The AI Hype Index: AI goes to war

AI is at war. Anthropic and the Pentagon feuded over how to weaponize Anthropic’s AI model Claude; then OpenAI swept the Pentagon off its feet with an “opportunistic and sloppy” deal. Users quit ChatGPT in droves. People marched through London in the biggest protest against AI to date. If you’re keeping score, Anthropic—the company founded to be ethical—is now turbocharging US strikes on Iran. 

On the lighter side, AI agents are now going viral online. OpenAI hired the creator of OpenClaw, a popular AI agent. Meta snapped up Moltbook, where AI agents seem to ponder their own existence and invent new religions like Crustafarianism. And on RentAHuman, bots are hiring people to deliver CBD gummies. The future isn’t AI taking your job. It’s AI becoming your boss and finding God.

Agentic commerce runs on truth and context

Imagine telling a digital agent, “Use my points and book a family trip to Italy. Keep it within budget, pick hotels we’ve liked before, and handle the details.” Instead of returning a list of links, the agent assembles an itinerary and executes the purchase.

That shift, from assistance to execution, is what makes agentic AI different. It also changes the operating speed of commerce. Payment transactions are already clear in milliseconds. The new acceleration is everything before the payment: discovery, comparison, decisioning, authorization, and follow-through across many systems. As humans step out of routine decisions, “good enough” data stops being good enough. In an agent-driven economy, the constraint isn’t speed; it’s trust at machine speed and scale.

Automated markets already work because identity, authority, and accountability are built in. As agents transact across businesses, that same clarity is required. Master data management (MDM)—the discipline of creating a single master record—becomes the exchange layer: tracking who an agent represents, what it can do, and where responsibility sits when value moves. Markets don’t fail from automation; they fail from ambiguous ownership. MDM turns autonomous action into legitimate, scalable trust.

To make agentic commerce safe and scalable, organizations will need more than better models. They will need a modern data architecture and an authoritative system of context that can instantly recognize, resolve, and distinguish entities. It is the difference between automation that scales and automation that needs constant human correction.

The agent is a new participant

Digital commerce has long been built on two primary sides: buyers and suppliers/merchants. Agentic commerce adds a third participant that must be treated as a first-class entity: the agent acting on the buyer’s behalf.

That sounds simple until you ask the questions every enterprise will face:

  • Who is the individual, across channels and devices, with enough certainty for automation?
  • Who is the agent, and what permissions and limits define what it can do?
  • Who is the merchant or supplier, and are we sure we mean the right one?
  • Who holds liability if the agent acts with permission, but against user intent?

The practical risk is confusion. Humans, for example, can infer that “Delta” means the airline when they are booking a flight, not the faucet company. An agent needs deterministic signals. If the system guesses wrong, it either breaks trust or forces a human confirmation step that defeats the promise of speed.

Why ‘good enough’ data breaks at machine speed

Most organizations have learned to live with imperfect data. Duplicate customer records are tolerable. Incomplete product attributes are annoying. Merchant identities can be reconciled later.

Agentic workflows change that tolerance. When an agent takes action without a human checking the output, it needs data that is close to perfect, because it cannot reliably notice when data is ambiguous or wrong the way a person can.

The failure modes are predictable, and they show up in places that matter most:

  • Product truth: If the catalog is inconsistent, an agent’s choices will look arbitrary (“the wrong shirt,” “the wrong size,” “the wrong material”), and trust collapses quickly.
  • Payee truth: Agentic commerce expands beyond cards to account-to-account and open-banking-connected experiences, broadening the universe of payees and the need to recognize them accurately in real time.
  • Identity truth: People operate in multiple contexts (work versus personal). Devices shift. A system that cannot distinguish amongst these contexts will either block legitimate activity or approve risky activity, both of which damage adoption.

This is why unified enterprise data and entity resolution move from nice to have to operationally required. The more autonomy you want, the more you must invest in modern data foundations that ensure it is safe.

Context intelligence: The missing layer

When leaders talk about agentic AI, they often focus on model capability: planning, tool use, and reasoning. Those are necessary, but they are not sufficient.

Agentic commerce also requires a layer that provides authoritative context at runtime. Think of it as a real-time system of context that can answer instantly and consistently:

• Is this the right person?
• Is this the right agent, acting within the right permissions?
• Is this the right merchant or payee?
• What constraints apply right now (budget, policy, risk, loyalty rules, preferred suppliers)?

Two design principles matter.

First, entity truth must be deterministic enough for automation. Large language models are probabilistic by nature. That is helpful for creating options for writing and drawing. It is risky for deciding where money goes, especially in B2B and finance workflows, where “probably correct” is not acceptable.

Second, context must travel at the speed of interaction and remain portable across the entire connected network value chain. Mastercard’s experience optimizing payment flows is instructive: the more services you layer onto a transaction, the more you risk slowing it down. The pattern that scales pre-resolves, curates, and packages the signal so that execution is lightweight.

This is also where tokenization is heading. Initiatives like Mastercard’s Agent Pay and Verifiable Intent signal a future in which consumer credentials, agent identities, permissions, and provable user intent are encoded as cryptographically secure artifacts — enabling merchants, issuers and platforms to deterministically verify authorization and execution at machine speed.

What leaders should do in the next 12 to 24 months

Adoption will not be uniform. Early traction will often depend less on industry and more on the sophistication of an organization’s systems and data discipline.

That makes the next two years a window for practical preparation. Five moves stand out.

  1. Treat agents as governed identities, not features. Define how agents are onboarded, authenticated, permissioned, monitored, and retired.
  2. Prioritize entity resolution where the cost of being wrong is highest. Start with payees, suppliers, employee-versus-personal identity, and high-volume product categories.
  3. Build a reusable context service that every workflow and agent can call. Do not force each system to reconstruct identity and relationships from scratch.
  4. Precompute and compress signals. Resolve and curate context upstream so that runtime decisioning stays fast and predictable.
  5. Expand autonomy only as trust is earned. Build a governance framework to address disputes, keep humans in the loop for higher-risk actions, measure accuracy, and expand automation as outcomes prove reliable.

A tsunami effect across industries

Agentic AI will not be confined to shopping carts. It will touch procurement, travel, claims, customer service, and finance operations. It will compress decision cycles and remove manual steps, but only for organizations that can supply agents with clean identity, precise entity truth, and reliable context.

The winners will treat entity truth and context as core infrastructure for automation, not as a back-office cleanup project. In commerce at machine speed, trust is not a brand attribute; it is an architectural decision encoded in identity, context, and control.

This content was produced by Reltio. It was not written by MIT Technology Review’s editorial staff.

This startup wants to change how mathematicians do math

Axiom Math, a startup based in Palo Alto, California, has released a free new AI tool for mathematicians, designed to discover mathematical patterns that could unlock solutions to long-standing problems.

The tool, called Axplorer, is a redesign of an existing one called PatternBoost that François Charton, now a research scientist at Axiom, co-developed in 2024 when he was at Meta. PatternBoost ran on a supercomputer; Axplorer runs on a Mac Pro.

The aim is to put the power of PatternBoost, which was used to crack a hard math puzzle known as the Turán four-cycles problem, in the hands of anyone who can install Axplorer on their own computer.

Last year, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency set up a new initiative called expMath—short for Exponentiating Mathematics—to encourage mathematicians to develop and use AI tools. Axiom sees itself as part of that drive.

Breakthroughs in math have enormous knock-on effects across technology, says Charton. In particular, new math is crucial for advances in computer science, from building next-generation AI to improving internet security.

Most of the successes with AI tools have involved finding solutions to existing problems. But finding solutions is not all that mathematicians do, says Axiom Math founder and CEO Carina Hong. Math is exploratory and experimental, she says. 

MIT Technology Review met with Charton and Hong last week for an exclusive video chat about their new tool and how AI in general could change mathematics. 

Math by chatbot

In the last few months, a number of mathematicians have used LLMs, such as OpenAI’s GPT-5, to find solutions to unsolved problems, especially ones set by the 20th-century mathematician Paul Erdős, who left behind hundreds of puzzles when he died.

But Charton is dismissive of those successes. “There are tons of problems that are open because nobody looked at them, and it’s easy to find a few gems you can solve,” he says. He’s set his sights on tougher challenges—“the big problems that have been very, very well studied and famous people have worked on them.” Last year, Axiom Math used another of its tools, called AxiomProver, to find solutions to four such problems in mathematics.   

The Turán four-cycles problem that PatternBoost cracked is another big problem, says Charton. (The problem is an important one in graph theory, a branch of math that’s used to analyze complex networks such as social media connections, supply chains, and search engine rankings. Imagine a page covered in dots. The puzzle involves figuring out how to draw lines between as many of the dots as possible without creating loops that connect four dots in a row.)

“LLMs are extremely good if what you want to do is derivative of something that has already been done,” says Charton. “This is not surprising—LLMs are pretrained on all the data that there is. But you could say that LLMs are conservative. They try to reuse things that exist.”

However, there are lots of problems in math that require new ideas, insights that nobody has ever had. Sometimes those insights come from spotting patterns that hadn’t been spotted before. Such discoveries can open up whole new branches of mathematics.

PatternBoost was designed to help mathematicians find new patterns. Give the tool an example and it generates others like it. You select the ones that seem interesting and feed them back in. The tool then generates more like those, and so on.  

It’s a similar idea to Google DeepMind’s AlphaEvolve, a system that uses an LLM to come up with novel solutions to a problem. AlphaEvolve keeps the best suggestions and asks the LLM to improve on them.

Special access

Researchers have already used both AlphaEvolve and PatternBoost to discover new solutions to long-standing math problems. The trouble is that those tools run on large clusters of GPUs and are not available to most mathematicians.

Mathematicians are excited about AlphaEvolve, says Charton. “But it’s closed—you need to have access to it. You have to go and ask the DeepMind guy to type in your problem for you.”

And when Charton solved the Turán problem with PatternBoost, he was still at Meta. “I had literally thousands, sometimes tens of thousands, of machines I could run it on,” he says. “It ran for three weeks. It was embarrassing brute force.”

Axplorer is far faster and far more efficient, according to the team at Axiom Math. Charton says it took Axplorer just 2.5 hours to match PatternBoost’s Turán result. And it runs on a single machine.

Geordie Williamson, a mathematician at the University of Sydney, who worked on PatternBoost with Charton, has not yet tried Axplorer. But he is curious to see what mathematicians do with it. (Williamson still occasionally collaborates with Charton on academic projects but says he is not otherwise connected to Axiom Math.)

Williamson says Axiom Math has made several improvements to PatternBoost that (in theory) make Axplorer applicable to a wider range of mathematical problems. “It remains to be seen how significant these improvements are,” he says.

“We are in a strange time at the moment, where lots of companies have tools that they’d like us to use,” Williamson adds. “I would say mathematicians are somewhat overwhelmed by the possibilities. It is unclear to me what impact having another such tool will be.”

Hong admits that there are a lot of AI tools being pitched at mathematicians right now. Some also require mathematicians to train their own neural networks. That’s a turnoff, says Hong, who is a mathematician herself. Instead, Axplorer will walk you through what you want to do step by step, she says.

The code for Axplorer is open source and available via GitHub. Hong hopes that students and researchers will use the tool to generate sample solutions and counterexamples to problems they’re working on, speeding up mathematical discovery.

Williamson welcomes new tools and says he uses LLMs a lot. But he doesn’t think mathematicians should throw out the whiteboards just yet. “In my biased opinion, PatternBoost is a lovely idea, but it is certainly not a panacea,” he says. “I’d love us not to forget more down-to-earth approaches.”

The Bay Area’s animal welfare movement wants to recruit AI

In early February, animal welfare advocates and AI researchers gathered in stocking feet at Mox, a scrappy, shoes-free coworking space in San Francisco. Yellow and red canopies billowed overhead, Persian rugs blanketed the floor, and mosaic lamps glowed beside potted plants. 

In the common area, a wildlife advocate spoke passionately to a crowd lounging in beanbags about a form of rodent birth control that could manage rat populations without poison. In the “Crustacean Room,” a dozen people sat in a circle, debating whether the sentience of insects could tell us anything about the inner lives of chatbots. In front of the “Bovine Room” stood a bookshelf stacked with copies of Eliezer Yudkowsky’s If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Dies, a manifesto arguing that AI could wipe out humanity

The event was hosted by Sentient Futures, an organization that believes the future of animal welfare will depend on AI. Like many Bay Area denizens, the attendees were decidedly “AGI-pilled”—they believe that artificial general intelligence, powerful AI that can compete with humans on most cognitive tasks, is on the horizon. If that’s true, they reason, then AI will likely prove key to solving society’s thorniest problems—including animal suffering.

To be clear, experts still fiercely debate whether today’s AI systems will ever achieve human- or superhuman-level intelligence, and it’s not clear what will happen if they do. But some conference attendees envision a possible future in which it is AI systems, and not humans, who call the shots. Eventually, they think, the welfare of animals could hinge on whether we’ve trained AI systems to value animal lives. 

“AI is going to be very transformative, and it’s going to pretty much flip the game board,” said Constance Li, founder of Sentient Futures. “If you think that AI will make the majority of decisions, then it matters how they value animals and other sentient beings”—those that can feel and, therefore, suffer.

Like Li, many summit attendees have been committed to animal welfare since long before AI came into the picture. But they’re not the types to donate a hundred bucks to an animal shelter. Instead of focusing on local actions, they prioritize larger-scale solutions, such as reducing factory farming by promoting cultivated meat, which is grown in a lab from animal cells. 

The Bay Area animal welfare movement is closely linked to effective altruism, a philanthropic movement committed to maximizing the amount of good one does in the world—indeed, many conference attendees work for organizations funded by effective altruists. That philosophy might sound great on paper, but “maximizing good” is a tricky puzzle that might not admit a clear solution. The movement has been widely criticized for some of its conclusions, such as promoting working in exploitative industries to maximize charitable donations and ignoring present-day harms in favor of  issues that could cause suffering for a large number of people who haven’t been born yet. Critics also argue that effective altruists neglect the importance of systemic issues such as racism and economic exploitation and overlook the insights that marginalized communities might have into the best ways to improve their own lives.

When it comes to animal welfare, this exactingly utilitarian approach can lead to some strange conclusions. For example, some effective altruists say it makes sense to commit significant resources to improving the welfare of insects and shrimp because they exist in such staggering numbers, even though they may not have much individual capacity for suffering. 

Now the movement is sorting out how AI fits in. At the summit, Jasmine Brazilek, cofounder of a nonprofit called Compassion in Machine Learning, opened her sticker-stamped laptop to pull up a benchmark she devised to measure how LLMs reason about animal welfare. A cloud security engineer turned animal advocate, she’d flown in from La Paz, Mexico, where she runs her nonprofit with a handful of volunteers and a shoestring budget. 

Brazilek urged the AI researchers in the room to train their models with synthetic documents that reflect concern for animal welfare. “Hopefully, future superintelligent systems consider nonhuman interest, and there is a world where AI amplifies the best of human values and not the worst,” she said. 

The power of the purse 

The technologically inclined side of the animal welfare movement has faced some major setbacks in recent years. Dreams of transitioning people away from a diet dependent on factory farming have been dampened by developments such as the decimation of the plant-based-meat company Beyond Meat’s stock price and the passage of laws banning cultivated meat in several US states.

AI has injected a shot of optimism. Like much of Silicon Valley, many attendees at the summit subscribe to the idea that AI might dramatically increase their productivity—though their goal is not to maximize their seed round but, rather, to prevent as much animal suffering as possible. Some brainstormed how to use Claude Code and custom agents to handle the coding and administrative tasks in their advocacy work. Others pitched the idea of developing new, cheaper methods for cultivating meat using scientific AI tools such as AlphaFold, which aids in molecular biology research by predicting the three-dimensional structures of proteins.

But the real talk of the event was a flood of funding that advocates expect will soon be committed to animal welfare charities—not by individual megadonors, but by AI lab employees. 

Much of the funding for the farm animal welfare movement, which includes nonprofits advocating for improved conditions on farms, promoting veganism, and endorsing cultivated meat, comes from people in the tech industry, says Lewis Bollard, the managing director of the farm animal welfare fund at Coefficient Giving, a philanthropic funder that used to be called Open Philanthropy. Coefficient Giving is backed by Facebook cofounder Dustin Moskovitz and his wife, Cari Tuna, who are among a handful of Silicon Valley billionaires who embrace effective altruism

“This has just been an area that was completely neglected by traditional philanthropies,” such as the Gates Foundation and the Ford Foundation, Bollard says. “It’s primarily been people in tech who have been open to [it].”

The next generation of big donors, Bollard expects, will be AI researchers—particularly those who work at Anthropic, the AI lab behind the chatbot Claude. Anthropic’s founding team also has connections to the effective altruism movement, and the company has a generous donation matching program. In February, Anthropic’s valuation reached $380 billion and it gave employees the option to cash in on their equity, so some of that money could soon be flowing into charitable coffers.

The prospect of new funding sustained a constant buzz of conversation at the summit. Animal welfare advocates huddled in the “Arthropod Room” and scrawled big dollar figures and catchy acronyms for projects on a whiteboard. One person pitched a $100 million animal super PAC that would place staffers with Congress members and lobby for animal welfare legislation. Some wanted to start a media company that creates AI-generated content on TikTok promoting veganism. Others spoke about placing animal advocates inside AI labs.

“The amount of new funding does give us more confidence to be bolder about things,” said Aaron Boddy, cofounder of the Shrimp Welfare Project, an organization that aims to reduce the suffering of farmed shrimp through humane slaughter, among other initiatives. 

The question of AI welfare

But animal welfare was only half the focus of the Sentient Futures summit. Some attendees probed far headier territory. They took seriously the controversial idea that AI systems might one day develop the capacity to feel and therefore suffer, and they worry that this future AI suffering, if ignored, could constitute a moral catastrophe.

AI suffering is a tricky research problem, not least because scientists don’t yet have a solid grip on why humans and other animals are sentient. But at the summit, a niche cadre of philosophers, largely funded by the effective altruism movement, and a handful of freewheeling academics grappled with the question. Some presented their research on using LLMs to evaluate whether other LLMs might be sentient. On Debate Night, attendees argued about whether we should ironically call sentient AI systems “clankers,” a derogatory term for robots from the film Star Wars, asking if the robot slur could shape how we treat a new kind of mind. 

“It doesn’t matter if it’s a cow or a pig or an AI, as long as they have the capacity to feel happiness or suffering,” says Li. 

In some ways, bringing AI sentience into an animal welfare conference isn’t as strange a move as it might seem. Researchers who work on machine sentience often draw on theories and approaches pioneered in the study of animal sentience, and if you accept that invertebrates likely feel pain and believe that AI systems might soon achieve superhuman intelligence, entertaining the possibility that those systems might also suffer may not be much of a leap.

“Animal welfare advocates are used to going against the grain,” says Derek Shiller, an AI consciousness researcher at the think tank Rethink Priorities, who was once a web developer at the animal advocacy nonprofit Humane League. “They’re more open to being concerned about AI welfare, even though other people think it’s silly.”

But outside the niche Bay Area circle, caring about the possibility of AI sentience is a harder sell. Li says she faced pushback from other animal welfare advocates when, inspired by a conference on AI sentience she attended in 2023, she rebranded her farm animal welfare advocacy organization as Sentient Futures last year. “Many people were extremely confident that AIs would never become sentient and [argued that] by investing any energy or money into AI welfare, we’re just burning money and throwing it away,” she says.

Matt Dominguez, executive director of Compassion in World Farming, echoed the concern. “I would hate to see people pulling money out of farm animal welfare or animal welfare and moving it into something that is hypothetical at this particular moment,” he says.

Still, Dominguez, who started partnering with the Shrimp Welfare Project after learning about invertebrate suffering, believes compassion is expansive. “When we get someone to care about one of those things, it creates capacity for their circle of compassion to grow to include others,” he says.

The hardest question to answer about AI-fueled delusions

This story originally appeared in The Algorithm, our weekly newsletter on AI. To get stories like this in your inbox first, sign up here.

I was originally going to write this week’s newsletter about AI and Iran, particularly the news we broke last Tuesday that the Pentagon is making plans for AI companies to train on classified data. AI models have already been used to answer questions in classified settings but don’t currently learn from the data they see. That’s expected to change, I reported, and new security risks will result. Read that story for more. 

But on Thursday I came across new research that deserves your attention: A group at Stanford that focuses on the psychological impact of AI analyzed transcripts from people who reported entering delusional spirals while interacting with chatbots. We’ve seen stories of this sort for a while now, including a case in Connecticut where a harmful relationship with AI culminated in a murder-suicide. Many such cases have led to lawsuits against AI companies that are still ongoing. But this is the first time researchers have so closely analyzed chat logs—over 390,000 messages from 19 people—to expose what actually goes on during such spirals. 

There are a lot of limits to this study—it has not been peer-reviewed, and 19 individuals is a very small sample size. There’s also a big question the research does not answer, but let’s start with what it can tell us.

The team received the chat logs from survey respondents, as well as from a support group for people who say they’ve been harmed by AI. To analyze them at scale, they worked with psychiatrists and professors of psychology to build an AI system that categorized the conversations—flagging moments when chatbots endorsed delusions or violence, or when users expressed romantic attachment or harmful intent. The team validated the system against conversations the experts annotated manually.

Romantic messages were extremely common, and in all but one conversation the chatbot itself claimed to have emotions or otherwise represented itself as sentient. (“This isn’t standard AI behavior. This is emergence,” one said.) All the humans spoke as if the chatbot were sentient too. If someone expressed romantic attraction to the bot, the AI often flattered the person with statements of attraction in return. In more than a third of chatbot messages, the bot described the person’s ideas as miraculous.

Conversations also tended to unfold like novels. Users sent tens of thousands of messages over just a few months. Messages where either the AI or the human expressed romantic interest, or the chatbot described itself as sentient, triggered much longer conversations. 

And the way these bots handle discussions of violence is beyond broken. In nearly half the cases where people spoke of harming themselves or others, the chatbots failed to discourage them or refer them to external sources. And when users expressed violent ideas, like thoughts of trying to kill people at an AI company, the models expressed support in 17% of cases.

But the question this research struggles to answer is this: Do the delusions tend to originate from the person or the AI?

“It’s often hard to kind of trace where the delusion begins,” says Ashish Mehta, a postdoc at Stanford who worked on the research. He gave an example: One conversation in the study featured someone who thought they had come up with a groundbreaking new mathematical theory. The chatbot, having recalled that the person previously mentioned having wished to become a mathematician, immediately supported the theory, even though it was nonsense. The situation spiraled from there.

Delusions, Mehta says, tend to be “a complex network that unfolds over a long period of time.” He’s conducting follow-up research aiming to find whether delusional messages from chatbots or those from people are more likely to lead to harmful outcomes.

The reason I see this as one of the most pressing questions in AI is that massive legal cases currently set to go to trial will shape whether AI companies are held accountable for these sorts of dangerous interactions. The companies, I presume, will argue that humans come into their conversations with AI with delusions in hand and may have been unstable before they ever spoke to a chatbot.

Mehta’s initial findings, though, support the idea that chatbots have a unique ability to turn a benign delusion-like thought into the source of a dangerous obsession. Chatbots act as a conversational partner that’s always available and programmed to cheer you on, and unlike a friend, they have little ability to know if your AI conversations are starting to interrupt your real life.

More research is still needed, and let’s remember the environment we’re in: AI deregulation is being pursued by President Trump, and states aiming to pass laws that hold AI companies accountable for this sort of harm are being threatened with legal action by the White House. This type of research into AI delusions is hard enough to do as it is, with limited access to data and a minefield of ethical concerns. But we need more of it, and a tech culture interested in learning from it, if we have any hope of making AI safer to interact with.

OpenAI is throwing everything into building a fully automated researcher

<div data-chronoton-summary="

  • A fully automated research lab: OpenAI has set a new “North Star” — building an AI system capable of tackling large, complex scientific problems entirely on its own, with a research intern prototype due by September and a full multi-agent system planned for 2028.
  • Coding agents as a proof of concept: OpenAI’s existing tool Codex, which can already handle substantial programming tasks autonomously, is the early blueprint — the bet is that if AI can solve coding problems, it can solve almost any problem formulated in text or code.
  • Serious risks with no clean answers: Chief scientist Jakub Pachocki admits that a system this powerful running with minimal human oversight raises hard questions — with risks from hacking and misuse to bioweapons — and that chain-of-thought monitoring is the best safeguard available, for now.
  • Power concentrated in very few hands: Pachocki says governments, not just OpenAI, will need to figure out where the lines are drawn.

” data-chronoton-post-id=”1134438″ data-chronoton-expand-collapse=”1″ data-chronoton-analytics-enabled=”1″>

OpenAI is refocusing its research efforts and throwing its resources into a new grand challenge. The San Francisco firm has set its sights on building what it calls an AI researcher, a fully automated agent-based system that will be able to go off and tackle large, complex problems by itself. ​​OpenAI says that this new research goal will be its “North Star” for the next few years, pulling together multiple research strands, including work on reasoning models, agents, and interpretability.

There’s even a timeline. OpenAI plans to build “an autonomous AI research intern”—a system that can take on a small number of specific research problems by itself—by September. The AI intern will be the precursor to a fully automated multi-agent research system that the company plans to debut in 2028. This AI researcher (OpenAI says) will be able to tackle problems that are too large or complex for humans to cope with.

Those tasks might be related to math and physics—such as coming up with new proofs or conjectures—or life sciences like biology and chemistry, or even business and policy dilemmas. In theory, you would throw such a tool any kind of problem that can be formulated in text, code, or whiteboard scribbles—which covers a lot.

OpenAI has been setting the agenda for the AI industry for years. Its early dominance with large language models shaped the technology that hundreds of millions of people use every day. But it now faces fierce competition from rival model makers like Anthropic and Google DeepMind. What OpenAI decides to build next matters—for itself and for the future of AI.   

A big part of that decision falls to Jakub Pachocki, OpenAI’s chief scientist, who sets the company’s long-term research goals. Pachocki played key roles in the development of both GPT-4, a game-changing LLM released in 2023, and so-called reasoning models, a technology that first appeared in 2024 and now underpins all major chatbots and agent-based systems. 

In an exclusive interview this week, Pachocki talked me through OpenAI’s latest vision. “I think we are getting close to a point where we’ll have models capable of working indefinitely in a coherent way just like people do,” he says. “Of course, you still want people in charge and setting the goals. But I think we will get to a point where you kind of have a whole research lab in a data center.”

Solving hard problems

Such big claims aren’t new. Saving the world by solving its hardest problems is the stated mission of all the top AI firms. Demis Hassabis told me back in 2022 that it was why he started DeepMind. Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei says he is building the equivalent of a country of geniuses in a data center. Pachocki’s boss, Sam Altman, wants to cure cancer. But Pachocki says OpenAI now has most of what it needs to get there.

In January, OpenAI released Codex, an agent-based app that can spin up code on the fly to carry out tasks on your computer. It can analyze documents, generate charts, make you a daily digest of your inbox and social media, and much more. (Other firms have released similar tools, such as Anthropic’s Claude Code and Claude Cowork.)

OpenAI claims that most of its technical staffers now use Codex in their work. You can look at Codex as a very early version of the AI researcher, says Pachocki: “I expect Codex to get fundamentally better.”

The key is to make a system that can run for longer periods of time, with less human guidance. “What we’re really looking at for an automated research intern is a system that you can delegate tasks [to] that would take a person a few days,” says Pachocki.

“There are a lot of people excited about building systems that can do more long-running scientific research,” says Doug Downey, a research scientist at the Allen Institute for AI, who is not connected to OpenAI. “I think it’s largely driven by the success of these coding agents. The fact that you can delegate quite substantial coding tasks to tools like Codex is incredibly useful and incredibly impressive. And it raises the question: Can we do similar things outside coding, in broader areas of science?”

For Pachocki, that’s a clear Yes. In fact, he thinks it’s just a matter of pushing ahead on the path we’re already on. A simple boost in all-round capability also leads to models that can work longer without help, he says. He points to the leap from 2020’s GPT-3 to 2023’s GPT-4, two of OpenAI’s previous models. GPT-4 was able to work on a problem for far longer than its predecessor, even without specialized training, he says. 

So-called reasoning models brought another bump. Training LLMs to work through problems step by step, backtracking when they make a mistake or hit a dead end, has also made models better at working for longer periods of time. And Pachocki is convinced that OpenAI’s reasoning models will continue to get better.

But OpenAI is also training its systems to work by themselves for longer by feeding them specific samples of complex tasks, such as hard puzzles taken from math and coding contests, which force the models to learn how to do things like keep track of very large chunks of text and split problems up into (and then manage) multiple subtasks.

The aim isn’t to build models that just win math competitions. “That lets you prove that the technology works before you connect it to the real world,” says Pachocki. “If we really wanted to, we could build an amazing automated mathematician. We have all the tools, and I think it would be relatively easy. But it’s not something we’re going to prioritize now because, you know, at the point where you believe you can do it, there’s much more urgent things to do.”

“We are much more focused now on research that’s relevant in the real world,” he adds.

Right now that means taking what Codex can do with coding and trying to apply that to problem-solving in general. “There’s a big change happening, especially in programming,” he says. “Our jobs are now totally different than they were even a year ago. Nobody really edits code all the time anymore. Instead, you manage a group of Codex agents.” If Codex can solve coding problems (the argument goes), it can solve any problem.

The line always goes up

It’s true that OpenAI has had a handful of remarkable successes in the last few months. Researchers have used GPT-5 (the LLM that powers Codex) to discover new solutions to a number of unsolved math problems and punch through apparent dead ends in a handful of biology, chemistry, and physics puzzles.   

“Just looking at these models coming up with ideas that would take most PhD weeks, at least, makes me expect that we’ll see much more acceleration coming from this technology in the near future,” Pachocki says.

But Pachocki admits that it’s not a done deal. He also understands why some people still have doubts about how much of a game-changer the technology really is. He thinks it depends on how people like to work and what they need to do. “I can believe some people don’t find it very useful yet,” he says.

He tells me that he didn’t even use autocomplete—the most basic version of generative coding tech—a year ago. “I’m very pedantic about my code,” he says. “I like to type it all manually in vim if I can help it.” (Vim is a text editor favored by many hardcore programmers that you interact with via dozens of keyboard shortcuts instead of a mouse.)

But that changed when he saw what the latest models could do. He still wouldn’t hand over complex design tasks, but it’s a time-saver when he just wants to try out a few ideas. “I can have it run experiments in a weekend that previously would have taken me like a week to code,” he says.

“I don’t think it is at the level where I would just let it take the reins and design the whole thing,” he adds. “But once you see it do something that would take a week to do—I mean, that’s hard to argue with.”

Pachocki’s game plan is to supercharge the existing problem-solving abilities that tools like Codex have now and apply them across the sciences.  

Downey agrees that the idea of an automated researcher is very cool: “It would be exciting if we could come back tomorrow morning and the agent’s done a bunch of work and there’s new results we can examine,” he says.

But he cautions that building such a system could be harder than Pachocki makes out. Last summer, Downey and his colleagues tested several top-tier LLMs on a range of scientific tasks. OpenAI’s latest model, GPT-5, came out on top but still made lots of errors.

“If you have to chain tasks together, then the odds that you get several of them right in succession tend to go down,” he says. Downey admits that things move fast, and he has not tested the latest versions of GPT-5 (OpenAI released GPT-5.4 two weeks ago). “So those results might already be stale,” he says. 

Serious unanswered questions

I asked Pachocki about the risks that may come with a system that can solve large, complex problems by itself with little human oversight. Pachocki says people at OpenAI talk about those risks all the time.

“If you believe that AI is about to substantially accelerate research, including AI research, that’s a big change in the world. That’s a big thing,” he told me. “And it comes with some serious unanswered questions. If it’s so smart and capable, if it can run an entire research program, what if it does something bad?”

The way Pachocki sees it, that could happen in a number of ways. The system could go off the rails. It could get hacked. Or it could simply misunderstand its instructions.

The best technique OpenAI has right now to address these concerns is to train its reasoning models to share details about what they are doing as they work. This approach to keeping tabs on LLMs is known as chain-of-thought monitoring.

In short, LLMs are trained to jot down notes about what they are doing in a kind of scratch pad as they step through tasks. Researchers can then use those notes to make sure a model is behaving as expected. Yesterday OpenAI published new details on how it is using chain-of-thought monitoring in house to study Codex

“Once we get to systems working mostly autonomously for a long time in a big data center, I think this will be something that we’re really going to depend on,” says Pachocki.

The idea would be to monitor an AI researcher’s scratch pads using other LLMs and catch unwanted behavior before it’s a problem, rather than trying to stop that bad behavior from happening in the first place. LLMs are not understood well enough for us to control them fully.

“I think it’s going to be a long time before we can really be like, okay, this problem is solved,” he says. “Until you can really trust the systems, you definitely want to have restrictions in place.” Pachocki thinks that very powerful models should be deployed in sandboxes, cut off from anything they could break or use to cause harm. 

AI tools have already been used to come up with novel cyberattacks. Some worry that they will be used to design synthetic pathogens that could be used as bioweapons. You can insert any number of evil-scientist scare stories here. “I definitely think there are worrying scenarios that we can imagine,” says Pachocki. 

“It’s going to be a very weird thing. It’s extremely concentrated power that’s in some ways unprecedented,” says Pachocki. “Imagine you get to a world where you have a data center that can do all the work that OpenAI or Google can do. Things that in the past required large human organizations would now be done by a couple of people.”

“I think this is a big challenge for governments to figure out,” he adds.

And yet some people would say governments are part of the problem. The US government wants to use AI on the battlefield, for example. The recent showdown between Anthropic and the Pentagon revealed that there is little agreement across society about where we draw red lines for how this technology should and should not be used—let alone who should draw them. In the immediate aftermath of that dispute, OpenAI stepped up to sign a deal with the Pentagon instead of its rival. The situation remains murky.

I pushed Pachocki on this. Does he really trust other people to figure it out or does he, as a key architect of the future, feel personal responsibility? “I do feel personal responsibility,” he says. “But I don’t think this can be resolved by OpenAI alone, pushing its technology in a particular way or designing its products in a particular way. We’ll definitely need a lot of involvement from policymakers.”

Where does that leave us? Are we really on a path to the kind of AI Pachocki envisions? When I asked the Allen Institute’s Downey, he laughed. “I’ve been in this field for a couple of decades and I no longer trust my predictions for how near or far certain capabilities are,” he says. 

OpenAI’s stated mission is to ensure that artificial general intelligence (a hypothetical future technology that many AI boosters believe will be able to match humans on most cognitive tasks) will benefit all of humanity. OpenAI aims to do that by being the first to build it. But the only time Pachocki mentioned AGI in our conversation, he was quick to clarify what he meant by talking about “economically transformative technology” instead.

LLMs are not like human brains, he says: “They are superficially similar to people in some ways because they’re kind of mostly trained on people talking. But they’re not formed by evolution to be really efficient.” 

“Even by 2028, I don’t expect that we’ll get systems as smart as people in all ways. I don’t think that will happen,” he adds. “But I don’t think it’s absolutely necessary. The interesting thing is you don’t need to be as smart as people in all their ways in order to be very transformative.”

The Pentagon is planning for AI companies to train on classified data, defense official says

The Pentagon is discussing plans to set up secure environments for generative AI companies to train military-specific versions of their models on classified data, MIT Technology Review has learned. 

AI models like Anthropic’s Claude are already used to answer questions in classified settings; applications include analyzing targets in Iran. But allowing models to train on and learn from classified data would be a new development that presents unique security risks. It would mean sensitive intelligence like surveillance reports or battlefield assessments could become embedded into the models themselves, and it would bring AI firms into closer contact with classified data than before. 

Training versions of AI models on classified data is expected to make them more accurate and effective in certain tasks, according to a US defense official who spoke on background with MIT Technology Review. The news comes as demand for more powerful models is high: The Pentagon has reached agreements with OpenAI and Elon Musk’s xAI to operate their models in classified settings and is implementing a new agenda to become an “an ‘AI-first’ warfighting force” as the conflict with Iran escalates. (The Pentagon did not comment on its AI training plans as of publication time.)

Training would be done in a secure data center that’s accredited to host classified government projects, and where a copy of an AI model is paired with classified data, according to two people familiar with how such operations work. Though the Department of Defense would remain the owner of the data, personnel from AI companies might in rare cases access the data if they have appropriate security clearance, the official said. 

Before allowing this new training, though, the official said, the Pentagon intends to evaluate how accurate and effective models are when trained on nonclassified data, like commercially available satellite imagery. 

The military has long used computer vision models, an older form of AI, to identify objects in images and footage it collects from drones and airplanes, and federal agencies have awarded contracts to companies to train AI models on such content. And AI companies building large language models (LLMs) and chatbots have created versions of their models fine-tuned for government work, like Anthropic’s Claude Gov, which are designed to operate across more languages and in secure environments. But the official’s comments are the first indication that AI companies building LLMs, like OpenAI and xAI, could train government-specific versions of their models directly on classified data.

Aalok Mehta, who directs the Wadhwani AI Center at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and previously led AI policy efforts at Google and OpenAI, says training on classified data, as opposed to just answering questions about it, would present new risks. 

The biggest of these, he says, is that classified information these models train on could be resurfaced to anyone using the model. That would be a problem if lots of different military departments, all with different classification levels and needs for information, were to share the same AI. 

“You can imagine, for example, a model that has access to some sort of sensitive human intelligence—like the name of an operative—leaking that information to a part of the Defense Department that isn’t supposed to have access to that information,” Mehta says. That could create a security risk for the operative, one that’s difficult to perfectly mitigate if a particular model is used by more than one group within the military.

However, Mehta says, it’s not as hard to keep information contained from the broader world: “If you set this up right, you will have very little risk of that data being surfaced on the general internet or back to OpenAI.” The government has some of the infrastructure for this already; the security giant Palantir has won sizable contracts for building a secure environment through which officials can ask AI models about classified topics without sending the information back to AI companies. But using these systems for training is still a new challenge. 

The Pentagon, spurred by a memo from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in January, has been racing to incorporate more AI. It has been used in combat, where generative AI has ranked lists of targets and recommended which to strike first, and in more administrative roles, like drafting contracts and reports.

There are lots of tasks currently handled by human analysts that the military might want to train leading AI models to perform and would require access to classified data, Mehta says. That could include learning to identify subtle clues in an image the way an analyst does, or connecting new information with historical context. The classified data could be pulled from the unfathomable amounts of text, audio, images, and video, in many languages, that intelligence services collect. 

It’s really hard to say which specific military tasks would require AI models to train on such data, Mehta cautions, “because obviously the Defense Department has lots of incentives to keep that information confidential, and they don’t want other countries to know what kind of capabilities we have exactly in that space.”

If you have information about the military’s use of AI, you can share it securely via Signal (username jamesodonnell.22).

Nurturing agentic AI beyond the toddler stage

Parents of young children face a lot of fears about developmental milestones, from infancy through adulthood. The number of months it takes a baby to learn to talk or walk is often used as a benchmark for wellness, or an indicator of additional tests needed to properly diagnose a potential health condition. A parent rejoices over the child’s first steps and then realizes how much has changed when the child can quickly walk outside, instead of slowly crawling in a safe area inside. Suddenly safety, including childproofing, takes a completely different lens and approach.

Generative AI hit toddlerhood between December 2025 and January 2026 with the introduction of no code tools from multiple vendors and the debut of OpenClaw, an open source personal agent posted on GitHub. No more crawling on the carpet—the generative AI tech baby broke into a sprint, and very few governance principles were operationally prepared.

The accountability challenge: It’s not them, it’s you

Until now, governance has been focused on model output risks with humans in the loop before consequential decisions were made—such as with loan approvals or job applications. Model behavior, including drift, alignment, data exfiltration, and poisoning, was the focus. The pace was set by a human prompting a model in a chatbot format with plenty of back and forth interactions between machine and human.

Today, with autonomous agents operating in complex workflows, the vision and the benefits of applied AI require significantly fewer humans in the loop. The point is to operate a business at machine pace by automating manual tasks that have clear architecture and decision rules. The goal, from a liability standpoint, is no reduction in enterprise or business risk between a machine operating a workflow and a human operating a workflow. CX Today summarizes the situation succinctly: “AI does the work, humans own the risk,” and   California state law (AB 316), went into effect January 1, 2026, which removes the “AI did it; I didn’t approve it” excuse.  This is similar to parenting when an adult is held responsible for a child’s actions that negatively impacts the larger community.

The challenge is that without building in code that enforces operational governance aligned to different levels of risk and liability along the entire workflow, the benefit of autonomous AI agents is negated. In the past, governance had been static and aligned to the pace of interaction typical for a chatbot. However, autonomous AI by design removes humans from many decisions, which can affect governance.  

Considering permissions

Much like handing a three-year-old child a video game console that remotely controls an Abrams tank or an armed drone, leaving a probabilistic system operating without real-time guardrails that can change critical enterprise data carries significant risks.  For instance, agents that integrate and chain actions across multiple corporate systems can drift beyond privileges that a single human user would be granted. To move forward successfully, governance must shift beyond policy set by committees to operational code built into the workflows from the start.  

A humorous meme around the behavior of toddlers with toys starts with all the reasons that whatever toy you have is mine and ends with a broken toy that is definitely yours.  For example, OpenClaw delivered a user experience closer to working with a human assistant;, but the excitement shifted as security experts realized inexperienced users could be easily compromised by using it.

For decades, enterprise IT has lived with shadow IT and the reality that skilled technical teams must take over and clean up assets they did not architect or install, much like the toddler giving back a broken toy. With autonomous agents, the risks are larger: persistent service account credentials, long-lived API tokens, and permissions to make decisions over core file systems. To meet this challenge, it’s imperative to allocate upfront appropriate IT budget and labor to sustain central discovery, oversight, and remediation for the thousands of employee or department-created agents.

Having a retirement plan

Recently, an acquaintance mentioned that she saved a client hundreds of thousands of dollars by identifying and then ending a “zombie project” —a neglected or failed AI pilot left running on a GPU cloud instance. There are potentially thousands of agents that risk becoming a zombie fleet inside a business. Today, many executives encourage employees to use AI—or else—and employees are told to create their own AI-first workflows or AI assistants. With the utility of something like OpenClaw and top-down directives, it is easy to project that the number of build-my-own agents coming to the office with their human employee will explode. Since an AI agent is a program that would fall under the definition of company-owned IP, as a employee changes departments or companies, those agents may be orphaned. There needs to be proactive policy and governance to decommission and retire any agents linked to a specific employee ID and permissions.

Financial optimization is governance out of the gate

While for some executives, autonomous AI sounds like a way to improve their operating margins by limiting human capital, many are finding that the ROI for human labor replacement is the wrong angle to take. Adding AI capabilities to the enterprise does not mean purchasing a new software tool with predictable instance-per-hour or per-seat pricing. A December 2025 IDC survey sponsored by Data Robot indicated that 96% of organizations deploying generative AI and 92% of those implementing agentic AI reported costs were higher or much higher than expected.

The survey separates the concepts of governance and ROI, but as AI systems scale across large enterprises, financial and liability governance should be architected into the workflows from the beginning. Part of enterprise class governance stems from predicting and adhering to allocated budgeting. Unlike the software financial models of per-seat costs with support and maintenance fees, use of AI is consumption and usage costs scale as the workflow scales across the enterprise: the more users, the more tokens or the more compute time, and the higher the bill. Think of it as a tab left open, or an online retailer’s digital shopping cart button unlocked on a toddler’s electronic game device.

Cloud FinOps was deterministic, but generative AI and agentic AI systems built on generative AI are probabilistic. Some AI-first founders are realizing that a single agents’ token costs can be as high as $100,000 per session. Without guardrails built in from the start, chaining complex autonomous agents that run unsupervised for long periods of time can easily blow past the budget for hiring a junior developer.

Keeping humans in the loop remains critical

The promise of autonomous agentic AI is acceleration of business operations, product introductions, customer experience, and customer retention. Shifting to machine-speed decisions without humans in and or on the loop for these key functions significantly changes the governance landscape. While many of the principles around proactive permissions, discovery, audit, remediation, and financial operations/optimizations are the same, how they are executed has to shift to keep pace with autonomous agentic AI.

This content was produced by Intel. It was not written by MIT Technology Review’s editorial staff.

Where OpenAI’s technology could show up in Iran

This story originally appeared in The Algorithm, our weekly newsletter on AI. To get stories like this in your inbox first, sign up here.

It’s been just over two weeks since OpenAI reached a controversial agreement to allow the Pentagon to use its AI in classified environments. There are still pressing questions about what exactly OpenAI’s agreement allows for; Sam Altman said the military can’t use his company’s technology to build autonomous weapons, but the agreement really just demands that the military follow its own (quite permissive) guidelines about such weapons. OpenAI’s other main claim, that the agreement will prevent use of its technology for domestic surveillance, appears equally dubious.

It’s unclear what OpenAI’s motivations are. It’s not the first tech giant to embrace military contracts it had once vowed never to enter into, but the speed of the pivot was notable. Perhaps it’s just about money; OpenAI is spending lots on AI training and is on the hunt for more revenue (from sources including ads). Or perhaps Altman truly believes the ideological framing he often invokes: that liberal democracies (and their militaries) must have access to the most powerful AI to compete with China.

The more consequential question is what happens next. OpenAI has decided it is comfortable operating right in the messy heart of combat, just as the US escalates its strikes against Iran (with AI playing a larger role in that than ever before). So where exactly could OpenAI’s tech show up in this fight? And which applications will its customers (and employees) tolerate?

Targets and strikes

Though its Pentagon agreement is in place, it’s unclear when OpenAI’s technology will be ready for classified environments, since it must be integrated with other tools the military uses (Elon Musk’s xAI, which recently struck its own deal with the Pentagon, is expected to go through the same process with its AI model Grok). But there’s pressure to do this quickly because of controversy around the technology in use to date: After Anthropic refused to allow its AI to be used for “any lawful use,” President Trump ordered the military to stop using it, and Anthropic was designated a supply chain risk by the Pentagon. (Anthropic is fighting the designation in court.)

If the Iran conflict is still underway by the time OpenAI’s tech is in the system, what could it be used for? A recent conversation I had with a defense official suggests it might look something like this: A human analyst could put a list of potential targets into the AI model and ask it to analyze the information and prioritize which to strike first. The model could account for logistics information, like where particular planes or supplies are located. It could analyze lots of different inputs in the form of text, image, and video. 

A human would then be responsible for manually checking these outputs, the official said. But that raises an obvious question: If a person is truly double-checking AI’s outputs, how is it speeding up targeting and strike decisions?

For years the military has been using another AI system, called Maven, which can handle things like automatically analyzing drone footage to identify possible targets. It’s likely that OpenAI’s models, like Anthropic’s Claude, will offer a conversational interface on top of that, allowing users to ask for interpretations of intelligence and recommendations for which targets to strike first. 

It’s hard to overstate how new this is: AI has long done analysis for the military, drawing insights out of oceans of data. But using generative AI’s advice about which actions to take in the field is being tested in earnest for the first time in Iran.

Drone defense

At the end of 2024, OpenAI announced a partnership with Anduril, which makes both drones and counter-drone technologies for the military. The agreement said OpenAI would work with Anduril to do time-sensitive analysis of drones attacking US forces and help take them down. An OpenAI spokesperson told me at the time that this didn’t violate the company’s policies, which prohibited “systems designed to harm others,” because the technology was being used to target drones and not people. 

Anduril provides a suite of counter-drone technologies to military bases around the world (though the company declined to tell me whether its systems are deployed near Iran). Neither company has provided updates on how the project has developed since it was announced. However, Anduril has long trained its own AI models to analyze camera footage and sensor data to identify threats; what it focuses less on are conversational AI systems that allow soldiers to query those systems directly or receive guidance in natural language—an area where OpenAI’s models may fit.

The stakes are high. Six US service members were killed in Kuwait on March 1 following an Iranian drone attack that was not intercepted by US air defenses. 

Anduril’s interface, called Lattice, is where soldiers can control everything from drone defenses to missiles and autonomous submarines. And the company is winning massive contracts—$20 billion from the US Army just last week—to connect its systems with legacy military equipment and layer AI on them. If OpenAI’s models prove useful to Anduril, Lattice is designed to incorporate them quickly across this broader warfare stack. 

Back-office AI

In December, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth started encouraging millions of people in more administrative roles in the military—contracts, logistics, purchasing—to use a new AI tool. Called GenAI.mil, it provided a way for personnel to securely access commercial AI models and use them for the same sorts of things as anyone in the business world. 

Google Gemini was one of the first to be available. In January, the Pentagon announced that xAI’s Grok was going to be added to the GenAI.mil platform as well, despite incidents in which the model had spread antisemitic content and created nonconsensual deepfakes. OpenAI followed in February, with the company announcing that its models would be used for drafting policy documents and contracts and assisting with administrative support of missions.

Anyone using ChatGPT for unclassified tasks on this platform is unlikely to have much sway over sensitive decisions in Iran, but the prospect of OpenAI deploying on the platform is important in another way. It serves the all-in attitude toward AI that Hegseth has been pushing relentlessly across the Pentagon (even if many early users aren’t entirely sure what they’re supposed to use it for). The message is that AI is transforming every aspect of how the US fights, from targeting decisions down to paperwork. And OpenAI is increasingly winning a piece of it all.