The involuntary criminals behind pig-butchering scams

This story first appeared in China Report, MIT Technology Review’s newsletter about technology developments in China. Sign up to receive it in your inbox every Tuesday.

There’s something so visceral about the phrase “pig-butchering scam.” The first time I came across it was in my reporting a year ago, when I was looking into how strange LinkedIn connection requests turned out to be from crypto scammers. 

As I wrote then, fraudsters were creating “fake profiles on social media sites or dating sites, [to] connect with victims, build virtual and often romantic relationships, and eventually persuade the victims to transfer over their assets.” The name, which scammers themselves came up with, compares the lengthy, involved trust-building process to what it’s like to grow a pig for slaughter. It’s a tactic that has been used to steal millions of dollars from victims on LinkedIn and other platforms. You can read that story here

But there are also other, far more dire consequences to these scams. And over the past few weeks, I’ve noticed growing attention, in both the US and China, to the scammers behind these crimes, who are often victims of the scams themselves. A new book in English, a movie in Chinese, and a slew of media reports in both languages are now shining light on the fascinating (and horrifying) aspects of a scary trend in human trafficking.

For a sense of scale, just last week Binance, one of the largest crypto exchanges, released data showing a huge jump in the number of pig-butchering scams reported to the company: an increase of 100.5% from 2022 to 2023, even though there are still a few months left in this year. 

This kind of fraud is the subject of a new Chinese movie that unexpectedly became a box-office hit. No More Bets is centered on two Chinese people who are lured to Myanmar with the promise of high-paying jobs; once trapped abroad, they are forced to become scammers, though—spoiler alert—they eventually manage to escape. But many of their fellow victims are abused, raped, or even killed for trying to do the same.

While the plot is fictional, it was adapted from dozens of interviews the movie crew conducted with real victims, some of which are shown at the end of the film. (I’ll probably check out the movie when it premieres in the US on August 31.)

Many low-level scammers have in fact been coerced into conducting crimes. They leave their homes with the hope of getting stable employment, but once they find themselves in a foreign country—usually Myanmar, Cambodia, or the Philippines—they are held captive and unable to leave.

Since the movie came out on August 8, it has made nearly $470 million at the box office, placing it among the top 10 highest-grossing movies worldwide this year, even though it was only screened in China. It has also dominated social media discourse in China, inspiring over a dozen trending topics on Weibo and other platforms. 

At the same time, investigative reports from Chinese journalists have corroborated the credibility of the movie’s plot. In a podcast published earlier this month, one Chinese-Malaysian victim told Wang Zhian, an exiled Chinese investigative journalist, about his experience of being lied to by job recruiters and forced to become a scammer in the Philippines. There, 80% of his colleagues were from mainland China, with the rest from Taiwan and Malaysia. 

Many of them are from rural areas and have little education. But as another Chinese publication recently reported, scammer groups are increasingly looking to recruit highly educated people as they target more Chinese students overseas, or even English-speaking populations. 

Chinese people are no strangers to telecom fraud and online scams, but the recent wave of attention has made them aware of how globalized these scams have become. It has also tarnished the reputation of Southeast Asian countries, which are now struggling to attract Chinese tourists.  

These days, if you type “Myanmar” into Douyin, the Chinese version of TikTok, all autocompletes are related to the pig-butchering scams, like the “self-told story of someone who escaped from Myanmar.” There are still videos promoting Myanmar to tourists, but the comment sections are filled with viewers who insinuate that the Burmese video creators are working for the human-trafficking groups. Myanmar even recently tried to work with a Chinese province to promote tourism, and most social media responses were negative

Meanwhile, in the US, Number Go Up, a new book about cryptocurrencies by Bloomberg reporter Zeke Faux, is out next month. Faux traveled to Sihanoukville in southwestern Cambodia, where criminal gangs orchestrate pig-butchering scams. It was once a prosperous casino town for Chinese businesspeople (gambling is outlawed in China). But after the Cambodian government turned against gambling, and the pandemic made international travel difficult, the gambling gangs turned their casinos into online scam operation centers. 

Faux visited one giant compound called “Chinatown,” where scam victims are trapped and isolated from the outside world by metal gates. Neighbors told Faux of frequent suicides: “If an ambulance doesn’t go inside at least twice a week, it is a wonder.” One victim told him he had to hide a phone in his rectum to get in touch with someone outside and escape. 

But stories of successful escapes are rare. Even though the Chinese government announced in mid-August that it would work more with Southeast Asian countries to crack down on these criminal activities, it remains to be seen how successful those efforts will be. In the case of Cambodia, international law enforcement actions so far have been obstructed by alleged corruption on the ground, according to a recent investigation by the New York Times.

As I reported last year, there are many factors that make it hard to hold these scammers accountable: their use of crypto, the weak government control in the regions where they operate, and the criminals’ ever-changing tactics and platform choices. But the fact that both reporting and pop culture are starting to draw attention to where and how these criminal groups operate could be a good first step toward justice.

What solution do you think can help reduce the number of pig-butchering scams? Let me know your thoughts at zeyi@technologyreview.com

Catch up with China

1. Forbes got a copy of a draft proposal from 2022 that would address national security concerns related to TikTok. While it is unclear whether the draft is still being considered a year later, it shows that the US government wanted unprecedented control over the platform’s internal data and essential functions. (Forbes)

2. After Japan started releasing treated radioactive water into the ocean last week, the Chinese government protested by banning seafood imports from the country. (CNN)

  • Many Chinese people are also mad about the release and have resolved to harass Japanese businesses with phone calls. (Al Jazeera)

3. The US commerce secretary, Gina Raimondo, visited Beijing on Monday, making her the latest high-ranking Biden administration official to travel to the country. She agreed with her Chinese counterpart that they would launch an “information exchange” on export controls. (Associated Press)

4. A new type of battery developed by the Chinese company CATL can make fast charging for EVs even faster. (MIT Technology Review)

5. The Biden administration is hoping to secure a six-month extension of the Science and Technology Agreement with China, a 44-year-old document that fosters scientific collaboration. (NBC News)

6. Chinese ultra-fast-fashion company Shein will acquire a one-third stake of Forever 21’s operating company, Sparc Group. In return, Sparc will gain a minority stake in Shein. The Chinese company will start selling Forever 21 apparel online, while Forever 21 will take Shein products to its physical stores. (Wall Street Journal $)

7. DiDi, the troubled Chinese ride-hailing giant, is selling its electric-vehicle business to XPeng, a Chinese EV company. (Reuters $)

Lost in translation

Currently, there are over 2,700 online hospitals in China, where people can get diagnoses and prescriptions completely online. Because many of these platforms are able to come up with a prescription in less than two minutes, there’s widespread suspicion that they are risking patient health by relying on ChatGPT-like models. 

Last week, the industry was put on notice after Beijing’s Municipal Health Commission drafted a new regulation to ban AI-generated prescriptions. According to Sailing Health, a Chinese medical news publication, the city-wide regulation repeats and reinforces a March 2022 national policy that instituted the same kind of ban, but the new proposal comes at a time when people have started to see what large language models are capable of and when a few tech platforms have already started experimenting with medical AI. 

Following news of the new proposal, JD Health, one of the leading digital health-care platforms in China, told the publication that its AI features are currently used only to match patients with doctors and help doctors increase productivity. Medlinker, a Chinese internet startup that announced an AI product in May, responded that the product, called MedGPT, is still in internal testing and hasn’t been used in any external services. 

One more thing

NBA star James Harden was having a lot of fun during a recent trip to China. When Harden promoted his new wine brand on the Douyin livestream e-commerce channel of Chinese influencer Crazy Young Brother, he was shocked that the first batch of 10,000 bottles (sold in bundles of two for $60) sold out in only 14 seconds. After a second batch of 6,000 bottles also sold out in seconds, Harden was so excited that he did a cartwheel in the back of the room.

Is the digital dollar dead?

It’s summer 2020. The world is under a series of lockdowns as the pandemic continues to run its course. And in academic and foreign policy circles, digital currencies are one of the hottest topics in town. 

China is well on its way to launching its own central bank digital currency, or CBDC, and many other countries have launched CBDC research projects. Even Facebook has proposed a global digital currency, called Libra

So when the Boston branch of the US Federal Reserve announces Project Hamilton, a collaboration with MIT’s Digital Currency Initiative, to research how a CBDC might be technically designed—it doesn’t raise many eyebrows. A hypothetical US central bank digital currency is hardly controversial, after all. And the US cannot afford to be left behind.

How things change. Three years later, the digital dollar—even though it doesn’t exist and the Fed says it has no plans to issue one—has become political red meat. Tapping into voters’ widespread opposition to government surveillance, a group of anti-CBDC politicians has emerged with the message that the digital dollar is something to fear. 

It’s difficult to pinpoint when the dynamic changed, but a distinct brand of CBDC alarmism seemed to pick up after President Joe Biden signed an executive order in March 2022 stating that his administration would “[place] the highest urgency on research and development efforts into the potential design and deployment options of a United States CBDC.”  

Now legislators in both houses of Congress have introduced bills aimed at making sure a CBDC doesn’t see the light of day. Presidential candidates are even campaigning against it. 

“Anyone with their eyes open could see the danger this type of arrangement would mean for Americans who … would like to be able to conduct business without having the government know every single transaction they’re making in real time,” Florida governor Ron DeSantis, who is running for the Republican nomination for president, said in May. In campaign speeches, DeSantis has described a dystopian future in which the government uses its CBDC network to block people from buying guns or fossil fuel. 

Not only does the Fed have no plans to issue a digital currency, but it has repeatedly said it wouldn’t do so without authorization from Congress. How one might work—including how closely it might imitate physical cash—is still a wide-open question that can only be answered through research and testing. 

Project Hamilton’s goal was to build and test a prototype of just one component of a potential system: a way to securely and resiliently handle the same quantity of transactions that the major payment card networks process.

Hamilton’s first phase demonstrated a feasible technical approach, and the researchers promised a “Phase 2” that would explore sophisticated approaches to privacy and offline payments. But late last year, shortly after the project came under scrutiny from anti-CBDC legislators, the Boston Fed ended Hamilton. Now the sort of technical design research that Project Hamilton exemplified may have to come from outside the central bank, which prefers to remain politically neutral.  

And a digital dollar looks less likely than ever before.

The case for cash

Opponents of a hypothetical US CBDC cast it as a solution in search of a problem. Dollars are already digital, after all. If you paid with a debit card recently, did you not pay with digital dollars? China’s move to pilot a consumer central bank digital currency is not reason by itself to pursue one, they argue. Libra failed to launch; a global digital currency run by a tech company is no longer an issue. What purpose would a government-issued digital currency serve other than to give the government a tool for financial surveillance and control?

But there is a problem—probably one that you’ve noticed yourself. Physical cash is going away. Fewer and fewer vendors are accepting bills and coins. On top of that, consumers are simply choosing to use less cash. That’s in part out of convenience, but there’s another big reason: you can’t use cash to buy things on the internet.

In the US, cash payments represented just 18% of all payments in 2022—down from 31% in 2016, according to research by the San Francisco Fed. Outside the US, things are even further along the road to a cashless society. The decline of cash is a primary reason more than 100 countries are researching the idea of creating their own digital currencies. 

The solution is a digital currency with all the features of physical cash, according to Willamette University law professor Rohan Grey.

That we can’t use cash on Amazon is only one argument for government-issued digital cash, says Grey. In the US, plenty of people rely on bills and coins because they don’t have bank accounts and can’t get credit or debit cards. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation estimates that in 2021, 5.9 million US households were “unbanked.” Besides that, Grey argues, cash has unique “social features” that we should be careful to preserve, including its privacy and anonymity. No one can trace how you spend your coins and bills. “I think anonymity is a social good,” he says. 

Last year, Grey helped author a US House bill called the Electronic Currency and Secure Hardware Act (ECASH). The legislation, which was introduced by Representative Stephen Lynch of Massachusetts, would have directed the Department of Treasury to create a digital dollar that could be used both online and offline and have cash-like features, “including anonymity, privacy, and minimal generation of data from transaction.” It didn’t make it out of the Financial Services Committee, but Grey says there are plans to reintroduce it this year.

DeSantis and other CBDC opponents most likely agree with Grey that we should replicate the privacy of cash in digital form—after all, they claim to be defending Americans against a financial surveillance state. But whereas Grey is advocating for a government-controlled system, they seem to prefer something more like decentralized cryptocurrency networks, which are not controlled by any central authority. 

DeSantis recently signed a bill explicitly banning a “centralized” digital dollar in Florida, apparently leaving the door open for one that is decentralized. Representative Tom Emmer of Minnesota, who introduced a bill this year that would prohibit the Fed from issuing a digital currency, has said multiple times that a CBDC must be “open, permissionless, and private.” “Permissionless” is a term enthusiasts use for crypto networks like Bitcoin and Ethereum, which are open to anyone with an internet connection. Emmer, a Republican,  is one of Congress’s most outspoken crypto enthusiasts.

A spectrum of possible designs

It is not clear how currency issued by a central bank could ever be controlled by a permissionless crypto network. And Bitcoin and similar cryptocurrencies have privacy issues of their own. Though users are pseudonymous, information about the sender, the recipient, and the amount of every transaction is published on the blockchain. Investigators are skilled at using clues, like personal information that users share with crypto exchanges, to discover users’ real identities.

Either way, using a blockchain network won’t suffice, says Grey, because many of the same people who rely on cash also lack internet access. He envisions cards that could be tapped together or to smartphones to transfer value anonymously, online or offline. Like physical dollars, the digital stand-ins would be so-called bearer instruments, meaning that possession gives the holder rights to ownership. There are a number of unanswered technical questions about how to pull all this off securely, however—a fact that Grey acknowledges.

Unanswered technical questions were also the motivation behind Project Hamilton. The researchers set out to investigate possible designs for a “resilient transaction processor” that could handle at minimum tens of thousands of transactions per second, the capacity they determined necessary to handle the volume of retail transactions in the US. But they also sought to develop a transaction processor that was flexible enough in its design to leave open a range of options for other parts of the system, like technologies for privacy and offline payments. 

The software they came up with does not use a blockchain, but it borrows components from Bitcoin. Neha Narula, director of the Digital Currency Initiative at the MIT Media Lab, says it’s possible to break a blockchain system down into its component parts and then apply some but not all of those pieces in a different context. 

For example, one piece is a blockchain’s decentralized nature, which makes it possible to run a cryptocurrency system without relying on any one person to control it. The team decided that a CBDC would not need this property, since it would be run by a central bank. Another property of blockchains is known as Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT), which allows the network to keep functioning even if malicious participants are acting dishonestly. The Hamilton team decided they could assume that since the system would be run by a single central bank, there wouldn’t be malicious participants, and so BFT wouldn’t be required. 

Ditching BFT and decentralized governance has its benefits. In Bitcoin, maintaining them both makes the system expensive and slow to run, in part because data must be replicated on every computer on the network. The result is that Bitcoin can only process around seven transactions per second. In early 2022, the Hamilton team demonstrated a system capable of processing 1.7 million transactions per second—much faster than even the Visa network, which Visa claims is able to process 65,000 transactions per second. 

Like Bitcoin, Hamilton’s transaction processor used cryptographic signatures to authorize payments. It also used Bitcoin’s method for recording transactions, called the unspent transaction outputs (UTXO) model, which stops people from spending the same coin twice. The details of the UTXO model are complicated, but it works because each transaction references the specific coins being spent. 

Narula stresses that Project Hamilton was a “first step” toward understanding how a CBDC might be designed. The team made the software open source so that other teams could build on it. But it was not advocating for specific design decisions. There is a spectrum of possible CBDC designs, ranging from traditional bank accounts that the Fed offers directly to consumers (currently it only offers accounts to banks) to something that looks like a “digital bearer instrument,” Narula says.

Besides demonstrating the ability to handle lots of transactions, Hamilton also showed that “if designers want to, it’s possible to build a system that stores very little data about transactions, users, and even outstanding balances,” says Narula. “A big misconception about CBDCs right now is this assumption that they have to be built in a way where whoever is running it can see everything.”

So… what’s next?

Nonetheless, not even a fundamental research project like Hamilton was able to escape the ire of anti-CBDC politicians.

In December of last year, Emmer and eight other members of Congress sent a letter to the president of the Boston Fed, arguing that there had been “insufficient visibility into the interaction between Project Hamilton and the private sector.” The legislators cited an FAQ from the Project Hamilton report stating that the Fed had been working with “government, academia, and the private sector” to learn about “potential use cases, a range of design options, and other considerations” related to CBDCs.

The letter went on to ask several questions, including whether the Boston Fed intended to fund startups interested in designing CBDCs and whether any firms involved in the project might be able to “exploit a regulatory advantage over competitors.”

Emmer’s office did not respond to MIT Technology Review’s questions regarding whether it ever received answers to the questions in the letter. But the Federal Reserve does not invest in startups. And it’s not surprising that Project Hamilton would openly take input from the private sector, because many of the most innovative ideas for digital currency technology lie in the commercial arena.

The letter’s final question asked how Project Hamilton was addressing concerns about “financial privacy and financial freedom” in a CBDC system. In fact, the “Phase 2” promised in the Hamilton research report, which was published in February of 2022, was explicitly meant to entail research into the use of advanced cryptography to “greatly increase user privacy from the central bank.” But when the project shut down in December, the announcement made no mention of Phase 2.

The Fed, which aims to stay out of politics whenever possible, hasn’t stopped doing research on CBDCs, says Darrell Duffie, a professor of finance at Stanford’s graduate school of business. But it has slowed considerably, and “nobody is charging ahead openly” the way Hamilton did, he says. Duffie speculates that “maybe Project Hamilton would have had another phase” if it had not been for Emmer’s letter. 

A spokesperson for the Boston Fed declined to answer questions about Phase 2. Project Hamilton “was completed at the end of 2022,” the spokesperson said in an emailed statement, adding that the Boston Fed “continues to contribute to ongoing Federal Reserve System research that aims to deepen the Federal Reserve’s understanding of the technology that could support the issuance of a CBDC.” The spokesperson also reiterated that the Fed “has made no decision on issuing a CBDC and would only proceed with the issuance of a CBDC with an authorizing law.”

According to MIT’s Narula, the collaboration with the Boston Fed “reached a natural end.” But  the Digital Currency Initiative has continued working on the research project formerly known as Hamilton and still hopes to publish some of that work. 

“The only way to really truly understand these types of systems is to build and test them,” she says.

What’s next for crypto in 2023

Last month’s sudden implosion of the popular cryptocurrency exchange FTX has intensified a political war for the soul of crypto that was already raging. 

In the coming year, we are likely to see that fight come to a head in US courtrooms and in Congress. The future of finance hangs in the balance.

The battle lines are complicated, but there are two prominent sides. A vocal crowd of crypto skeptics, which includes prominent politicians and regulators, wants to rein in an industry it sees as overrun with fraud and harmful to consumers. The catastrophic demise of FTX has emboldened this group.

Then there are the champions of “decentralization.” Members of this camp tend to believe that cryptocurrency networks like Bitcoin and Ethereum—since they are accessible to anyone with an internet connection and are controlled by public networks instead of companies, governments, or banks—are vital to the future of privacy and financial freedom. They worry that misguided attempts at regulation could imperil those freedoms.

To this group, the collapse of FTX is further proof that centralized control is dangerous—and a reminder of why crypto exists in the first place. Their goal is a blockchain-based financial system that is more accessible and private than the traditional one, which they see as plagued by surveillance and rent-seeking middlemen.

The truth is, policymakers had crypto in the crosshairs long before the FTX debacle. The courtroom fights and congressional debates we will see in 2023 were going to happen regardless. And given the outsize role that America plays in the world’s financial system, the outcomes of these fights will have global implications. 

For those who see open blockchains as crucial to the future of finance, the stakes have never been higher. Can they hold their ground and keep decentralized financial systems free from traditional regulatory frameworks? Or will policymakers manage to tame these platforms by imposing some degree of centralization? These questions have lingered over crypto for years. Now we’re on the verge of getting answers. 

“The crypto we created”

The details of the FTX collapse are complicated and still coming to light. Its founder and CEO, Sam Bankman-Fried, has been indicted in the US on fraud and money laundering charges. It’s hard to know how much crypto itself is to blame. 

Although crypto enthusiasts may now be inclined to distance themselves from FTX, the episode reflects “the crypto we created,” says Neha Narula, director of the Digital Currency Initiative at MIT.

To begin with, she says, the industry is over-reliant on centralized exchanges like FTX. But it’s not just the centralization. “It’s also this token casino economy,” says Narula. 

Like many crypto firms, FTX created its own cryptocurrency. What started the chain reaction that unraveled the exchange was reporting in early November by CoinDesk that FTX’s affiliated trading firm, Alameda Research, had a significant portion of its money denominated in that currency, called FTT. As CoinDesk put it: Alameda, which was believed to have more than $10 billion in assets, was resting on “a foundation largely made up of a coin that a sister company invented, not an independent asset like a fiat currency or another crypto.” The revelation set off a series of events that eventually caused FTT’s value to plummet. 

In fact, the whole  industry has built a “self-referential ecosystem” on top of “ambiguous tokens” created “out of nowhere,” with “very loose arguments for why they should have any value,” Narula says. The FTT token is just one of thousands of cryptocurrencies.

The ambiguity of these tokens is a big reason regulators are now zeroing in on an emerging area of the crypto world known as decentralized finance, or “DeFi.” 

Decentralize this

Let’s stick with FTT as an example. In the US, it is not possible to buy FTT on a centralized exchange. That’s because it’s likely that if an exchange were to offer it, it would risk getting in trouble with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 

The SEC’s mission is to protect investors who participate in financial asset markets. It does so by requiring the companies selling these assets to register with the agency and submit comprehensive disclosures about their finances.

SEC chair Gary Gensler has said he believes that many of the cryptocurrencies in circulation are securities and should be regulated as such—implying that organizations offering those assets to US customers are doing so illegally. Since FTT resembles FTX stock in important ways, it likely falls into this category.

But although the government can stop centralized exchanges from listing unregistered securities, it can’t stop exchanges that run completely on a blockchain from letting people trade those securities.

Decentralized exchanges, or DEXs, are central to the fast-growing world of DeFi. The most prominent DEX is Uniswap, which sees more than a billion dollars in daily trading volume. Uniswap is a set of smart contracts—essentially, computer programs that are stored on and executed by the Ethereum blockchain—that allow anyone with an internet connection to buy and sell a wide range of cryptocurrencies, regardless of how regulators might classify them.

DeFi’s proponents have pointed to FTX as the latest evidence that what we need is an alternative, “open,” and decentralized financial system. DeFi applications verify transactions cryptographically, and everything is recorded on the blockchain. There are no corruptible middlemen.

Therein lies the problem, however, with decentralized financial applications—at least in the eyes of policymakers: if there is truly no one in the middle, there is no one to regulate. How can regulators police securities trading on decentralized platforms? How do they make sure illicit funds aren’t being used?

This challenge explains why the hot topic of “DeFi front ends” is on track to boil over in Washington this year.

“Front ends” is the industry term for the web-based user interfaces through which most people access DeFi protocols, since doing so otherwise requires some specialized technical know-how. In the case of Uniswap, a startup called Uniswap Labs built and maintains the front end.

The big question now is whether a DeFi front end should be required to get a license from the government, says Stephen Palley, a partner at the law firm Brown Rudnick and cochair of the firm’s digital commerce group. He doesn’t think so, at least not in every case:

“If I create a website and all that it does is give people the ability to interact with software that somebody else created that exists on a global distributed database—that they could interact with themselves already—how have I created a securities exchange?” 

DeFi has exploded in popularity in the past two years, but it is still niche and mostly a thing for traders. It hasn’t yet delivered on its more idealistic promise. Proponents argue that regulating front ends could be fatal to DeFi because it would add the kind of barrier to entry that blockchains were supposed to eliminate.

It seems safe to say that whether regulators gain control of this important DeFi access point will have a profound influence on how the underlying technology evolves from here. Don’t be surprised to see regulators take some kind of action soon, says Palley. This fight is likely to play out in the courts over the next two years, he says. Congress may also get involved. 

Tornado warning

DeFi advocates are also facing off against regulators on a separate front, where the main issue at hand is privacy. Nowhere are the stakes higher for the future of the decentralized financial systems than in the case of Tornado Cash.

Like Uniswap, Tornado Cash is a set of smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain. It lets users deposit cryptocurrency in a pool of other people’s digital money and then withdraw it to a different address, while using advanced cryptographic techniques called zero-knowledge proofs to ensure that there is no public link between the deposit address and the withdrawal address. That means the money is no longer tied on the blockchain to the user’s past transactions, which makes it harder to trace and provides a layer of privacy.

In August, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 45 Ethereum addresses associated with the platform, effectively banning Americans from using it and decimating its user base. The agency said it took the action because Tornado Cash had been used to “launder” billions of dollars, including hundreds of millions stolen by North Korean state-sponsored hackers.

OFAC has sanctioned blockchain addresses associated with foreign individuals before, but never has it sanctioned a smart contract. It also doesn’t have the authority to do so, argues Peter Van Valkenburgh, director of research at Coin Center, a policy advocacy group in Washington, DC. As Coin Center points out, many of the contracts OFAC sanctioned cannot be modified, blocked, or turned off by any of Tornado Cash developers; they exist independent of human intervention. 

While OFAC has the legal power to sanction people and certain foreign entities, it can’t ban  Americans from using a tool like Tornado Cash, Van Valkenburgh says: “The statute that gives OFAC power was never intended by Congress to be used to tell Americans which software tools they can and cannot use.”

Coin Center has filed a lawsuit against the Treasury Department aimed at reversing the sanctions and blocking the Treasury from “enforcing against ordinary their self-evident and basic rights to privacy.” Besides arguing that OFAC does not have the authority to ban software tools, Coin Center also argues that the sanctions violate the Constitution. The popular US crypto exchange Coinbase is funding a similar lawsuit against the Treasury. 

After the sanctions came down, GitHub removed the project’s source code, and the project’s website, tornado.cash, was taken down. Separate from OFAC’s actions, Dutch authorities detained one of Tornado Cash’s developers, Alexey Pertsev, and a prosecutor has accused Pertsev of facilitating money laundering.

Pertsev was one of Tornado Cash’s founders. But like most crypto projects, Tornado Cash is open source and relies on a loosely affiliated collective of contributors. Another cofounder, Roman Semenov, did not respond to a request for a comment.

All of crypto is watching the Tornado Cash saga closely, because whatever happens will shape the future of online finance. “A developer should not be treated like a financial intermediary just for writing code and putting it on the internet,” says Narula. There are many steps between doing that and running a service, she says. 

At what point does a financial application go from being just code on the internet to being a service? That’s also the question at the heart of the conflict over DeFi front ends. 

At stake in both cases is the freedom to use a blockchain-based service without seeking permission from the government. One thing we can expect is that crypto’s true believers will fight with everything they have to keep that freedom in place.