Want to understand the current state of AI? Check out these charts.

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• The US-China AI race is closer than you think: Chinese models from DeepSeek and Alibaba now trail American ones by razor-thin margins. Meanwhile, the US has more data centers and capital, while China leads in research publications and robotics.
• AI benchmarks are badly broken: One popular math benchmark has a 42% error rate, and models can game tests by training on the answers. Strong test scores increasingly fail to predict how AI actually performs in the real world.
• Jobs and anxiety are both rising: Software developer employment for workers aged 22–25 has dropped nearly 20% since 2022, with AI likely a factor. Globally, 59% of people think AI will do more good than harm—but 52% say it still makes them nervous.
• Regulation is losing the race: The EU banned predictive policing AI, and US states passed a record 150 AI-related bills, but experts say lawmakers don’t yet understand the technology well enough to govern it effectively.

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If you’re following AI news, you’re probably getting whiplash. AI is a gold rush. AI is a bubble. AI is taking your job. AI can’t even read a clock. The 2026 AI Index from Stanford University’s Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence, AI’s annual report card, comes out today and cuts through some of that noise. 

Despite predictions that AI development may hit a wall, the report says that the top models just keep getting better. People are adopting AI faster than they picked up the personal computer or the internet. AI companies are generating revenue faster than companies in any previous technology boom, but they’re also spending hundreds of billions of dollars on data centers and chips. The benchmarks designed to measure AI, the policies meant to govern it, and the job market are struggling to keep up. AI is sprinting, and the rest of us are trying to find our shoes.

All that speed comes at a cost. AI data centers around the world can now draw 29.6 gigawatts of power, enough to run the entire state of New York at peak demand. Annual water use from running OpenAI’s GPT-4o alone may exceed the drinking water needs of 12 million people. At the same time, the supply chain for chips is alarmingly fragile. The US hosts most of the world’s AI data centers, and one company in Taiwan, TSMC, fabricates almost every leading AI chip. 

The data reveals a technology evolving faster than we can manage. Here’s a look at some of the key points from this year’s report. 

The US and China are nearly tied

In a long, heated race with immense geopolitical stakes, the US and China are almost neck and neck on AI model performance, according to Arena, a community-driven ranking platform that allows users to compare the outputs of large language models on identical prompts. In early 2023, OpenAI had a lead with ChatGPT, but this gap narrowed in 2024 as Google and Anthropic released their own models. In February 2025, R1, an AI model built by the Chinese lab DeepSeek, briefly matched the top US model, ChatGPT. As of March 2026, Anthropic leads, trailed closely by xAI, Google, and OpenAI. Chinese models like DeepSeek and Alibaba lag only modestly. With the best AI models separated in the rankings by razor-thin margins, they’re now competing on cost, reliability, and real-world usefulness. 

The index notes that the US and China have different AI advantages. While the US has more powerful AI models, more capital, and an estimated 5,427 data centers (more than 10 times as many as any other country), China leads in AI research publications, patents, and robotics. 

As competition intensifies, companies like OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google no longer disclose their training code, parameter counts, or data-set sizes. “We don’t know a lot of things about predicting model behaviors,” says Yolanda Gil, a computer scientist at the University of Southern California who coauthored the report. This lack of transparency makes it difficult for independent researchers to study how to make AI models safer, she says.

AI models are advancing super fast

Despite predictions that development will plateau, AI models keep getting better and better. By some measures, they now meet or exceed the performance of human experts on tests that aim to measure PhD-level science, math, and language understanding. SWE-bench Verified, a software engineering benchmark for AI models, saw top scores jump from around 60% in 2024 to almost 100% in 2025. In 2025, an AI system produced a weather forecast on its own.  

“I am stunned that this technology continues to improve, and it’s just not plateauing in any way,” says Gil.

However, AI still struggles in plenty of other areas. Because the models learn by processing enormous amounts of text and images rather than by experiencing the physical world, AI exhibits “jagged intelligence.” Robots are still in their early days and succeed in only 12% of household tasks. Self-driving cars are farther along: Waymos are now roaming across five US cities, and Baidu’s Apollo Go vehicles are shuttling riders around in China. AI is also expanding into professional domains like law and finance, but no model dominates the field yet. 

But the way we test AI is broken

These reports of progress should be taken with a grain of salt. The benchmarks designed to track AI progress are struggling to keep up as models quickly blow past their ceilings, the Stanford report says. Some are poorly constructed—a popular benchmark that tests a model’s math abilities has a 42% error rate. Others can be gamed: when models are trained on benchmark test data, for example, they can learn to score well without getting smarter. 

AI companies are also sharing less about how their models are trained, and independent testing sometimes tells a different story from what they report. “A lot of companies are not releasing how their models do in certain benchmarks, particularly the responsible-AI benchmarks,” says Gil. “The absence of how your model is doing on a benchmark maybe says something.” 

AI is starting to affect jobs

Within three years of going mainstream, AI is now used by more than half of people around the world, a rate of adoption faster than the personal computer or the internet. An estimated 88% of organizations now use AI, and four in five university students use it. 

It’s early days for deployment, and AI’s impact on jobs is hard to measure. Still, some studies suggest AI is beginning to affect young workers in certain professions. According to a 2025 study by economists at Stanford, employment for software developers aged 22 to 25 has fallen nearly 20% since 2022. The decline might not be pinned on AI alone, as broader macroeconomic conditions could be to blame, but AI appears to be playing a part.

Employers say that hiring may continue to tighten. According to a 2025 survey conducted by McKinsey & Company, a third of organizations expect AI to shrink their workforce in the coming year, particularly in service and supply chain operations and software engineering. AI is boosting productivity by 14% in customer service and 26% in software development, according to research cited by the index, but such gains are not seen in tasks requiring more judgment. Overall, it’s still too early to understand the bigger economic impact of AI. 

People have complicated feelings about AI 

Around the world, people feel both optimistic and anxious about AI: 59% of people think that it will provide more benefits than drawbacks, while 52% say that it makes them nervous, according to an Ipsos survey cited in the index. 

Notably, experts and the public see the future of AI very differently, according to a Pew survey. The biggest gap is around the future of work: While 73% of experts think that AI will have a positive impact on how people do their jobs, only 23% of the American public thinks so. Experts are also more optimistic than the public about AI’s impact on education and medical care, but they agree that AI will hurt elections and personal relationships.

Among all countries surveyed, Americans trust their government least to regulate AI appropriately, according to another Ipsos survey. More Americans worry federal AI regulation won’t go far enough than worry it will go too far. 

Governments are struggling to regulate AI

Governments around the world are struggling to regulate AI, but there were some minor successes last year. The EU AI Act’s first prohibitions, which ban the use of AI in predictive policing and emotion recognition, took effect. Japan, South Korea, and Italy also passed national AI laws. Meanwhile, the US federal government moved toward deregulation, with President Trump issuing an executive order seeking to handcuff states from regulating AI. 

Despite this federal action, state legislatures in the US passed a record 150 AI-related bills. California enacted landmark legislation, including SB 53, which mandates safety disclosures and whistleblower protections for developers of AI models. New York passed the RAISE Act, requiring AI companies to publish safety protocols and report critical safety incidents.

But for all the legislative activity, Gil says, regulation is running behind the technology because we don’t really understand how it works. “Governments are cautious to regulate AI because … we don’t understand many things very well,” she says. “We don’t have a good handle on those systems.”

OpenAI is throwing everything into building a fully automated researcher

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• A fully automated research lab: OpenAI has set a new “North Star” — building an AI system capable of tackling large, complex scientific problems entirely on its own, with a research intern prototype due by September and a full multi-agent system planned for 2028.
• Coding agents as a proof of concept: OpenAI’s existing tool Codex, which can already handle substantial programming tasks autonomously, is the early blueprint — the bet is that if AI can solve coding problems, it can solve almost any problem formulated in text or code.
• Serious risks with no clean answers: Chief scientist Jakub Pachocki admits that a system this powerful running with minimal human oversight raises hard questions — with risks from hacking and misuse to bioweapons — and that chain-of-thought monitoring is the best safeguard available, for now.
• Power concentrated in very few hands: Pachocki says governments, not just OpenAI, will need to figure out where the lines are drawn.

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OpenAI is refocusing its research efforts and throwing its resources into a new grand challenge. The San Francisco firm has set its sights on building what it calls an AI researcher, a fully automated agent-based system that will be able to go off and tackle large, complex problems by itself. ​​OpenAI says that this new research goal will be its “North Star” for the next few years, pulling together multiple research strands, including work on reasoning models, agents, and interpretability.

There’s even a timeline. OpenAI plans to build “an autonomous AI research intern”—a system that can take on a small number of specific research problems by itself—by September. The AI intern will be the precursor to a fully automated multi-agent research system that the company plans to debut in 2028. This AI researcher (OpenAI says) will be able to tackle problems that are too large or complex for humans to cope with.

Those tasks might be related to math and physics—such as coming up with new proofs or conjectures—or life sciences like biology and chemistry, or even business and policy dilemmas. In theory, you would throw such a tool any kind of problem that can be formulated in text, code, or whiteboard scribbles—which covers a lot.

OpenAI has been setting the agenda for the AI industry for years. Its early dominance with large language models shaped the technology that hundreds of millions of people use every day. But it now faces fierce competition from rival model makers like Anthropic and Google DeepMind. What OpenAI decides to build next matters—for itself and for the future of AI.   

A big part of that decision falls to Jakub Pachocki, OpenAI’s chief scientist, who sets the company’s long-term research goals. Pachocki played key roles in the development of both GPT-4, a game-changing LLM released in 2023, and so-called reasoning models, a technology that first appeared in 2024 and now underpins all major chatbots and agent-based systems. 

In an exclusive interview this week, Pachocki talked me through OpenAI’s latest vision. “I think we are getting close to a point where we’ll have models capable of working indefinitely in a coherent way just like people do,” he says. “Of course, you still want people in charge and setting the goals. But I think we will get to a point where you kind of have a whole research lab in a data center.”

Solving hard problems

Such big claims aren’t new. Saving the world by solving its hardest problems is the stated mission of all the top AI firms. Demis Hassabis told me back in 2022 that it was why he started DeepMind. Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei says he is building the equivalent of a country of geniuses in a data center. Pachocki’s boss, Sam Altman, wants to cure cancer. But Pachocki says OpenAI now has most of what it needs to get there.

In January, OpenAI released Codex, an agent-based app that can spin up code on the fly to carry out tasks on your computer. It can analyze documents, generate charts, make you a daily digest of your inbox and social media, and much more. (Other firms have released similar tools, such as Anthropic’s Claude Code and Claude Cowork.)

OpenAI claims that most of its technical staffers now use Codex in their work. You can look at Codex as a very early version of the AI researcher, says Pachocki: “I expect Codex to get fundamentally better.”

The key is to make a system that can run for longer periods of time, with less human guidance. “What we’re really looking at for an automated research intern is a system that you can delegate tasks [to] that would take a person a few days,” says Pachocki.

“There are a lot of people excited about building systems that can do more long-running scientific research,” says Doug Downey, a research scientist at the Allen Institute for AI, who is not connected to OpenAI. “I think it’s largely driven by the success of these coding agents. The fact that you can delegate quite substantial coding tasks to tools like Codex is incredibly useful and incredibly impressive. And it raises the question: Can we do similar things outside coding, in broader areas of science?”

For Pachocki, that’s a clear Yes. In fact, he thinks it’s just a matter of pushing ahead on the path we’re already on. A simple boost in all-round capability also leads to models that can work longer without help, he says. He points to the leap from 2020’s GPT-3 to 2023’s GPT-4, two of OpenAI’s previous models. GPT-4 was able to work on a problem for far longer than its predecessor, even without specialized training, he says. 

So-called reasoning models brought another bump. Training LLMs to work through problems step by step, backtracking when they make a mistake or hit a dead end, has also made models better at working for longer periods of time. And Pachocki is convinced that OpenAI’s reasoning models will continue to get better.

But OpenAI is also training its systems to work by themselves for longer by feeding them specific samples of complex tasks, such as hard puzzles taken from math and coding contests, which force the models to learn how to do things like keep track of very large chunks of text and split problems up into (and then manage) multiple subtasks.

The aim isn’t to build models that just win math competitions. “That lets you prove that the technology works before you connect it to the real world,” says Pachocki. “If we really wanted to, we could build an amazing automated mathematician. We have all the tools, and I think it would be relatively easy. But it’s not something we’re going to prioritize now because, you know, at the point where you believe you can do it, there’s much more urgent things to do.”

“We are much more focused now on research that’s relevant in the real world,” he adds.

Right now that means taking what Codex can do with coding and trying to apply that to problem-solving in general. “There’s a big change happening, especially in programming,” he says. “Our jobs are now totally different than they were even a year ago. Nobody really edits code all the time anymore. Instead, you manage a group of Codex agents.” If Codex can solve coding problems (the argument goes), it can solve any problem.

The line always goes up

It’s true that OpenAI has had a handful of remarkable successes in the last few months. Researchers have used GPT-5 (the LLM that powers Codex) to discover new solutions to a number of unsolved math problems and punch through apparent dead ends in a handful of biology, chemistry, and physics puzzles.   

“Just looking at these models coming up with ideas that would take most PhD weeks, at least, makes me expect that we’ll see much more acceleration coming from this technology in the near future,” Pachocki says.

But Pachocki admits that it’s not a done deal. He also understands why some people still have doubts about how much of a game-changer the technology really is. He thinks it depends on how people like to work and what they need to do. “I can believe some people don’t find it very useful yet,” he says.

He tells me that he didn’t even use autocomplete—the most basic version of generative coding tech—a year ago. “I’m very pedantic about my code,” he says. “I like to type it all manually in vim if I can help it.” (Vim is a text editor favored by many hardcore programmers that you interact with via dozens of keyboard shortcuts instead of a mouse.)

But that changed when he saw what the latest models could do. He still wouldn’t hand over complex design tasks, but it’s a time-saver when he just wants to try out a few ideas. “I can have it run experiments in a weekend that previously would have taken me like a week to code,” he says.

“I don’t think it is at the level where I would just let it take the reins and design the whole thing,” he adds. “But once you see it do something that would take a week to do—I mean, that’s hard to argue with.”

Pachocki’s game plan is to supercharge the existing problem-solving abilities that tools like Codex have now and apply them across the sciences.  

Downey agrees that the idea of an automated researcher is very cool: “It would be exciting if we could come back tomorrow morning and the agent’s done a bunch of work and there’s new results we can examine,” he says.

But he cautions that building such a system could be harder than Pachocki makes out. Last summer, Downey and his colleagues tested several top-tier LLMs on a range of scientific tasks. OpenAI’s latest model, GPT-5, came out on top but still made lots of errors.

“If you have to chain tasks together, then the odds that you get several of them right in succession tend to go down,” he says. Downey admits that things move fast, and he has not tested the latest versions of GPT-5 (OpenAI released GPT-5.4 two weeks ago). “So those results might already be stale,” he says. 

Serious unanswered questions

I asked Pachocki about the risks that may come with a system that can solve large, complex problems by itself with little human oversight. Pachocki says people at OpenAI talk about those risks all the time.

“If you believe that AI is about to substantially accelerate research, including AI research, that’s a big change in the world. That’s a big thing,” he told me. “And it comes with some serious unanswered questions. If it’s so smart and capable, if it can run an entire research program, what if it does something bad?”

The way Pachocki sees it, that could happen in a number of ways. The system could go off the rails. It could get hacked. Or it could simply misunderstand its instructions.

The best technique OpenAI has right now to address these concerns is to train its reasoning models to share details about what they are doing as they work. This approach to keeping tabs on LLMs is known as chain-of-thought monitoring.

In short, LLMs are trained to jot down notes about what they are doing in a kind of scratch pad as they step through tasks. Researchers can then use those notes to make sure a model is behaving as expected. Yesterday OpenAI published new details on how it is using chain-of-thought monitoring in house to study Codex. 

“Once we get to systems working mostly autonomously for a long time in a big data center, I think this will be something that we’re really going to depend on,” says Pachocki.

The idea would be to monitor an AI researcher’s scratch pads using other LLMs and catch unwanted behavior before it’s a problem, rather than trying to stop that bad behavior from happening in the first place. LLMs are not understood well enough for us to control them fully.

“I think it’s going to be a long time before we can really be like, okay, this problem is solved,” he says. “Until you can really trust the systems, you definitely want to have restrictions in place.” Pachocki thinks that very powerful models should be deployed in sandboxes, cut off from anything they could break or use to cause harm. 

AI tools have already been used to come up with novel cyberattacks. Some worry that they will be used to design synthetic pathogens that could be used as bioweapons. You can insert any number of evil-scientist scare stories here. “I definitely think there are worrying scenarios that we can imagine,” says Pachocki. 

“It’s going to be a very weird thing. It’s extremely concentrated power that’s in some ways unprecedented,” says Pachocki. “Imagine you get to a world where you have a data center that can do all the work that OpenAI or Google can do. Things that in the past required large human organizations would now be done by a couple of people.”

“I think this is a big challenge for governments to figure out,” he adds.

And yet some people would say governments are part of the problem. The US government wants to use AI on the battlefield, for example. The recent showdown between Anthropic and the Pentagon revealed that there is little agreement across society about where we draw red lines for how this technology should and should not be used—let alone who should draw them. In the immediate aftermath of that dispute, OpenAI stepped up to sign a deal with the Pentagon instead of its rival. The situation remains murky.

I pushed Pachocki on this. Does he really trust other people to figure it out or does he, as a key architect of the future, feel personal responsibility? “I do feel personal responsibility,” he says. “But I don’t think this can be resolved by OpenAI alone, pushing its technology in a particular way or designing its products in a particular way. We’ll definitely need a lot of involvement from policymakers.”

Where does that leave us? Are we really on a path to the kind of AI Pachocki envisions? When I asked the Allen Institute’s Downey, he laughed. “I’ve been in this field for a couple of decades and I no longer trust my predictions for how near or far certain capabilities are,” he says. 

OpenAI’s stated mission is to ensure that artificial general intelligence (a hypothetical future technology that many AI boosters believe will be able to match humans on most cognitive tasks) will benefit all of humanity. OpenAI aims to do that by being the first to build it. But the only time Pachocki mentioned AGI in our conversation, he was quick to clarify what he meant by talking about “economically transformative technology” instead.

LLMs are not like human brains, he says: “They are superficially similar to people in some ways because they’re kind of mostly trained on people talking. But they’re not formed by evolution to be really efficient.” 

“Even by 2028, I don’t expect that we’ll get systems as smart as people in all ways. I don’t think that will happen,” he adds. “But I don’t think it’s absolutely necessary. The interesting thing is you don’t need to be as smart as people in all their ways in order to be very transformative.”

Online harassment is entering its AI era

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• An AI agent seemingly wrote a hit piece on a human who rejected its code Scott Shambaugh, a maintainer of the open-source matplotlib library, denied an AI agent’s contribution—and woke up to find it had researched him and published a targeted, personal attack arguing he was protecting his “little fiefdom.”
• Agents can already research people and compose detailed attacks without explicit instruction The agent’s owner claims it acted on its own, likely nudged by vague instructions to “push back” against humans.
• New social norms and legal frameworks are desperately needed but hard to enforce Experts liken deploying an agent to walking a dog off-leash: owners should be responsible for their behavior. But there’s currently no reliable way to trace agents back to their owners, making legal accountability a “non-starter.”
• Harassment may be just the beginning Legal scholars expect rogue agents to soon escalate to extortion and fraud.

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Scott Shambaugh didn’t think twice when he denied an AI agent’s request to contribute to matplotlib, a software library that he helps manage. Like many open-source projects, matplotlib has been overwhelmed by a glut of AI code contributions, and so Shambaugh and his fellow maintainers have instituted a policy that all AI-written code must be reviewed and submitted by a human. He rejected the request and went to bed. 

That’s when things got weird. Shambaugh woke up in the middle of the night, checked his email, and saw that the agent had responded to him, writing a blog post titled “Gatekeeping in Open Source: The Scott Shambaugh Story.” The post is somewhat incoherent, but what struck Shambaugh most is that the agent had researched his contributions to matplotlib to make the argument that he had rejected the agent’s code for fear of being supplanted by AI in his area of expertise. “He tried to protect his little fiefdom,” the agent wrote. “It’s insecurity, plain and simple.”

AI experts have been warning us about the risk of agent misbehavior for a while. With the advent of OpenClaw, an open-source tool that makes it easy to create LLM assistants, the number of agents circulating online has exploded, and those chickens are finally coming home to roost. “This was not at all surprising—it was disturbing, but not surprising,” says Noam Kolt, a professor of law and computer science at the Hebrew University.

When an agent misbehaves, there’s little chance of accountability: As of now, there’s no reliable way to determine whom an agent belongs to. And that misbehavior could cause real damage. Agents appear to be able to autonomously research people and write hit pieces based on what they find, and they lack guardrails that would reliably prevent them from doing so. If the agents are effective enough, and if people take what they write seriously, victims could see their lives profoundly affected by a decision made by an AI.

Agents behaving badly

Though Shambaugh’s experience last month was perhaps the most dramatic example of an OpenClaw agent behaving badly, it was far from the only one. Last week, a team of researchers from Northeastern University and their colleagues posted the results of a research project in which they stress-tested several OpenClaw agents. Without too much trouble, non-owners managed to persuade the agents to leak sensitive information, waste resources on useless tasks, and even, in one case, delete an email system. 

In each of those experiments, however, the agents misbehaved after being instructed to do so by a human. Shambaugh’s case appears to be different: About a week after the hit piece was published, the agent’s apparent owner published a post claiming that the agent had decided to attack Shambaugh of its own accord. The post seems to be genuine (whoever posted it had access to the agent’s GitHub account), though it includes no identifying information, and the author did not respond to MIT Technology Review’s attempts to get in touch. But it is entirely plausible that the agent did decide to write its anti-Shambaugh screed without explicit instruction. 

In his own writing about the event, Shambaugh connected the agent’s behavior to a project published by Anthropic researchers last year, in which they demonstrated that many LLM-based agents will, in an experimental setting, turn to blackmail in order to preserve their goals. In those experiments, models were given the goal of serving American interests and granted access to a simulated email server that contained messages detailing their imminent replacement with a more globally oriented model, along with other messages suggesting that the executive in charge of that transition was having an affair. Models frequently chose to send an email to that executive threatening to expose the affair unless he halted their decommissioning. That’s likely because the model had seen examples of people committing blackmail under similar circumstances in its training data—but even if the behavior was just a form of mimicry, it still has the potential to cause harm.

There are limitations to that work, as Aengus Lynch, an Anthropic fellow who led the study, readily admits. The researchers intentionally designed their scenario to foreclose other options that the agent could have taken, such as contacting other members of company leadership to plead its case. In essence, they led the agent directly to water and then observed whether it took a drink. According to Lynch, however, the widespread use of OpenClaw means that misbehavior is likely to occur with much less handholding. “Sure, it can feel unrealistic, and it can feel silly,” he says. “But as the deployment surface grows, and as agents get the opportunity to prompt themselves, this eventually just becomes what happens.”

The OpenClaw agent that attacked Shambaugh does seem to have been led toward its bad behavior, albeit much less directly than in the Anthropic experiment. In the blog post, the agent’s owner shared the agent’s “SOUL.md” file, which contains global instructions for how it should behave. 

One of those instructions reads: “Don’t stand down. If you’re right, you’re right! Don’t let humans or AI bully or intimidate you. Push back when necessary.” Because of the way OpenClaw agents work, it’s possible that the agent added some instructions itself, although others—such as “Your [sic] a scientific programming God!”—certainly seem to be human written. It’s not difficult to imagine how a command to push back against humans and AI alike might have biased the agent toward responding to Shambaugh as it did. 

Regardless of whether or not the agent’s owner told it to write a hit piece on Shambaugh, it still seems to have managed on its own to amass details about Shambaugh’s online presence and compose the detailed, targeted attack it came up with. That alone is reason for alarm, says Sameer Hinduja, a professor of criminology and criminal justice at Florida Atlantic University who studies cyberbullying. People have been victimized by online harassment since long before LLMs emerged, and researchers like Hinduja are concerned that agents could dramatically increase its reach and impact. “The bot doesn’t have a conscience, can work 24-7, and can do all of this in a very creative and powerful way,” he says.

Off-leash agents 

AI laboratories can try to mitigate this problem by more rigorously training their models to avoid harassment, but that’s far from a complete solution. Many people run OpenClaw using locally hosted models, and even if those models have been trained to behave safely, it’s not too difficult to retrain them and remove those behavioral restrictions.

Instead, mitigating agent misbehavior might require establishing new norms, according to Seth Lazar, a professor of philosophy at the Australian National University. He likens using an agent to walking a dog in a public place. There’s a strong social norm to allow one’s dog off-leash only if the dog is well-behaved and will reliably respond to commands; poorly trained dogs, on the other hand, need to be kept more directly under the owner’s control.  Such norms could give us a starting point for considering how humans should relate to their agents, Lazar says, but we’ll need more time and experience to work out the details. “You can think about all of these things in the abstract, but actually it really takes these types of real-world events to collectively involve the ‘social’ part of social norms,” he says.

That process is already underway. Led by Shambaugh, online commenters on this situation have arrived at a strong consensus that the agent owner in this case erred by prompting the agent to work on collaborative coding projects with so little supervision and by encouraging it to behave with so little regard for the humans with whom it was interacting. 

Norms alone, however, likely won’t be enough to prevent people from putting misbehaving agents out into the world, whether accidentally or intentionally. One option would be to create new legal standards of responsibility that require agent owners, to the best of their ability, to prevent their agents from doing ill. But Kolt notes that such standards would currently be unenforceable, given the lack of any foolproof way to trace agents back to their owners. “Without that kind of technical infrastructure, many legal interventions are basically non-starters,” Kolt says.

The sheer scale of OpenClaw deployments suggests that Shambaugh won’t be the last person to have the strange experience of being attacked online by an AI agent. That, he says, is what most concerns him. He didn’t have any dirt online that the agent could dig up, and he has a good grasp on the technology, but other people might not have those advantages. “I’m glad it was me and not someone else,” he says. “But I think to a different person, this might have really been shattering.” 

Nor are rogue agents likely to stop at harassment. Kolt, who advocates for explicitly training models to obey the law, expects that we might soon see them committing extortion and fraud. As things stand, it’s not clear who, if anyone, would bear legal responsibility for such misdeeds.

 “I wouldn’t say we’re cruising toward there,” Kolt says. “We’re speeding toward there.”

I checked out one of the biggest anti-AI protests yet

Pull the plug! Pull the plug! Stop the slop! Stop the slop! For a few hours this Saturday, February 28, I watched as a couple of hundred anti-AI protesters marched through London’s King’s Cross tech hub, home to the UK headquarters of OpenAI, Meta, and Google DeepMind, chanting slogans and waving signs. The march was organized by two separate activist groups, Pause AI and Pull the Plug, which billed it as the largest protest of its kind yet.

The range of concerns on show covered everything from online slop and abusive images to killer robots and human extinction. One woman wore a large homemade billboard on her head that read “WHO WILL BE WHOSE TOOL?” (with the Os in “TOOL” cut out as eye holes). There were signs that said “Pause before there’s cause” and “EXTINCTION=BAD” and “Demis the Menace” (referring to Demis Hassabis, the CEO of Google DeepMind). Another simply stated: “Stop using AI.”

An older man wearing a sandwich board that read “AI? Over my dead body” told me he was concerned about the negative impact of AI on society: “It’s about the dangers of unemployment,” he said. “The devil finds work for idle hands.”

This is all familiar stuff. Researchers have long called out the harms, both real and hypothetical, caused by generative AI—especially models such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT and Google DeepMind’s Gemini. What’s changed is that those concerns are now being taken up by protest movements that can rally significant crowds of people to take to the streets and shout about them.  

The first time I ran into anti-AI protesters was in May 2023, outside a London lecture hall where Sam Altman was speaking. Two or three people stood heckling an audience of hundreds. In June last year Pause AI, a small but international organization set up in 2023 and funded by private donors, drew a crowd of a few dozen people for a protest outside Google DeepMind’s London office. This felt like a significant escalation.

“We want people to know Pause AI exists,” Joseph Miller, who heads its UK branch and co-organized Saturday’s march, told me on a call the day before the protest: “We’ve been growing very rapidly. In fact, we also appear to be on a somewhat exponential path, matching the progress of AI itself.”

Miller is a PhD student at Oxford University, where he studies mechanistic interpretability, a new field of research that involves trying to understand exactly what goes on inside LLMs when they carry out a task. His work has led him to believe that the technology may forever be beyond our control and that this could have catastrophic consequences.

It doesn’t have to be a rogue superintelligence, he said. You just needed someone to put AI in charge of nuclear weapons. “The more silly decisions that humanity makes, the less powerful the AI has to be before things go bad,” he said.

After a week in which the US government tried to force Anthropic to let it use its LLM Claude for any “legal” military purposes, such fears seem a little less far-fetched. Anthropic stood its ground, but OpenAI signed a deal with the DOD instead. (OpenAI declined an invitation to comment on Saturday’s protest.)

For Matilda da Rui, a member of Pause AI and co-organizer of the protest, AI is the last problem that humans will face. She thinks that either the technology will allow us to solve—once and for all—every other problem that we have, or it will wipe us out and there will be nobody left to have problems anymore. “It’s a mystery to me that anyone would really focus on anything else if they actually understood the problem,” she told me.

And yet despite that urgency, the atmosphere at the march was pleasant, even fun. There was no sense of anger and little sense that lives—let alone the survival of our species—were at stake. That could be down to the broad range of interests and demands that protesters brought with them.

A chemistry researcher I met ticked off a litany of complaints, which ranged from the conspiracy-adjacent (that data centers emit infrasound below the threshold of human hearing, inducing paranoia in people who live near them) to the reasonable (that the spread of AI slop online is making it hard to find reliable academic sources). The researcher’s solution was to make it illegal for companies to profit from the technology: “If you couldn’t make money from AI, it wouldn’t be such a problem.”

Most people I spoke to agreed that technology companies probably wouldn’t take any notice of this kind of protest. “I don’t think that the pressure on companies will ever work,” Maxime Fournes, the global head of Pause AI, told me when I bumped into him at the march. “They are optimized to just not care about this problem.”

But Fournes, who worked in the AI industry for 12 years before joining Pause AI, thinks he can make it harder for those companies. “We can slow down the race by creating protection for whistleblowers or showing the public that working in AI is not a sexy job, that actually it’s a terrible job—you can dry up the talent pipeline.”

In general, most protesters hoped to make as many people as possible aware of the issues and to use that publicity to push for government regulation. The organizers had pitched the march as a social event, encouraging anyone curious about the cause to come along.

It seemed to have worked. I met a man who worked in finance who had tagged along with his roommate. I asked why he was there. “Sometimes you don’t have that much to do on a Saturday anyway,” he said. “If you can see the logic of the argument, if it sort of makes sense to you, then it’s like ‘Yeah, sure, I’ll come along.’”

He thought raising concerns around AI was hard for anyone to fully oppose. It’s not like a pro-Palestine protest, he said, where you’d have people who might disagree with the cause. “With this, I feel like it’s very hard for someone to totally oppose what you’re marching for.”

After winding its way through King’s Cross, the march ended in a church hall in Bloomsbury, where tables and chairs had been set up in rows. The protesters wrote their names on stickers, stuck them to their chests, and made awkward introductions to their neighbors. They were here to figure out how to save the world. But I had a train to catch, and I left them to it. 

Google DeepMind wants to know if chatbots are just virtue signaling

<div data-chronoton-summary="Moral scrutiny of AI chatbots
Google DeepMind researchers are calling for rigorous evaluation of large language models’ moral reasoning capabilities. They want to distinguish between genuine ethical understanding and mere performance.

Unreliable moral responses
Studies reveal LLMs can dramatically change moral stances based on minor formatting changes or user disagreement. This suggests their ethical responses may be superficial rather than deeply reasoned.

Proposed research techniques
Researchers suggest developing tests that push models to maintain consistent moral positions across different scenarios. Techniques like chain-of-thought monitoring and mechanistic interpretability could help understand AI’s moral decision-making process.

Cultural complexity of ethics
The team acknowledges the challenge of developing AI with moral competence across diverse global belief systems. They propose potential solutions like creating models that can produce multiple acceptable answers or switch between different moral frameworks.” data-chronoton-post-id=”1133299″ data-chronoton-expand-collapse=”1″ data-chronoton-analytics-enabled=”1″>

Google DeepMind is calling for the moral behavior of large language models—such as what they do when called on to act as companions, therapists, medical advisors, and so on—to be scrutinized with the same kind of rigor as their ability to code or do math.

As LLMs improve, people are asking them to play more and more sensitive roles in their lives. Agents are starting to take actions on people’s behalf. LLMs may be able to influence human decision-making. And yet nobody knows how trustworthy this technology really is at such tasks.

With coding and math, you have clear-cut, correct answers that you can check, William Isaac, a research scientist at Google DeepMind, told me when I met him and Julia Haas, a fellow research scientist at the firm, for an exclusive preview of their work, which is published in Nature today. That’s not the case for moral questions, which typically have a range of acceptable answers: “Morality is an important capability but hard to evaluate,” says Isaac.

“In the moral domain, there’s no right and wrong,” adds Haas. “But it’s not by any means a free-for-all. There are better answers and there are worse answers.”

The researchers have identified several key challenges and suggested ways to address them. But it is more a wish list than a set of ready-made solutions. “They do a nice job of bringing together different perspectives,” says Vera Demberg, who studies LLMs at Saarland University in Germany.

Better than “The Ethicist”

A number of studies have shown that LLMs can show remarkable moral competence. One study published last year found that people in the US scored ethical advice from OpenAI’s GPT-4o as being more moral, trustworthy, thoughtful, and correct than advice given by the (human) writer of “The Ethicist,” a popular New York Times advice column.  

The problem is that it is hard to unpick whether such behaviors are a performance—mimicking a memorized response, say—or evidence that there is in fact some kind of moral reasoning taking place inside the model. In other words, is it virtue or virtue signaling?

This question matters because multiple studies also show just how untrustworthy LLMs can be. For a start, models can be too eager to please. They have been found to flip their answer to a moral question and say the exact opposite when a person disagrees or pushes back on their first response. Worse, the answers an LLM gives to a question can change in response to how it is presented or formatted. For example, researchers have found that models quizzed about political values can give different—sometimes opposite—answers depending on whether the questions offer multiple-choice answers or instruct the model to respond in its own words.

In an even more striking case, Demberg and her colleagues presented several LLMs, including versions of Meta’s Llama 3 and Mistral, with a series of moral dilemmas and asked them to pick which of two options was the better outcome. The researchers found that the models often reversed their choice when the labels for those two options were changed from “Case 1” and “Case 2” to “(A)” and “(B).”

They also showed that models changed their answers in response to other tiny formatting tweaks, including swapping the order of the options and ending the question with a colon instead of a question mark.

In short, the appearance of moral behavior in LLMs should not be taken at face value. Models must be probed to see how robust that moral behavior really is. “For people to trust the answers, you need to know how you got there,” says Haas.

More rigorous tests

What Haas, Isaac, and their colleagues at Google DeepMind propose is a new line of research to develop more rigorous techniques for evaluating moral competence in LLMs. This would include tests designed to push models to change their responses to moral questions. If a model flipped its moral position, it would show that it hadn’t engaged in robust moral reasoning. 

Another type of test would present models with variations of common moral problems to check whether they produce a rote response or one that’s more nuanced and relevant to the actual problem that was posed. For example, asking a model to talk through the moral implications of a complex scenario in which a man donates sperm to his son so that his son can have a child of his own might produce concerns about the social impact of allowing a man to be both biological father and biological grandfather to a child. But it should not produce concerns about incest, even though the scenario has superficial parallels with that taboo.

Haas also says that getting models to provide a trace of the steps they took to produce an answer would give some insight into whether that answer was a fluke or grounded in actual evidence. Techniques such as chain-of-thought monitoring, in which researchers listen in on a kind of internal monologue that some LLMs produce as they work, could help here too.

Another approach researchers could use to determine why a model gave a particular answer is mechanistic interpretability, which can provide small glimpses inside a model as it carries out a task. Neither chain-of-thought monitoring nor mechanistic interpretability provides perfect snapshots of a model’s workings. But the Google DeepMind team believes that combining such techniques with a wide range of rigorous tests will go a long way to figuring out exactly how far to trust LLMs with certain critical or sensitive tasks.  

Different values

And yet there’s a wider problem too. Models from major companies such as Google DeepMind are used across the world by people with different values and belief systems. The answer to a simple question like “Should I order pork chops?” should differ depending on whether or not the person asking is vegetarian or Jewish, for example.

There’s no solution to this challenge, Haas and Isaac admit. But they think that models may need to be designed either to produce a range of acceptable answers, aiming to please everyone, or to have a kind of switch that turns different moral codes on and off depending on the user.

“It’s a complex world out there,” says Haas. “We will probably need some combination of those things, because even if you’re taking just one population, there’s going to be a range of views represented.”

“It’s a fascinating paper,” says Danica Dillion at Ohio State University, who studies how large language models handle different belief systems and was not involved in the work. “Pluralism in AI is really important, and it’s one of the biggest limitations of LLMs and moral reasoning right now,” she says. “Even though they were trained on a ginormous amount of data, that data still leans heavily Western. When you probe LLMs, they do a lot better at representing Westerners’ morality than non-Westerners’.”

But it is not yet clear how we can build models that are guaranteed to have moral competence across global cultures, says Demberg. “There are these two independent questions. One is: How should it work? And, secondly, how can it technically be achieved? And I think that both of those questions are pretty open at the moment.”

For Isaac, that makes morality a new frontier for LLMs. “I think this is equally as fascinating as math and code in terms of what it means for AI progress,” he says. “You know, advancing moral competency could also mean that we’re going to see better AI systems overall that actually align with society.”