveys, certain themes appeared repeatedly: the loss of jobs, funding, or opportunities; restrictions on speech and research topics; and limits on who can carry out that research. These shifts have left many respondents deeply concerned about the “long-term implications in IP generation, new scientists, and spinout companies in the US,” as one respondent put it. 

One of the things we heard most consistently is that the uncertainty of the current moment is pushing people to take a more risk-averse approach to their scientific work—either by selecting projects that require fewer resources or that seem more in line with the administration’s priorities, or by erring on the side of hiring fewer people. “We’re not thinking so much about building and enabling … we’re thinking about surviving,” said one respondent. 

Ultimately, many are worried that all the lost opportunities will result in less innovation overall—and caution that it will take time to grasp the full impact. 

“We’re not going to feel it right now, but in like two to three years from now, you will feel it,” said one entrepreneur with a PhD who started his company directly from his area of study. “There are just going to be fewer people that should have been inventing things.”

The money: “Folks are definitely feeling the pressure”

The most immediate impact has been financial. Already, the Trump administration has pulled back support for many areas of science—ending more than a thousand awards by the National Institutes of Health and over 100 grants for climate-related projects by the National Science Foundation. The rate of new awards granted by both agencies has slowed, and the NSF has cut the number of graduate fellowships it’s funding by half for this school year. 

The administration has also cut or threatened to cut funding from a growing number of universities, including Harvard, Columbia, Brown, and UCLA, for supposedly not doing enough to combat antisemitism.

As a result, our honorees said that finding funding to support their work has gotten much harder—and it was already a big challenge before. 

A biochemist at a public university told us she’d lost a major NIH grant. Since it was terminated earlier this year, she’s been spending less time in the lab and more on fundraising. 

Others described uncertainty about the status of grants from a wide range of agencies, including NSF, the Advanced Research Projects Agency for Health, the Department of Energy, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which collectively could pay out more than $44 million to the researchers we’ve recognized. Several had waited months for news on an application’s status or updates on when funds they had already won would be disbursed. One AI researcher who studies climate-related issues is concerned that her multiyear grant may not be renewed, even though renewal would have been “fairly standard” in the past.

Two individuals lamented the cancellation of 24 awards in May by the DOE’s Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, including grants for carbon capture projects and a clean cement plant. One said the decision had “severely disrupted the funding environment for climate-tech startups” by creating “widespread uncertainty,” “undermining investor confidence,” and “complicating strategic planning.” 

Climate research and technologies have been a favorite target of the Trump administration: The recently passed tax and spending bill put stricter timelines in place that make it harder for wind and solar installations to qualify for tax credits via the Inflation Reduction Act. Already, at least 35 major commercial climate-tech projects have been canceled or downsized this year. 

In response to a detailed list of questions, a DOE spokesperson said, “Secretary [Chris] Wright and President Trump have made it clear that unleashing American scientific innovation is a top priority.” They pointed to “robust investments in science” in the president’s proposed budget and the spending bill and cited special areas of focus “to maintain America’s global competitiveness,” including nuclear fusion, high-performance computing, quantum computing, and AI. 

Other respondents cited tighter budgets brought on by a change in how the government calculates indirect costs, which are funds included in research grants to cover equipment, institutional overhead, and in some cases graduate students’ salaries. In February, the NIH instituted a 15% cap on indirect costs—which ran closer to 28% of the research funds the NIH awarded in 2023. The DOE, DOD, and NSF all soon proposed similar caps. This collective action has sparked lawsuits, and indirect costs remain in limbo. (MIT, which owns MIT Technology Review, is involved in several of these lawsuits; MIT Technology Review is editorially independent from the university.) 

Looking ahead, an academic at a public university in Texas, where the money granted for indirect costs funds student salaries, said he plans to hire fewer students for his own lab. “It’s very sad that I cannot promise [positions] at this point because of this,” he told us, adding that the cap could also affect the competitiveness of public universities in Texas, since schools elsewhere may fund their student researchers differently. 

At the same time, two people with funding through the Defense Department—which could see a surge of investment under the president’s proposed budget—said their projects were moving forward as planned. A biomedical engineer at a public university in the Midwest expressed excitement about what he perceives as a fresh surge of federal interest in industrial and defense applications of synthetic biology. Still, he acknowledged colleagues working on different projects don’t feel as optimistic: “Folks are definitely feeling the pressure.”

Many who are affected by cuts or delays are now looking for new funding sources in a bid to become less reliant on the federal government. Eleven people said they are pursuing or plan to pursue philanthropic and foundation funding or to seek out industry support. However, the amount of private funding available can’t begin to make up the difference in federal funds lost, and investors often focus more on low-risk, short-term applications than on open scientific questions. 

The NIH responded to a detailed list of questions with a statement pointing to unspecified investments in early-career researchers. “Recent updates to our priorities and processes are designed to broaden scientific opportunity rather than restrict it, ensuring that taxpayer-funded research is rigorous, reproducible, and relevant to all Americans,” it reads. The NSF declined a request for comment from MIT Technology Review

Further complicating this financial picture are tariffs—some of which are already in effect, and many more of which have been threatened. Nine people who responded to our survey said their work is already being affected by these taxes imposed on goods imported into the US. For some scientists, this has meant higher operating costs for their labs: An AI researcher said tariffs are making computational equipment more expensive, while the Texas academic said the cost of buying microscopes from a German firm had gone up by thousands of dollars since he first budgeted for them. (Neither the White House press office nor the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy responded to requests for comment.) 

One cleantech entrepreneur saw a positive impact on his business as more US companies reevaluated their supply chains and sought to incorporate more domestic suppliers. The entrepreneur’s firm, which is based in the US, has seen more interest for its services from potential customers seeking “tariff-proof vendors.”  

“Everybody is proactive on tariffs and we’re one of these solutions—we’re made in America,” he said. 

Another person, who works for a European firm, is factoring potential tariffs into decisions about where to open new production facilities. Though the Trump administration has said the taxes are meant to reinvigorate US manufacturing, she’s now less inclined to build out a significant presence in the US because, she said, tariffs may drive up the costs of importing raw materials that are required to make the company’s product. 

What’s more, financial backers have encouraged her company to stay rooted abroad because of the potential impact of tariffs for US-based facilities: “People who invest worldwide—they are saying it’s reassuring for them right now to consider investing in Europe,” she said.

The climate of fear: “It will impact the entire university if there is retaliation” 

Innovators working in both academia and the private sector described new concerns about speech and the politicization of science. Many have changed how they describe their work in order to better align with the administration’s priorities—fearing funding cuts, job terminations, immigration action, and other potential retaliation. 

This is particularly true for those who work at universities. The Trump administration has reached deals with some institutions, including Columbia and Brown, that would restore part of the funding it slashed—but only after the universities agreed to pay hefty fines and abide by terms that, critics say, hand over an unprecedented level of oversight to administration officials. 

Some respondents had received guidance on what they could or couldn’t say from program managers at their funding agencies or their universities or investors; others had not received any official guidance but made personal decisions on what to say and share publicly based on recent news of grant cancellations.

Both on and off campus, there is substantial pressure on diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives, which have been hit particularly hard as the administration seeks to eliminate what it called “illegal and immoral discrimination programs” in one of the first executive orders of President Trump’s second term.  

One respondent, whose work focuses on fighting child sexual abuse materials, recalled rewriting a grant abstract “3x to remove words banned” by Senator Ted Cruz of Texas, an administration ally; back in February, Cruz identified 3,400 NSF grants as “woke DEI” research advancing “neo-Marxist class warfare propaganda.” (His list includes grants to research self-driving cars and solar eclipses. His office did not respond to a request for comment.) 

Many other researchers we spoke with are also taking steps to avoid being put in the DEI bucket. A technologist at a Big Tech firm whose work used to include efforts to provide more opportunities for marginalized communities to get into computing has stopped talking about those recruiting efforts. One biologist described hearing that grant applications for the NIH now have to avoid words like “cell type diversity” for “DEI reasons”—no matter that “cell type diversity” is, she said, a common and “neutral” scientific term in microbiology. (In its statement, the NIH said: “To be clear, no scientific terms are banned, and commonly used terms like ‘cell type diversity’ are fully acceptable in applications and research proposals.”) 

Plenty of other research has also gotten caught up in the storm

One person who works in climate technology said that she now talks about “critical minerals,” “sovereignty,” and “energy independence” or “dominance” rather than “climate” or “industrial decarbonization.” (Trump’s Energy Department has boosted investment in critical minerals, pledging nearly $1 billion to support related projects.) Another individual working in AI said she has been instructed to talk less about “regulation,” “safety,” or “ethics” as they relate to her work. One survey respondent described the language shift as “definitely more red-themed.”

Some said that shifts in language won’t change the substance of their work, but others feared they will indeed affect the research itself. 

Emma Pierson, an assistant professor of computer science at the University of California, Berkeley, worried that AI companies may kowtow to the administration, which could in turn “influence model development.” While she noted that this fear is speculative, the Trump administration’s AI Action Plan contains language that directs the federal government to purchase large language models that generate “truthful responses” (by the administration’s definition), with a goal of “preventing woke AI in the federal government.” 

And one biomedical researcher fears that the administration’s effective ban on DEI will force an end to outreach “favoring any one community” and hurt efforts to improve the representation of women and people of color in clinical trials. The NIH and the Food and Drug Administration had been working for years to address the historic underrepresentation of these groups through approaches including specific funding opportunities to address health disparities; many of these efforts have recently been cut

Respondents from both academia and the private sector told us they’re aware of the high stakes of speaking out. 

“As an academic, we have to be very careful about how we voice our personal opinion because it will impact the entire university if there is retaliation,” one engineering professor told us. 

“I don’t want to be a target,” said one cleantech entrepreneur, who worries not only about reprisals from the current administration but also about potential blowback from Democrats if he cooperates with it. 

“I’m not a Trumper!” he said. “I’m just trying not to get fined by the EPA.” 

The people: “The adversarial attitude against immigrants … is posing a brain drain”

Immigrants are crucial to American science, but what one respondent called a broad “persecution of immigrants,” and an increasing climate of racism and xenophobia, are matters of growing concern. 

Some people we spoke with feel vulnerable, particularly those who are immigrants themselves. The Trump administration has revoked 6,000 international student visas (causing federal judges to intervene in some cases) and threatened to “aggressively” revoke the visas of Chinese students in particular. In recent months, the Justice Department has prioritized efforts to denaturalize certain citizens, while similar efforts to revoke green cards granted decades ago were shut down by court order. One entrepreneur who holds a green card told us, “I find myself definitely being more cognizant of what I’m saying in public and certainly try to stay away from anything political as a result of what’s going on, not just in science but in the rest of the administration’s policies.” 

On top of all this, federal immigration raids and other enforcement actions—authorities have turned away foreign academics upon arrival to the US and detained others with valid academic visas, sometimes because of their support for Palestine—have created a broad climate of fear.  

Four respondents said they were worried about their own immigration status, while 16 expressed concerns about their ability to attract or retain talent, including international students. More than a million international students studied in the US last year, with nearly half of those enrolling in graduate programs, according to the Institute of International Education

“The adversarial attitude against immigrants, especially those from politically sensitive countries, is posing a brain drain,” an AI researcher at a large public university on the West Coast told us. 

This attack on immigration in the US can be compounded by state-level restrictions. Texas and Florida both restrict international collaborations with and recruitment of scientists from countries including China, even though researchers told us that international collaborations could help mitigate the impacts of decreased domestic funding. “I cannot collaborate at this point because there’s too many restrictions and Texas also can limit us from visiting some countries,” the Texas academic said. “We cannot share results. We cannot visit other institutions … and we cannot give talks.”

All this is leading to more interest in positions outside the United States. One entrepreneur, whose business is multinational, said that their company has received a much higher share of applications from US-based candidates to openings in Europe than it did a year ago, despite the lower salaries offered there. 

“It is becoming easier to hire good people in the UK,” confirmed Karen Sarkisyan, a synthetic biologist based in London. 

At least one US-based respondent, an academic in climate technology, accepted a tenured position in the United Kingdom. Another said that she was looking for positions in other countries, despite her current job security and “very good” salary. “I can tell more layoffs are coming, and the work I do is massively devalued. I can’t stand to be in a country that treats their scientists and researchers and educated people like this,” she told us. 

Some professors reported in our survey and interviews that their current students are less interested in pursuing academic careers because graduate and PhD students are losing offers and opportunities as a result of grant cancellations. So even as the number of international students dwindles, there may also be “shortages in domestic grad students,” one mechanical engineer at a public university said, and “research will fall behind.”  

Have more information on this story or a tip for something else that we should report? Using a non-work device, reach the reporter on Signal at eileenguo.15 or tips@technologyreview.com.

In the end, this will affect not just academic research but also private-sector innovation. One biomedical entrepreneur told us that academic collaborators frequently help his company generate lots of ideas: “We hope that some of them will pan out and become very compelling areas for us to invest in.” Particularly for small startups without large research budgets, having fewer academics to work with will mean that “we just invest less, we just have fewer options to innovate,” he said. “The level of risk that industry is willing to take is generally lower than academia, and you can’t really bridge that gap.” 

Despite it all, a number of researchers and entrepreneurs who generally expressed frustration about the current political climate said they still consider the US the best place to do science. 

Pierson, the AI researcher at Berkeley, described staying committed to her research into social inequities despite the political backlash: “I’m an optimist. I do believe this will pass, and these problems are not going to pass unless we work on them.” 

And a biotech entrepreneur pointed out that US-based scientists can still command more resources than those in most other countries. “I think the US still has so much going for it. Like, there isn’t a comparable place to be if you’re trying to be on the forefront of innovation—trying to build a company or find opportunities,” he said.

Several academics and founders who came to the US to pursue scientific careers spoke about still being drawn to America’s spirit of invention and the chance to advance on their own merits. “For me, I’ve always been like, the American dream is something real,” said one. They said they’re holding fast to those ideals—for now.

Here’s how we picked this year’s Innovators Under 35

Next week, we’ll publish our 2025 list of Innovators Under 35, highlighting smart and talented people who are working in many areas of emerging technology. This new class features 35 accomplished founders, hardware engineers, roboticists, materials scientists, and others who are already tackling tough problems and making big moves in their careers. All are under the age of 35. 

One is developing a technology to reduce emissions from shipping, while two others are improving fertility treatments and creating new forms of contraception. Another is making it harder for people to maliciously share intimate images online. And quite a few are applying artificial intelligence to their respective fields in novel ways. 

We’ll also soon reveal our 2025 Innovator of the Year, whose technical prowess is helping physicians diagnose and treat critically ill patients more quickly. What’s more (here’s your final hint), our winner even set a world record as a result of this work. 

MIT Technology Review first published a list of Innovators Under 35 in 1999. It’s a grand tradition for us, and we often follow the work of various featured innovators for years, even decades, after they appear on the list. So before the big announcement, I want to take a moment to explain how we select the people we recognize each year. 

Step 1: Call for nominations

Our process begins with a call for nominations, which typically goes out in the final months of the previous year and is open to anyone, anywhere in the world. We encourage people to nominate themselves, which takes just a few minutes. This method helps us discover people doing important work that we might not otherwise encounter. 

This year we had 420 nominations. Two-thirds of our candidates were put forward by someone else and one-third nominated themselves. We received nominations for people located in about 40 countries. Nearly 70% were based in the United States, with the UK, Switzerland, China, and the United Arab Emirates, respectively, having the next-highest concentrations. 

After nominations close, a few editors then spend several weeks reviewing the nominees and selecting semifinalists. During this phase, we look for people who have developed practical solutions to societal issues or made important scientific advances that could translate into new technologies. Their work should have the potential for broad impact—it can’t be niche or incremental. And what’s unique about their approach must be clear. 

Step 2: Semifinalist applications 

This year, we winnowed our initial list of hundreds of nominees to 108 semifinalists. Then we asked those entrants for more information to help us get to know them better and evaluate their work. 

We request three letters of reference and a résumé from each semifinalist, and we ask all of them to answer a few short questions about their work. We also give them the option to share a video or pass along relevant journal articles or other links to help us learn more about what they do.

Step 3: Expert judges weigh in

Next, we bring in dozens of experts to vet the semifinalists. This year, 38 judges evaluated and scored the applications. We match the contenders with judges who work in similar fields whenever possible. At least two judges review each entrant, though most are seen by three. 

All these judges volunteer their time, and some return to help year after year. A few of our longtime judges include materials scientists Yet-Ming Chiang (MIT) and Julia Greer (Caltech), MIT neuroscientist Ed Boyden, and computer scientist Ben Zhao of the University of Chicago. 

John Rogers, a materials scientist and biomedical engineer at Northwestern University, has been a judge for more than a decade (and was featured on our very first Innovators list, in 1999). Here’s what he had to say about why he stays involved: “This award is compelling because it recognizes young people with scientific achievements that are not only of fundamental interest but also of practical significance, at the highest levels.” 

Step 4: Editors make the final calls 

In a final layer of vetting, editors who specialize in covering biotechnology, climate and energy, and artificial intelligence review the semifinalists whom judges scored highly in their respective areas. Staff editors and reporters can also nominate people they’ve come across in their coverage, and we add them to the mix for consideration. 

Last, a small team of senior editors reviews all the semifinalists and the judges’ scores, as well as our own staff’s recommendations, and selects 35 honorees. We aim for a good combination of people from a variety of disciplines working in different regions of the world. And we take a staff vote to pick an Innovator of the Year—someone whose work we particularly admire. 

In the end, it’s impossible to include every deserving individual on our list. But by incorporating both external nominations and outside expertise from our judges, we aim to make the evaluation process as rigorous and open as possible.  

So who made the cut this year? Come back on September 8 to find out.

India is still working on sewer robots

When Jitender was a child in New Delhi, both his parents worked as manual scavengers—a job that involved clearing the city’s sewers of solid waste by hand. Now, he is among almost 200 contractors involved in the Delhi government’s effort to shift from this manual process to safer mechanical methods.

Although it has been outlawed since 1993, manual scavenging—the practice of extracting human excreta from toilets, sewers, or septic tanks—is still practiced widely in India. The work is usually done by people who belong to what are considered the lowest castes, known as the Scheduled Castes or Dalits. Not only is the job undignified, but it can be extremely dangerous: People who enter clogged sewers to clean them face the risk of asphyxiation from exposure to toxic gases like ammonia and methane. According to data presented in the Indian parliament, manual scavenging was responsible for more than 500 deaths between 2018 and 2023.

Several companies have emerged to offer alternatives at a wide range of technical complexity. For example, Genrobotics, based in Kerala, has developed the “Bandicoot Robot” (shown above), a mechanical scavenger that features robotic legs, night-vision cameras, and the ability to detect toxic gas. Researchers at the Indian Institute of Technology in Chennai have developed a robot for septic tanks that has a suction mechanism to pump out the slurry. 

More than 220 Bandicoot robots have been deployed in India, says Vipin Govind, head of marketing and communications at Genrobotics. The company’s reach, he says, enables “even resource-constrained municipalities” to deploy the technology effectively.

Despite these technological options, a 2021 report by the Ministry of Social Justice & Empowerment found that there are still more than 58,000 manual scavengers across India. Independent observers say the numbers are even higher.  

The machine that Jitender uses is mounted on a pickup truck and uses rotating rods, high-pressure streams of water, and a mechanical claw to break up blockages and remove debris. “Earlier, a sanitation worker would get into a sewer and clear the drain with some equipment, but now with these machines we just drop the nozzle into the drain and turn on the pump,” he says. But Vijay Shehriyar, part of the same Delhi initiative, explains that the machines have not entirely replaced manual scavenging in the city. “The manual cleaning is still employed at many places, especially in narrow lanes,” he says. 

Bezwada Wilson, an activist who has long campaigned for the eradication of manual scavenging, explains that most of the drainage and sewage systems across the country are not well planned and were built without proper engineering oversight. Any solution would need to take into consideration all the resulting differences in infrastructure, he says: “It can’t be that you come up with an alternative and force it upon the drainage system without understanding its nature.”

Hamaad Habibullah is a freelance journalist based in New Delhi. 

3 Things James O’Donnell is into right now

Overthink

This is a podcast in which two very smart people (who happen to be young and hilarious professors of philosophy) draw unexpected philosophical connections between facets of modern life. Ellie Anderson and David Peña-Guzmán have done hour-long episodes on everything from mommy issues to animal justice, with particularly sharp segments on tech-adjacent issues like biohacking and the relationship between AI and art. Whenever I think society is dealing with a brand-new problem, these two unearth someone who was pondering it centuries ago. It’s a treat to listen to. 

A film from the tech billionaire bunker

Over the summer I was eager to watch Mountainhead, a darkly funny film by Jesse Armstrong, the creator of Succession, that follows four unlikable tech founders as they watch the world collapse under political turmoil and violence caused by AI deepfakes. I was prepared for it to seem like a documentary, but to a reporter who is in frequent dialogue with AI’s movers and shakers, it felt a little too real. From their remote mountain mansion, they talk about AI accelerationism, utilitarian ethics, uploading one’s consciousness to the cloud, liberating humanity to other planetsall common conversation topics among the tech elite that has had so much influence in the current administration.  

Music by human beings

For much of last winter I was reporting a story about just how far AI-generated music has come. As a lifelong musician (I play guitar, bass, and drums, none particularly well), I found the songs I heardbuilt with models whose creators have been sued for training on the discographies of artists without compensationso convincingly human that they made me deeply uncomfortable. Since then, I’ve had a revitalized zeal for live shows where real people in punk bands or jazz trios do things that AI is not capable of (Sophie Truax is my latest favorite). 

On the ground in Ukraine’s largest Starlink repair shop

Oleh Kovalskyy thinks that Starlink terminals are built as if someone assembled them with their feet. Or perhaps with their hands behind their back. 

To demonstrate this last image, Kovalskyy—a large, 47-year-old Ukrainian, clad in sweatpants and with tattoos stretching from his wrists up to his neck—leans over to wiggle his fingers in the air behind him, laughing as he does. Components often detach, he says through bleached-white teeth, and they’re sensitive to dust and moisture. “It’s terrible quality. Very terrible.” 

But even if he’s not particularly impressed by the production quality, he won’t dispute how important the satellite internet service has been to his country’s defense. 

Starlink is absolutely critical to Ukraine’s ability to continue in the fight against Russia: It’s how troops in battle zones stay connected with faraway HQs; it’s how many of the drones essential to Ukraine’s survival hit their targets; it’s even how soldiers stay in touch with spouses and children back home. 

At the time of my visit to Kovalskyy in March 2025, however, it had begun to seem like this vital support system may suddenly disappear. Reuters had just broken news that suggested Musk, who was then still deeply enmeshed in Trump world, would remove Ukraine’s access to the service should its government fail to toe the line in US-led peace negotiations. Musk denied the allegations shortly afterward, but given Trump’s fickle foreign policy and inconsistent support of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky, the uncertainty of the technology’s future had become—and remains—impossible to ignore.  

a view down at the back of a volunteer working in a corner workbench. Tools and components are piled on every bit of the surface as well as the shelves in front of him.

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a carboard box stuffed with grey cylinders

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Kovalskyy’s unofficial Starlink repair shop may be the biggest of its kind in the world. Ordered chaos is the best way to describe it.

The stakes couldn’t be higher: Another Reuters report in late July revealed that Musk had ordered the restriction of Starlink in parts of Ukraine during a critical counteroffensive back in 2022. “Ukrainian troops suddenly faced a communications blackout,” the story explains. “Soldiers panicked, drones surveilling Russian forces went dark, and long-range artillery units, reliant on Starlink to aim their fire, struggled to hit targets.”

None of this is lost on Kovalskyy—and for now Starlink access largely comes down to the unofficial community of users and engineers of which Kovalskyy is just one part: Narodnyi Starlink.

The group, whose name translates to “The People’s Starlink,” was created back in March 2022 by a tech-savvy veteran of the previous battles against Russia-backed militias in Ukraine’s east. It started as a Facebook group for the country’s infant yet burgeoning community of Starlink users—a forum to share guidance and swap tips—but it very quickly emerged as a major support system for the new war effort. Today, it has grown to almost 20,000 members, including the unofficial expert “Dr. Starlink”—famous for his creative ways of customizing the systems—and other volunteer engineers like Kovalskyy and his men. It’s a prime example of the many informal, yet highly effective, volunteer networks that have kept Ukraine in the fight, both on and off the front line.

A repaired and mounted Starlink terminal standing on a cobbled road

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a Starlink unit mounted to the roof of a vehicle with pink tinted windows

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Kovalskyy and his crew of eight volunteers have repaired or customized more than 15,000 terminals since the war began in February 2022. Here, they test repaired units in a nearby parking lot.

Kovalskyy gave MIT Technology Review exclusive access to his unofficial Starlink repair workshop in the city of Lviv, about 300 miles west of Kyiv. Ordered chaos is the best way to describe it: Spread across a few small rooms in a nondescript two-story building behind a tile shop, sagging cardboard boxes filled with mud-splattered Starlink casings form alleyways among the rubble of spare parts. Like flying buttresses, green circuit boards seem to prop up the walls, and coils of cable sprout from every crevice.

Those acquainted with the workshop refer to it as the biggest of its kind in Ukraine—and, by extension, maybe the world. Official and unofficial estimates suggest that anywhere from 42,000 to 160,000 Starlink terminals operate in the country. Kovalskyy says he and his crew of eight volunteers have repaired or customized more than 15,000 terminals since the war began.

a surface scattered with pieces of used blue tape of various colors and sizes. Two ziploc bags with small metal parts are also taped up.
The informal, accessible nature of the Narodnyi Starlink community has been critical to its success. One military communications officer was inspired by Kovalskyy to set up his own repair workshop as part of Ukraine’s armed forces, but he says that official processes can be slower than private ones by a factor of 10.
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Despite the pressure, the chance that they may lose access to Starlink was not worrying volunteers like Kovalskyy at the time of my visit; in our conversations, it was clear they had more pressing concerns than the whims of a foreign tech mogul. Russia continues to launch frequent aerial bombardments of Ukrainian cities, sometimes sending more than 500 drones in a single night. The threat of involuntary mobilization to the front line looms on every street corner. How can one plan for a hypothetical future crisis when crisis defines every minute of one’s day?


Almost every inch of every axis of the battlefield in Ukraine is enabled by Starlink. It connects pilots near the trenches with reconnaissance drones soaring kilometers above them. It relays the video feeds from those drones to command centers in rear positions. And it even connects soldiers, via encrypted messaging services, with their family and friends living far from the front.  

Although some soldiers and volunteers, including members of Narodnyi Starlink, refer to Starlink as a luxury, the reality is that it’s an essential utility; without it, Ukrainian forces would need to rely on other, often less effective means of communication. These include wired-line networks, mobile internet, and older geostationary satellite technology—all of which provide connectivity that is either slower, more vulnerable to interference, or more difficult for untrained soldiers to set up. 

“If not for Starlink, we would already be counting rubles in Kyiv,” Kovalskyy says.

close up of a Starlink unit on the lap of a volunteer, who is writing notes in a gridded notebook

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a hand holding pieces of shrapnel

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The workshop’s crew has learned to perform adjustments to terminals, especially in adapting them for battlefield conditions. At right, a volunteer engineer shows the fragments of shrapnel he has extracted from the terminals.

Despite being designed primarily for commercial use, Starlink provides a fantastic battlefield solution. The low-latency, high-bandwidth connection its terminals establish with its constellation of low-Earth-orbit satellites can transmit large streams of data while remaining very difficult for the enemy to jam—in part because the satellites, unlike geostationary ones, are in constant motion. 

It’s also fairly easy to use, so that soldiers with little or no technical knowledge can connect in minutes. And the system costs much less than other military technology; while the US and Polish governments pay business rates for many of Ukraine’s Starlink systems, individual soldiers or military units can purchase the hardware at the private rate of about $500, and subscribe for just $50 per month.

No alternatives match Starlink for cost, ease of use, or coverage—and none will in the near future. Its constellation of 8,000 satellites dwarfs that of its main competitor, a service called OneWeb sold by the French satellite operator Eutelsat, which has only 630 satellites. OneWeb’s hardware costs about 20 times more, and a subscription can run significantly higher, since OneWeb targets business customers. Amazon’s Project Kuiper, the most likely future competitor, started putting satellites in space only this year. 


Volodymyr Stepanets, a 51-year-old Ukrainian self-described “geek,” had been living in Krakow, Poland, with his family when Russia invaded in 2022. But before that, he had volunteered for several years on the front lines of the war against Russian-supported paramilitaries that began in 2014. 

He recalls, in those early months in eastern Ukraine, witnessing troops coordinating an air strike with rulers and a calculator; the whole process took them between 30 and 40 minutes. “All these calculations can be done in one minute,” he says he told them. “All we need is a very stupid computer and very easy software.” (The Ukrainian military declined to comment on this issue.)

Stepanets subsequently committed to helping this brigade, the 72nd, integrate modern technology into its operations. He says that within one year, he had taught them how to use modern communication platforms, positioning devices, and older satellite communication systems that predate Starlink. 

a Starlink terminal with leaves inside the housing, seen lit in silhouette and numbered 5566
Narodnyi Starlink members ask each other for advice about how to adapt the systems: how to camouflage them from marauding Russian drones or resolve glitches in the software, for example.
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So after Russian tanks rolled across the border, Stepanets was quick to see how Starlink’s service could provide an advantage to Ukraine’s armed forces. He also recognized that these units, as well as civilian users, would need support in utilizing the new technology. And that’s how he came up with the idea for Narodnyi Starlink, an open Facebook group he launched on March 21, just a few weeks after the full invasion began and the Ukrainian government requested the activation of Starlink.

Over the past few years, the Narodnyi Starlink digital community has grown to include volunteer engineers, resellers, and military service members interested in the satellite comms service. The group’s members post roughly three times per day, often sharing or asking for advice about adaptations, or seeking volunteers to fix broken equipment. A user called Igor Semenyak recently asked, for example, whether anyone knew how to mask his system from infrared cameras. “How do you protect yourself from heat radiation?” he wrote, to which someone suggested throwing special heat-proof fabric over the terminal.

Its most famous member is probably a man widely considered the brains of the group: Oleg Kutkov, a 36-year-old software engineer otherwise known to some members as “Dr. Starlink.” Kutkov had been privately studying Starlink technology from his home in Kyiv since 2021, having purchased a system to tinker with when service was still unavailable in the country; he believes that he may have been the country’s first Starlink user. Like Stepanets, he saw the immense potential for Starlink after Russia broke traditional communication lines ahead of its attack.

“Our infrastructure was very vulnerable because we did not have a lot of air defense,” says Kutkov, who still works full time as an engineer at the US networking company Ubiquiti’s R&D center in Kyiv. “Starlink quickly became a crucial part of our survival.”

Stepanets contacted Kutkov after coming across his popular Twitter feed and blog, which had been attracting a lot of attention as early Starlink users sought help. Kutkov still publishes the results of his own research there—experiments he performs in his spare time, sometimes staying up until 3 a.m. to complete them. In May, for example, he published a blog post explaining how users can physically move a user account from one terminal to another when the printed circuit board in one is “so severely damaged that repair is impossible or impractical.” 

“Oleg Kutkov is the coolest engineer I’ve met in my entire life,” Kovalskyy says.

a volunteer holding a Starlink vertically to pry it open

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two volunteers at workbenches repairing terminals

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When the fighting is at its worst, the workshop may receive 500 terminals to repair every month. The crew lives and sometimes even sleeps there.

Supported by Kutkov’s technical expertise and Stepanets’s organizational prowess, Kovalskyy’s warehouse became the major repair hub (though other volunteers also make repairs elsewhere). Over time, Kovalskyy—who co-owned a regional internet service provider before the war—and his crew have learned to perform adjustments to Starlink terminals, especially to adapt them for battlefield conditions. For example, they modified them to receive charge at the right voltage directly from vehicles, years before Starlink released a proprietary car adapter. They’ve also switched out Starlink’s proprietary SPX plugs—which Kovalskyy criticized as vulnerable to moisture and temperature changes—with standard ethernet ports. 

Together, the three civilians—Kutkov, Stepanets, and Kovalskyy—effectively lead Narodnyi Starlink. Along with several other members who wished to remain anonymous, they hold meetings every Monday over Zoom to discuss their activities, including recent Starlink-related developments on the battlefield, as well as information security. 

While the public group served as a suitable means of disseminating information in the early stages of the war when speed was critical, they have had to move a lot of their communications to private channels after discovering Russian surveillance; Stepanets says that at least as early as 2024, Russians had translated a 300-page educational document they had produced and shared online. Now, as administrators of the Facebook group, the three men block the publication of any posts deemed to reveal information that might be useful to Russian forces. 

Stepanets believes the threat extends beyond the group’s intel to its members’ physical safety. When we talked, he brought up the attempted assassination of the Ukrainian activist and volunteer Serhii Sternenko in May this year. Although Sternenko was unaffiliated with Narodnyi Starlink, the event served as a clear reminder of the risks even civilian volunteers undertake in wartime Ukraine. “The Russian FSB and other [security] services still understand the importance of participation in initiatives like [Narodnyi Starlink],” Stepanets says. He stresses that the group is not an organization with a centralized chain of command, but a community that would continue operating if any of its members were no longer able to perform their roles. 

closeup of a Starlink board with light shining through the holes
“We have extremely professional engineers who are extremely intelligent,” Kovalskyy told me. “Repairing Starlink terminals for them is like shooting ducks with HIMARS [a vehicle-borne GPS-guided rocket launcher].”
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The informal, accessible nature of this community has been critical to its success. Operating outside official structures has allowed Narodnyi Starlink to function much more efficiently than state channels. Yuri Krylach, a military communications officer who was inspired by Kovalskyy to set up his own repair workshop as part of Ukraine’s armed forces, says that official processes can be slower than private ones by a factor of 10; his own team’s work is often interrupted by other tasks that commanders deem more urgent, whereas members of the Narodnyi Starlink community can respond to requests quickly and directly. (The military declined to comment on this issue, or on any military connections with Narodnyi Starlink.)


Most of the Narodnyi Starlink members I spoke to, including active-duty soldiers, were unconcerned about the report that Musk might withdraw access to the service in Ukraine. They pointed out that doing so would involve terminating state contracts, including those with the US Department of Defense and Poland’s Ministry of Digitalization. Losing contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars (the Polish government claims to pay $50 million per year in subscription fees), on top of the private subscriptions, would cost the company a significant amount of revenue. “I don’t really think that Musk would cut this money supply,” Kutkov says. “It would be quite stupid.” Oleksandr Dolynyak, an officer in the 103rd Separate Territorial Defense Brigade and a Narodnyi Starlink member since 2022, says: “As long as it is profitable for him, Starlink will work for us.”

Stepanets does believe, however, that Musk’s threats exposed an overreliance on the technology that few had properly considered. “Starlink has really become one of the powerful tools of defense of Ukraine,” he wrote in a March Facebook post entitled “Irreversible Starlink hegemony,” accompanied by an image of the evil Darth Sidious from Star Wars. “Now, the issue of the country’s dependence on the decisions of certain eccentric individuals … has reached [a] melting point.”

Even if telecommunications experts both inside and outside the military agree that Starlink has no direct substitute, Stepanets believes that Ukraine needs to diversify its portfolio of satellite communication tools anyway, integrating additional high-speed satellite communication services like OneWeb. This would relieve some of the pressure caused by Musk’s erratic, unpredictable personality and, he believes, give Ukraine some sense of control over its wartime communications. (SpaceX did not respond to a request for comment.) 

The Ukrainian military seems to agree with this notion. In late March, at a closed-door event in Kyiv, the country’s then-deputy minister of defense Kateryna Chernohorenko announced the formation of a special Space Policy Directorate “to consolidate internal and external capabilities to advance Ukraine’s military space sector.” The announcement referred to the creation of a domestic “satellite constellation,” which suggests that reliance on foreign services like Starlink had been a catalyst. “Ukraine needs to transition from the role of consumer to that of a full-fledged player in the space sector,” a government blog post stated. (Chernohorenko did not respond to a request for comment.)

Ukraine isn’t alone in this quandary. Recent discussions about a potential Starlink deal with the Italian government, for example, have stalled as a result of Musk’s behavior. And as Juliana Süss, an associate fellow at the UK’s Royal United Services Institute, points out, Taiwan chose SpaceX’s competitor Eutelsat when it sought a satellite communications partner in 2023.

“I think we always knew that SpaceX is not always the most reliable partner,” says Süss, who also hosts RUSI’s War in Space podcast, citing Musk’s controversial comments about the country’s status. “The Taiwan problems are a good example for how the rest of the world might be feeling about this.”

Nevertheless, Ukraine is about to become even more deeply enmeshed with Starlink; the country’s leading mobile operator Kyivstar announced in July that Ukraine will soon become the first European nation to offer Starlink direct-to-mobile services. Süss is cautious about placing too much emphasis on this development though. “This step does increase dependency,” she says. “But that dependency is already there.” Adding an additional channel of communications as a possible backup is otherwise a logical action for a country at war, she says.


These issues can feel far away for the many Ukrainians who are just trying to make it through to the next day. Despite its location in the far west of Ukraine, Lviv, home to Kovalskyy’s shop, is still frequently hit by Russian kamikaze drones, and local military-affiliated sites are popular targets. 

Still, during our time together, Kovalskyy was far more worried by the prospect of his team’s possible mobilization. In March, the Ministry of Defense had removed the special status that had otherwise protected his people from involuntary conscription given the nature of their volunteer activities. They’re now at risk of being essentially picked up off the street by Ukraine’s dreaded military recruitment teams, known as the TCK, whenever they leave the house.

A room with walls covered by a grid of patches and Ukrainian flags, and stacks of grey boxes on the floor
The repair shop displays patches from many different Ukrainian military units—each given as a gift for their services. “We sometimes perform miracles with Starlinks,” Kovalskyy said.
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This is true even though there’s so much demand for the workshop’s services that during my visit, Kovalskyy expressed frustration at the vast amount of time they’ve had to dedicate solely to basic repairs. “We have extremely professional engineers who are extremely intelligent,” he told me. “Repairing Starlink terminals for them is like shooting ducks with HIMARS [a vehicle-borne GPS-guided rocket launcher].” 

At least the situation seemed to have become better on the front over the winter, Kovalskyy added, handing me a Starlink antenna whose flat, white surface had been ripped open by shrapnel. When the fighting is at its worst, the team might receive 500 terminals to repair every month, and the crew lives in the workshop, sometimes even sleeping there. But at that moment in time, it was receiving only a couple of hundred.

We ended our morning at the workshop by browsing its vast collection of varied military patches, pinned to the wall on large pieces of Velcro. Each had been given as a gift by a different unit as thanks for the services of Kovalskyy and his team, an indication of the diversity and size of Ukraine’s military: almost 1 million soldiers protecting a 600-mile front line. At the same time, it’s a physical reminder that they almost all rely on a single technology with just a few production factories located on another continent nearly 6,000 miles away.

“We sometimes perform miracles with Starlinks,” Kovalskyy says. 

He and his crew can only hope that they will still be able to for the foreseeable future—or, better yet, that they won’t need to at all.  

Charlie Metcalfe is a British journalist. He writes for magazines and newspapers including Wired, the Guardian, and MIT Technology Review.