The data center boom in the desert

In the high desert east of Reno, Nevada, construction crews are flattening the golden foothills of the Virginia Range, laying the foundations of a data center city.

Google, Tract, Switch, EdgeCore, Novva, Vantage, and PowerHouse are all operating, building, or expanding huge facilities within the Tahoe Reno Industrial Center, a business park bigger than the city of Detroit. 


This story is a part of MIT Technology Review’s series “Power Hungry: AI and our energy future,” on the energy demands and carbon costs of the artificial-intelligence revolution.


Meanwhile, Microsoft acquired more than 225 acres of undeveloped property within the center and an even larger plot in nearby Silver Springs, Nevada. Apple is expanding its data center, located just across the Truckee River from the industrial park. OpenAI has said it’s considering building a data center in Nevada as well.

The corporate race to amass computing resources to train and run artificial intelligence models and store information in the cloud has sparked a data center boom in the desert—just far enough away from Nevada’s communities to elude wide notice and, some fear, adequate scrutiny. 

Switch, a data center company based in Las Vegas, says the full build-out of its campus at the Tahoe Reno Industrial Center could exceed seven million square feet.
EMILY NAJERA

The full scale and potential environmental impacts of the developments aren’t known, because the footprint, energy needs, and water requirements are often closely guarded corporate secrets. Most of the companies didn’t respond to inquiries from MIT Technology Review, or declined to provide additional information about the projects. 

But there’s “a whole lot of construction going on,” says Kris Thompson, who served as the longtime project manager for the industrial center before stepping down late last year. “The last number I heard was 13 million square feet under construction right now, which is massive.”

Indeed, it’s the equivalent of almost five Empire State Buildings laid out flat. In addition, public filings from NV Energy, the state’s near-monopoly utility, reveal that a dozen data-center projects, mostly in this area, have requested nearly six gigawatts of electricity capacity within the next decade. 

That would make the greater Reno area—the biggest little city in the world—one of the largest data-center markets around the globe.

It would also require expanding the state’s power sector by about 40%, all for a single industry in an explosive growth stage that may, or may not, prove sustainable. The energy needs, in turn, suggest those projects could consume billions of gallons of water per year, according to an analysis conducted for this story. 

Construction crews are busy building data centers throughout the Tahoe Reno Industrial Center.
EMILY NAJERA

The build-out of a dense cluster of energy and water-hungry data centers in a small stretch of the nation’s driest state, where climate change is driving up temperatures faster than anywhere else in the country, has begun to raise alarms among water experts, environmental groups, and residents. That includes members of the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, whose namesake water body lies within their reservation and marks the end point of the Truckee River, the region’s main source of water.

Much of Nevada has suffered through severe drought conditions for years, farmers and communities are drawing down many of the state’s groundwater reservoirs faster than they can be refilled, and global warming is sucking more and more moisture out of the region’s streams, shrubs, and soils.

“Telling entities that they can come in and stick more straws in the ground for data centers is raising a lot of questions about sound management,” says Kyle Roerink, executive director of the Great Basin Water Network, a nonprofit that works to protect water resources throughout Nevada and Utah. 

“We just don’t want to be in a situation where the tail is wagging the dog,” he later added, “where this demand for data centers is driving water policy.”

Luring data centers

In the late 1850s, the mountains southeast of Reno began enticing prospectors from across the country, who hoped to strike silver or gold in the famed Comstock Lode. But Storey County had few residents or economic prospects by the late 1990s, around the time when Don Roger Norman, a media-shy real estate speculator, spotted a new opportunity in the sagebrush-covered hills. 

He began buying up tens of thousands of acres of land for tens of millions of dollars and lining up development approvals to lure industrial projects to what became the Tahoe Reno Industrial Center. His partners included Lance Gilman, a cowboy-hat-wearing real estate broker, who later bought the nearby Mustang Ranch brothel and won a seat as a county commissioner.

In 1999, the county passed an ordinance that preapproves companies to develop most types of commercial and industrial projects across the business park, cutting months to years off the development process. That helped cinch deals with a flock of tenants looking to build big projects fast, including Walmart, Tesla, and Redwood Materials. Now the promise of fast permits is helping to draw data centers by the gigawatt.

On a clear, cool January afternoon, Brian Armon, a commercial real estate broker who leads the industrial practices group at NAI Alliance, takes me on a tour of the projects around the region, which mostly entails driving around the business center.

Lance Gilman standing on a hill overlooking building in the industrial center
Lance Gilman, a local real estate broker, helped to develop the Tahoe Reno Industrial Center and land some of its largest tenants.
GREGG SEGAL

After pulling off Interstate 80 onto USA Parkway, he points out the cranes, earthmovers, and riprap foundations, where a variety of data centers are under construction. Deeper into the industrial park, Armon pulls up near Switch’s long, low, arched-roof facility, which sits on a terrace above cement walls and security gates. The Las Vegas–based company says the first phase of its data center campus encompasses more than a million square feet, and that the full build-out will cover seven times that space. 

Over the next hill, we turn around in Google’s parking lot. Cranes, tents, framing, and construction equipment extend behind the company’s existing data center, filling much of the 1,210-acre lot that the search engine giant acquired in 2017.

Last August, during an event at the University of Nevada, Reno, the company announced it would spend $400 million to expand the data center campus along with another one in Las Vegas.

Thompson says that the development company, Tahoe Reno Industrial LLC, has now sold off every parcel of developable land within the park (although several lots are available for resale following the failed gamble of one crypto tenant).

When I ask Armon what’s attracting all the data centers here, he starts with the fast approvals but cites a list of other lures as well: The inexpensive land. NV Energy’s willingness to strike deals to supply relatively low-cost electricity. Cool nighttime and winter temperatures, as far as American deserts go, which reduce the energy and water needs. The proximity to tech hubs such as Silicon Valley, which cuts latency for applications in which milliseconds matter. And the lack of natural disasters that could shut down the facilities, at least for the most part.

“We are high in seismic activity,” he says. “But everything else is good. We’re not going to have a tornado or flood or a devastating wildfire.”

Then there’s the generous tax policies.

In 2023, Novva, a Utah-based data center company, announced plans to build a 300,000-square-foot facility within the industrial business park.

Nevada doesn’t charge corporate income tax, and it has also enacted deep tax cuts specifically for data centers that set up shop in the state. That includes abatements of up to 75% on property tax for a decade or two—and nearly as much of a bargain on the sales and use taxes applied to equipment purchased for the facilities.

Data centers don’t require many permanent workers to run the operations, but the projects have created thousands of construction jobs. They’re also helping to diversify the region’s economy beyond casinos and generating tax windfalls for the state, counties, and cities, says Jeff Sutich, executive director of the Northern Nevada Development Authority. Indeed, just three data-center projects, developed by Apple, Google, and Vantage, will produce nearly half a billion dollars in tax revenue for Nevada, even with those generous abatements, according to the Nevada Governor’s Office of Economic Development.

The question is whether the benefits of data centers are worth the tradeoffs for Nevadans, given the public health costs, greenhouse-gas emissions, energy demands, and water strains.

The rain shadow

The Sierra Nevada’s granite peaks trace the eastern edge of California, forcing Pacific Ocean winds to rise and cool. That converts water vapor in the air into the rain and snow that fill the range’s tributaries, rivers, and lakes. 

But the same meteorological phenomenon casts a rain shadow over much of neighboring Nevada, forming an arid expanse known as the Great Basin Desert. The state receives about 10 inches of precipitation a year, about a third of the national average.

The Truckee River draws from the melting Sierra snowpack at the edge of Lake Tahoe, cascades down the range, and snakes through the flatlands of Reno and Sparks. It forks at the Derby Dam, a Reclamation Act project a few miles from the Tahoe Reno Industrial Center, which diverts water to a farming region further east while allowing the rest to continue north toward Pyramid Lake. 

Along the way, an engineered system of reservoirs, canals, and treatment plants divert, store, and release water from the river, supplying businesses, cities, towns, and native tribes across the region. But Nevada’s population and economy are expanding, creating more demands on these resources even as they become more constrained. 

The Truckee River, which originates at Lake Tahoe and terminates at Pyramid Lake, is the major water source for cities, towns, and farms across northwestern Nevada.
EMILY NAJERA

Throughout much of the 2020s the state has suffered through one of the hottest and most widespread droughts on record, extending two decades of abnormally dry conditions across the American West. Some scientists fear it may constitute an emerging megadrought

About 50% of Nevada currently faces moderate to exceptional drought conditions. In addition, more than half of the state’s hundreds of groundwater basins are already “over-appropriated,” meaning the water rights on paper exceed the levels believed to be underground. 

It’s not clear if climate change will increase or decrease the state’s rainfall levels, on balance. But precipitation patterns are expected to become more erratic, whiplashing between short periods of intense rainfall and more-frequent, extended, or severe droughts. 

In addition, more precipitation will fall as rain rather than snow, shortening the Sierra snow season by weeks to months over the coming decades. 

“In the extreme case, at the end of the century, that’s pretty much all of winter,” says Sean McKenna, executive director of hydrologic sciences at the Desert Research Institute, a research division of the Nevada System of Higher Education.

That loss will undermine an essential function of the Sierra snowpack: reliably delivering water to farmers and cities when it’s most needed in the spring and summer, across both Nevada and California. 

These shifting conditions will require the region to develop better ways to store, preserve, and recycle the water it does get, McKenna says. Northern Nevada’s cities, towns, and agencies will also need to carefully evaluate and plan for the collective impacts of continuing growth and development on the interconnected water system, particularly when it comes to water-hungry projects like data centers, he adds.

“We can’t consider each of these as a one-off, without considering that there may be tens or dozens of these in the next 15 years,” McKenna says.

Thirsty data centers

Data centers suck up water in two main ways.

As giant rooms of server racks process information and consume energy, they generate heat that must be shunted away to prevent malfunctions and damage to the equipment. The processing units optimized for training and running AI models often draw more electricity and, in turn, produce more heat.

To keep things cool, more and more data centers have turned to liquid cooling systems that don’t need as much electricity as fan cooling or air-conditioning.

These often rely on water to absorb heat and transfer it to outdoor cooling towers, where much of the moisture evaporates. Microsoft’s US data centers, for instance, could have directly evaporated nearly 185,000 gallons of “clean freshwater” in the course of training OpenAI’s GPT-3 large language model, according to a 2023 preprint study led by researchers at the University of California, Riverside. (The research has since been peer-reviewed and is awaiting publication.)

What’s less appreciated, however, is that the larger data-center drain on water generally occurs indirectly, at the power plants generating extra electricity for the turbocharged AI sector. These facilities, in turn, require more water to cool down equipment, among other purposes.

You have to add up both uses “to reflect the true water cost of data centers,” says Shaolei Ren, an associate professor of electrical and computer engineering at UC Riverside and coauthor of the study.

Ren estimates that the 12 data-center projects listed in NV Energy’s report would directly consume between 860 million gallons and 5.7 billion gallons a year, based on the requested electricity capacity. (“Consumed” here means the water is evaporated, not merely withdrawn and returned to the engineered water system.) The indirect water drain associated with electricity generation for those operations could add up to 15.5 billion gallons, based on the average consumption of the regional grid.

The exact water figures would depend on shifting climate conditions, the type of cooling systems each data center uses, and the mix of power sources that supply the facilities.

Solar power, which provides roughly a quarter of Nevada’s power, requires relatively little water to operate, for instance. But natural-gas plants, which generate about 56%, withdraw 2,803 gallons per megawatt-hour on average, according to the Energy Information Administration

Geothermal plants, which produce about 10% of the state’s electricity by cycling water through hot rocks, generally consume less water than fossil fuel plants do but often require more water than other renewables, according to some research

But here too, the water usage varies depending on the type of geothermal plant in question. Google has lined up several deals to partially power its data centers through Fervo Energy, which has helped to commercialize an emerging approach that injects water under high pressure to fracture rock and form wells deep below the surface. 

The company stresses that it doesn’t evaporate water for cooling and that it relies on brackish groundwater, not fresh water, to develop and run its plants. In a recent post, Fervo noted that its facilities consume significantly less water per megawatt-hour than coal, nuclear, or natural-gas plants do.

Part of NV Energy’s proposed plan to meet growing electricity demands in Nevada includes developing several natural-gas peaking units, adding more than one gigawatt of solar power and installing another gigawatt of battery storage. It’s also forging ahead with a more than $4 billion transmission project.

But the company didn’t respond to questions concerning how it will supply all of the gigawatts of additional electricity requested by data centers, if the construction of those power plants will increase consumer rates, or how much water those facilities are expected to consume.

NV Energy operates a transmission line, substation, and power plant in or around the Tahoe Reno Industrial Center.
EMILY NAJERA

“NV Energy teams work diligently on our long-term planning to make investments in our infrastructure to serve new customers and the continued growth in the state without putting existing customers at risk,” the company said in a statement.

An added challenge is that data centers need to run around the clock. That will often compel utilities to develop new electricity-generating sources that can run nonstop as well, as natural-gas, geothermal, or nuclear plants do, says Emily Grubert, an associate professor of sustainable energy policy at the University of Notre Dame, who has studied the relative water consumption of electricity sources. 

“You end up with the water-intensive resources looking more important,” she adds.

Even if NV Energy and the companies developing data centers do strive to power them through sources with relatively low water needs, “we only have so much ability to add six gigawatts to Nevada’s grid,” Grubert explains. “What you do will never be system-neutral, because it’s such a big number.”

Securing supplies

On a mid-February morning, I meet TRI’s Thompson and Don Gilman, Lance Gilman’s son, at the Storey County offices, located within the industrial center. 

“I’m just a country boy who sells dirt,” Gilman, also a real estate broker, says by way of introduction. 

We climb into his large SUV and drive to a reservoir in the heart of the industrial park, filled nearly to the lip. 

Thompson explains that much of the water comes from an on-site treatment facility that filters waste fluids from companies in the park. In addition, tens of millions of gallons of treated effluent will also likely flow into the tank this year from the Truckee Meadows Water Authority Reclamation Facility, near the border of Reno and Sparks. That’s thanks to a 16-mile pipeline that the developers, the water authority, several tenants, and various local cities and agencies partnered to build, through a project that began in 2021.

“Our general improvement district is furnishing that water to tech companies here in the park as we speak,” Thompson says. “That helps preserve the precious groundwater, so that is an environmental feather in the cap for these data centers. They are focused on environmental excellence.”

The reservoir within the industrial business park provides water to data centers and other tenants.
EMILY NAJERA

But data centers often need drinking-quality water—not wastewater merely treated to irrigation standards—for evaporative cooling, “to avoid pipe clogs and/or bacterial growth,” the UC Riverside study notes. For instance, Google says its data centers withdrew about 7.7 billion gallons of water in 2023, and nearly 6 billion of those gallons were potable. 

Tenants in the industrial park can potentially obtain access to water from the ground and the Truckee River, as well. From early on, the master developers worked hard to secure permits to water sources, since they are nearly as precious as development entitlements to companies hoping to build projects in the desert.

Initially, the development company controlled a private business, the TRI Water and Sewer Company, that provided those services to the business park’s tenants, according to public documents. The company set up wells, a water tank, distribution lines, and a sewer disposal system. 

But in 2000, the board of county commissioners established a general improvement district, a legal mechanism for providing municipal services in certain parts of the state, to manage electricity and then water within the center. It, in turn, hired TRI Water and Sewer as the operating company.

As of its 2020 service plan, the general improvement district held permits for nearly 5,300 acre-feet of groundwater, “which can be pumped from well fields within the service area and used for new growth as it occurs.” The document lists another 2,000 acre-feet per year available from the on-site treatment facility, 1,000 from the Truckee River, and 4,000 more from the effluent pipeline. 

Those figures haven’t budged much since, according to Shari Whalen, general manager of the TRI General Improvement District. All told, they add up to more than 4 billion gallons of water per year for all the needs of the industrial park and the tenants there, data centers and otherwise.

Whalen says that the amount and quality of water required for any given data center depends on its design, and that those matters are worked out on a case-by-case basis. 

When asked if the general improvement district is confident that it has adequate water resources to supply the needs of all the data centers under development, as well as other tenants at the industrial center, she says: “They can’t just show up and build unless they have water resources designated for their projects. We wouldn’t approve a project if it didn’t have those water resources.”

Water battles

As the region’s water sources have grown more constrained, lining up supplies has become an increasingly high-stakes and controversial business.

More than a century ago, the US federal government filed a lawsuit against an assortment of parties pulling water from the Truckee River. The suit would eventually establish that the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe’s legal rights to water for irrigation superseded other claims. But the tribe has been fighting to protect those rights and increase flows from the river ever since, arguing that increasing strains on the watershed from upstream cities and businesses threaten to draw away water reserved for reservation farming, decrease lake levels, and harm native fish.

The Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe considers the water body and its fish, including the endangered cui-ui and threatened Lahontan cutthroat trout, to be essential parts of its culture, identity, and way of life. The tribe was originally named Cui-ui Ticutta, which translates to cui-ui eaters. The lake continues to provide sustenance as well as business for the tribe and its members, a number of whom operate boat charters and fishing guide services.

“It’s completely tied into us as a people,” says Steven Wadsworth, chairman of the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe.

“That is what has sustained us all this time,” he adds. “It’s just who we are. It’s part of our spiritual well-being.”

Steven Wadsworth, chairman of the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, fears that data centers will divert water that would otherwise reach the tribe’s namesake lake.
EMILY NAJERA

In recent decades, the tribe has sued the Nevada State Engineer, Washoe County, the federal government, and others for overallocating water rights and endangering the lake’s fish. It also protested the TRI General Improvement District’s applications to draw thousands of additional acre‑feet of groundwater from a basin near the business park. In 2019, the State Engineer’s office rejected those requests, concluding that the basin was already fully appropriated. 

More recently, the tribe took issue with the plan to build the pipeline and divert effluent that would have flown into the Truckee, securing an agreement that required the Truckee Meadows Water Authority and other parties to add back several thousand acre‑feet of water to the river. 

Whalen says she’s sensitive to Wadsworth’s concerns. But she says that the pipeline promises to keep a growing amount of treated wastewater out of the river, where it could otherwise contribute to rising salt levels in the lake.

“I think that the pipeline from [the Truckee Meadows Water Authority] to our system is good for water quality in the river,” she says. “I understand philosophically the concerns about data centers, but the general improvement district is dedicated to working with everyone on the river for regional water-resource planning—and the tribe is no exception.”

Water efficiency 

In an email, Thompson added that he has “great respect and admiration,” for the tribe and has visited the reservation several times in an effort to help bring industrial or commercial development there.

He stressed that all of the business park’s groundwater was “validated by the State Water Engineer,” and that the rights to surface water and effluent were purchased “for fair market value.”

During the earlier interview at the industrial center, he and Gilman had both expressed confidence that tenants in the park have adequate water supplies, and that the businesses won’t draw water away from other areas. 

“We’re in our own aquifer, our own water basin here,” Thompson said. “You put a straw in the ground here, you’re not going to pull water from Fernley or from Reno or from Silver Springs.”

Gilman also stressed that data-center companies have gotten more water efficient in recent years, echoing a point others made as well.

“With the newer technology, it’s not much of a worry,” says Sutich, of the Northern Nevada Development Authority. “The technology has come a long way in the last 10 years, which is really giving these guys the opportunity to be good stewards of water usage.”

An aerial view of the cooling tower fans at Google’s data center in the Tahoe Reno Industrial Center.
GOOGLE

Indeed, Google’s existing Storey County facility is air-cooled, according to the company’s latest environmental report. The data center withdrew 1.9 million gallons in 2023 but only consumed 200,000 gallons. The rest cycles back into the water system.

Google said all the data centers under construction on its campus will also “utilize air-cooling technology.” The company didn’t respond to a question about the scale of its planned expansion in the Tahoe Reno Industrial Center, and referred a question about indirect water consumption to NV Energy.

The search giant has stressed that it strives to be water efficient across all of its data centers, and decides whether to use air or liquid cooling based on local supply and projected demand, among other variables.

Four years ago, the company set a goal of replenishing more water than it consumes by 2030. Locally, it also committed to provide half a million dollars to the National Forest Foundation to improve the Truckee River watershed and reduce wildfire risks. 

Microsoft clearly suggested in earlier news reports that the Silver Springs land it purchased around the end of 2022 would be used for a data center. NAI Alliance’s market real estate report identifies that lot, as well as the parcel Microsoft purchased within the Tahoe Reno Industrial Center, as data center sites.

But the company now declines to specify what it intends to build in the region. 

“While the land purchase is public knowledge, we have not disclosed specific details [of] our plans for the land or potential development timelines,” wrote Donna Whitehead, a Microsoft spokesperson, in an email. 

Workers have begun grading land inside a fenced off lot within the Tahoe Reno Industrial Center.
EMILY NAJERA

Microsoft has also scaled down its global data-center ambitions, backing away from several projects in recent months amid shifting economic conditions, according to various reports.

Whatever it ultimately does or doesn’t build, the company stresses that it has made strides to reduce water consumption in its facilities. Late last year, the company announced that it’s using “chip-level cooling solutions” in data centers, which continually circulate water between the servers and chillers through a closed loop that the company claims doesn’t lose any water to evaporation. It says the design requires only a “nominal increase” in energy compared to its data centers that rely on evaporative water cooling.

Others seem to be taking a similar approach. EdgeCore also said its 900,000-square-foot data center at the Tahoe Reno Industrial Center will rely on an “air-cooled closed-loop chiller” that doesn’t require water evaporation for cooling. 

But some of the companies seem to have taken steps to ensure access to significant amounts of water. Switch, for instance, took a lead role in developing the effluent pipeline. In addition, Tract, which develops campuses on which third-party data centers can build their own facilities, has said it lined up more than 1,100 acre-feet of water rights, the equivalent of nearly 360 million gallons a year. 

Apple, Novva, Switch, Tract, and Vantage didn’t respond to inquiries from MIT Technology Review

Coming conflicts 

The suggestion that companies aren’t straining water supplies when they adopt air cooling is, in many cases, akin to saying they’re not responsible for the greenhouse gas produced through their power use simply because it occurs outside of their facilities. In fact, the additional water used at a power plant to meet the increased electricity needs of air cooling may exceed any gains at the data center, Ren, of UC Riverside, says.

“That’s actually very likely, because it uses a lot more energy,” he adds.

That means that some of the companies developing data centers in and around Storey County may simply hand off their water challenges to other parts of Nevada or neighboring states across the drying American West, depending on where and how the power is generated, Ren says. 

Google has said its air-cooled facilities require about 10% more electricity, and its environmental report notes that the Storey County facility is one of its two least-energy-efficient data centers. 

Pipes running along Google’s data center campus help the search company cool its servers.
GOOGLE

Some fear there’s also a growing mismatch between what Nevada’s water permits allow, what’s actually in the ground, and what nature will provide as climate conditions shift. Notably, the groundwater committed to all parties from the Tracy Segment basin—a long-fought-over resource that partially supplies the TRI General Improvement District—already exceeds the “perennial yield.” That refers to the maximum amount that can be drawn out every year without depleting the reservoir over the long term.

“If pumping does ultimately exceed the available supply, that means there will be conflict among users,” Roerink, of the Great Basin Water Network, said in an email. “So I have to wonder: Who could be suing whom? Who could be buying out whom? How will the tribe’s rights be defended?”

The Truckee Meadows Water Authority, the community-owned utility that manages the water system for Reno and Sparks, said it is planning carefully for the future and remains confident there will be “sufficient resources for decades to come,” at least within its territory east of the industrial center.

Storey County, the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, and the State Engineer’s office didn’t respond to questions or accept interview requests. 

Open for business

As data center proposals have begun shifting into Northern Nevada’s cities, more local residents and organizations have begun to take notice and express concerns. The regional division of the Sierra Club, for instance, recently sought to overturn the approval of Reno’s first data center, about 20 miles west of the Tahoe Reno Industrial Center. 

Olivia Tanager, director of the Sierra Club’s Toiyabe Chapter, says the environmental organization was shocked by the projected electricity demands from data centers highlighted in NV Energy’s filings.

Nevada’s wild horses are a common sight along USA Parkway, the highway cutting through the industrial business park. 
EMILY NAJERA

“We have increasing interest in understanding the impact that data centers will have to our climate goals, to our grid as a whole, and certainly to our water resources,” she says. “The demands are extraordinary, and we don’t have that amount of water to toy around with.”

During a city hall hearing in January that stretched late into the evening, she and a line of residents raised concerns about the water, energy, climate, and employment impacts of AI data centers. At the end, though, the city council upheld the planning department’s approval of the project, on a 5-2 vote.

“Welcome to Reno,” Kathleen Taylor, Reno’s vice mayor, said before casting her vote. “We’re open for business.”

Where the river ends

In late March, I walk alongside Chairman Wadsworth, of the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, on the shores of Pyramid Lake, watching a row of fly-fishers in waders cast their lines into the cold waters. 

The lake is the largest remnant of Lake Lahontan, an Ice Age inland sea that once stretched across western Nevada and would have submerged present-day Reno. But as the climate warmed, the lapping waters retreated, etching erosional terraces into the mountainsides and exposing tufa deposits around the lake, large formations of porous rock made of calcium-carbonate. That includes the pyramid-shaped island on the eastern shore that inspired the lake’s name.

A lone angler stands along the shores of Pyramid Lake.

In the decades after the US Reclamation Service completed the Derby Dam in 1905, Pyramid Lake declined another 80 feet and nearby Winnemucca Lake dried up entirely.

“We know what happens when water use goes unchecked,” says Wadsworth, gesturing eastward toward the range across the lake, where Winnemucca once filled the next basin over. “Because all we have to do is look over there and see a dry, barren lake bed that used to be full.”

In an earlier interview, Wadsworth acknowledged that the world needs data centers. But he argued they should be spread out across the country, not densely clustered in the middle of the Nevada desert.

Given the fierce competition for resources up to now, he can’t imagine how there could be enough water to meet the demands of data centers, expanding cities, and other growing businesses without straining the limited local supplies that should, by his accounting, flow to Pyramid Lake.

He fears these growing pressures will force the tribe to wage new legal battles to protect their rights and preserve the lake, extending what he refers to as “a century of water wars.”

“We have seen the devastating effects of what happens when you mess with Mother Nature,” Wadsworth says. “Part of our spirit has left us. And that’s why we fight so hard to hold on to what’s left.”

Everything you need to know about estimating AI’s energy and emissions burden

When we set out to write a story on the best available estimates for AI’s energy and emissions burden, we knew there would be caveats and uncertainties to these numbers. But, we quickly discovered, the caveats are the story too. 


This story is a part of MIT Technology Review’s series “Power Hungry: AI and our energy future,” on the energy demands and carbon costs of the artificial-intelligence revolution.


Measuring the energy used by an AI model is not like evaluating a car’s fuel economy or an appliance’s energy rating. There’s no agreed-upon method or public database of values. There are no regulators who enforce standards, and consumers don’t get the chance to evaluate one model against another. 

Despite the fact that billions of dollars are being poured into reshaping energy infrastructure around the needs of AI, no one has settled on a way to quantify AI’s energy usage. Worse, companies are generally unwilling to disclose their own piece of the puzzle. There are also limitations to estimating the emissions associated with that energy demand, because the grid hosts a complicated, ever-changing mix of energy sources. 

It’s a big mess, basically. So, that said, here are the many variables, assumptions, and caveats that we used to calculate the consequences of an AI query. (You can see the full results of our investigation here.)

Measuring the energy a model uses

Companies like OpenAI, dealing in “closed-source” models, generally offer access to their  systems through an interface where you input a question and receive an answer. What happens in between—which data center in the world processes your request, the energy it takes to do so, and the carbon intensity of the energy sources used—remains a secret, knowable only to the companies. There are few incentives for them to release this information, and so far, most have not.

That’s why, for our analysis, we looked at open-source models. They serve as a very imperfect proxy but the best one we have. (OpenAI, Microsoft, and Google declined to share specifics on how much energy their closed-source models use.) 

The best resources for measuring the energy consumption of open-source AI models are AI Energy Score, ML.Energy, and MLPerf Power. The team behind ML.Energy assisted us with our text and image model calculations, and the team behind AI Energy Score helped with our video model calculations.

Text models

AI models use up energy in two phases: when they initially learn from vast amounts of data, called training, and when they respond to queries, called inference. When ChatGPT was launched a few years ago, training was the focus, as tech companies raced to keep up and build ever-bigger models. But now, inference is where the most energy is used.

The most accurate way to understand how much energy an AI model uses in the inference stage is to directly measure the amount of electricity used by the server handling the request. Servers contain all sorts of components—powerful chips called GPUs that do the bulk of the computing, other chips called CPUs, fans to keep everything cool, and more. Researchers typically measure the amount of power the GPU draws and estimate the rest (more on this shortly). 

To do this, we turned to PhD candidate Jae-Won Chung and associate professor Mosharaf Chowdhury at the University of Michigan, who lead the ML.Energy project. Once we collected figures for different models’ GPU energy use from their team, we had to estimate how much energy is used for other processes, like cooling. We examined research literature, including a 2024 paper from Microsoft, to understand how much of a server’s total energy demand GPUs are responsible for. It turns out to be about half. So we took the team’s GPU energy estimate and doubled it to get a sense of total energy demands. 

The ML.Energy team uses a batch of 500 prompts from a larger dataset to test models. The hardware is kept the same throughout; the GPU is a popular Nvidia chip called the H100. We decided to focus on models of three sizes from the Meta Llama family: small (8 billion parameters), medium (70 billion), and large (405 billion). We also identified a selection of prompts to test. We compared these with the averages for the entire batch of 500 prompts. 

Image models

Stable Diffusion 3 from Stability AI is one of the most commonly used open-source image-generating models, so we made it our focus. Though we tested multiple sizes of the text-based Meta Llama model, we focused on one of the most popular sizes of Stable Diffusion 3, with 2 billion parameters. 

The team uses a dataset of example prompts to test a model’s energy requirements. Though the energy used by large language models is determined partially by the prompt, this isn’t true for diffusion models. Diffusion models can be programmed to go through a prescribed number of “denoising steps” when they generate an image or video, with each step being an iteration of the algorithm that adds more detail to the image. For a given step count and model, all images generated have the same energy footprint.

The more steps, the higher quality the end result—but the more energy used. Numbers of steps vary by model and application, but 25 is pretty common, and that’s what we used for our standard quality. For higher quality, we used 50 steps. 

We mentioned that GPUs are usually responsible for about half of the energy demands of large language model requests. There is not sufficient research to know how this changes for diffusion models that generate images and videos. In the absence of a better estimate, and after consulting with researchers, we opted to stick with this 50% rule of thumb for images and videos too.

Video models

Chung and Chowdhury do test video models, but only ones that generate short, low-quality GIFs. We don’t think the videos these models produce mirror the fidelity of the AI-generated video that many people are used to seeing. 

Instead, we turned to Sasha Luccioni, the AI and climate lead at Hugging Face, who directs the AI Energy Score project. She measures the energy used by the GPU during AI requests. We chose two versions of the CogVideoX model to test: an older, lower-quality version and a newer, higher-quality one. 

We asked Luccioni to use her tool, called Code Carbon, to test both and measure the results of a batch of video prompts we selected, using the same hardware as our text and image tests to keep as many variables as possible the same. She reported the GPU energy demands, which we again doubled to estimate total energy demands. 

Tracing where that energy comes from

After we understand how much energy it takes to respond to a query, we can translate that into the total emissions impact. Doing so requires looking at the power grid from which data centers draw their electricity. 

Nailing down the climate impact of the grid can be complicated, because it’s both interconnected and incredibly local. Imagine the grid as a system of connected canals and pools of water. Power plants add water to the canals, and electricity users, or loads, siphon it out. In the US, grid interconnections stretch all the way across the country. So, in a way, we’re all connected, but we can also break the grid up into its component pieces to get a sense for how energy sources vary across the country. 

Understanding carbon intensity

The key metric to understand here is called carbon intensity, which is basically a measure of how many grams of carbon dioxide pollution are released for every kilowatt-hour of electricity that’s produced. 

To get carbon intensity figures, we reached out to Electricity Maps, a Danish startup company that gathers data on grids around the world. The team collects information from sources including governments and utilities and uses them to publish historical and real-time estimates of the carbon intensity of the grid. You can find more about their methodology here

The company shared with us historical data from 2024, both for the entire US and for a few key balancing authorities (more on this in a moment). After discussions with Electricity Maps founder Olivier Corradi and other experts, we made a few decisions about which figures we would use in our calculations. 

One way to measure carbon intensity is to simply look at all the power plants that are operating on the grid, add up the pollution they’re producing at the moment, and divide that total by the electricity they’re producing. But that doesn’t account for the emissions that are associated with building and tearing down power plants, which can be significant. So we chose to use carbon intensity figures that account for the whole life cycle of a power plant. 

We also chose to use the consumption-based carbon intensity of energy rather than production-based. This figure accounts for imports and exports moving between different parts of the grid and best represents the electricity that’s being used, in real time, within a given region. 

For most of the calculations you see in the story, we used the average carbon intensity for the US for 2024, according to Electricity Maps, which is 402.49 grams of carbon dioxide equivalent per kilowatt-hour. 

Understanding balancing authorities

While understanding the picture across the entire US can be helpful, the grid can look incredibly different in different locations. 

One way we can break things up is by looking at balancing authorities. These are independent bodies responsible for grid balancing in a specific region. They operate mostly independently, though there’s a constant movement of electricity between them as well. There are 66 balancing authorities in the US, and we can calculate a carbon intensity for the part of the grid encompassed by a specific balancing authority.

Electricity Maps provided carbon intensity figures for a few key balancing authorities, and we focused on several that play the largest roles in data center operations. ERCOT (which covers most of Texas) and PJM (a cluster of states on the East Coast, including Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey) are two of the regions with the largest burden of data centers, according to research from the Harvard School of Public Health

We added CAISO (in California) because it covers the most populated state in the US. CAISO also manages a grid with a significant number of renewable energy sources, making it a good example of how carbon intensity can change drastically depending on the time of day. (In the middle of the day, solar tends to dominate, while natural gas plays a larger role overnight, for example.)

One key caveat here is that we’re not entirely sure where companies tend to send individual AI inference requests. There are clusters of data centers in the regions we chose as examples, but when you use a tech giant’s AI model, your request could be handled by any number of data centers owned or contracted by the company. One reasonable approximation is location: It’s likely that the data center servicing a request is close to where it’s being made, so a request on the West Coast might be most likely to be routed to a data center on that side of the country. 

Explaining what we found

To better contextualize our calculations, we introduced a few comparisons people might be more familiar with than kilowatt-hours and grams of carbon dioxide. In a few places, we took the amount of electricity estimated to be used by a model and calculated how long that electricity would be able to power a standard microwave, as well as how far it might take someone on an e-bike. 

In the case of the e-bike, we assumed an efficiency of 25 watt-hours per mile, which falls in the range of frequently cited efficiencies for a pedal-assisted bike. For the microwave, we assumed an 800-watt model, which falls within the average range in the US. 

We also introduced a comparison to contextualize greenhouse gas emissions: miles driven in a gas-powered car. For this, we used data from the US Environmental Protection Agency, which puts the weighted average fuel economy of vehicles in the US in 2022 at 393 grams of carbon dioxide equivalent per mile. 

Predicting how much energy AI will use in the future

After measuring the energy demand of an individual query and the emissions it generated, it was time to estimate how all of this added up to national demand. 

There are two ways to do this. In a bottom-up analysis, you estimate how many individual queries there are, calculate the energy demands of each, and add them up to determine the total. For a top-down look, you estimate how much energy all data centers are using by looking at larger trends. 

Bottom-up is particularly difficult, because, once again, closed-source companies do not share such information and declined to talk specifics with us. While we can make some educated guesses to give us a picture of what might be happening right now, looking into the future is perhaps better served by taking a top-down approach.

This data is scarce as well. The most important report was published in December by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, which is funded by the Department of Energy, and the report authors noted that it’s only the third such report released in the last 20 years. Academic climate and energy researchers we spoke with said it’s a major problem that AI is not considered its own economic sector for emissions measurements, and there aren’t rigorous reporting requirements. As a result, it’s difficult to track AI’s climate toll. 

Still, we examined the report’s results, compared them with other findings and estimates, and consulted independent experts about the data. While much of the report was about data centers more broadly, we drew out data points that were specific to the future of AI. 

Company goals

We wanted to contrast these figures with the amounts of energy that AI companies themselves say they need. To do so, we collected reports by leading tech and AI companies about their plans for energy and data center expansions, as well as the dollar amounts they promised to invest. Where possible, we fact-checked the promises made in these claims. (Meta and Microsoft’s pledges to use more nuclear power, for example, would indeed reduce the carbon emissions of the companies, but it will take years, if not decades, for these additional nuclear plants to come online.) 

Requests to companies

We submitted requests to Microsoft, Google, and OpenAI to have data-driven conversations about their models’ energy demands for AI inference. None of the companies made executives or leadership available for on-the-record interviews about their energy usage.

This story was supported by a grant from the Tarbell Center for AI Journalism.

Four reasons to be optimistic about AI’s energy usage

The day after his inauguration in January, President Donald Trump announced Stargate, a $500 billion initiative to build out AI infrastructure, backed by some of the biggest companies in tech. Stargate aims to accelerate the construction of massive data centers and electricity networks across the US to ensure it keeps its edge over China.


This story is a part of MIT Technology Review’s series “Power Hungry: AI and our energy future,” on the energy demands and carbon costs of the artificial-intelligence revolution.


The whatever-it-takes approach to the race for worldwide AI dominance was the talk of Davos, says Raquel Urtasun, founder and CEO of the Canadian robotruck startup Waabi, referring to the World Economic Forum’s annual January meeting in Switzerland, which was held the same week as Trump’s announcement. “I’m pretty worried about where the industry is going,” Urtasun says. 

She’s not alone. “Dollars are being invested, GPUs are being burned, water is being evaporated—it’s just absolutely the wrong direction,” says Ali Farhadi, CEO of the Seattle-based nonprofit Allen Institute for AI.

But sift through the talk of rocketing costs—and climate impact—and you’ll find reasons to be hopeful. There are innovations underway that could improve the efficiency of the software behind AI models, the computer chips those models run on, and the data centers where those chips hum around the clock.

Here’s what you need to know about how energy use, and therefore carbon emissions, could be cut across all three of those domains, plus an added argument for cautious optimism: There are reasons to believe that the underlying business realities will ultimately bend toward more energy-efficient AI.

1/ More efficient models

The most obvious place to start is with the models themselves—the way they’re created and the way they’re run.

AI models are built by training neural networks on lots and lots of data. Large language models are trained on vast amounts of text, self-driving models are trained on vast amounts of driving data, and so on.

But the way such data is collected is often indiscriminate. Large language models are trained on data sets that include text scraped from most of the internet and huge libraries of scanned books. The practice has been to grab everything that’s not nailed down, throw it into the mix, and see what comes out. This approach has certainly worked, but training a model on a massive data set over and over so it can extract relevant patterns by itself is a waste of time and energy.

There might be a more efficient way. Children aren’t expected to learn just by reading everything that’s ever been written; they are given a focused curriculum. Urtasun thinks we should do something similar with AI, training models with more curated data tailored to specific tasks. (Waabi trains its robotrucks inside a superrealistic simulation that allows fine-grained control of the virtual data its models are presented with.)

It’s not just Waabi. Writer, an AI startup that builds large language models for enterprise customers, claims that its models are cheaper to train and run in part because it trains them using synthetic data. Feeding its models bespoke data sets rather than larger but less curated ones makes the training process quicker (and therefore less expensive). For example, instead of simply downloading Wikipedia, the team at Writer takes individual Wikipedia pages and rewrites their contents in different formats—as a Q&A instead of a block of text, and so on—so that its models can learn more from less.

Training is just the start of a model’s life cycle. As models have become bigger, they have become more expensive to run. So-called reasoning models that work through a query step by step before producing a response are especially power-hungry because they compute a series of intermediate subresponses for each response. The price tag of these new capabilities is eye-watering: OpenAI’s o3 reasoning model has been estimated to cost up to $30,000 per task to run.  

But this technology is only a few months old and still experimental. Farhadi expects that these costs will soon come down. For example, engineers will figure out how to stop reasoning models from going too far down a dead-end path before they determine it’s not viable. “The first time you do something it’s way more expensive, and then you figure out how to make it smaller and more efficient,” says Farhadi. “It’s a fairly consistent trend in technology.”

One way to get performance gains without big jumps in energy consumption is to run inference steps (the computations a model makes to come up with its response) in parallel, he says. Parallel computing underpins much of today’s software, especially large language models (GPUs are parallel by design). Even so, the basic technique could be applied to a wider range of problems. By splitting up a task and running different parts of it at the same time, parallel computing can generate results more quickly. It can also save energy by making more efficient use of available hardware. But it requires clever new algorithms to coordinate the multiple subtasks and pull them together into a single result at the end. 

The largest, most powerful models won’t be used all the time, either. There is a lot of talk about small models, versions of large language models that have been distilled into pocket-size packages. In many cases, these more efficient models perform as well as larger ones, especially for specific use cases.

As businesses figure out how large language models fit their needs (or not), this trend toward more efficient bespoke models is taking off. You don’t need an all-purpose LLM to manage inventory or to respond to niche customer queries. “There’s going to be a really, really large number of specialized models, not one God-given model that solves everything,” says Farhadi.

Christina Shim, chief sustainability officer at IBM, is seeing this trend play out in the way her clients adopt the technology. She works with businesses to make sure they choose the smallest and least power-hungry models possible. “It’s not just the biggest model that will give you a big bang for your buck,” she says. A smaller model that does exactly what you need is a better investment than a larger one that does the same thing: “Let’s not use a sledgehammer to hit a nail.”

2/ More efficient computer chips

As the software becomes more streamlined, the hardware it runs on will become more efficient too. There’s a tension at play here: In the short term, chipmakers like Nvidia are racing to develop increasingly powerful chips to meet demand from companies wanting to run increasingly powerful models. But in the long term, this race isn’t sustainable.

“The models have gotten so big, even running the inference step now starts to become a big challenge,” says Naveen Verma, cofounder and CEO of the upstart microchip maker EnCharge AI.

Companies like Microsoft and OpenAI are losing money running their models inside data centers to meet the demand from millions of people. Smaller models will help. Another option is to move the computing out of the data centers and into people’s own machines.

That’s something that Microsoft tried with its Copilot+ PC initiative, in which it marketed a supercharged PC that would let you run an AI model (and cover the energy bills) yourself. It hasn’t taken off, but Verma thinks the push will continue because companies will want to offload as much of the costs of running a model as they can.

But getting AI models (even small ones) to run reliably on people’s personal devices will require a step change in the chips that typically power those devices. These chips need to be made even more energy efficient because they need to be able to work with just a battery, says Verma.

That’s where EnCharge comes in. Its solution is a new kind of chip that ditches digital computation in favor of something called analog in-memory computing. Instead of representing information with binary 0s and 1s, like the electronics inside conventional, digital computer chips, the electronics inside analog chips can represent information along a range of values in between 0 and 1. In theory, this lets you do more with the same amount of power. 

SHIWEN SVEN WANG

EnCharge was spun out from Verma’s research lab at Princeton in 2022. “We’ve known for decades that analog compute can be much more efficient—orders of magnitude more efficient—than digital,” says Verma. But analog computers never worked well in practice because they made lots of errors. Verma and his colleagues have discovered a way to do analog computing that’s precise.

EnCharge is focusing just on the core computation required by AI today. With support from semiconductor giants like TSMC, the startup is developing hardware that performs high-dimensional matrix multiplication (the basic math behind all deep-learning models) in an analog chip and then passes the result back out to the surrounding digital computer.

EnCharge’s hardware is just one of a number of experimental new chip designs on the horizon. IBM and others have been exploring something called neuromorphic computing for years. The idea is to design computers that mimic the brain’s super-efficient processing powers. Another path involves optical chips, which swap out the electrons in a traditional chip for light, again cutting the energy required for computation. None of these designs yet come close to competing with the electronic digital chips made by the likes of Nvidia. But as the demand for efficiency grows, such alternatives will be waiting in the wings. 

It is also not just chips that can be made more efficient. A lot of the energy inside computers is spent passing data back and forth. IBM says that it has developed a new kind of optical switch, a device that controls digital traffic, that is 80% more efficient than previous switches.   

3/ More efficient cooling in data centers

Another huge source of energy demand is the need to manage the waste heat produced by the high-end hardware on which AI models run. Tom Earp, engineering director at the design firm Page, has been building data centers since 2006, including a six-year stint doing so for Meta. Earp looks for efficiencies in everything from the structure of the building to the electrical supply, the cooling systems, and the way data is transferred in and out.

For a decade or more, as Moore’s Law tailed off, data-center designs were pretty stable, says Earp. And then everything changed. With the shift to processors like GPUs, and with even newer chip designs on the horizon, it is hard to predict what kind of hardware a new data center will need to house—and thus what energy demands it will have to support—in a few years’ time. But in the short term the safe bet is that chips will continue getting faster and hotter: “What I see is that the people who have to make these choices are planning for a lot of upside in how much power we’re going to need,” says Earp.

One thing is clear: The chips that run AI models, such as GPUs, require more power per unit of space than previous types of computer chips. And that has big knock-on implications for the cooling infrastructure inside a data center. “When power goes up, heat goes up,” says Earp.

With so many high-powered chips squashed together, air cooling (big fans, in other words) is no longer sufficient. Water has become the go-to coolant because it is better than air at whisking heat away. That’s not great news for local water sources around data centers. But there are ways to make water cooling more efficient.

One option is to use water to send the waste heat from a data center to places where it can be used. In Denmark water from data centers has been used to heat homes. In Paris, during the Olympics, it was used to heat swimming pools.  

Water can also serve as a type of battery. Energy generated from renewable sources, such as wind turbines or solar panels, can be used to chill water that is stored until it is needed to cool computers later, which reduces the power usage at peak times.

But as data centers get hotter, water cooling alone doesn’t cut it, says Tony Atti, CEO of Phononic, a startup that supplies specialist cooling chips. Chipmakers are creating chips that move data around faster and faster. He points to Nvidia, which is about to release a chip that processes 1.6 terabytes a second: “At that data rate, all hell breaks loose and the demand for cooling goes up exponentially,” he says.

According to Atti, the chips inside servers suck up around 45% of the power in a data center. But cooling those chips now takes almost as much power, around 40%. “For the first time, thermal management is becoming the gate to the expansion of this AI infrastructure,” he says.

Phononic’s cooling chips are small thermoelectric devices that can be placed on or near the hardware that needs cooling. Power an LED chip and it emits photons; power a thermoelectric chip and it emits phonons (which are to vibrational energy—a.k.a. temperature—as photons are to light). In short, phononic chips push heat from one surface to another.

Squeezed into tight spaces inside and around servers, such chips can detect minute increases in heat and switch on and off to maintain a stable temperature. When they’re on, they push excess heat into a water pipe to be whisked away. Atti says they can also be used to increase the efficiency of existing cooling systems. The faster you can cool water in a data center, the less of it you need.

4/ Cutting costs goes hand in hand with cutting energy use

Despite the explosion in AI’s energy use, there’s reason to be optimistic. Sustainability is often an afterthought or a nice-to-have. But with AI, the best way to reduce overall costs is to cut your energy bill. That’s good news, as it should incentivize companies to increase efficiency. “I think we’ve got an alignment between climate sustainability and cost sustainability,” says Verma. ”I think ultimately that will become the big driver that will push the industry to be more energy efficient.”

Shim agrees: “It’s just good business, you know?”

Companies will be forced to think hard about how and when they use AI, choosing smaller, bespoke options whenever they can, she says: “Just look at the world right now. Spending on technology, like everything else, is going to be even more critical going forward.”

Shim thinks the concerns around AI’s energy use are valid. But she points to the rise of the internet and the personal computer boom 25 years ago. As the technology behind those revolutions improved, the energy costs stayed more or less stable even though the number of users skyrocketed, she says.

It’s a general rule Shim thinks will apply this time around as well: When tech matures, it gets more efficient. “I think that’s where we are right now with AI,” she says.

AI is fast becoming a commodity, which means that market competition will drive prices down. To stay in the game, companies will be looking to cut energy use for the sake of their bottom line if nothing else. 

In the end, capitalism may save us after all. 

Can nuclear power really fuel the rise of AI?

In the AI arms race, all the major players say they want to go nuclear.  

Over the past year, the likes of Meta, Amazon, Microsoft, and Google have sent out a flurry of announcements related to nuclear energy. Some are about agreements to purchase power from existing plants, while others are about investments looking to boost unproven advanced technologies.


This story is a part of MIT Technology Review’s series “Power Hungry: AI and our energy future,” on the energy demands and carbon costs of the artificial-intelligence revolution.


These somewhat unlikely partnerships could be a win for both the nuclear power industry and large tech companies. Tech giants need guaranteed sources of energy, and many are looking for low-emissions ones to hit their climate goals. For nuclear plant operators and nuclear technology developers, the financial support of massive established customers could help keep old nuclear power plants open and push new technologies forward.

“There [are] a lot of advantages to nuclear,” says Michael Terrell, senior director of clean energy and carbon reduction at Google. Among them, he says, are that it’s “clean, firm, carbon-free, and can be sited just about anywhere.” (Firm energy sources are those that provide constant power.) 

But there’s one glaring potential roadblock: timing. “There are needs on different time scales,” says Patrick White, former research director at the Nuclear Innovation Alliance. Many of these tech companies will require large amounts of power in the next three to five years, White says, but building new nuclear plants can take close to a decade. 

Some next-generation nuclear technologies, especially small modular reactors, could take less time to build, but the companies promising speed have yet to build their first reactors—and in some cases they are still years away from even modestly sized demonstrations. 

This timing mismatch means that even as tech companies tout plans for nuclear power, they’ll actually be relying largely on fossil fuels, keeping coal plants open, and even building new natural gas plants that could stay open for decades. AI and nuclear could genuinely help each other grow, but the reality is that the growth could be much slower than headlines suggest. 

AI’s need for speed

The US alone has roughly 3,000 data centers, and current projections say the AI boom could add thousands more by the end of the decade. The rush could increase global data center power demand by as much as 165% by 2030, according to one recent analysis from Goldman Sachs. In the US, estimates from industry and academia suggest energy demand for data centers could be as high as 400 terawatt-hours by 2030—up from fewer than 100 terawatt-hours in 2020 and higher than the total electricity demand from the entire country of Mexico.

There are indications that the data center boom might be decelerating, with some companies slowing or pausing some projects in recent weeks. But even the most measured projections, in analyses like one recent report from the International Energy Agency, predict that energy demand will increase. The only question is by how much.  

Many of the same tech giants currently scrambling to build data centers have also set climate goals, vowing to reach net-zero emissions or carbon-free energy within the next couple of decades. So they have a vested interest in where that electricity comes from. 

Nuclear power has emerged as a strong candidate for companies looking to power data centers while cutting emissions. Unlike wind turbines and solar arrays that generate electricity intermittently, nuclear power plants typically put out a constant supply of energy to the grid, which aligns well with what data centers need. “Data center companies pretty much want to run full out, 24/7,” says Rob Gramlich, president of Grid Strategies, a consultancy focused on electricity and transmission.

It also doesn’t hurt that, while renewables are increasingly politicized and under attack by the current administration in the US, nuclear has broad support on both sides of the aisle. 

The problem is how to build up nuclear capacity—existing facilities are limited, and new technologies will take time to build. In 2022, all the nuclear reactors in the US together provided around 800 terawatt-hours of electricity to the power grid, a number that’s been basically steady for the past two decades. To meet electricity demand from data centers expected in 2030 with nuclear power, we’d need to expand the fleet of reactors in the country by half.

New nuclear news 

Some of the most exciting headlines regarding the burgeoning relationship between AI and nuclear technology involve large, established companies jumping in to support innovations that could bring nuclear power into the 21st century. 

In October 2024, Google signed a deal with Kairos Power, a next-generation nuclear company that recently received construction approval for two demonstration reactors from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The company is working to build small, molten-salt-cooled reactors, which it says will be safer and more efficient than conventional technology. The Google deal is a long-term power-purchase agreement: The tech giant will buy up to 500 megawatts of electricity by 2035 from whatever plants Kairos manages to build, with the first one scheduled to come online by 2030. 

Amazon is also getting involved with next-generation nuclear technology with a direct investment in Maryland-based X-energy. The startup is among those working to create smaller, more-standardized reactors that can be built more quickly and with less expense.

In October, Amazon signed a deal with Energy Northwest, a utility in Washington state, that will see Amazon fund the initial phase of a planned X-energy small modular reactor project in the state. The tech giant will have a right to buy electricity from one of the modules in the first project, which could generate 320 megawatts of electricity and be expanded to generate as much as 960 megawatts. Many new AI-focused data centers under construction will require 500 megawatts of power or more, so this project might be just large enough to power a single site. 

The project will help meet energy needs “beginning in the early 2030s,” according to Amazon’s website. X-energy is currently in the pre-application process with the NRC, which must grant approval before the Washington project can move forward.

Solid, long-term plans could be a major help in getting next-generation technologies off the ground. “It’s going to be important in the next couple [of] years to see more firm commitments and actual money going out for these projects,” says Jessica Lovering, who cofounded the Good Energy Collective, a policy research organization that advocates for the use of nuclear energy. 

However, these early projects won’t be enough to make a dent in demand. The next-generation reactors Amazon and Google are supporting are modestly sized demonstrations—the first commercial installations of new technologies. They won’t be close to the scale needed to meet the energy demand expected from new data centers by 2030. 

To provide a significant fraction of the terawatt-hours of electricity large tech companies use each year, nuclear companies will likely need to build dozens of new plants, not just a couple of reactors. 

Purchasing power 

One approach to get around this mismatch is to target existing reactors. 

Microsoft made headlines in this area last year when it signed a long-term power purchase agreement with Constellation, the owner of the Three Mile Island Unit 1 nuclear plant in Pennsylvania. Constellation plans to reopen one of the reactors at that site and rename it the Crane Clean Energy Center. The deal with Microsoft ensures that there will be a customer for the electricity from the plant, if it successfully comes back online. (It’s currently on track to do so in 2028.)

“If you don’t want to wait a decade for new technology, one of the biggest tools that we have in our tool kit today is to support relicensing of operating power plants,” says Urvi Parekh, head of global energy for Meta. Older facilities can apply for 20-year extensions from the NRC, a process that customers buying the energy can help support as it tends to be expensive and lengthy, Parekh says. 

While these existing reactors provide some opportunity for Big Tech to snap up nuclear energy now, a limited number are in good enough shape to extend or reopen. 

In the US, 24 reactors have licenses that will be up for renewal before 2035, roughly a quarter of those in operation today. A handful of plants could potentially be reopened in addition to Three Mile Island, White says. Palisades Nuclear Plant in Michigan has received a $1.52 billion loan guarantee from the US Department of Energy to reopen, and the owner of the Duane Arnold Energy Center in Iowa has filed a request with regulators that could begin the reopening process.

Some sites have reactors that could be upgraded to produce more power without building new infrastructure, adding a total of between two and eight gigawatts, according to a recent report from the Department of Energy. That could power a handful of moderately sized data centers, but power demand is growing for individual projects—OpenAI has suggested the need for data centers that would require at least five gigawatts of power. 

Ultimately, new reactors will be needed to expand capacity significantly, whether they use established technology or next-generation designs. Experts tend to agree that neither would be able to happen at scale until at least the early 2030s. 

In the meantime, decisions made today in response to this energy demand boom will have ripple effects for years. Most power plants can last for several decades or more, so what gets built today will likely stay on the grid through 2040 and beyond. Whether the AI boom will entrench nuclear energy, fossil fuels, or other sources of electricity on the grid will depend on what is introduced to meet demand now. 

No individual technology, including nuclear power, is likely to be the one true solution. As Google’s Terrell puts it, everything from wind and solar, energy storage, geothermal, and yes, nuclear, will be needed to meet both energy demand and climate goals. “I think nuclear gets a lot of love,” he says. “But all of this is equally as important.”

How AI is introducing errors into courtrooms

It’s been quite a couple weeks for stories about AI in the courtroom. You might have heard about the deceased victim of a road rage incident whose family created an AI avatar of him to show as an impact statement (possibly the first time this has been done in the US). But there’s a bigger, far more consequential controversy brewing, legal experts say. AI hallucinations are cropping up more and more in legal filings. And it’s starting to infuriate judges. Just consider these three cases, each of which gives a glimpse into what we can expect to see more of as lawyers embrace AI.

A few weeks ago, a California judge, Michael Wilner, became intrigued by a set of arguments some lawyers made in a filing. He went to learn more about those arguments by following the articles they cited. But the articles didn’t exist. He asked the lawyers’ firm for more details, and they responded with a new brief that contained even more mistakes than the first. Wilner ordered the attorneys to give sworn testimonies explaining the mistakes, in which he learned that one of them, from the elite firm Ellis George, used Google Gemini as well as law-specific AI models to help write the document, which generated false information. As detailed in a filing on May 6, the judge fined the firm $31,000. 

Last week, another California-based judge caught another hallucination in a court filing, this time submitted by the AI company Anthropic in the lawsuit that record labels have brought against it over copyright issues. One of Anthropic’s lawyers had asked the company’s AI model Claude to create a citation for a legal article, but Claude included the wrong title and author. Anthropic’s attorney admitted that the mistake was not caught by anyone reviewing the document. 

Lastly, and perhaps most concerning, is a case unfolding in Israel. After police arrested an individual on charges of money laundering, Israeli prosecutors submitted a request asking a judge for permission to keep the individual’s phone as evidence. But they cited laws that don’t exist, prompting the defendant’s attorney to accuse them of including AI hallucinations in their request. The prosecutors, according to Israeli news outlets, admitted that this was the case, receiving a scolding from the judge. 

Taken together, these cases point to a serious problem. Courts rely on documents that are accurate and backed up with citations—two traits that AI models, despite being adopted by lawyers eager to save time, often fail miserably to deliver. 

Those mistakes are getting caught (for now), but it’s not a stretch to imagine that at some point soon, a judge’s decision will be influenced by something that’s totally made up by AI, and no one will catch it. 

I spoke with Maura Grossman, who teaches at the School of Computer Science at the University of Waterloo as well as Osgoode Hall Law School, and has been a vocal early critic of the problems that generative AI poses for courts. She wrote about the problem back in 2023, when the first cases of hallucinations started appearing. She said she thought courts’ existing rules requiring lawyers to vet what they submit to the courts, combined with the bad publicity those cases attracted, would put a stop to the problem. That hasn’t panned out.

Hallucinations “don’t seem to have slowed down,” she says. “If anything, they’ve sped up.” And these aren’t one-off cases with obscure local firms, she says. These are big-time lawyers making significant, embarrassing mistakes with AI. She worries that such mistakes are also cropping up more in documents not written by lawyers themselves, like expert reports (in December, a Stanford professor and expert on AI admitted to including AI-generated mistakes in his testimony).  

I told Grossman that I find all this a little surprising. Attorneys, more than most, are obsessed with diction. They choose their words with precision. Why are so many getting caught making these mistakes?

“Lawyers fall in two camps,” she says. “The first are scared to death and don’t want to use it at all.” But then there are the early adopters. These are lawyers tight on time or without a cadre of other lawyers to help with a brief. They’re eager for technology that can help them write documents under tight deadlines. And their checks on the AI’s work aren’t always thorough. 

The fact that high-powered lawyers, whose very profession it is to scrutinize language, keep getting caught making mistakes introduced by AI says something about how most of us treat the technology right now. We’re told repeatedly that AI makes mistakes, but language models also feel a bit like magic. We put in a complicated question and receive what sounds like a thoughtful, intelligent reply. Over time, AI models develop a veneer of authority. We trust them.

“We assume that because these large language models are so fluent, it also means that they’re accurate,” Grossman says. “We all sort of slip into that trusting mode because it sounds authoritative.” Attorneys are used to checking the work of junior attorneys and interns but for some reason, Grossman says, don’t apply this skepticism to AI.

We’ve known about this problem ever since ChatGPT launched nearly three years ago, but the recommended solution has not evolved much since then: Don’t trust everything you read, and vet what an AI model tells you. As AI models get thrust into so many different tools we use, I increasingly find this to be an unsatisfying counter to one of AI’s most foundational flaws.

Hallucinations are inherent to the way that large language models work. Despite that, companies are selling generative AI tools made for lawyers that claim to be reliably accurate. “Feel confident your research is accurate and complete,” reads the website for Westlaw Precision, and the website for CoCounsel promises its AI is “backed by authoritative content.” That didn’t stop their client, Ellis George, from being fined $31,000.

Increasingly, I have sympathy for people who trust AI more than they should. We are, after all, living in a time when the people building this technology are telling us that AI is so powerful it should be treated like nuclear weapons. Models have learned from nearly every word humanity has ever written down and are infiltrating our online life. If people shouldn’t trust everything AI models say, they probably deserve to be reminded of that a little more often by the companies building them. 

This story originally appeared in The Algorithm, our weekly newsletter on AI. To get stories like this in your inbox first, sign up here.

Inside the story that enraged OpenAI

In 2019, Karen Hao, a senior reporter with MIT Technology Review, pitched me on writing a story about a then little-known company, OpenAI. It was her biggest assignment to date. Hao’s feat of reporting took a series of twists and turns over the coming months, eventually revealing how OpenAI’s ambition had taken it far afield from its original mission. The finished story was a prescient look at a company at a tipping point—or already past it. And OpenAI was not happy with the result. Hao’s new book, Empire of AI: Dreams and Nightmares in Sam Altman’s OpenAI, is an in-depth exploration of the company that kick-started the AI arms race, and what that race means for all of us. This excerpt is the origin story of that reporting. — Niall Firth, executive editor, MIT Technology Review

I arrived at OpenAI’s offices on August 7, 2019. Greg Brockman, then thirty‑one, OpenAI’s chief technology officer and soon‑to‑be company president, came down the staircase to greet me. He shook my hand with a tentative smile. “We’ve never given someone so much access before,” he said.

At the time, few people beyond the insular world of AI research knew about OpenAI. But as a reporter at MIT Technology Review covering the ever‑expanding boundaries of artificial intelligence, I had been following its movements closely.

Until that year, OpenAI had been something of a stepchild in AI research. It had an outlandish premise that AGI could be attained within a decade, when most non‑OpenAI experts doubted it could be attained at all. To much of the field, it had an obscene amount of funding despite little direction and spent too much of the money on marketing what other researchers frequently snubbed as unoriginal research. It was, for some, also an object of envy. As a nonprofit, it had said that it had no intention to chase commercialization. It was a rare intellectual playground without strings attached, a haven for fringe ideas.

But in the six months leading up to my visit, the rapid slew of changes at OpenAI signaled a major shift in its trajectory. First was its confusing decision to withhold GPT‑2 and brag about it. Then its announcement that Sam Altman, who had mysteriously departed his influential perch at YC, would step in as OpenAI’s CEO with the creation of its new “capped‑profit” structure. I had already made my arrangements to visit the office when it subsequently revealed its deal with Microsoft, which gave the tech giant priority for commercializing OpenAI’s technologies and locked it into exclusively using Azure, Microsoft’s cloud‑computing platform.

Each new announcement garnered fresh controversy, intense speculation, and growing attention, beginning to reach beyond the confines of the tech industry. As my colleagues and I covered the company’s progression, it was hard to grasp the full weight of what was happening. What was clear was that OpenAI was beginning to exert meaningful sway over AI research and the way policymakers were learning to understand the technology. The lab’s decision to revamp itself into a partially for‑profit business would have ripple effects across its spheres of influence in industry and government. 

So late one night, with the urging of my editor, I dashed off an email to Jack Clark, OpenAI’s policy director, whom I had spoken with before: I would be in town for two weeks, and it felt like the right moment in OpenAI’s history. Could I interest them in a profile? Clark passed me on to the communications head, who came back with an answer. OpenAI was indeed ready to reintroduce itself to the public. I would have three days to interview leadership and embed inside the company.


Brockman and I settled into a glass meeting room with the company’s chief scientist, Ilya Sutskever. Sitting side by side at a long conference table, they each played their part. Brockman, the coder and doer, leaned forward, a little on edge, ready to make a good impression; Sutskever, the researcher and philosopher, settled back into his chair, relaxed and aloof.

I opened my laptop and scrolled through my questions. OpenAI’s mission is to ensure beneficial AGI, I began. Why spend billions of dollars on this problem and not something else?

Brockman nodded vigorously. He was used to defending OpenAI’s position. “The reason that we care so much about AGI and that we think it’s important to build is because we think it can help solve complex problems that are just out of reach of humans,” he said.

He offered two examples that had become dogma among AGI believers. Climate change. “It’s a super‑complex problem. How are you even supposed to solve it?” And medicine. “Look at how important health care is in the US as a political issue these days. How do we actually get better treatment for people at lower cost?”

On the latter, he began to recount the story of a friend who had a rare disorder and had recently gone through the exhausting rigmarole of bouncing between different specialists to figure out his problem. AGI would bring together all of these specialties. People like his friend would no longer spend so much energy and frustration on getting an answer.

Why did we need AGI to do that instead of AI? I asked.

This was an important distinction. The term AGI, once relegated to an unpopular section of the technology dictionary, had only recently begun to gain more mainstream usage—in large part because of OpenAI.

And as OpenAI defined it, AGI referred to a theoretical pinnacle of AI research: a piece of software that had just as much sophistication, agility, and creativity as the human mind to match or exceed its performance on most (economically valuable) tasks. The operative word was theoretical. Since the beginning of earnest research into AI several decades earlier, debates had raged about whether silicon chips encoding everything in their binary ones and zeros could ever simulate brains and the other biological processes that give rise to what we consider intelligence. There had yet to be definitive evidence that this was possible, which didn’t even touch on the normative discussion of whether people should develop it.

AI, on the other hand, was the term du jour for both the version of the technology currently available and the version that researchers could reasonably attain in the near future through refining existing capabilities. Those capabilities—rooted in powerful pattern matching known as machine learning—had already demonstrated exciting applications in climate change mitigation and health care.

Sutskever chimed in. When it comes to solving complex global challenges, “fundamentally the bottleneck is that you have a large number of humans and they don’t communicate as fast, they don’t work as fast, they have a lot of incentive problems.” AGI would be different, he said. “Imagine it’s a large computer network of intelligent computers—they’re all doing their medical diagnostics; they all communicate results between them extremely fast.”

This seemed to me like another way of saying that the goal of AGI was to replace humans. Is that what Sutskever meant? I asked Brockman a few hours later, once it was just the two of us.

“No,” Brockman replied quickly. “This is one thing that’s really important. What is the purpose of technology? Why is it here? Why do we build it? We’ve been building technologies for thousands of years now, right? We do it because they serve people. AGI is not going to be different—not the way that we envision it, not the way we want to build it, not the way we think it should play out.”

That said, he acknowledged a few minutes later, technology had always destroyed some jobs and created others. OpenAI’s challenge would be to build AGI that gave everyone “economic freedom” while allowing them to continue to “live meaningful lives” in that new reality. If it succeeded, it would decouple the need to work from survival.

“I actually think that’s a very beautiful thing,” he said.

In our meeting with Sutskever, Brockman reminded me of the bigger picture. “What we view our role as is not actually being a determiner of whether AGI gets built,” he said. This was a favorite argument in Silicon Valley—the inevitability card. If we don’t do it, somebody else will. “The trajectory is already there,” he emphasized, “but the thing we can influence is the initial conditions under which it’s born.

“What is OpenAI?” he continued. “What is our purpose? What are we really trying to do? Our mission is to ensure that AGI benefits all of humanity. And the way we want to do that is: Build AGI and distribute its economic benefits.”

His tone was matter‑of‑fact and final, as if he’d put my questions to rest. And yet we had somehow just arrived back to exactly where we’d started.


Our conversation continued on in circles until we ran out the clock after forty‑five minutes. I tried with little success to get more concrete details on what exactly they were trying to build—which by nature, they explained, they couldn’t know—and why, then, if they couldn’t know, they were so confident it would be beneficial. At one point, I tried a different approach, asking them instead to give examples of the downsides of the technology. This was a pillar of OpenAI’s founding mythology: The lab had to build good AGI before someone else built a bad one.

Brockman attempted an answer: deepfakes. “It’s not clear the world is better through its applications,” he said.

I offered my own example: Speaking of climate change, what about the environmental impact of AI itself? A recent study from the University of Massachusetts Amherst had placed alarming numbers on the huge and growing carbon emissions of training larger and larger AI models.

That was “undeniable,” Sutskever said, but the payoff was worth it because AGI would, “among other things, counteract the environmental cost specifically.” He stopped short of offering examples.

“It is unquestioningly very highly desirable that data centers be as green as possible,” he added.

“No question,” Brockman quipped.

“Data centers are the biggest consumer of energy, of electricity,” Sutskever continued, seeming intent now on proving that he was aware of and cared about this issue.

“It’s 2 percent globally,” I offered.

“Isn’t Bitcoin like 1 percent?” Brockman said.

Wow!” Sutskever said, in a sudden burst of emotion that felt, at this point, forty minutes into the conversation, somewhat performative.

Sutskever would later sit down with New York Times reporter Cade Metz for his book Genius Makers, which recounts a narrative history of AI development, and say without a hint of satire, “I think that it’s fairly likely that it will not take too long of a time for the entire surface of the Earth to become covered with data centers and power stations.” There would be “a tsunami of computing . . . almost like a natural phenomenon.” AGI—and thus the data centers needed to support them—would be “too useful to not exist.”

I tried again to press for more details. “What you’re saying is OpenAI is making a huge gamble that you will successfully reach beneficial AGI to counteract global warming before the act of doing so might exacerbate it.”

“I wouldn’t go too far down that rabbit hole,” Brockman hastily cut in. “The way we think about it is the following: We’re on a ramp of AI progress. This is bigger than OpenAI, right? It’s the field. And I think society is actually getting benefit from it.”

“The day we announced the deal,” he said, referring to Microsoft’s new $1 billion investment, “Microsoft’s market cap went up by $10 billion. People believe there is a positive ROI even just on short‑term technology.”

OpenAI’s strategy was thus quite simple, he explained: to keep up with that progress. “That’s the standard we should really hold ourselves to. We should continue to make that progress. That’s how we know we’re on track.”

Later that day, Brockman reiterated that the central challenge of working at OpenAI was that no one really knew what AGI would look like. But as researchers and engineers, their task was to keep pushing forward, to unearth the shape of the technology step by step.

He spoke like Michelangelo, as though AGI already existed within the marble he was carving. All he had to do was chip away until it revealed itself.


There had been a change of plans. I had been scheduled to eat lunch with employees in the cafeteria, but something now required me to be outside the office. Brockman would be my chaperone. We headed two dozen steps across the street to an open‑air café that had become a favorite haunt for employees.

This would become a recurring theme throughout my visit: floors I couldn’t see, meetings I couldn’t attend, researchers stealing furtive glances at the communications head every few sentences to check that they hadn’t violated some disclosure policy. I would later learn that after my visit, Jack Clark would issue an unusually stern warning to employees on Slack not to speak with me beyond sanctioned conversations. The security guard would receive a photo of me with instructions to be on the lookout if I appeared unapproved on the premises. It was odd behavior in general, made odder by OpenAI’s commitment to transparency. What, I began to wonder, were they hiding, if everything was supposed to be beneficial research eventually made available to the public?

At lunch and through the following days, I probed deeper into why Brockman had cofounded OpenAI. He was a teen when he first grew obsessed with the idea that it could be possible to re‑create human intelligence. It was a famous paper from British mathematician Alan Turing that sparked his fascination. The name of its first section, “The Imitation Game,” which inspired the title of the 2014 Hollywood dramatization of Turing’s life, begins with the opening provocation, “Can machines think?” The paper goes on to define what would become known as the Turing test: a measure of the progression of machine intelligence based on whether a machine can talk to a human without giving away that it is a machine. It was a classic origin story among people working in AI. Enchanted, Brockman coded up a Turing test game and put it online, garnering some 1,500 hits. It made him feel amazing. “I just realized that was the kind of thing I wanted to pursue,” he said.

In 2015, as AI saw great leaps of advancement, Brockman says that he realized it was time to return to his original ambition and joined OpenAI as a cofounder. He wrote down in his notes that he would do anything to bring AGI to fruition, even if it meant being a janitor. When he got married four years later, he held a civil ceremony at OpenAI’s office in front of a custom flower wall emblazoned with the shape of the lab’s hexagonal logo. Sutskever officiated. The robotic hand they used for research stood in the aisle bearing the rings, like a sentinel from a post-apocalyptic future.

“Fundamentally, I want to work on AGI for the rest of my life,” Brockman told me.

What motivated him? I asked Brockman.

What are the chances that a transformative technology could arrive in your lifetime? he countered.

He was confident that he—and the team he assembled—was uniquely positioned to usher in that transformation. “What I’m really drawn to are problems that will not play out in the same way if I don’t participate,” he said.

Brockman did not in fact just want to be a janitor. He wanted to lead AGI. And he bristled with the anxious energy of someone who wanted history‑defining recognition. He wanted people to one day tell his story with the same mixture of awe and admiration that he used to recount the ones of the great innovators who came before him.

A year before we spoke, he had told a group of young tech entrepreneurs at an exclusive retreat in Lake Tahoe with a twinge of self‑pity that chief technology officers were never known. Name a famous CTO, he challenged the crowd. They struggled to do so. He had proved his point.

In 2022, he became OpenAI’s president.


During our conversations, Brockman insisted to me that none of OpenAI’s structural changes signaled a shift in its core mission. In fact, the capped profit and the new crop of funders enhanced it. “We managed to get these mission‑aligned investors who are willing to prioritize mission over returns. That’s a crazy thing,” he said.

OpenAI now had the long‑term resources it needed to scale its models and stay ahead of the competition. This was imperative, Brockman stressed. Failing to do so was the real threat that could undermine OpenAI’s mission. If the lab fell behind, it had no hope of bending the arc of history toward its vision of beneficial AGI. Only later would I realize the full implications of this assertion. It was this fundamental assumption—the need to be first or perish—that set in motion all of OpenAI’s actions and their far‑reaching consequences. It put a ticking clock on each of OpenAI’s research advancements, based not on the timescale of careful deliberation but on the relentless pace required to cross the finish line before anyone else. It justified OpenAI’s consumption of an unfathomable amount of resources: both compute, regardless of its impact on the environment; and data, the amassing of which couldn’t be slowed by getting consent or abiding by regulations.

Brockman pointed once again to the $10 billion jump in Microsoft’s market cap. “What that really reflects is AI is delivering real value to the real world today,” he said. That value was currently being concentrated in an already wealthy corporation, he acknowledged, which was why OpenAI had the second part of its mission: to redistribute the benefits of AGI to everyone.

Was there a historical example of a technology’s benefits that had been successfully distributed? I asked.

“Well, I actually think that—it’s actually interesting to look even at the internet as an example,” he said, fumbling a bit before settling on his answer. “There’s problems, too, right?” he said as a caveat. “Anytime you have something super transformative, it’s not going to be easy to figure out how to maximize positive, minimize negative.

“Fire is another example,” he added. “It’s also got some real drawbacks to it. So we have to figure out how to keep it under control and have shared standards.

“Cars are a good example,” he followed. “Lots of people have cars, benefit a lot of people. They have some drawbacks to them as well. They have some externalities that are not necessarily good for the world,” he finished hesitantly.

“I guess I just view—the thing we want for AGI is not that different from the positive sides of the internet, positive sides of cars, positive sides of fire. The implementation is very different, though, because it’s a very different type of technology.”

His eyes lit up with a new idea. “Just look at utilities. Power companies, electric companies are very centralized entities that provide low‑cost, high‑quality things that meaningfully improve people’s lives.”

It was a nice analogy. But Brockman seemed once again unclear about how OpenAI would turn itself into a utility. Perhaps through distributing universal basic income, he wondered aloud, perhaps through something else.

He returned to the one thing he knew for certain. OpenAI was committed to redistributing AGI’s benefits and giving everyone economic freedom. “We actually really mean that,” he said.

“The way that we think about it is: Technology so far has been something that does rise all the boats, but it has this real concentrating effect,” he said. “AGI could be more extreme. What if all value gets locked up in one place? That is the trajectory we’re on as a society. And we’ve never seen that extreme of it. I don’t think that’s a good world. That’s not a world that I want to sign up for. That’s not a world that I want to help build.”


In February 2020, I published my profile for MIT Technology Review, drawing on my observations from my time in the office, nearly three dozen interviews, and a handful of internal documents. “There is a misalignment between what the company publicly espouses and how it operates behind closed doors,” I wrote. “Over time, it has allowed a fierce competitiveness and mounting pressure for ever more funding to erode its founding ideals of transparency, openness, and collaboration.”

Hours later, Elon Musk replied to the story with three tweets in rapid succession:

“OpenAI should be more open imo”

“I have no control & only very limited insight into OpenAI. Confidence in Dario for safety is not high,” he said, referring to Dario Amodei, the director of research.

“All orgs developing advanced AI should be regulated, including Tesla”

Afterward, Altman sent OpenAI employees an email.

“I wanted to share some thoughts about the Tech Review article,” he wrote. “While definitely not catastrophic, it was clearly bad.”

It was “a fair criticism,” he said that the piece had identified a disconnect between the perception of OpenAI and its reality. This could be smoothed over not with changes to its internal practices but some tuning of OpenAI’s public messaging. “It’s good, not bad, that we have figured out how to be flexible and adapt,” he said, including restructuring the organization and heightening confidentiality, “in order to achieve our mission as we learn more.” OpenAI should ignore my article for now and, in a few weeks’ time, start underscoring its continued commitment to its original principles under the new transformation. “This may also be a good opportunity to talk about the API as a strategy for openness and benefit sharing,” he added, referring to an application programming interface for delivering OpenAI’s models.

“The most serious issue of all, to me,” he continued, “is that someone leaked our internal documents.” They had already opened an investigation and would keep the company updated. He would also suggest that Amodei and Musk meet to work out Musk’s criticism, which was “mild relative to other things he’s said” but still “a bad thing to do.” For the avoidance of any doubt, Amodei’s work and AI safety were critical to the mission, he wrote. “I think we should at some point in the future find a way to publicly defend our team (but not give the press the public fight they’d love right now).”

OpenAI wouldn’t speak to me again for three years.

From the book Empire of AI: Dreams and Nightmares in Sam Altman’s OpenAI, by Karen Hao, to be published on May 20, 2025, by Penguin Press, an imprint of Penguin Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. Copyright © 2025 by Karen Hao.

Access to experimental medical treatments is expanding across the US

A couple of weeks ago I was in Washington, DC, for a gathering of scientists, policymakers, and longevity enthusiasts. They had come together to discuss ways to speed along the development of drugs and other treatments that might extend the human lifespan.

One approach that came up was to simply make experimental drugs more easily accessible. Let people try drugs that might help them live longer, the argument went. Some groups have been pushing bills to do just that in Montana, a state whose constitution explicitly values personal liberty.

A couple of years ago, a longevity lobbying group helped develop a bill that expanded on the state’s existing Right to Try law, which allowed seriously ill people to apply for access to experimental drugs (that is, drugs that have not been approved by drug regulators). The expansion, which was passed in 2023, opened access for people who are not seriously ill. 

Over the last few months, the group has been pushing further—for a new bill that sets out exactly how clinics can sell experimental, unproven treatments in the state to anyone who wants them. At the end of the second day of the event, the man next to me looked at his phone. “It just passed,” he told me. (The lobbying group has since announced that the state’s governor Greg Gianforte has signed the bill into law, but when I called his office, Gianforte’s staff said they could not legally tell me whether or not he has.)

The passing of the bill could make Montana something of a US hub for experimental treatments. But it represents a wider trend: the creep of Right to Try across the US. And a potentially dangerous departure from evidence-based medicine.

In the US, drugs must be tested in human volunteers before they can be approved and sold. Early-stage clinical trials are small and check for safety. Later trials test both the safety and efficacy of a new drug.

The system is designed to keep people safe and to prevent manufacturers from selling ineffective or dangerous products. It’s meant to protect us from snake oil.

But people who are seriously ill and who have exhausted all other treatment options are often desperate to try experimental drugs. They might see it as a last hope. Sometimes they can volunteer for clinical trials, but time, distance, and eligibility can rule out that option.

Since the 1980s, seriously or terminally ill people who cannot take part in a trial for some reason can apply for access to experimental treatments through a “compassionate use” program run by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The FDA authorizes almost all of the compassionate use requests it receives (although manufacturers don’t always agree to provide their drug for various reasons).

But that wasn’t enough for the Goldwater Institute, a libertarian organization that in 2014 drafted a model Right to Try law for people who are terminally ill. Versions of this draft have since been passed into law in 41 US states, and the US has had a federal Right to Try law since 2018. These laws generally allow people who are seriously ill to apply for access to drugs that have only been through the very first stages of clinical trials, provided they give informed consent.

Some have argued that these laws have been driven by a dislike of both drug regulation and the FDA. After all, they are designed to achieve the same result as the compassionate use program. The only difference is that they bypass the FDA.

Either way, it’s worth noting just how early-stage these treatments are. A drug that has been through phase I trials might have been tested in just 20 healthy people. Yes, these trials are designed to test the safety of a drug, but they are never conclusive. At that point in a drug’s development, no one can know how a sick person—who is likely to be taking other medicines— will react to it.

Now these Right to Try laws are being expanded even more. The Montana bill, which goes the furthest, will enable people who are not seriously ill to access unproven treatments, and other states have been making moves in the same direction.

Just this week, Georgia’s governor signed into law the Hope for Georgia Patients Act, which allows people with life-threatening illnesses to access personalized treatments, those that are “unique to and produced exclusively for an individual patient based on his or her own genetic profile.” Similar laws, known as “Right to Try 2.0,”  have been passed in other states, too, including Arizona, Mississippi, and North Carolina.

And last year, Utah passed a law that allows health care providers (including chiropractors, podiatrists, midwives, and naturopaths) to deliver unapproved placental stem cell therapies. These treatments involve cells collected from placentas, which are thought to hold promise for tissue regeneration. But they haven’t been through human trials. They can cost tens of thousands of dollars, and their effects are unknown. Utah’s law was described as a “pretty blatant broadbrush challenge to the FDA’s authority” by an attorney who specializes in FDA law. And it’s one that could put patients at risk.

Laws like these spark a lot of very sensitive debates. Some argue that it’s a question of medical autonomy, and that people should have the right to choose what they put in their own bodies.

And many argue there’s a cost-benefit calculation to be made. A seriously ill person potentially has more to gain and less to lose from trying an experimental drug, compared to someone who is in good health.

But everyone needs to be protected from ineffective drugs. Most ethicists think it’s unethical to sell a treatment when you have no idea if it will work, and that argument has been supported by numerous US court decisions over the years. 

There could be a financial incentive for doctors to recommend an experimental drug, especially when they are granted protections by law. (Right to Try laws tend to protect prescribing doctors from disciplinary action and litigation should something go wrong.)

On top of all this, many ethicists are also concerned that the FDA’s drug approval process itself has been on a downward slide over the last decade or so. An increasing number of drug approvals are fast-tracked based on weak evidence, they argue.

Scientists and ethicists on both sides of the debate are now waiting to see what unfolds under the new US administration.  

In the meantime, a quote from Diana Zuckerman, president of the nonprofit National Center for Health Research, comes to mind: “Sometimes hope helps people do better,” she told me a couple of years ago. “But in medicine, isn’t it better to have hope based on evidence rather than hope based on hype?”

This article first appeared in The Checkup, MIT Technology Review’s weekly biotech newsletter. To receive it in your inbox every Thursday, and read articles like this first, sign up here.

How US research cuts are threatening crucial climate data

Over the last few months, and especially the last few weeks, there’s been an explosion of news about proposed budget cuts to science in the US. One trend I’ve noticed: Researchers and civil servants are sounding the alarm that those cuts mean we might lose key data that helps us understand our world and how climate change is affecting it.

My colleague James Temple has a new story out today about researchers who are attempting to measure the temperature of mountain snowpack across the western US. Snow that melts in the spring is a major water source across the region, and monitoring the temperature far below the top layer of snow could help scientists more accurately predict how fast water will flow down the mountains, allowing farmers, businesses, and residents to plan accordingly.

But long-running government programs that monitor the snowpack across the West are among those being threatened by cuts across the US federal government. Also potentially in trouble: carbon dioxide measurements in Hawaii, hurricane forecasting tools, and a database that tracks the economic impact of natural disasters. It’s all got me thinking: What do we lose when data is in danger?

Take for example the work at Mauna Loa Observatory, which sits on the northern side of the world’s largest active volcano. In this Hawaii facility, researchers have been measuring the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere since 1958.

The resulting graph, called the Keeling Curve (after Charles David Keeling, the scientist who kicked off the effort) is a pillar of climate research. It shows that carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas warming the planet, has increased in the atmosphere from around 313 parts per million in 1958 to over 420 parts per million today.

Proposed cuts to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) jeopardize the Keeling Curve’s future. As Ralph Keeling (current steward of the curve and Keeling’s son) put it in a new piece for Wired, “If successful, this loss will be a nightmare scenario for climate science, not just in the United States, but the world.”

This story has echoes across the climate world right now. A lab at Princeton that produces what some consider the top-of-the-line climate models used to make hurricane forecasts could be in trouble because of NOAA budget cuts. And last week, NOAA announced it would no longer track the economic impact of the biggest natural disasters in the US.

Some of the largest-scale climate efforts will feel the effects of these cuts, and as James’s new story shows, they could also seep into all sorts of specialized fields. Even seemingly niche work can have a huge impact not just on research, but on people.

The frozen reservoir of the Sierra snowpack provides about a third of California’s groundwater, as well as the majority used by towns and cities in northwest Nevada. Researchers there are hoping to help officials better forecast the timing of potential water supplies across the region.

This story brought to mind my visit to El Paso, Texas, a few years ago. I spoke with farmers there who rely on water coming down the Rio Grande, alongside dwindling groundwater, to support their crops. There, water comes down from the mountains in Colorado and New Mexico in the spring and is held in the Elephant Butte Reservoir. One farmer I met showed me pages and pages of notes of reservoir records, which he had meticulously copied by hand. Those crinkled pages were a clear sign: Publicly available data was crucial to his work.

The endeavor of scientific research, particularly when it involves patiently gathering data, isn’t always exciting. Its importance is often overlooked. But as cuts continue, we’re keeping a lookout, because losing data could harm our ability to track, address, and adapt to our changing climate. 

This article is from The Spark, MIT Technology Review’s weekly climate newsletter. To receive it in your inbox every Wednesday, sign up here.

This baby boy was treated with the first personalized gene-editing drug

Doctors say they constructed a bespoke gene-editing treatment in less than seven months and used it to treat a baby with a deadly metabolic condition.

The rapid-fire attempt to rewrite the child’s DNA marks the first time gene editing has been tailored to treat a single individual, according to a report published in the New England Journal of Medicine.

The baby who was treated, Kyle “KJ” Muldoon Jr., suffers from a rare metabolic condition caused by a particularly unusual gene misspelling.

Researchers say their attempt to correct the error demonstrates the high level of precision new types of gene editors offer. 

“I don’t think I’m exaggerating when I say that this is the future of medicine,” says Kiran Musunuru, an expert in gene editing at the University of Pennsylvania whose team designed the drug. “My hope is that someday no rare disease patients will die prematurely from misspellings in their genes, because we’ll be able to correct them.”

The project also highlights what some experts are calling a growing crisis in gene-editing technology. That’s because even though the technology could cure thousands of genetic conditions, most are so rare that companies could never recoup the costs of developing a treatment for them. 

In KJ’s case, the treatment was programmed to correct a single letter of DNA in his cells.

“In reality, this drug will probably never be used again,” says Rebecca Ahrens-Nicklas, a physician at the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia who treats metabolic diseases in children and who led the overall effort to treat the child.

That effort involved more than 45 scientists and doctors as well as pro bono assistance from several biotechnology companies. Musunuru says he cannot estimate how much it had cost in time and effort.

Eventually, he says, the cost of custom gene-editing treatments might be similar to that of liver transplants, which is around $800,000, not including lifelong medical care and drugs.

The researchers used a new version of CRISPR technology, called base editing, that can replace a single letter of DNA at a specific location. 

Previous versions of CRISPR have generally been used to delete genes, not rewrite them to restore their function.

The researchers say they were looking for a patient to treat when they learned about KJ. After he was born in August, a doctor noted that the infant was lethargic. Tests found he had a metabolic disorder that leads to the buildup of ammonia, a condition that’s frequently fatal without a liver transplant.

In KJ’s case, gene sequencing showed that the cause was a misspelled letter in the gene CPS1 that stopped it from making a vital enzyme.

The researchers approached KJ’s parents, Nicole and Kyle Muldoon, with the idea of using gene editing to try to correct their baby’s DNA. After they agreed, a race ensued to design the editing drug, test it in animals, and get permission from the US Food and Drug Administration to treat KJ in a one-off experiment.

The team says the boy, who hasn’t turned one yet, received three doses of the gene-editing treatment, of gradually increasing strength. They can’t yet determine exactly how well the gene editor worked because they don’t want to take a liver biopsy, which would be needed to check if KJ’s genes have really been corrected.

But Ahrens-Nicklas says that because the child is “growing and thriving,” she thinks the editing has been at least partly successful and that he may now have “a milder form of this horrific disease.”

“He’s received three doses of the therapy without any complications, and is showing some early signs of benefit,” she says. “It’s really important to say that it’s still very early, so we will need to continue to watch KJ closely to fully understand the full effects of this therapy.”

The case suggests a future in which parents will take sick children to a clinic where their DNA will be sequenced, and then they will rapidly receive individualized treatments. Currently, this would only work for liver diseases, for which it’s easier to deliver gene-editing instructions, but eventually it might also become a possible approach for treating brain diseases and conditions like muscular dystrophy.

The experiment is drawing attention to a gap between what gene editing can do and what treatments are likely to become available to people who need them.

So far, biotechnology companies testing gene editing are working only on fairly common gene conditions, like sickle cell disease, leaving hundreds of ultra-rare conditions aside. One-off treatments, like the one helping KJ, are too expensive to create and get approved without some way to recoup the costs.

The apparent success in treating KJ, however, is making it even more urgent to figure out a way forward. Researchers acknowledge that they don’t yet know how to scale up personalized treatment, although Musunuru says initial steps to standardize the process are underway at his university and in Europe.