The race to make the perfect baby is creating an ethical mess

Consider, if you will, the translucent blob in the eye of a microscope: a human blastocyst, the biological specimen that emerges just five days or so after a fateful encounter between egg and sperm. This bundle of cells, about the size of a grain of sand pulled from a powdery white Caribbean beach, contains the coiled potential of a future life: 46 chromosomes, thousands of genes, and roughly six billion base pairs of DNA—an instruction manual to assemble a one-of-a-kind human.

Now imagine a laser pulse snipping a hole in the blastocyst’s outermost shell so a handful of cells can be suctioned up by a microscopic pipette. This is the moment, thanks to advances in genetic sequencing technology, when it becomes possible to read virtually that entire instruction manual.

An emerging field of science seeks to use the analysis pulled from that procedure to predict what kind of a person that embryo might become. Some parents turn to these tests to avoid passing on devastating genetic disorders that run in their families. A much smaller group, driven by dreams of Ivy League diplomas or attractive, well-behaved offspring, are willing to pay tens of thousands of dollars to optimize for intelligence, appearance, and personality. Some of the most eager early boosters of this technology are members of the Silicon Valley elite, including tech billionaires like Elon Musk, Peter Thiel, and Coinbase CEO Brian Armstrong. 

Embryo selection is less like a build-a-baby workshop and more akin to a store where parents can shop for their future children from several available models—complete with stat cards.

But customers of the companies emerging to provide it to the public may not be getting what they’re paying for. Genetics experts have been highlighting the potential deficiencies of this testing for years. A 2021 paper by members of the European Society of Human Genetics said, “No clinical research has been performed to assess its diagnostic effectiveness in embryos. Patients need to be properly informed on the limitations of this use.” And a paper published this May in the Journal of Clinical Medicine echoed this concern and expressed particular reservations about screening for psychiatric disorders and non-­disease-related traits: “Unfortunately, no clinical research has to date been published comprehensively evaluating the effectiveness of this strategy [of predictive testing]. Patient awareness regarding the limitations of this procedure is paramount.”    

Moreover, the assumptions underlying some of this work—that how a person turns out is the product not of privilege or circumstance but of innate biology—have made these companies a political lightning rod. 

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As this niche technology begins to make its way toward the mainstream, scientists and ethicists are racing to confront the implications—for our social contract, for future generations, and for our very understanding of what it means to be human.


Preimplantation genetic testing (PGT), while still relatively rare, is not new. Since the 1990s, parents undergoing in vitro fertilization have been able to access a number of genetic tests before choosing which embryo to use. A type known as PGT-M can detect single-gene disorders like cystic fibrosis, sickle cell anemia, and Huntington’s disease. PGT-A can ascertain the sex of an embryo and identify chromosomal abnormalities that can lead to conditions like Down syndrome or reduce the chances that an embryo will implant successfully in the uterus. PGT-SR helps parents avoid embryos with issues such as duplicated or missing segments of the chromosome.

Those tests all identify clear-cut genetic problems that are relatively easy to detect, but most of the genetic instruction manual included in an embryo is written in far more nuanced code. In recent years, a fledgling market has sprung up around a new, more advanced version of the testing process called PGT-P: preimplantation genetic testing for polygenic disorders (and, some claim, traits)—that is, outcomes determined by the elaborate interaction of hundreds or thousands of genetic variants.

In 2020, the first baby selected using PGT-P was born. While the exact figure is unknown, estimates put the number of children who have now been born with the aid of this technology in the hundreds. As the technology is commercialized, that number is likely to grow.

Embryo selection is less like a build-a-baby workshop and more akin to a store where parents can shop for their future children from several available models—complete with stat cards indicating their predispositions.

A handful of startups, armed with tens of millions of dollars of Silicon Valley cash, have developed proprietary algorithms to compute these stats—analyzing vast numbers of genetic variants and producing a “polygenic risk score” that shows the probability of an embryo developing a variety of complex traits.  

For the last five years or so, two companies—Genomic Prediction and Orchid—have dominated this small landscape, focusing their efforts on disease prevention. But more recently, two splashy new competitors have emerged: Nucleus Genomics and Herasight, which have rejected the more cautious approach of their predecessors and waded into the controversial territory of genetic testing for intelligence. (Nucleus also offers tests for a wide variety of other behavioral and appearance-related traits.) 

The practical limitations of polygenic risk scores are substantial. For starters, there is still a lot we don’t understand about the complex gene interactions driving polygenic traits and disorders. And the biobank data sets they are based on tend to overwhelmingly represent individuals with Western European ancestry, making it more difficult to generate reliable scores for patients from other backgrounds. These scores also lack the full context of environment, lifestyle, and the myriad other factors that can influence a person’s characteristics. And while polygenic risk scores can be effective at detecting large, population-level trends, their predictive abilities drop significantly when the sample size is as tiny as a single batch of embryos that share much of the same DNA.

The medical community—including organizations like the American Society of Human Genetics, the American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics, and the American Society for Reproductive Medicine—is generally wary of using polygenic risk scores for embryo selection. “The practice has moved too fast with too little evidence,” the American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics wrote in an official statement in 2024.

But beyond questions of whether evidence supports the technology’s effectiveness, critics of the companies selling it accuse them of reviving a disturbing ideology: eugenics, or the belief that selective breeding can be used to improve humanity. Indeed, some of the voices who have been most confident that these methods can successfully predict nondisease traits have made startling claims about natural genetic hierarchies and innate racial differences.

What everyone can agree on, though, is that this new wave of technology is helping to inflame a centuries-old debate over nature versus nurture.


The term “eugenics” was coined in 1883 by a British anthropologist and statistician named Sir Francis Galton, inspired in part by the work of his cousin Charles Darwin. He derived it from a Greek word meaning “good in stock, hereditarily endowed with noble qualities.”

Some of modern history’s darkest chapters have been built on Galton’s legacy, from the Holocaust to the forced sterilization laws that affected certain groups in the United States well into the 20th century. Modern science has demonstrated the many logical and empirical problems with Galton’s methodology. (For starters, he counted vague concepts like “eminence”—as well as infections like syphilis and tuberculosis—as heritable phenotypes, meaning characteristics that result from the interaction of genes and environment.)

Yet even today, Galton’s influence lives on in the field of behavioral genetics, which investigates the genetic roots of psychological traits. Starting in the 1960s, researchers in the US began to revisit one of Galton’s favorite methods: twin studies. Many of these studies, which analyzed pairs of identical and fraternal twins to try to determine which traits were heritable and which resulted from socialization, were funded by the US government. The most well-known of these, the Minnesota Twin Study, also accepted grants from the Pioneer Fund, a now defunct nonprofit that had promoted eugenics and “race betterment” since its founding in 1937. 

The nature-versus-nurture debate hit a major inflection point in 2003, when the Human Genome Project was declared complete. After 13 years and at a cost of nearly $3 billion, an international consortium of thousands of researchers had sequenced 92% of the human genome for the first time.

Today, the cost of sequencing a genome can be as low as $600, and one company says it will soon drop even further. This dramatic reduction has made it possible to build massive DNA databases like the UK Biobank and the National Institutes of Health’s All of Us, each containing genetic data from more than half a million volunteers. Resources like these have enabled researchers to conduct genome-wide association studies, or GWASs, which identify correlations between genetic variants and human traits by analyzing single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs)—the most common form of genetic variation between individuals. The findings from these studies serve as a reference point for developing polygenic risk scores.

Most GWASs have focused on disease prevention and personalized medicine. But in 2011, a group of medical researchers, social scientists, and economists launched the Social Science Genetic Association Consortium (SSGAC) to investigate the genetic basis of complex social and behavioral outcomes. One of the phenotypes they focused on was the level of education people reached.

“It was a bit of a phenotype of convenience,” explains Patrick Turley, an economist and member of the steering committee at SSGAC, given that educational attainment is routinely recorded in surveys when genetic data is collected. Still, it was “clear that genes play some role,” he says. “And trying to understand what that role is, I think, is really interesting.” He adds that social scientists can also use genetic data to try to better “understand the role that is due to nongenetic pathways.”

Many on the left are generally willing to allow that any number of traits, from addiction to obesity, are genetically influenced. Yet heritable cognitive ability seems to be “beyond the pale for us to integrate as a source of difference.”

The work immediately stirred feelings of discomfort—not least among the consortium’s own members, who feared that they might unintentionally help reinforce racism, inequality, and genetic determinism. 

It’s also created quite a bit of discomfort in some political circles, says Kathryn Paige Harden, a psychologist and behavioral geneticist at the University of Texas in Austin, who says she has spent much of her career making the unpopular argument to fellow liberals that genes are relevant predictors of social outcomes. 

Harden thinks a strength of those on the left is their ability to recognize “that bodies are different from each other in a way that matters.” Many are generally willing to allow that any number of traits, from addiction to obesity, are genetically influenced. Yet, she says, heritable cognitive ability seems to be “beyond the pale for us to integrate as a source of difference that impacts our life.” 

Harden believes that genes matter for our understanding of traits like intelligence, and that this should help shape progressive policymaking. She gives the example of an education department seeking policy interventions to improve math scores in a given school district. If a polygenic risk score is “as strongly correlated with their school grades” as family income is, she says of the students in such a district, then “does deliberately not collecting that [genetic] information, or not knowing about it, make your research harder [and] your inferences worse?”

To Harden, persisting with this strategy of avoidance for fear of encouraging eugenicists is a mistake. If “insisting that IQ is a myth and genes have nothing to do with it was going to be successful at neutralizing eugenics,” she says, “it would’ve won by now.”

Part of the reason these ideas are so taboo in many circles is that today’s debate around genetic determinism is still deeply infused with Galton’s ideas—and has become a particular fixation among the online right. 

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After Elon Musk took over Twitter (now X) in 2022 and loosened its restrictions on hate speech, a flood of accounts started sharing racist posts, some speculating about the genetic origins of inequality while arguing against immigration and racial integration. Musk himself frequently reposts and engages with accounts like Crémieux Recueil, the pen name of independent researcher Jordan Lasker, who has written about the “Black-White IQ gap,” and i/o, an anonymous account that once praised Musk for “acknowledging data on race and crime,” saying it “has done more to raise awareness of the disproportionalities observed in these data than anything I can remember.” (In response to allegations that his research encourages eugenics, Lasker wrote to MIT Technology Review, “The popular understanding of eugenics is about coercion and cutting people cast as ‘undesirable’ out of the breeding pool. This is nothing like that, so it doesn’t qualify as eugenics by that popular understanding of the term.” After going to print, i/o wrote in an email, “Just because differences in intelligence at the individual level are largely heritable, it does not mean that group differences in measured intelligence … are due to genetic differences between groups,” but that the latter is not “scientifically settled” and “an extremely important (and necessary) research area that should be funded rather than made taboo.” He added, “I’ve never made any argument against racial integration or intermarriage or whatever.” X and Musk did not respond to requests for comment.)

Harden, though, warns against discounting the work of an entire field because of a few noisy neoreactionaries. “I think there can be this idea that technology is giving rise to the terrible racism,” she says. The truth, she believes, is that “the racism has preexisted any of this technology.”


In 2019, a company called Genomic Prediction began to offer the first preimplantation polygenic testing that had ever been made commercially available. With its LifeView Embryo Health Score, prospective parents are able to assess their embryos’ predisposition to genetically complex health problems like cancer, diabetes, and heart disease. Pricing for the service starts at $3,500. Genomic Prediction uses a technique called an SNP array, which targets specific sites in the genome where common variants occur. The results are then cross-checked against GWASs that show correlations between genetic variants and certain diseases.

Four years later, a company named Orchid began offering a competing test. Orchid’s Whole Genome Embryo Report distinguished itself by claiming to sequence more than 99% of an embryo’s genome, allowing it to detect novel mutations and, the company says, diagnose rare diseases more accurately. For $2,500 per embryo, parents can access polygenic risk scores for 12 disorders, including schizophrenia, breast cancer, and hypothyroidism. 

Orchid was founded by a woman named Noor Siddiqui. Before getting undergraduate and graduate degrees from Stanford, she was awarded the Thiel fellowship—a $200,000 grant given to young entrepreneurs willing to work on their ideas instead of going to college—back when she was a teenager, in 2012. This set her up to attract attention from members of the tech elite as both customers and financial backers. Her company has raised $16.5 million to date from investors like Ethereum founder Vitalik Buterin, former Coinbase CTO Balaji Srinivasan, and Armstrong, the Coinbase CEO.

In August Siddiqui made the controversial suggestion that parents who choose not to use genetic testing might be considered irresponsible. “Just be honest: you’re okay with your kid potentially suffering for life so you can feel morally superior …” she wrote on X.

Americans have varied opinions on the emerging technology. In 2024, a group of bioethicists surveyed 1,627 US adults to determine attitudes toward a variety of polygenic testing criteria. A large majority approved of testing for physical health conditions like cancer, heart disease, and diabetes. Screening for mental health disorders, like depression, OCD, and ADHD, drew a more mixed—but still positive—response. Appearance-related traits, like skin color, baldness, and height, received less approval as something to test for.

Intelligence was among the most contentious traits—unsurprising given the way it has been weaponized throughout history and the lack of cultural consensus on how it should even be defined. (In many countries, intelligence testing for embryos is heavily regulated; in the UK, the practice is banned outright.) In the 2024 survey, 36.9% of respondents approved of preimplantation genetic testing for intelligence, 40.5% disapproved, and 22.6% said they were uncertain.

Despite the disagreement, intelligence has been among the traits most talked about as targets for testing. From early on, Genomic Prediction says, it began receiving inquiries “from all over the world” about testing for intelligence, according to Diego Marin, the company’s head of global business development and scientific affairs.

At one time, the company offered a predictor for what it called “intellectual disability.” After some backlash questioning both the predictive capacity and the ethics of these scores, the company discontinued the feature. “Our mission and vision of this company is not to improve [a baby], but to reduce risk for disease,” Marin told me. “When it comes to traits about IQ or skin color or height or something that’s cosmetic and doesn’t really have a connotation of a disease, then we just don’t invest in it.”

Orchid, on the other hand, does test for genetic markers associated with intellectual disability and developmental delay. But that may not be all. According to one employee of the company, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, intelligence testing is also offered to “high-roller” clients. According to this employee, another source close to the company, and reporting in the Washington Post, Musk used Orchid’s services in the conception of at least one of the children he shares with the tech executive Shivon Zilis. (Orchid, Musk, and Zilis did not respond to requests for comment.)


I met Kian Sadeghi, the 25-year-old founder of New York–based Nucleus Genomics, on a sweltering July afternoon in his SoHo office. Slight and kinetic, Sadeghi spoke at a machine-gun pace, pausing only occasionally to ask if I was keeping up. 

Sadeghi had modified his first organism—a sample of brewer’s yeast—at the age of 16. As a high schooler in 2016, he was taking a course on CRISPR-Cas9 at a Brooklyn laboratory when he fell in love with the “beautiful depth” of genetics. Just a few years later, he dropped out of college to build “a better 23andMe.” 

His company targets what you might call the application layer of PGT-P, accepting data from IVF clinics—and even from the competitors mentioned in this story—and running its own computational analysis.

“Unlike a lot of the other testing companies, we’re software first, and we’re consumer first,” Sadeghi told me. “It’s not enough to give someone a polygenic score. What does that mean? How do you compare them? There’s so many really hard design problems.”

Like its competitors, Nucleus calculates its polygenic risk scores by comparing an individual’s genetic data with trait-associated variants identified in large GWASs, providing statistically informed predictions. 

Nucleus provides two displays of a patient’s results: a Z-score, plotted from –4 to 4, which explains the risk of a certain trait relative to a population with similar genetic ancestry (for example, if Embryo #3 has a 2.1 Z-score for breast cancer, its risk is higher than average), and an absolute risk score, which includes relevant clinical factors (Embryo #3 has a minuscule actual risk of breast cancer, given that it is male).

The real difference between Nucleus and its competitors lies in the breadth of what it claims to offer clients. On its sleek website, prospective parents can sort through more than 2,000 possible diseases, as well as traits from eye color to IQ. Access to the Nucleus Embryo platform costs $8,999, while the company’s new IVF+ offering—which includes one IVF cycle with a partner clinic, embryo screening for up to 20 embryos, and concierge services throughout the process—starts at $24,999.

“Maybe you want your baby to have blue eyes versus green eyes,” Nucleus founder Kian Sadeghi said at a June event. “That is up to the liberty of the parents.”

Its promises are remarkably bold. The company claims to be able to forecast a propensity for anxiety, ADHD, insomnia, and other mental issues. It says you can see which of your embryos are more likely to have alcohol dependence, which are more likely to be left-handed, and which might end up with severe acne or seasonal allergies. (Nevertheless, at the time of writing, the embryo-screening platform provided this disclaimer: “DNA is not destiny. Genetics can be a helpful tool for choosing an embryo, but it’s not a guarantee. Genetic research is still in it’s [sic] infancy, and there’s still a lot we don’t know about how DNA shapes who we are.”)

To people accustomed to sleep trackers, biohacking supplements, and glucose monitoring, taking advantage of Nucleus’s options might seem like a no-brainer. To anyone who welcomes a bit of serendipity in their life, this level of perceived control may be disconcerting to say the least.

Sadeghi likes to frame his arguments in terms of personal choice. “Maybe you want your baby to have blue eyes versus green eyes,” he told a small audience at Nucleus Embryo’s June launch event. “That is up to the liberty of the parents.”

On the official launch day, Sadeghi spent hours gleefully sparring with X users who accused him of practicing eugenics. He rejects the term, favoring instead “genetic optimization”—though it seems he wasn’t too upset about the free viral marketing. “This week we got five million impressions on Twitter,” he told a crowd at the launch event, to a smattering of applause. (In an email to MIT Technology Review, Sadeghi wrote, “The history of eugenics is one of coercion and discrimination by states and institutions; what Nucleus does is the opposite—genetic forecasting that empowers individuals to make informed decisions.”)

Nucleus has raised more than $36 million from investors like Srinivasan, Alexis Ohanian’s venture capital firm Seven Seven Six, and Thiel’s Founders Fund. (Like Siddiqui, Sadeghi was a recipient of a Thiel fellowship when he dropped out of college; a representative for Thiel did not respond to a request for comment for this story.) Sadeghi has even poached Genomic Prediction’s cofounder Nathan Treff, who is now Nucleus’s chief clinical officer.

Sadeghi’s real goal is to build a one-stop shop for every possible application of genetic sequencing technology, from genealogy to precision medicine to genetic engineering. He names a handful of companies providing these services, with a combined market cap in the billions. “Nucleus is collapsing all five of these companies into one,” he says. “We are not an IVF testing company. We are a genetic stack.”


This spring, I elbowed my way into a packed hotel bar in the Flatiron district, where over a hundred people had gathered to hear a talk called “How to create SUPERBABIES.” The event was part of New York’s Deep Tech Week, so I expected to meet a smattering of biotech professionals and investors. Instead, I was surprised to encounter a diverse and curious group of creatives, software engineers, students, and prospective parents—many of whom had come with no previous knowledge of the subject.

The speaker that evening was Jonathan Anomaly, a soft-spoken political philosopher whose didactic tone betrays his years as a university professor.

Some of Anomaly’s academic work has focused on developing theories of rational behavior. At Duke and the University of Pennsylvania, he led introductory courses on game theory, ethics, and collective action problems as well as bioethics, digging into thorny questions about abortion, vaccines, and euthanasia. But perhaps no topic has interested him so much as the emerging field of genetic enhancement. 

In 2018, in a bioethics journal, Anomaly published a paper with the intentionally provocative title “Defending Eugenics.” He sought to distinguish what he called “positive eugenics”—noncoercive methods aimed at increasing traits that “promote individual and social welfare”—from the so-called “negative eugenics” we know from our history books.

Anomaly likes to argue that embryo selection isn’t all that different from practices we already take for granted. Don’t believe two cousins should be allowed to have children? Perhaps you’re a eugenicist, he contends. Your friend who picked out a six-foot-two Harvard grad from a binder of potential sperm donors? Same logic.

His hiring at the University of Pennsylvania in 2019 caused outrage among some students, who accused him of “racial essentialism.” In 2020, Anomaly left academia, lamenting that “American universities had become an intellectual prison.”

A few years later, Anomaly joined a nascent PGT-P company named Herasight, which was promising to screen for IQ.

At the end of July, the company officially emerged from stealth mode. A representative told me that most of the money raised so far is from angel investors, including Srinivasan, who also invested in Orchid and Nucleus. According to the launch announcement on X, Herasight has screened “hundreds of embryos” for private customers and is beginning to offer its first publicly available consumer product, a polygenic assessment that claims to detect an embryo’s likelihood of developing 17 diseases.

Their marketing materials boast predictive abilities 122% better than Orchid’s and 193% better than Genomic Prediction’s for this set of diseases. (“Herasight is comparing their current predictor to models we published over five years ago,” Genomic Prediction responded in a statement. “Our team is confident our predictors are world-class and are not exceeded in quality by any other lab.”) 

The company did not include comparisons with Nucleus, pointing to the “absence of published performance validations” by that company and claiming it represented a case where “marketing outpaces science.” (“Nucleus is known for world-class science and marketing, and we understand why that’s frustrating to our competitors,” a representative from the company responded in a comment.) 

Herasight also emphasized new advances in “within-family validation” (making sure that the scores are not merely picking up shared environmental factors by comparing their performance between unrelated people to their performance between siblings) and “cross-­ancestry accuracy” (improving the accuracy of scores for people outside the European ancestry groups where most of the biobank data is concentrated). The representative explained that pricing varies by customer and the number of embryos tested, but it can reach $50,000.

When it comes to traits that Jonathan Anomaly believes are genetically encoded, intelligence is just the tip of the iceberg. He has also spoken about the heritability of empathy, violence, religiosity, and political leanings.

Herasight tests for just one non-disease-related trait: intelligence. For a couple who produce 10 embryos, it claims it can detect an IQ spread of about 15 points, from the lowest-scoring embryo to the highest. The representative says the company plans to release a detailed white paper on its IQ predictor in the future.

The day of Herasight’s launch, Musk responded to the company announcement: “Cool.” Meanwhile, a Danish researcher named Emil Kirkegaard, whose research has largely focused on IQ differences between racial groups, boosted the company to his nearly 45,000 followers on X (as well as in a Substack blog), writing, “Proper embryo selection just landed.” Kirkegaard has in fact supported Anomaly’s work for years; he’s posted about him on X and recommended his 2020 book Creating Future People, which he called a “biotech eugenics advocacy book,” adding: “Naturally, I agree with this stuff!”

When it comes to traits that Anomaly believes are genetically encoded, intelligence—which he claimed in his talk is about 75% heritable—is just the tip of the iceberg. He has also spoken about the heritability of empathy, impulse control, violence, passivity, religiosity, and political leanings.

Anomaly concedes there are limitations to the kinds of relative predictions that can be made from a small batch of embryos. But he believes we’re only at the dawn of what he likes to call the “reproductive revolution.” At his talk, he pointed to a technology currently in development at a handful of startups: in vitro gametogenesis. IVG aims to create sperm or egg cells in a laboratory using adult stem cells, genetically reprogrammed from cells found in a sample of skin or blood. In theory, this process could allow a couple to quickly produce a practically unlimited number of embryos to analyze for preferred traits. Anomaly predicted this technology could be ready to use on humans within eight years.

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“I doubt the FDA will allow it immediately. That’s what places like Próspera are for,” he said, referring to the so-called “startup city” in Honduras, where scientists and entrepreneurs can conduct medical experiments free from the kinds of regulatory oversight they’d encounter in the US.

“You might have a moral intuition that this is wrong,” said Anomaly, “but when it’s discovered that elites are doing it privately … the dominoes are going to fall very, very quickly.” The coming “evolutionary arms race,” he claimed, will “change the moral landscape.”

He added that some of those elites are his own customers: “I could already name names, but I won’t do it.”

After Anomaly’s talk was over, I spoke with a young photographer who told me he was hoping to pursue a master’s degree in theology. He came to the event, he told me, to reckon with the ethical implications of playing God. “Technology is sending us toward an Old-to-New-Testament transition moment, where we have to decide what parts of religion still serve us,” he said soberly.


Criticisms of polygenic testing tend to fall into two camps: skepticism about the tests’ effectiveness and concerns about their ethics. “On one hand,” says Turley from the Social Science Genetic Association Consortium, “you have arguments saying ‘This isn’t going to work anyway, and the reason it’s bad is because we’re tricking parents, which would be a problem.’ And on the other hand, they say, ‘Oh, this is going to work so well that it’s going to lead to enormous inequalities in society.’ It’s just funny to see. Sometimes these arguments are being made by the same people.”

One of those people is Sasha Gusev, who runs a quantitative genetics lab at the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute. A vocal critic of PGT-P for embryo selection, he also often engages in online debates with the far-right accounts promoting race science on X.

Gusev is one of many professionals in his field who believe that because of numerous confounding socioeconomic factors—for example, childhood nutrition, geography, personal networks, and parenting styles—there isn’t much point in trying to trace outcomes like educational attainment back to genetics, particularly not as a way to prove that there’s a genetic basis for IQ.

He adds, “I think there’s a real risk in moving toward a society where you see genetics and ‘genetic endowments’ as the drivers of people’s behavior and as a ceiling on their outcomes and their capabilities.”

Gusev thinks there is real promise for this technology in clinical settings among specific adult populations. For adults identified as having high polygenic risk scores for cancer and cardiovascular disease, he argues, a combination of early screening and intervention could be lifesaving. But when it comes to the preimplantation testing currently on the market, he thinks there are significant limitations—and few regulatory measures or long-term validation methods to check the promises companies are making. He fears that giving these services too much attention could backfire.

“These reckless, overpromised, and oftentimes just straight-up manipulative embryo selection applications are a risk for the credibility and the utility of these clinical tools,” he says.

Many IVF patients have also had strong reactions to publicity around PGT-P. When the New York Times published an opinion piece about Orchid in the spring, angry parents took to Reddit to rant. One user posted, “For people who dont [sic] know why other types of testing are necessary or needed this just makes IVF people sound like we want to create ‘perfect’ babies, while we just want (our) healthy babies.”

Still, others defended the need for a conversation. “When could technologies like this change the mission from helping infertile people have healthy babies to eugenics?” one Redditor posted. “It’s a fine line to walk and an important discussion to have.”

Some PGT-P proponents, like Kirkegaard and Anomaly, have argued that policy decisions should more explicitly account for genetic differences. In a series of blog posts following the 2024 presidential election, under the header “Make science great again,” Kirkegaard called for ending affirmative action laws, legalizing race-based hiring discrimination, and removing restrictions on data sets like the NIH’s All of Us biobank that prevent researchers like him from using the data for race science. Anomaly has criticized social welfare policies for putting a finger on the scale to “punish the high-IQ people.”

Indeed, the notion of genetic determinism has gained some traction among loyalists to President Donald Trump. 

In October 2024, Trump himself made a campaign stop on the conservative radio program The Hugh Hewitt Show. He began a rambling answer about immigration and homicide statistics. “A murderer, I believe this, it’s in their genes. And we got a lot of bad genes in our country right now,” he told the host.

Gusev believes that while embryo selection won’t have much impact on individual outcomes, the intellectual framework endorsed by many PGT-P advocates could have dire social consequences.

“If you just think of the differences that we observe in society as being cultural, then you help people out. You give them better schooling, you give them better nutrition and education, and they’re able to excel,” he says. “If you think of these differences as being strongly innate, then you can fool yourself into thinking that there’s nothing that can be done and people just are what they are at birth.”

For the time being, there are no plans for longitudinal studies to track actual outcomes for the humans these companies have helped bring into the world. Harden, the behavioral geneticist from UT Austin, suspects that 25 years down the line, adults who were once embryos selected on the basis of polygenic risk scores are “going to end up with the same question that we all have.” They will look at their life and wonder, “What would’ve had to change for it to be different?”

Julia Black is a Brooklyn-based features writer and a reporter in residence at Omidyar Network. She has previously worked for Business Insider, Vox, The Information, and Esquire.

The quest to find out how our bodies react to extreme temperatures

It’s the 25th of June and I’m shivering in my lab-issued underwear in Fort Worth, Texas. Libby Cowgill, an anthropologist in a furry parka, has wheeled me and my cot into a metal-walled room set to 40 °F. A loud fan pummels me from above and siphons the dregs of my body heat through the cot’s mesh from below. A large respirator fits snug over my nose and mouth. The device tracks carbon dioxide in my exhales—a proxy for how my metabolism speeds up or slows down throughout the experiment. Eventually Cowgill will remove my respirator to slip a wire-thin metal temperature probe several pointy inches into my nose.

Cowgill and a graduate student quietly observe me from the corner of their so-called “climate chamber. Just a few hours earlier I’d sat beside them to observe as another volunteer, a 24-year-old personal trainer, endured the cold. Every few minutes, they measured his skin temperature with a thermal camera, his core temperature with a wireless pill, and his blood pressure and other metrics that hinted at how his body handles extreme cold. He lasted almost an hour without shivering; when my turn comes, I shiver aggressively on the cot for nearly an hour straight.

I’m visiting Texas to learn about this experiment on how different bodies respond to extreme climates. “What’s the record for fastest to shiver so far?” I jokingly ask Cowgill as she tapes biosensing devices to my chest and legs. After I exit the cold, she surprises me: “You, believe it or not, were not the worst person we’ve ever seen.”

Climate change forces us to reckon with the knotty science of how our bodies interact with the environment.

Cowgill is a 40-something anthropologist at the University of Missouri who powerlifts and teaches CrossFit in her spare time. She’s small and strong, with dark bangs and geometric tattoos. Since 2022, she’s spent the summers at the University of North Texas Health Science Center tending to these uncomfortable experiments. Her team hopes to revamp the science of thermoregulation. 

While we know in broad strokes how people thermoregulate, the science of keeping warm or cool is mottled with blind spots. “We have the general picture. We don’t have a lot of the specifics for vulnerable groups,” says Kristie Ebi, an epidemiologist with the University of Washington who has studied heat and health for over 30 years. “How does thermoregulation work if you’ve got heart disease?” 

“Epidemiologists have particular tools that they’re applying for this question,” Ebi continues. “But we do need more answers from other disciplines.”

Climate change is subjecting vulnerable people to temperatures that push their limits. In 2023, about 47,000 heat-related deaths are believed to have occurred in Europe. Researchers estimate that climate change could add an extra 2.3 million European heat deaths this century. That’s heightened the stakes for solving the mystery of just what happens to bodies in extreme conditions. 

Extreme temperatures already threaten large stretches of the world. Populations across the Middle East, Asia, and sub-­Saharan Africa regularly face highs beyond widely accepted levels of human heat tolerance. Swaths of the southern US, northern Europe, and Asia now also endure unprecedented lows: The 2021 Texas freeze killed at least 246 people, and a 2023 polar vortex sank temperatures in China’s northernmost city to a hypothermic record of –63.4 °F. 

This change is here, and more is coming. Climate scientists predict that limiting emissions can prevent lethal extremes from encroaching elsewhere. But if emissions keep course, fierce heat and even cold will reach deeper into every continent. About 2.5 billion people in the world’s hottest places don’t have air-­conditioning. When people do, it can make outdoor temperatures even worse, intensifying the heat island effect in dense cities. And neither AC nor radiators are much help when heat waves and cold snaps capsize the power grid.

A thermal image shows a human male holding up peace signs during a test of extreme temperatures.

COURTESY OF MAX G. LEVY
A thermal image shows a human hand during a test of extreme temperatures.

COURTESY OF MAX G. LEVY
A thermal image shows a human foot during a test of extreme temperatures.

COURTESY OF MAX G. LEVY

“You, believe it or not, were not the worst person we’ve ever seen,” the author was told after enduring Cowgill’s “climate chamber.”

Through experiments like Cowgill’s, researchers around the world are revising rules about when extremes veer from uncomfortable to deadly. Their findings change how we should think about the limits of hot and cold—and how to survive in a new world. 

Embodied change

Archaeologists have known for some time that we once braved colder temperatures than anyone previously imagined. Humans pushed into Eurasia and North America well before the last glacial period ended about 11,700 years ago. We were the only hominins to make it out of this era. Neanderthals, Denisovans, and Homo floresiensis all went extinct. We don’t know for certain what killed those species. But we do know that humans survived thanks to protection from clothing, large social networks, and physiological flexibility. Human resilience to extreme temperature is baked into our bodies, behavior, and genetic code. We wouldn’t be here without it. 

“Our bodies are constantly in communication with the environment,” says Cara Ocobock, an anthropologist at the University of Notre Dame who studies how we expend energy in extreme conditions. She has worked closely with Finnish reindeer herders and Wyoming mountaineers. 

But the relationship between bodies and temperature is surprisingly still a mystery to scientists. In 1847, the anatomist Carl Bergmann observed that animal species grow larger in cold climates. The zoologist Joel Asaph Allen noted in 1877 that cold-dwellers had shorter appendages. Then there’s the nose thing: In the 1920s, the British anthropologist Arthur Thomson theorized that people in cold places have relatively long, narrow noses, the better to heat and humidify the air they take in. These theories stemmed from observations of animals like bears and foxes, and others that followed stemmed from studies comparing the bodies of cold-accustomed Indigenous populations with white male control groups. Some, like those having to do with optimization of surface area, do make sense: It seems reasonable that a tall, thin body increases the amount of skin available to dump excess heat. The problem is, scientists have never actually tested this stuff in humans. 

“Our bodies are constantly in communication with the environment.”

Cara Ocobock, anthropologist, University of Notre Dame

Some of what we know about temperature tolerance thus far comes from century-old race science or assumptions that anatomy controls everything. But science has evolved. Biology has matured. Childhood experiences, lifestyles, fat cells, and wonky biochemical feedback loops can contribute to a picture of the body as more malleable than anything imagined before. And that’s prompting researchers to change how they study it.

“If you take someone who’s super long and lanky and lean and put them in a cold climate, are they gonna burn more calories to stay warm than somebody who’s short and broad?” Ocobock says. “No one’s looked at that.”

Ocobock and Cowgill teamed up with Scott Maddux and Elizabeth Cho at the Center for Anatomical Sciences at the University of North Texas Health Fort Worth. All four are biological anthropologists who have also puzzled over whether the rules Bergmann, Allen, and Thomson proposed are actually true. 

For the past four years, the team has been studying how factors like metabolism, fat, sweat, blood flow, and personal history control thermoregulation. 

Your native climate, for example, may influence how you handle temperature extremes. In a unique study of mortality statistics from 1980s Milan, Italians raised in warm southern Italy were more likely to survive heat waves in the northern part of the country. 

Similar trends have appeared in cold climes. Researchers often measure cold tolerance by a person’s “brown adipose,” a type of fat that is specialized for generating heat (unlike white fat, which primarily stores energy). Brown fat is a cold adaptation because it delivers heat without the mechanism of shivering. Studies have linked it to living in cold climates, particularly at young ages. Wouter van Marken Lichtenbelt, the physiologist at Maastricht University who with colleagues discovered brown fat in adults, has shown that this tissue can further activate with cold exposure and even help regulate blood sugar and influence how the body burns other fat. 

That adaptability served as an early clue for the Texas team. They want to know how a person’s response to hot and cold correlates with height, weight, and body shape. What is the difference, Maddux asks, between “a male who’s 6 foot 6 and weighs 240 pounds” and someone else in the same environment “who’s 4 foot 10 and weighs 89 pounds”? But the team also wondered if shape was only part of the story. 

Their multi-year experiment uses tools that anthropologists couldn’t have imagined a century ago—devices that track metabolism in real time and analyze genetics. Each participant gets a CT scan (measuring body shape), a DEXA scan (estimating percentages of fat and muscle), high-resolution 3D scans, and DNA analysis from saliva to examine ancestry genetically. 

Volunteers lie on a cot in underwear, as I did, for about 45 minutes in each climate condition, all on separate days. There’s dry cold, around 40 °F, akin to braving a walk-in refrigerator. Then dry heat and humid heat: 112 °F with 15% humidity and 98 °F with 85% humidity. They call it “going to Vegas” and “going to Houston,” says Cowgill. The chamber session is long enough to measure an effect, but short enough to be safe. 

Before I traveled to Texas, Cowgill told me she suspected the old rules would fall. Studies linking temperature tolerance to race and ethnicity, for example, seemed tenuous because biological anthropologists today reject the concept of distinct races. It’s a false premise, she told me: “No one in biological anthropology would argue that human beings do not vary across the globe—that’s obvious to anyone with eyes. [But] you can’t draw sharp borders around populations.” 

She added, “I think there’s a substantial possibility that we spend four years testing this and find out that really, limb length, body mass, surface area […] are not the primary things that are predicting how well you do in cold and heat.” 

Adaptable to a degree

In July 1995, a week-long heat wave pushed Chicago above 100 °F, killing roughly 500 people. Thirty years later, Ollie Jay, a physiologist at the University of Sydney, can duplicate the conditions of that exceptionally humid heat wave in a climate chamber at his laboratory. 

“We can simulate the Chicago heat wave of ’95. The Paris heat wave of 2003. The heat wave [in early July of this year]  in Europe,” Jay says. “As long as we’ve got the temperature and humidity information, we can re-create those conditions.”

“Everybody has quite an intimate experience of feeling hot, so we’ve got 8 billion experts on how to keep cool,” he says. Yet our internal sense of when heat turns deadly is unreliable. Even professional athletes overseen by experienced medics have died after missing dangerous warning signs. And little research has been done to explore how vulnerable populations such as elderly people, those with heart disease, and low-income communities with limited access to cooling respond to extreme heat. 

Jay’s team researches the most effective strategies for surviving it. He lambastes air-conditioning, saying it demands so much energy that it can aggravate climate change in “a vicious cycle.” Instead, he has monitored people’s vital signs while they use fans and skin mists to endure three hours in humid and dry heat. In results published last year, his research found that fans reduced cardiovascular strain by 86% for people with heart disease in the type of humid heat familiar in Chicago. 

Dry heat was a different story. In that simulation, fans not only didn’t help but actually doubled the rate at which core temperatures rose in healthy older people.

Heat kills. But not without a fight. Your body must keep its internal temperature in a narrow window flanking 98 °F by less than two degrees. The simple fact that you’re alive means you are producing heat. Your body needs to export that heat without amassing much more. The nervous system relaxes narrow blood vessels along your skin. Your heart rate increases, propelling more warm blood to your extremities and away from your organs. You sweat. And when that sweat evaporates, it carries a torrent of body heat away with it. 

This thermoregulatory response can be trained. Studies by van Marken Lichtenbelt have shown that exposure to mild heat increases sweat capacity, decreases blood pressure, and drops resting heart rate. Long-term studies based on Finnish saunas suggest similar correlations

The body may adapt protectively to cold, too. In this case, body heat is your lifeline. Shivering and exercise help keep bodies warm. So can clothing. Cardiovascular deaths are thought to spike in cold weather. But people more adapted to cold seem better able to reroute their blood flow in ways that keep their organs warm without dropping their temperature too many degrees in their extremities. 

Earlier this year, the biological anthropologist Stephanie B. Levy (no relation) reported that New Yorkers who experienced lower average temperatures had more productive brown fat, adding evidence for the idea that the inner workings of our bodies adjust to the climate throughout the year and perhaps even throughout our lives. “Do our bodies hold a biological memory of past seasons?” Levy wonders. “That’s still an open question. There’s some work in rodent models to suggest that that’s the case.”

Although people clearly acclimatize with enough strenuous exposures to either cold or heat, Jay says, “you reach a ceiling.” Consider sweat: Heat exposure can increase the amount you sweat only until your skin is completely saturated. It’s a non­negotiable physical limit. Any additional sweat just means leaking water without carrying away any more heat. “I’ve heard people say we’ll just find a way of evolving out of this—we’ll biologically adapt,” Jay says. “Unless we’re completely changing our body shape, then that’s not going to happen.”

And body shape may not even sway thermoregulation as much as previously believed. The subject I observed, a personal trainer, appeared outwardly adapted for cold: his broad shoulders didn’t even fit in a single CT scan image. Cowgill supposed that this muscle mass insulated him. When he emerged from his session in the 40 °F environment, though, he had finally started shivering—intensely. The researchers covered him in a heated blanket. He continued shivering. Driving to lunch over an hour later in a hot car, he still mentioned feeling cold. An hour after that, a finger prick drew no blood, a sign that blood vessels in his extremities remained constricted. His body temperature fell about half a degree C in the cold session—a significant drop—and his wider build did not appear to shield him from the cold as well as my involuntary shivering protected me. 

I asked Cowgill if perhaps there is no such thing as being uniquely predisposed to hot or cold. “Absolutely,” she said. 

A hot mess

So if body shape doesn’t tell us much about how a person maintains body temperature, and acclimation also runs into limits, then how do we determine how hot is too hot? 

In 2010 two climate change researchers, Steven Sherwood and Matthew Huber, argued that regions around the world become uninhabitable at wet-bulb temperatures of 35 °C, or 95 °F. (Wet-bulb measurements are a way to combine air temperature and relative humidity.) Above 35 °C, a person simply wouldn’t be able to dissipate heat quickly enough. But it turns out that their estimate was too optimistic. 

Researchers “ran with” that number for a decade, says Daniel Vecellio, a bioclimatologist at the University of Nebraska, Omaha. “But the number had never been actually empirically tested.” In 2021 a Pennsylvania State University physiologist, W. Larry Kenney, worked with Vecellio and others to test wet-bulb limits in a climate chamber. Kenney’s lab investigates which combinations of temperature, humidity, and time push a person’s body over the edge. 

Not long after, the researchers came up with their own wet-bulb limit of human tolerance: below 31 °C in warm, humid conditions for the youngest cohort, people in their thermoregulatory prime. Their research suggests that a day reaching 98 °F and 65% humidity, for example, poses danger in a matter of hours, even for healthy people. 

JUSTIN CLEMONS

JUSTIN CLEMONS
three medical team members make preparations around a person on a gurney

JUSTIN CLEMONS

Cowgill and her colleagues Elizabeth Cho (top) and Scott Maddux prepare graduate student Joanna Bui for a “room-temperature test.”

In 2023, Vecellio and Huber teamed up, combining the growing arsenal of lab data with state-of-the-art climate simulations to predict where heat and humidity most threatened global populations: first the Middle East and South Asia, then sub-Saharan Africa and eastern China. And assuming that warming reaches 3 to 4 °C over preindustrial levels this century, as predicted, parts of North America, South America, and northern and central Australia will be next. 

Last June, Vecellio, Huber, and Kenney co-published an article revising the limits that Huber had proposed in 2010. “Why not 35 °C?” explained why the human limits have turned out to be lower than expected. Those initial estimates overlooked the fact that our skin temperature can quickly jump above 101 °F in hot weather, for example, making it harder to dump internal heat.

The Penn State team has published deep dives on how heat tolerance changes with sex and age. Older participants’ wet-bulb limits wound up being even lower—between 27 and 28 °C in warm, humid conditions—and varied more from person to person than they did in young people. “The conditions that we experience now—especially here in North America and Europe, places like that—are well below the limits that we found in our research,” Vecellio says. “We know that heat kills now.”  

What this fast-growing body of research suggests, Vecellio stresses, is that you can’t define heat risk by just one or two numbers. Last year, he and researchers at Arizona State University pulled up the hottest 10% of hours between 2005 and 2020 for each of 96 US cities. They wanted to compare recent heat-health research with historical weather data for a new perspective: How frequently is it so hot that people’s bodies can’t compensate for it? Over 88% of those “hot hours” met that criterion for people in full sun. In the shade, most of those heat waves became meaningfully less dangerous. 

“There’s really almost no one who ‘needs’ to die in a heat wave,” says Ebi, the epidemiologist. “We have the tools. We have the understanding. Essentially all [those] deaths are preventable.”

More than a number

A year after visiting Texas, I called Cowgill to hear what she was thinking after four summers of chamber experiments. She told me that the only rule about hot and cold she currently stands behind is … well, none.

She recalled a recent participant—the smallest man in the study, weighing 114 pounds. “He shivered like a leaf on a tree,” Cowgill says. Normally, a strong shiverer warms up quickly. Core temperature may even climb a little. “This [guy] was just shivering and shivering and shivering and not getting any warmer,” she says. She doesn’t know why this happened. “Every time I think I get a picture of what’s going on in there, we’ll have one person come in and just kind of be a complete exception to the rule,” she says, adding that you can’t just gloss over how much human bodies vary inside and out.

The same messiness complicates physiology studies. 

Jay looks to embrace bodily complexities by improving physiological simulations of heat and the human strain it causes. He’s piloted studies that input a person’s activity level and type of clothing to predict core temperature, dehydration, and cardiovascular strain based on the particular level of heat. One can then estimate the person’s risk on the basis of factors like age and health. He’s also working on physiological models to identify vulnerable groups, inform early-warning systems ahead of heat waves, and possibly advise cities on whether interventions like fans and mists can help protect residents. “Heat is an all-of-­society issue,” Ebi says. Officials could better prepare the public for cold snaps this way too.

“Death is not the only thing we’re concerned about,” Jay adds.  Extreme temperatures bring morbidity and sickness and strain hospital systems: “There’s all these community-level impacts that we’re just completely missing.”

Climate change forces us to reckon with the knotty science of how our bodies interact with the environment. Predicting the health effects is a big and messy matter. 

The first wave of answers from Fort Worth will materialize next year. The researchers will analyze thermal images to crunch data on brown fat. They’ll resolve whether, as Cowgill suspects, your body shape may not sway temperature tolerance as much as previously assumed. “Human variation is the rule,” she says, “not the exception.” 

Max G. Levy is an independent journalist who writes about chemistry, public health, and the environment.

How aging clocks can help us understand why we age—and if we can reverse it

Be honest: Have you ever looked up someone from your childhood on social media with the sole intention of seeing how they’ve aged? 

One of my colleagues, who shall remain nameless, certainly has. He recently shared a photo of a former classmate. “Can you believe we’re the same age?” he asked, with a hint of glee in his voice. A relative also delights in this pastime. “Wow, she looks like an old woman,” she’ll say when looking at a picture of someone she has known since childhood. The years certainly are kinder to some of us than others.

But wrinkles and gray hairs aside, it can be difficult to know how well—or poorly—someone’s body is truly aging, under the hood. A person who develops age-related diseases earlier in life, or has other biological changes associated with aging (such as elevated cholesterol or markers of inflammation), might be considered “biologically older” than a similar-age person who doesn’t have those changes. Some 80-year-olds will be weak and frail, while others are fit and active. 

Doctors have long used functional tests that measure their patients’ strength or the distance they can walk, for example, or simply “eyeball” them to guess whether they look fit enough to survive some treatment regimen, says Tamir Chandra, who studies aging at the Mayo Clinic. 

But over the past decade, scientists have been uncovering new methods of looking at the hidden ways our bodies are aging. What they’ve found is changing our understanding of aging itself. 

“Aging clocks” are new scientific tools that can measure how our organs are wearing out, giving us insight into our mortality and health. They hint at our biological age. While chronological age is simply how many birthdays we’ve had, biological age is meant to reflect something deeper. It measures how our bodies are handling the passing of time and—perhaps—lets us know how much more of it we have left. And while you can’t change your chronological age, you just might be able to influence your biological age.

It’s not just scientists who are using these clocks. Longevity influencers like Bryan Johnson often use them to make the case that they are aging backwards. “My telomeres say I’m 10 years old,” Johnson posted on X in April. The Kardashians have tried them too (Khloé was told on TV that her biological age was 12 years below her chronological age). Even my local health-food store offers biological age testing. Some are pushing the use of clocks even further, using them to sell unproven “anti-aging” supplements.

The science is still new, and few experts in the field—some of whom affectionately refer to it as “clock world”—would argue that an aging clock can definitively reveal an individual’s biological age. 

But their work is revealing that aging clocks can offer so much more than an insta-brag, a snake-oil pitch—or even just an eye-catching number. In fact, they are helping scientists unravel some of the deepest mysteries in biology: Why do we age? How do we age? When does aging begin? What does it even mean to age?

Ultimately, and most importantly, they might soon tell us whether we can reverse the whole process.

Clocks kick off

The way your genes work can change. Molecules called methyl groups can attach to DNA, controlling the way genes make proteins. This process is called methylation, and it can potentially occur at millions of points along the genome. These epigenetic markers, as they are known, can switch genes on or off, or increase or decrease how much protein they make. They’re not part of our DNA, but they influence how it works.

In 2011, Steve Horvath, then a biostatistician at the University of California, Los Angeles, took part in a study that was looking for links between sexual orientation and these epigenetic markers. Steve is straight; he says his twin brother, Markus, who also volunteered, is gay.

That study didn’t find a link between DNA methyl­ation and sexual orientation. But when Horvath looked at the data, he noticed a different trend—a very strong link between age and methylation at around 88 points on the genome. He once told me he fell off his chair when he saw it

Many of the affected genes had already been linked to age-related brain and cardiovascular diseases, but it wasn’t clear how methylation might be related to those diseases. 

If a model could work out what average aging looks like, it could potentially estimate whether someone was aging unusually fast or slowly. It could transform medicine and fast-track the search for an anti-aging drug. It could help us understand what aging is, and why it happens at all.

In 2013, Horvath collected methylation data from 8,000 tissue and cell samples to create what he called the Horvath clock—essentially a mathematical model that could estimate age on the basis of DNA methylation at 353 points on the genome. From a tissue sample, it was able to detect a person’s age within a range of 2.9 years.

That clock changed everything. Its publication in 2013 marked the birth of “clock world.” To some, the possibilities were almost endless. If a model could work out what average aging looks like, it could potentially estimate whether someone was aging unusually fast or slowly. It could transform medicine and fast-track the search for an anti-aging drug. It could help us understand what aging is, and why it happens at all.

The epigenetic clock was a success story in “a field that, frankly, doesn’t have a lot of success stories,” says João Pedro de Magalhães, who researches aging at the University of Birmingham, UK.

It took a few years, but as more aging researchers heard about the clock, they began incorporating it into their research and even developing their own clocks. Horvath became a bit of a celebrity. Scientists started asking for selfies with him at conferences, he says. Some researchers even made T-shirts bearing the front page of his 2013 paper.

Some of the many other aging clocks developed since have become notable in their own right. Examples include the PhenoAge clock, which incorporates health data such as blood cell counts and signs of inflammation along with methyl­ation, and the Dunedin Pace of Aging clock, which tells you how quickly or slowly a person is aging rather than pointing to a specific age. Many of the clocks measure methylation, but some look at other variables, such as proteins in blood or certain carbohydrate molecules that attach to such proteins.

Today, there are hundreds or even thousands of clocks out there, says Chiara Herzog, who researches aging at King’s College London and is a member of the Biomarkers of Aging Consortium. Everyone has a favorite. Horvath himself favors his GrimAge clock, which was named after the Grim Reaper because it is designed to predict time to death.

That clock was trained on data collected from people who were monitored for decades, many of whom died in that period. Horvath won’t use it to tell people when they might die of old age, he stresses, saying that it wouldn’t be ethical. Instead, it can be used to deliver a biological age that hints at how long a person might expect to live. Someone who is 50 but has a GrimAge of 60 can assume that, compared with the average 50-year-old, they might be a bit closer to the end.

GrimAge is not perfect. While it can strongly predict time to death given the health trajectory someone is on, no aging clock can predict if someone will start smoking or get a divorce (which generally speeds aging) or suddenly take up running (which can generally slow it). “People are complicated,” Horvath tells MIT Technology Review. “There’s a huge error bar.”

On the whole, the clocks are pretty good at making predictions about health and lifespan. They’ve been able to predict that people over the age of 105 have lower biological ages, which tracks given how rare it is for people to make it past that age. A higher epigenetic age has been linked to declining cognitive function and signs of Alzheimer’s disease, while better physical and cognitive fitness has been linked to a lower epigenetic age.

Black-box clocks

But accuracy is a challenge for all aging clocks. Part of the problem lies in how they were designed. Most of the clocks were trained to link age with methylation. The best clocks will deliver an estimate that reflects how far a person’s biology deviates from the average. Aging clocks are still judged on how well they can predict a person’s chronological age, but you don’t want them to be too close, says Lucas Paulo de Lima Camillo, head of machine learning at Shift Bioscience, who was awarded $10,000 by the Biomarkers of Aging Consortium for developing a clock that could estimate age within a range of 2.55 years.

a cartoon alarm clock shrugging
None of the clocks are precise enough to predict the biological age of a single person. Putting the same biological sample through five different clocks will give you five wildly different results.
LEON EDLER

“There’s this paradox,” says Camillo. If a clock is really good at predicting chronological age, that’s all it will tell you—and it probably won’t reveal much about your biological age. No one needs an aging clock to tell them how many birthdays they’ve had. Camillo says he’s noticed that when the clocks get too close to “perfect” age prediction, they actually become less accurate at predicting mortality.

Therein lies the other central issue for scientists who develop and use aging clocks: What is the thing they are really measuring? It is a difficult question for a field whose members notoriously fail to agree on the basics. (Everything from the definition of aging to how it occurs and why is up for debate among the experts.)

They do agree that aging is incredibly complex. A methylation-based aging clock might tell you about how that collection of chemical markers compares across individuals, but at best, it’s only giving you an idea of their “epigenetic age,” says Chandra. There are probably plenty of other biological markers that might reveal other aspects of aging, he says: “None of the clocks measure everything.” 

We don’t know why some methyl groups appear or disappear with age, either. Are these changes causing damage? Or are they a by-product of it? Are the epigenetic patterns seen in a 90-year-old a sign of deterioration? Or have they been responsible for keeping that person alive into very old age?

To make matters even more complicated, two different clocks can give similar answers by measuring methylation at entirely different regions of the genome. No one knows why, or which regions might be the best ones to focus on.

“The biomarkers have this black-box quality,” says Jesse Poganik at Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston. “Some of them are probably causal, some of them may be adaptive … and some of them may just be neutral”: either “there’s no reason for them not to happen” or “they just happen by random chance.”

What we know is that, as things stand, none of the clocks are precise enough to predict the biological age of a single person (sorry, Khloé). Putting the same biological sample through five different clocks will give you five wildly different results.

Even the same clock can give you different answers if you put a sample through it more than once. “They’re not yet individually predictive,” says Herzog. “We don’t know what [a clock result] means for a person, [or if] they’re more or less likely to develop disease.”

And it’s why plenty of aging researchers—even those who regularly use the clocks in their work—haven’t bothered to measure their own epigenetic age. “Let’s say I do a clock and it says that my biological age … is five years older than it should be,” says Magalhães. “So what?” He shrugs. “I don’t see much point in it.”

You might think this lack of clarity would make aging clocks pretty useless in a clinical setting. But plenty of clinics are offering them anyway. Some longevity clinics are more careful, and will regularly test their patients with a range of clocks, noting their results and tracking them over time. Others will simply offer an estimate of biological age as part of a longevity treatment package.

And then there are the people who use aging clocks to sell supplements. While no drug or supplement has been definitively shown to make people live longer, that hasn’t stopped the lightly regulated wellness industry from pushing a range of “treatments” that range from lotions to herbal pills all the way through to stem-cell injections.

Some of these people come to aging meetings. I was in the audience at an event when one CEO took to the stage to claim he had reversed his own biological age by 18 years—thanks to the supplement he was selling. Tom Weldon of Ponce de Leon Health told us his gray hair was turning brown. His biological age was supposedly reversing so rapidly that he had reached “longevity escape velocity.”

But if the people who buy his supplements expect some kind of Benjamin Button effect, they might be disappointed. His company hasn’t yet conducted a randomized controlled trial to demonstrate any anti-aging effects of that supplement, called Rejuvant. Weldon says that such a trial would take years and cost millions of dollars, and that he’d “have to increase the price of our product more than four times” to pay for one. (The company has so far tested the active ingredient in mice and carried out a provisional trial in people.)

More generally, Horvath says he “gets a bad taste in [his] mouth” when people use the clocks to sell products and “make a quick buck.” But he thinks that most of those sellers have genuine faith in both the clocks and their products. “People truly believe their own nonsense,” he says. “They are so passionate about what they discovered, they fall into this trap of believing [their] own prejudices.” 

The accuracy of the clocks is at a level that makes them useful for research, but not for individual predictions. Even if a clock did tell someone they were five years younger than their chronological age, that wouldn’t necessarily mean the person could expect to live five years longer, says Magalhães. “The field of aging has long been a rich ground for snake-oil salesmen and hype,” he says. “It comes with the territory.” (Weldon, for his part, says Rejuvant is the only product that has “clinically meaningful” claims.) 

In any case, Magalhães adds that he thinks any publicity is better than no publicity.

And there’s the rub. Most people in the longevity field seem to have mixed feelings about the trendiness of aging clocks and how they are being used. They’ll agree that the clocks aren’t ready for consumer prime time, but they tend to appreciate the attention. Longevity research is expensive, after all. With a surge in funding and an explosion in the number of biotech companies working on longevity, aging scientists are hopeful that innovation and progress will follow. 

So they want to be sure that the reputation of aging clocks doesn’t end up being tarnished by association. Because while influencers and supplement sellers are using their “biological ages” to garner attention, scientists are now using these clocks to make some remarkable discoveries. Discoveries that are changing the way we think about aging.

How to be young again

Two little mice lie side by side, anesthetized and unconscious, as Jim White prepares his scalpel. The animals are of the same breed but look decidedly different. One is a youthful three-month-old, its fur thick, black, and glossy. By comparison, the second mouse, a 20-month-old, looks a little the worse for wear. Its fur is graying and patchy. Its whiskers are short, and it generally looks kind of frail.

But the two mice are about to have a lot more in common. White, with some help from a colleague, makes incisions along the side of each mouse’s body and into the upper part of an arm and leg on the same side. He then carefully stitches the two animals together—membranes, fascia, and skin. 

The procedure takes around an hour, and the mice are then roused from their anesthesia. At first, the two still-groggy animals pull away from each other. But within a few days, they seem to have accepted that they now share their bodies. Soon their circulatory systems will fuse, and the animals will share a blood flow too.

cartoon man in profile with a stick of a wrist watch around a lit stick of dynamite in his mouth
“People are complicated. There’s a huge error bar.” — Steve Horvath, former biostatistician at the University of California, Los Angeles
LEON EDLER

White, who studies aging at Duke University, has been stitching mice together for years; he has performed this strange procedure, known as heterochronic parabiosis, more than a hundred times. And he’s seen a curious phenomenon occur. The older mice appear to benefit from the arrangement. They seem to get younger.

Experiments with heterochronic parabiosis have been performed for decades, but typically scientists keep the mice attached to each other for only a few weeks, says White. In their experiment, he and his colleagues left the mice attached for three months—equivalent to around 10 human years. The team then carefully separated the animals to assess how each of them had fared. “You’d think that they’d want to separate immediately,” says White. “But when you detach them … they kind of follow each other around.”

The most striking result of that experiment was that the older mice who had been attached to a younger mouse ended up living longer than other mice of a similar age. “[They lived] around 10% longer, but [they] also maintained a lot of [their] function,” says White. They were more active and maintained their strength for longer, he adds.

When his colleagues, including Poganik, applied aging clocks to the mice, they found that their epigenetic ages were lower than expected. “The young circulation slowed aging in the old mice,” says White. The effect seemed to last, too—at least for a little while. “It preserved that youthful state for longer than we expected,” he says.

The young mice went the other way and appeared biologically older, both while they were attached to the old mice and shortly after they were detached. But in their case, the effect seemed to be short-lived, says White: “The young mice went back to being young again.” 

To White, this suggests that something about the “youthful state” might be programmed in some way. That perhaps it is written into our DNA. Maybe we don’t have to go through the biological process of aging. 

This gets at a central debate in the aging field: What is aging, and why does it happen? Some believe it’s simply a result of accumulated damage. Some believe that the aging process is programmed; just as we grow limbs, develop a brain, reach puberty, and experience menopause, we are destined to deteriorate. Others think programs that play an important role in our early development just turn out to be harmful later in life by chance. And there are some scientists who agree with all of the above.

White’s theory is that being old is just “a loss of youth,” he says. If that’s the case, there’s a silver lining: Knowing how youth is lost might point toward a way to somehow regain it, perhaps by restoring those youthful programs in some way. 

Dogs and dolphins

Horvath’s eponymous clock was developed by measuring methylation in DNA samples taken from tissues around the body. It seems to represent aging in all these tissues, which is why Horvath calls it a pan-tissue clock. Given that our organs are thought to age differently, it was remarkable that a single clock could measure aging in so many of them.

But Horvath had ambitious plans for an even more universal clock: a pan-species model that could measure aging in all mammals. He started out, in 2017, with an email campaign that involved asking hundreds of scientists around the world to share samples of tissues from animals they had worked with. He tried zoos, too.   

The pan-mammalian clock suggests that there is something universal about aging—not just that all mammals experience it in a similar way, but that a similar set of genetic or epigenetic factors might be responsible for it.

“I learned that people had spent careers collecting [animal] tissues,” he says. “They had freezers full of [them].” Amenable scientists would ship those frozen tissues, or just DNA, to Horvath’s lab in California, where he would use them to train a new model.

Horvath says he initially set out to profile 30 different species. But he ended up receiving around 15,000 samples from 200 scientists, representing 348 species—including everything from dogs to dolphins. Could a single clock really predict age in all of them?

“I truly felt it would fail,” says Horvath. “But it turned out that I was completely wrong.” He and his colleagues developed a clock that assessed methylation at 36,000 locations on the genome. The result, which was published in 2023 as the pan-mammalian clock, can estimate the age of any mammal and even the maximum lifespan of the species. The data set is open to anyone who wants to download it, he adds: “I hope people will mine the data to find the secret of how to extend a healthy lifespan.”

The pan-mammalian clock suggests that there is something universal about aging—not just that all mammals experience it in a similar way, but that a similar set of genetic or epigenetic factors might be responsible for it.

Comparisons between mammals also support the idea that the slower methylation changes occur, the longer the lifespan of the animal, says Nelly Olova, an epigeneticist who researches aging at the University of Edinburgh in the UK. “DNA methylation slowly erodes with age,” she says. “We still have the instructions in place, but they become a little messier.” The research in different mammals suggests that cells can take only so much change before they stop functioning.

“There’s a finite amount of change that the cell can tolerate,” she says. “If the instructions become too messy and noisy … it cannot support life.”

Olova has been investigating exactly when aging clocks first begin to tick—in other words, the point at which aging starts. Clocks can be trained on data from volunteers, and by matching the patterns of methylation on their DNA to their chronological age. The trained clocks are then typically used to estimate the biological age of adults. But they can also be used on samples from children. Or babies. They can be used to work out the biological age of cells that make up embryos. 

In her research, Olova used adult skin cells, which—thanks to Nobel Prize–winning research in the 2000s—can be “reprogrammed” back to a state resembling that of the pluripotent stem cells found in embryos. When Olova and her colleagues used a “partial reprogramming” approach to take cells close to that state, they found that the closer they got to the entirely reprogrammed state, the “younger” the cells were. 

It was around 20 days after the cells had been reprogrammed into stem cells that they reached the biological age of zero according to the clock used, says Olova. “It was a bit surreal,” she says. “The pluripotent cells measure as minus 0.5; they’re slightly below zero.”

Vadim Gladyshev, a prominent aging researcher at Harvard University, has since proposed that the same negative level of aging might apply to embryos. After all, some kind of rejuvenation happens during the early stages of embryo formation—an aged egg cell and an aged sperm cell somehow create a brand-new cell. The slate is wiped clean.

Gladyshev calls this point “ground zero.” He posits that it’s reached sometime during the “mid-embryonic state.” At this point, aging begins. And so does “organismal life,” he argues. “It’s interesting how this coincides with philosophical questions about when life starts,” says Olova. 

Some have argued that life begins when sperm meets egg, while others have suggested that the point when embryonic cells start to form some kind of unified structure is what counts. The ground zero point is when the body plan is set out and cells begin to organize accordingly, she says. “Before that, it’s just a bunch of cells.”

This doesn’t mean that life begins at the embryonic state, but it does suggest that this is when aging begins—perhaps as the result of “a generational clearance of damage,” says Poganik.

It is early days—no pun intended—for this research, and the science is far from settled. But knowing when aging begins could help inform attempts to rewind the clock. If scientists can pinpoint an ideal biological age for cells, perhaps they can find ways to get old cells back to that state. There might be a way to slow aging once cells reach a certain biological age, too. 

“Presumably, there may be opportunities for targeting aging before … you’re full of gray hair,” says Poganik. “It could mean that there is an ideal window for intervention which is much earlier than our current geriatrics-based approach.”

When young meets old

When White first started stitching mice together, he would sit and watch them for hours. “I was like, look at them go! They’re together, and they don’t even care!” he says. Since then, he’s learned a few tricks. He tends to work with female mice, for instance—the males tend to bicker and nip at each other, he says. The females, on the other hand, seem to get on well. 

The effect their partnership appears to have on their biological ages, if only temporarily, is among the ways aging clocks are helping us understand that biological age is plastic to some degree. White and his colleagues have also found, for instance, that stress seems to increase biological age, but that the effect can be reversed once the stress stops. Both pregnancy and covid-19 infections have a similar reversible effect.

Poganik wonders if this finding might have applications for human organ transplants. Perhaps there’s a way to measure the biological age of an organ before it is transplanted and somehow rejuvenate organs before surgery. 

But new data from aging clocks suggests that this might be more complicated than it sounds. Poganik and his colleagues have been using methylation clocks to measure the biological age of samples taken from recently transplanted hearts in living people. 

If being old is simply a case of losing our youthfulness, then that might give us a clue to how we can somehow regain it.

Young hearts do well in older bodies, but the biological age of these organs eventually creeps up to match that of their recipient. The same is true for older hearts in younger bodies, says Poganik, who has not yet published his findings. “After a few months, the tissue may assimilate the biological age of the organism,” he says. 

If that’s the case, the benefits of young organs might be short-lived. It also suggests that scientists working on ways to rejuvenate individual organs may need to focus their anti-aging efforts on more systemic means of rejuvenation—for example, stem cells that repopulate the blood. Reprogramming these cells to a youthful state, perhaps one a little closer to “ground zero,” might be the way to go.

Whole-body rejuvenation might be some way off, but scientists are still hopeful that aging clocks might help them find a way to reverse aging in people.

“We have the machinery to reset our epigenetic clock to a more youthful state,” says White. “That means we have the ability to turn the clock backwards.” 

How healthy am I? My immunome knows the score.  

The story is a collaboration between MIT Technology Review and Aventine, a non-profit research foundation that creates and supports content about how technology and science are changing the way we live.

It’s not often you get a text about the robustness of your immune system, but that’s what popped up on my phone last spring. Sent by John Tsang, an immunologist at Yale, the text came after his lab had put my blood through a mind-boggling array of newfangled tests. The result—think of it as a full-body, high-resolution CT scan of my immune system—would reveal more about the state of my health than any test I had ever taken. And it could potentially tell me far more than I wanted to know.

“David,” the text read, “you are the red dot.”

Tsang was referring to an image he had attached to the text that showed a graph with a scattering of black dots representing other people whose immune systems had been evaluated—and a lone red one. There also was a score: 0.35.

I had no idea what any of this meant.

The red dot was the culmination of an immuno-quest I had begun on an autumn afternoon a few months earlier, when a postdoc in Tsang’s lab drew several vials of my blood. It was also a significant milestone in a decades-long journey I’ve taken as a journalist covering life sciences and medicine. Over the years, I’ve offered myself up as a human guinea pig for hundreds of tests promising new insights into my health and mortality. In 2001, I was one of the first humans to have my DNA sequenced. Soon after, in the early 2000s, researchers tapped into my proteome—proteins circulating in my blood. Then came assessments of my microbiome, metabolome, and much more. I have continued to test-drive the latest protocols and devices, amassing tens of terabytes of data on myself, and I’ve reported on the results in dozens of articles and a book called Experimental Man. Over time, the tests have gotten better and more informative, but no test I had previously taken promised to deliver results more comprehensive or closer to revealing the truth about my underlying state of health than what John Tsang was offering.

Over the years, I’ve offered myself up as a human guinea pig for hundreds of tests promising new insights into my health and mortality. But no test I had previously taken promised to deliver results more comprehensive or closer to revealing the truth about my underlying state of health.

It also was not lost on me that I’m now 20-plus years older than I was when I took those first tests. Back in my 40s, I was ridiculously healthy. Since then, I’ve been battered by various pathogens, stresses, and injuries, including two bouts of covid and long covid—and, well, life.

But I’d kept my apprehensions to myself as Tsang, a slim, perpetually smiling man who directs the Yale Center for Systems and Engineering Immunology, invited me into his office in New Haven to introduce me to something called the human immunome.

John Tsang in his office
John Tsang has helped create a new test for your immune system.
JULIE BIDWELL

Made up of 1.8 trillion cells and trillions more proteins, metabolites, mRNA, and other biomolecules, every person’s immunome is different, and it is constantly changing. It’s shaped by our DNA, past illnesses, the air we have breathed, the food we have eaten, our age, and the traumas and stresses we have experienced—in short, everything we have ever been exposed to physically and emotionally. Right now, your immune system is hard at work identifying and fending off viruses and rogue cells that threaten to turn cancerous—or maybe already have. And it is doing an excellent job of it all, or not, depending on how healthy it happens to be at this particular moment.

Yet as critical as the immunome is to each of us, this universe of cells and molecules has remained largely beyond the reach of modern medicine—a vast yet inaccessible operating system that powerfully influences everything from our vulnerability to viruses and cancer to how well we age to whether we tolerate certain foods better than others.

Now, thanks to a slew of new technologies and to scientists like Tsang, who is on the Steering Committee of the Chan Zuckerberg Biohub New York, understanding this vital and mysterious system is within our grasp, paving the way for powerful new tools and tests to help us better assess, diagnose and treat diseases.

Already, new research is revealing patterns in the ways our bodies respond to stress and disease. Scientists are creating contrasting portraits of weak and robust immunomes—portraits that someday, it’s hoped, could offer new insights into patient care and perhaps detect illnesses before symptoms appear. There are plans afoot to deploy this knowledge and technology on a global scale, which would enable scientists to observe the effects of climate, geography, and countless other factors on the immunome. The results could transform what it means to be healthy and how we identify and treat disease.

It all begins with a test that can tell you whether your immune system is healthy or not.

Reading the immunome

Sitting in his office last fall, Tsang—a systems immunologist whose expertise combines computer science and immunology— began my tutorial in immunomics by introducing me to a study that he and his team wrote up in a 2024 paper published in Nature Medicine. It described the results of measurements made on blood samples taken from 270 subjects—tests similar to the ones Tsang’s team would be running on me. In the study, Tsang and his colleagues looked at the immune systems of 228 patients diagnosed with a variety of genetic disorders and a control group of 42 healthy people.

To help me visualize what my results might look like, Tsang opened his laptop to reveal several colorful charts from the study, punctuated by black dots representing each person evaluated. The results reminded me vaguely of abstract paintings by Joan Miró. But in place of colorful splotches, whirls, and circles were an assortment of scatter plots, Gantt charts, and heat maps tinted in greens, blues, oranges, and purples.

It all looked like gibberish to me.

Luckily, Tsang was willing to serve as my guide. Flashing his perpetually patient smile, he explained that these colorful jumbles depicted what his team had uncovered about each subject after taking blood samples and assessing the details of how well their immune cells, proteins, mRNA, and other immune system components were doing their job.

IBRAHIM RAYINTAKATH

The results placed people—represented by the individual dots—on a left-to-right continuum, ranging from those with unhealthy immunomes on the left to those with healthy immunomes on the right. Background colors, meanwhile, were used to identify people with different medical conditions affecting their immune systems. For example, olive-green indicated those with auto-immune disorders; orange backgrounds were designated for individuals with no known disease history. Tsang said he and his team would be placing me on a similar graph after they finished analyzing my blood.

Tsang’s measurements go significantly beyond what can be discerned from the handful of immune biomarkers that people routinely get tested for today. “The main immune cell panel typically ordered by a physician is called a CBC differential,” he told me. CBC, which stands for “complete blood count,” is a decades-old type of analysis that counts levels of red blood cells, hemoglobin, and basic immune cell types (neutrophils, lymphocytes, monocytes, basophils, and eosinophils). Changes in these levels can indicate whether a person’s immune system might be reacting to a virus or other infection, cancer, or something else. Other blood tests—like one that looks for elevated levels of C-reactive protein, which can indicate inflammation associated with heart disease—are more specific than the CBC. But they still rely on blunt counting—in this case of certain proteins.

Tsang’s assessment, by contrast, tests up to a million cells, proteins, mRNA and immune biomolecules—significantly more than the CBC and others. His protocol is designed to paint a more holistic portrait of a person’s immune system by not only counting cells and molecules but also by assessing their interactions. The CBC “doesn’t tell me as a physician what the cells being counted are doing,” says Rachel Sparks, a clinical immunologist who was the lead author of the Nature Medicine study and is now a translational medicine physician with the drug giant AstraZeneca. “I just know that there are more neutrophils than normal, which may or may not indicate that they’re behaving badly. We now have technology that allows us to see at a granular level what a cell is actually doing when a virus appears—how it’s changing and reacting.”

Tsang’s measurements go significantly beyond what can be discerned from the handful of immune biomarkers that people routinely get tested for today. His assessment tests up to a million cells, proteins, mRNA and immune biomolecules.

Such breakthroughs have been made possible thanks to a raft of new and improved technologies that have evolved over the past decade, allowing scientists like Tsang and Sparks to explore the intricacies of the immunome with newfound precision. These include devices that can count myriad different types of cells and biomolecules, as well as advanced sequencers that identify and characterize DNA, RNA, proteins, and other molecules. There are now instruments that also can measure thousands of changes and reactions that occur inside a single immune cell as it reacts to a virus or other threat.

Tsang and Spark’s’ team used data generated by such measurements to identify and characterize a series of signals distinctive to unhealthy immune systems. Then they used the presence or absence of these signals to create a numerical assessment of the health of a person’s immunome—a score they call an “immune health metric,” or IHM.

Rachel Sparks outdoors in a green space
Clinical immunologist Rachel Sparks hopes new tests can improve medical care.
JARED SOARES

To make sense of the crush of data being collected, Tsang’s team used machine-learning algorithms that correlated the results of the many measurements with a patient’s known health status and age. They also used AI to compare their findings with immune system data collected elsewhere. All this allowed them to determine and validate an IHM score for each person, and to place it on their spectrum, identifying that person as healthy or not.

It all came together for the first time with the publication of the Nature Medicine paper, in which Tsang and his colleagues reported the results from testing multiple immune variables in the 270 subjects. They also announced a remarkable discovery: Patients with different kinds of diseases reacted with similar disruptions to their immunomes. For instance, many showed a lower level of the aptly named natural killer immune cells, regardless of what they were suffering from. Critically, the immune profiles of those with diagnosed diseases tended to look very different from those belonging to the outwardly healthy people in the study. And, as expected, immune health declined in the older patients.

But then the results got really interesting. In a few cases, the immune systems of  unhealthy and healthy people looked similar, with some people appearing near the “healthy” area of the chart even though they were known to have diseases. Most likely this was because their symptoms were in remission and not causing an immune reaction at the moment when their blood was drawn, Tsang told me. 

In other cases, people without a known disease showed up on the chart closer to those who were known to be sick. “Some of these people who appear to be in good health are overlapping with pathology that traditional metrics can’t spot,” says Tsang, whose Nature Medicine paper reported that roughly half the healthy individuals in the study had IHM scores that overlapped with those of people known to be sick. Either these seemingly healthy people had normal immune systems that were busy fending off, say, a passing virus, or  their immune systems had been impacted by aging and the vicissitudes of life. Potentially more worrisome, they were harboring an illness or stress that was not yet making them ill but might do so eventually.

These findings have obvious implications for medicine. Spotting a low immune score in a seemingly healthy person could make it possible to identify and start treating an illness before symptoms appear, diseases worsen, or tumors grow and metastasize. IHM-style evaluations could also provide clues as to why some people respond differently to viruses like the one that causes covid, and why vaccines—which are designed to activate a healthy immune system—might not work as well in people whose immune systems are compromised.

Spotting a low immune score in a seemingly healthy person could make it possible to identify and start treating an illness before symptoms appear, diseases worsen, or tumors grow and metastasize.

“One of the more surprising things about the last pandemic was that all sorts of random younger people who seemed very healthy got sick and then they were gone,” says Mark Davis, a Stanford immunologist who helped pioneer the science being developed in labs like Tsang’s. “Some had underlying conditions like obesity and diabetes, but some did not. So the question is, could we have pointed out that something was off with these folks’ immune systems? Could we have diagnosed that and warned people to take extra precautions?”

Tsang’s IHM test is designed to answer a simple question: What is the relative health of your immune system? But there are other assessments being developed to provide more detailed information on how the body is doing. Tsang’s own team is working on a panel of additional scores aimed at getting finer detail on specific immune conditions. These include a test that measures the health of a person’s bone marrow, which makes immune cells. “If you have a bone marrow stress or inflammatory condition in the bone marrow, you could have lower capacity to produce cells, which will be reflected by this score,” he says. Another detailed metric will measure protein levels to predict how a person will respond to a virus.

Tsang hopes that an IHM-style test will one day be part of a standard physical exam—a snapshot of a patient’s immune system that could inform care. For instance, has a period of intense stress compromised the immune system, making it less able to fend off this season’s flu? Will someone’s score predict a better or worse response to a vaccine or a cancer drug? How does a person’s immune system change with age?

Or, as I anxiously wondered while waiting to learn my own score, will the results reveal an underlying disorder or disease, silently ticking away until it shows itself?

Toward a human immunome project  

The quest to create advanced tests like the IHM for the immune system began more than 15 years ago, when scientists like Mark Davis became frustrated with a field in which research—primarily in mice—was focused mostly on individual immune cells and proteins. In 2007 he launched the Stanford Human Immune Monitoring Center, one of the first efforts to conceptualize the human immunome as a holistic, body-wide network in human beings. Speaking by Zoom from his office in Palo Alto, California, Davis told me that the effort had spawned other projects, including a landmark twin study showing that a lot of immune variation is not genetic, which was then the prevailing theory, but is heavily influenced by environmental factors—a major shift in scientists’ understanding.

Shai Shen-Orr
Shai Shen-Orr sees a day when people will check their immune scores on an app.
COURTESY OF SHAI SHEN-ORR

Davis and others also laid the groundwork for tests like John Tsang’s by discovering how a T cell—among the most common and important immune players—can recognize pathogens, cancerous cells, and other threats, triggering defensive measures that can include destroying the threat. This and other discoveries have revealed many of the basic mechanics of how immune cells work, says Davis, “but there’s still a lot we have to learn.”

One researcher working with Davis in those early days was Shai Shen-Orr, who is now director of the Zimin Institute for AI Solutions in Healthcare at the Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, based in Haifa, Israel. (He’s also a frequent collaborator with Tsang.) Shen-Orr, like Tsang, is a systems immunologist. He recalls that in 2007, when he was a postdoc in Davis’s lab, immunologists had identified around 100 cell types and a similar number of cytokines—proteins that act as messengers in the immune system. But they weren’t able to measure them simultaneously, which limited visibility into how the immune system works as a whole. Today, Shen-Orr says, immunologists can measure hundreds of cell types and thousands of proteins and watch them interact.

Shen-Orr’s current lab has developed its own version of an immunome test that he calls IMM-AGE (short for “immune age”), the basics of which were published in a 2019 paper in Nature Medicine. IMM-AGE looks at the composition of people’s immune systems—how many of each type of immune cell they have and how these numbers change as they age. His team has used this information primarily to ascertain a person’s risk of heart disease.

Shen-Orr also has been a vociferous advocate for expanding the pool of test samples, which now come mostly from Americans and Europeans. “We need to understand why different people in different environments react differently and how that works,” he says. “We also need to test a lot more people—maybe millions.”

Tsang has seen why a limited sample size can pose problems. In 2013, he says, researchers at the National Institutes of Health came up with a malaria vaccine that was effective for almost everyone who got it during clinical trials conducted in Maryland. “But in Africa,” he says, “it only worked for about 25% of the people.” He attributes this to the significant differences in genetics, diet, climate, and other environmental factors that cause people’s immunomes to develop differently. “Why?” he asks. “What exactly was different about the immune systems in Maryland and Tanzania? That’s what we need to understand so we can design personalized vaccines and treatments.”

“What exactly was different about the immune systems in Maryland and Tanzania? That’s what we need to understand so we can design personalized vaccines and treatments.”

John Tsang

For several years, Tsang and Shen-Orr have advocated going global with testing, “but there has been resistance,” Shen-Orr says. “Look, medicine is conservative and moves slowly, and the technology is expensive and labor intensive.” They finally got the audience they needed at a 2022 conference in La Jolla, California, convened by the Human Immunome Project, or HIP. (The organization was originally founded in 2016 to create more effective vaccines but had recently changed its name to emphasize a pivot from just vaccines to the wider field of immunome science.) It was in La Jolla that they met HIP’s then-new chairperson, Jane Metcalfe, a cofounder of Wired magazine, who saw what was at stake.

“We’ve got all of these advanced molecular immunological profiles being developed,” she said, “but we can’t begin to predict the breadth of immune system variability if we’re  only testing small numbers of people in Palo Alto or Tel Aviv. And that’s when the big aha moment struck us that we need sites everywhere to collect that information so we can build proper computer models and a predictive understanding of the human immune system.”

IBRAHIM RAYINTAKATH

Following that meeting, HIP created a new scientific plan, with Tsang and Shen-Orr as chief science officers. The group set an ambitious goal of raising around $3 billion over the next 10 years—a goal Tsang and Metcalfe say will be met by working in conjunction with a broad network of public and private supporters. Cutbacks in federal funding for biomedical research in the US may limit funds from this traditional source, but HIP plans to work with government agencies outside the US too, with the goal of creating a comprehensive global immunological database.

HIP’s plan is to first develop a pilot version based on Tsang’s test, which it will call the Immune Monitoring Kit, to test a few thousand people in Africa, Australia, East Asia, Europe, the US, and Israel. The initial effort, according to Metcalfe, is expected to begin by the end of the year.  

After that, HIP would like to expand to some 150 sites around the world, eventually assessing about 250,000 people and collecting a vast cache of data and insights that Tsang believes will profoundly affect—even revolutionize—clinical medicine, public health, and drug development.

My immune health metric score is …

As HIP develops its pilot study to take on the world, John Tsang, for better or worse, has added one more North American Caucasian male to the small number of people who have received an IHM score to date. That would be me.

It took a long time to get my score, but Tsang didn’t leave me hanging once he pinged me the red dot. “We plotted you with other participants who are clinically quite healthy,” he texted, referring to a cluster of black dots on the grid he had sent, although he cautioned that the group I’m being compared with includes only a few dozen people. “Higher IHM means better immune health,” he wrote, referring to my 0.35 score, which he described as a number on an arbitrary scale. “As you can see, your IHM is right in the middle of a bunch of people 20 years younger.”

This was a relief, given that our immune system, like so many other bodily functions, declines with age—though obviously at different rates. Yet I also felt a certain disappointment. To be honest, I had expected more granular detail after having a million or so cells and markers tested—like perhaps some insights on why I got long covid (twice) and others didn’t. Tsang and other scientists are working on ways to extract more specific information from the tests. Still, he insists that the single score itself is a powerful tool to understand the general state of our immunomes, indicating the absence or presence of underlying health issues that might not be revealed in traditional testing.

To be honest, I had expected more granular detail after having a million or so cells and markers tested—like perhaps some insights on why I got long covid (twice) and others didn’t.

I asked Tsang what my score meant for my future. “Your score is always changing depending on what you’re exposed to and due to age,” he said, adding that the IHM is still so new that it’s hard to know exactly what the score means until researchers do more work—and until HIP can evaluate and compare thousands or hundreds of thousands of people. They also need to keep testing me over time to see how my immune system changes as it’s exposed to new perturbations and stresses.

For now, I’m left with a simple number. Though it tells me little about the detailed workings of my immune system, the good news is that it raises no red flags. My immune system, it turns out, is pretty healthy.

A few days after receiving my score from Tsang, I heard from Shen-Orr about more results. Tsang had shared my data with his lab so that he could run his IMM-AGE protocol on my immunome and provide me with another score to worry about. Shen-Orr’s result put the age of my immune system at around 57—still 10 years younger than my true age.

The coming age of the immunome

Shai Shen-Orr imagines a day when people will be able to check their advanced IHM and IMM-AGE scores—or their HIP Immune Monitoring Kit score—on an app after a blood draw, the way they now check health data such as heart rate and blood pressure. Jane Metcalfe talks about linking IHM-type measurements and analyses with rising global temperatures and steamier days and nights to study how global warming might affect the immune system of, say, a newborn or a pregnant woman. “This could be plugged into other people’s models and really help us understand the effects of pollution, nutrition, or climate change on human health,” she says.

“I think [in 10 years] I’ll be able to use this much more granular understanding of what the immune system is doing at the cellular level in my patients. And hopefully we could target our therapies more directly to those cells or pathways that are contributing to disease.”

Rachel Sparks

Other clues could also be on the horizon. “At some point we’ll have IHM scores that can provide data on who will be most affected by a virus during a pandemic,” Tsang says. Maybe that will help researchers engineer an immune system response that shuts down the virus before it spreads. He says it’s possible to run a test like that now, but it remains experimental and will take years to fully develop, test for safety and accuracy, and establish standards and protocols for use as a tool of global public health. “These things take a long time,” he says. 

The same goes for bringing IHM-style tests into the exam room, so doctors like Rachel Sparks can use the results to help treat their patients. “I think in 10 years, with some effort, we really could have something useful,” says Stanford’s Mark Davis. Sparks agrees. “I think by then I’ll be able to use this much more granular understanding of what the immune system is doing at the cellular level in my patients,” she says. “And hopefully we could target our therapies more directly to those cells or pathways that are contributing to disease.”

Personally, I’ll wait for more details with a mix of impatience, curiosity, and at least a hint of concern. I wonder what more the immune circuitry deep inside me might reveal about whether I’m healthy at this very moment, or will be tomorrow, or next month, or years from now. 

David Ewing Duncan is an award-winning science writer. For more information on this story check out his Futures Column on Substack.

Scientists can see Earth’s permafrost thawing from space

Something is rotten in the city of Nunapitchuk. In recent years, a crack has formed in the middle of a house. Sewage has leached into the earth. Soil has eroded around buildings, leaving them perched atop precarious lumps of dirt. There are eternal puddles. And mold. The ground can feel squishy, sodden. 

This small town in northern Alaska is experiencing a sometimes overlooked consequence of climate change: thawing permafrost. And Nunapitchuk is far from the only Arctic town to find itself in such a predicament. 

Permafrost, which lies beneath about 15% of the land in the Northern Hemisphere, is defined as ground that has remained frozen for at least two years. Historically, much of the world’s permafrost has remained solid and stable for far longer, allowing people to build whole towns atop it. But as the planet warms, a process that is happening more rapidly near the poles than at more temperate latitudes, permafrost is thawing and causing a host of infrastructural and environmental problems.

Now scientists think they may be able to use satellite data to delve deep beneath the ground’s surface and get a better understanding of how the permafrost thaws, and which areas might be most severely affected because they had more ice to start with. Clues from the short-term behavior of those especially icy areas, seen from space, could portend future problems.

Using information gathered both from space and on the ground, they are working with affected communities to anticipate whether a house’s foundation will crack—and whether it is worth mending that crack or is better to start over in a new house on a stable hilltop. These scientists’ permafrost predictions are already helping communities like Nunapitchuk make those tough calls.

But it’s not just civilian homes that are at risk. One of the top US intelligence agencies, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), is also interested in understanding permafrost better. That’s because the same problems that plague civilians in the high north also plague military infrastructure, at home and abroad. The NGA is, essentially, an organization full of space spies—people who analyze data from surveillance satellites and make sense of it for the country’s national security apparatus. 

Understanding the potential instabilities of the Alaskan military infrastructure—which includes radar stations that watch for intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as military bases and National Guard posts—is key to keeping those facilities in good working order and planning for their strengthened future. Understanding the potential permafrost weaknesses that could affect the infrastructure of countries like Russia and China, meanwhile, affords what insiders might call “situational awareness” about competitors. 

The work to understand this thawing will only become more relevant, for civilians and their governments alike, as the world continues to warm. 

The ground beneath

If you live much below the Arctic Circle, you probably don’t think a lot about permafrost. But it affects you no matter where you call home.

In addition to the infrastructural consequences for real towns like Nunapitchuk, thawing permafrost contains sequestered carbon—twice as much as currently inhabits the atmosphere. As the permafrost thaws, the process can release greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. That release can cause a feedback loop: Warmer temperatures thaw permafrost, which releases greenhouse gases, which warms the air more, which then—you get it. 

The microbes themselves, along with previously trapped heavy metals, are also set dangerously free.

For many years, researchers’ primary options for understanding some of these freeze-thaw changes involved hands-on, on-the-ground surveys. But in the late 2000s, Kevin Schaefer, currently a senior scientist at the Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences at the University of Colorado Boulder, started to investigate a less labor-intensive idea: using radar systems aboard satellites to survey the ground beneath. 

This idea implanted itself in his brain in 2009, when he traveled to a place called Toolik Lake, southwest of the oilfields of Prudhoe Bay in Alaska. One day, after hours of drilling sample cores out of the ground to study permafrost, he was relaxing in the Quonset hut, chatting with colleagues. They began to discuss how  space-based radar could potentially detect how the land sinks and heaves back up as temperatures change. 

Huh, he thought. Yes, radar probably could do that

Scientists call the ground right above permafrost the active layer. The water in this layer of soil contracts and expands with the seasons: during the summer, the ice suffusing the soil melts and the resulting decrease in volume causes the ground to dip. During the winter, the water freezes and expands, bulking the active layer back up. Radar can help measure that height difference, which is usually around one to five centimeters. 

Schaefer realized that he could use radar to measure the ground elevation at the start and end of the thaw. The electromagnetic waves that bounce back at those two times would have traveled slightly different distances. That difference would reveal the tiny shift in elevation over the seasons and would allow him to estimate how much water had thawed and refrozen in the active layer and how far below the surface the thaw had extended.

With radar, Schaefer realized, scientists could cover a lot more literal ground, with less effort and at lower cost.

“It took us two years to figure out how to write a paper on it,” he says; no one had ever made those measurements before. He and colleagues presented the idea at the 2010 meeting of the American Geophysical Union and published a paper in 2012 detailing the method, using it to estimate the thickness of the active layer on Alaska’s North Slope.

When they did, they helped start a new subfield that grew as large-scale data sets started to become available around 5 to 10 years ago, says Roger Michaelides, a geophysicist at Washington University in St. Louis and a collaborator of Schaefer’s. Researchers’ efforts were aided by the growth in space radar systems and smaller, cheaper satellites. 

With the availability of global data sets (sometimes for free, from government-run satellites like the European Space Agency’s Sentinel) and targeted observations from commercial companies like Iceye, permafrost studies are moving from bespoke regional analyses to more automated, large-scale monitoring and prediction.

The remote view

Simon Zwieback, a geospatial and environmental expert at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, sees the consequences of thawing permafrost firsthand every day. His office overlooks a university parking lot, a corner of which is fenced off to keep cars and pedestrians from falling into a brand-new sinkhole. That area of asphalt had been slowly sagging for more than a year, but over a week or two this spring, it finally started to collapse inward. 

Kevin Schaefer stands on top of a melting layer of ice near the Alaskan pipeline on the North Slope of Alaska.
COURTESY OF KEVIN SCHAEFER

The new remote research methods are a large-scale version of Zwieback taking in the view from his window. Researchers look at the ground and measure how its height changes as ice thaws and refreezes. The approach can cover wide swaths of land, but it involves making assumptions about what’s going on below the surface—namely, how much ice suffuses the soil in the active layer and permafrost. Thawing areas with relatively low ice content could mimic thinner layers with more ice. And it’s important to differentiate the two, since more ice in the permafrost means more potential instability. 

To check that they’re on the right track, scientists have historically had to go out into the field. But a few years ago, Zwieback started to explore a way to make better and deeper estimates of ice content using the available remote sensing data. Finding a way to make those kinds of measurements on a large scale was more than an academic exercise: Areas of what he calls “excess ice” are most liable to cause instability at the surface. “In order to plan in these environments, we really need to know how much ice there is, or where those locations are that are rich in ice,” he says.

Zwieback, who did his undergraduate and graduate studies in Switzerland and Austria, wasn’t always so interested in permafrost, or so deeply affected by it. But in 2014, when he was a doctoral student in environmental engineering, he joined an environmental field campaign in Siberia, at the Lena River Delta, which resembles a gigantic piece of coral fanning out into the Arctic Ocean. Zwieback was near a town called Tiksi, one of the world’s northernmost settlements. It’s a military outpost and starting point for expeditions to the North Pole, featuring an abandoned plane near the ocean. Its Soviet-era concrete buildings sometimes bring it to the front page of the r/UrbanHell subreddit. 

Here, Zwieback saw part of the coastline collapse, exposing almost pure ice. It looked like a subterranean glacier, but it was permafrost. “That really had an indelible impact on me,” he says. 

Later, as a doctoral student in Zurich and postdoc in Canada, he used his radar skills to understand the rapid changes that the activity of permafrost impressed upon the landscape. 

And now, with his job in Fairbanks and his ideas about the use of radar sensing, he has done work funded by the NGA, which has an open Arctic data portal. 

In his Arctic research, Zwieback started with the approach underlying most radar permafrost studies: looking at the ground’s seasonal subsidence and heave. “But that’s something that happens very close to the surface,” he says. “It doesn’t really tell us about these long-term destabilizing effects,” he adds.

In warmer summers, he thought, subtle clues would emerge that could indicate how much ice is buried deeper down.

For example, he expected those warmer-than-average periods to exaggerate the amount of change seen on the surface, making it easier to tell which areas are ice-rich. Land that was particularly dense with ice would dip more than it “should”—a precursor of bigger dips to come.

The first step, then, was to measure subsidence directly, as usual. But from there, Zwieback developed an algorithm to ingest data about the subsidence over time—as measured by radar—and other environmental information, like the temperatures at each measurement. He then created a digital model of the land that allowed him to adjust the simulated amount of ground ice and determine when it matched the subsidence seen in the real world. With that, researchers could infer the amount of ice beneath.

Next, he made maps of that ice that could potentially be useful to engineers—whether they were planning a new subdivision or, as his funders might be, keeping watch on a military airfield.

“What was new in my work was to look at these much shorter periods and use them to understand specific aspects of this whole system, and specifically how much ice there is deep down,” Zwieback says. 

The NGA, which has also funded Schaefer’s work, did not respond to an initial request for comment but did later provide feedback for fact-checking. It removed an article on its website about Zwieback’s grant and its application to agency interests around the time that the current presidential administration began to ban mention of climate change in federal research. But the thawing earth is of keen concern. 

To start, the US has significant military infrastructure in Alaska: It’s home to six military bases and 49 National Guard posts, as well as 21 missile-detecting radar sites. Most are vulnerable to thaw now or in the near future, given that 85% of the state is on permafrost. 

Beyond American borders, the broader north is in a state of tension. Russia’s relations with Northern Europe are icy. Its invasion of Ukraine has left those countries fearing that they too could be invaded, prompting Sweden and Finland, for instance, to join NATO. The US has threatened takeovers of Greenland and Canada. And China—which has shipping and resource ambitions for the region—is jockeying to surpass the US as the premier superpower. 

Permafrost plays a role in the situation. “As knowledge has expanded, so has the understanding that thawing permafrost can affect things NGA cares about, including the stability of infrastructure in Russia and China,” read the NGA article. Permafrost covers 60% of Russia, and thaws have affected more than 40% of buildings in northern Russia already, according to statements from the country’s minister of natural resources in 2021. Experts say critical infrastructure like roads and pipelines is at risk, along with military installations. That could weaken both Russia’s strategic position and the security of its residents. In China, meanwhile, according to a report from the Council on Strategic Risks, important moving parts like the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, “which allows Beijing to more quickly move military personnel near contested areas of the Indian border,” is susceptible to ground thaw—as are oil and gas pipelines linking Russia and China. 

In the field

Any permafrost analysis that relies on data from space requires verification on Earth. The hope is that remote methods will become reliable enough to use on their own, but while they’re being developed, researchers must still get their hands muddy with more straightforward and longer tested physical methods. Some use a network called Circumpolar Active Layer Monitoring, which has existed since 1991, incorporating active-layer data from hundreds of measurement sites across the Northern Hemisphere. 

Sometimes, that data comes from people physically probing an area; other sites use tubes permanently inserted into the ground, filled with a liquid that indicates freezing; still others use underground cables that measure soil temperature. Some researchers, like Schaefer, lug ground-penetrating radar systems around the tundra. He’s taken his system to around 50 sites and made more than 200,000 measurements of the active layer.

The field-ready ground-penetrating radar comes in a big box—the size of a steamer trunk—that emits radio pulses. These pulses bounce off the bottom of the active layer, or the top of the permafrost. In this case, the timing of that reflection reveals how thick the active layer is. With handles designed for humans, Schaefer’s team drags this box around the Arctic’s boggier areas. 

The box floats. “I do not,” he says. He has vivid memories of tromping through wetlands, his legs pushing straight down through the muck, his body sinking up to his hips.

Andy Parsekian and Kevin Schaefer haul a ground penetrating radar unit through the tundra near Utqiagvik.
COURTESY OF KEVIN SCHAEFER

Zwieback also needs to verify what he infers from his space data. And so in 2022, he went to the Toolik Field station, a National Science Foundation–funded ecology research facility along the Dalton Highway and adjacent to Schaefer’s Toolik Lake. This road, which goes from Fairbanks up to the Arctic Ocean, is colloquially called the Haul Road; it was made famous in the TV show Ice Road Truckers. From this access point, Zwieback’s team needed to get deep samples of soil whose ice content could be analyzed in the lab.

Every day, two teams would drive along the Dalton Highway to get close to their field sites. Slamming their car doors, they would unload and hop on snow machines to travel the final distance. Often they would see musk oxen, looking like bison that never cut their hair. The grizzlies were also interested in these oxen, and in the nearby caribou. 

At the sites they could reach, they took out a corer, a long, tubular piece of equipment driven by a gas engine, meant to drill deep into the ground. Zwieback or a teammate pressed it into the earth. The barrel’s two blades rotated, slicing a cylinder about five feet down to ensure that their samples went deep enough to generate data that can be compared with the measurements made from space. Then they pulled up and extracted the cylinder, a sausage of earth and ice.

All day every day for a week, they gathered cores that matched up with the pixels in radar images taken from space. In those cores, the ice was apparent to the eye. But Zwieback didn’t want anecdata. “We want to get a number,” he says.

So he and his team would pack their soil cylinders back to the lab. There they sliced them into segments and measured their volume, in both their frozen and their thawed form, to see how well the measured ice content matched estimates from the space-based algorithm. 

The initial validation, which took months, demonstrated the value of using satellites for permafrost work. The ice profiles that Zwieback’s algorithm inferred from the satellite data matched measurements in the lab down to about 1.1 feet, and farther in a warm year, with some uncertainty near the surface and deeper into the permafrost. 

Whereas it cost tens of thousands of dollars to fly in on a helicopter, drive in a car, and switch to a snowmobile to ultimately sample a small area using your hands, only to have to continue the work at home, the team needed just a few hundred dollars to run the algorithm on satellite data that was free and publicly available. 

Michaelides, who is familiar with Zwieback’s work, agrees that estimating excess ice content is key to making infrastructural decisions, and that historical methods of sussing it out have been costly in all senses. Zwieback’s method of using late-summer clues to infer what’s going on at that depth “is a very exciting idea,” he says, and the results “demonstrate that there is considerable promise for this approach.” 

He notes, though, that using space-based radar to understand the thawing ground is complicated: Ground ice content, soil moisture, and vegetation can differ even within a single pixel that a satellite can pick out. “To be clear, this limitation is not unique to Simon’s work,” Michaelides says; it affects all space-radar methods. There is also excess ice below even where Zwieback’s algorithm can probe—something the labor-intensive on-ground methods can pick up that still can’t be seen from space. 

Mapping out the future

After Zwieback did his fieldwork, NGA decided to do its own. The agency’s attempt to independently validate his work—in Prudhoe Bay, Utqiagvik, and Fairbanks—was part of a project it called Frostbyte. 

Its partners in that project—the Army’s Cold Regions Research Engineering Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory—declined requests for interviews. As far as Zwieback knows, they’re still analyzing data. 

But the intelligence community isn’t the only group interested in research like Zwieback’s. He also works with Arctic residents, reaching out to rural Alaskan communities where people are trying to make decisions about whether to relocate or where to build safely. “They typically can’t afford to do expensive coring,” he says. “So the idea is to make these data available to them.” 

Zwieback and his team haul their gear out to gather data from drilled core samples, a process which can be arduous and costly.
ANDREW JOHNSON

Schaefer is also trying to bridge the gap between his science and the people it affects. Through a company called Weather Stream, he is helping communities identify risks to infrastructure before anything collapses, so they can take preventative action.

Making such connections has always been a key concern for Erin Trochim, a geospatial scientist at the University of Alaska Fairbanks. As a researcher who works not just on permafrost but also on policy, she’s seen radar science progress massively in recent years—without commensurate advances on the ground.

For instance, it’s still hard for residents in her town of Fairbanks—or anywhere—to know if there’s permafrost on their property at all, unless they’re willing to do expensive drilling. She’s encountered this problem, still unsolved, on property she owns. And if an expert can’t figure it out, non-experts hardly stand a chance. “It’s just frustrating when a lot of this information that we know from the science side, and [that’s] trickled through the engineering side, hasn’t really translated into the on-the-ground construction,” she says. 

There is a group, though, trying to turn that trickle into a flood: Permafrost Pathways, a venture that launched with a $41 million grant through the TED Audacious Project. In concert with affected communities, including Nunapitchuk, it is building a data-gathering network on the ground, and combining information from that network with satellite data and local knowledge to help understand permafrost thaw and develop adaptation strategies. 

“I think about it often as if you got a diagnosis of a disease,” says Sue Natali, the head of the project. “It’s terrible, but it’s also really great, because when you know what your problem is and what you’re dealing with, it’s only then that you can actually make a plan to address it.” 

And the communities Permafrost Pathways works with are making plans. Nunapitchuk has decided to relocate, and the town and the research group have collaboratively surveyed the proposed new location: a higher spot on hardpacked sand. Permafrost Pathways scientists were able to help validate the stability of the new site—and prove to policymakers that this stability would extend into the future. 

Radar helps with that in part, Natali says, because unlike other satellite detectors, it penetrates clouds. “In Alaska, it’s extremely cloudy,” she says. “So other data sets have been very, very challenging. Sometimes we get one image per year.”

And so radar data, and algorithms like Zwieback’s that help scientists and communities make sense of that data, dig up deeper insight into what’s going on beneath northerners’ feet—and how to step forward on firmer ground. 

Sarah Scoles is a freelance science journalist based in southern Colorado and the author, most recently, of the book Countdown: The Blinding Future of Nuclear Weapons.

How AI and Wikipedia have sent vulnerable languages into a doom spiral

When Kenneth Wehr started managing the Greenlandic-language version of Wikipedia four years ago, his first act was to delete almost everything. It had to go, he thought, if it had any chance of surviving.

Wehr, who’s 26, isn’t from Greenland—he grew up in Germany—but he had become obsessed with the island, an autonomous Danish territory, after visiting as a teenager. He’d spent years writing obscure Wikipedia articles in his native tongue on virtually everything to do with it. He even ended up moving to Copenhagen to study Greenlandic, a language spoken by some 57,000 mostly Indigenous Inuit people scattered across dozens of far-flung Arctic villages. 

The Greenlandic-language edition was added to Wikipedia around 2003, just a few years after the site launched in English. By the time Wehr took its helm nearly 20 years later, hundreds of Wikipedians had contributed to it and had collectively written some 1,500 articles totaling over tens of thousands of words. It seemed to be an impressive vindication of the crowdsourcing approach that has made Wikipedia the go-to source for information online, demonstrating that it could work even in the unlikeliest places. 

There was only one problem: The Greenlandic Wikipedia was a mirage. 

Virtually every single article had been published by people who did not actually speak the language. Wehr, who now teaches Greenlandic in Denmark, speculates that perhaps only one or two Greenlanders had ever contributed. But what worried him most was something else: Over time, he had noticed that a growing number of articles appeared to be copy-pasted into Wikipedia by people using machine translators. They were riddled with elementary mistakes—from grammatical blunders to meaningless words to more significant inaccuracies, like an entry that claimed Canada had only 41 inhabitants. Other pages sometimes contained random strings of letters spat out by machines that were unable to find suitable Greenlandic words to express themselves. 

“It might have looked Greenlandic to [the authors], but they had no way of knowing,” complains Wehr.

“Sentences wouldn’t make sense at all, or they would have obvious errors,” he adds. “AI translators are really bad at Greenlandic.”  

What Wehr describes is not unique to the Greenlandic edition. 

Wikipedia is the most ambitious multilingual project after the Bible: There are editions in over 340 languages, and a further 400 even more obscure ones are being developed and tested. Many of these smaller editions have been swamped with automatically translated content as AI has become increasingly accessible. Volunteers working on four African languages, for instance, estimated to MIT Technology Review that between 40% and 60% of articles in their Wikipedia editions were uncorrected machine translations. And after auditing the Wikipedia edition in Inuktitut, an Indigenous language close to Greenlandic that’s spoken in Canada, MIT Technology Review estimates that more than two-thirds of pages containing more than several sentences feature portions created this way. 

This is beginning to cause a wicked problem. AI systems, from Google Translate to ChatGPT, learn to “speak” new languages by scraping huge quantities of text from the internet. Wikipedia is sometimes the largest source of online linguistic data for languages with few speakers—so any errors on those pages, grammatical or otherwise, can poison the wells that AI is expected to draw from. That can make the models’ translation of these languages particularly error-prone, which creates a sort of linguistic doom loop as people continue to add more and more poorly translated Wikipedia pages using those tools, and AI models continue to train from poorly translated pages. It’s a complicated problem, but it boils down to a simple concept: Garbage in, garbage out

“These models are built on raw data,” says Kevin Scannell, a former professor of computer science at Saint Louis University who now builds computer software tailored for endangered languages. “They will try and learn everything about a language from scratch. There is no other input. There are no grammar books. There are no dictionaries. There is nothing other than the text that is inputted.”

There isn’t perfect data on the scale of this problem, particularly because a lot of AI training data is kept confidential and the field continues to evolve rapidly. But back in 2020, Wikipedia was estimated to make up more than half the training data that was fed into AI models translating some languages spoken by millions across Africa, including Malagasy, Yoruba, and Shona. In 2022, a research team from Germany that looked into what data could be obtained by online scraping even found that Wikipedia was the sole easily accessible source of online linguistic data for 27 under-resourced languages. 

This could have significant repercussions in cases where Wikipedia is poorly written—potentially pushing the most vulnerable languages on Earth toward the precipice as future generations begin to turn away from them. 

“Wikipedia will be reflected in the AI models for these languages,” says Trond Trosterud, a computational linguist at the University of Tromsø in Norway, who has been raising the alarm about the potentially harmful outcomes of badly run Wikipedia editions for years. “I find it hard to imagine it will not have consequences. And, of course, the more dominant position that Wikipedia has, the worse it will be.” 

Use responsibly

Automation has been built into Wikipedia since the very earliest days. Bots keep the platform operational: They repair broken links, fix bad formatting, and even correct spelling mistakes. These repetitive and mundane tasks can be automated away with little problem. There is even an army of bots that scurry around generating short articles about rivers, cities, or animals by slotting their names into formulaic phrases. They have generally made the platform better. 

But AI is different. Anybody can use it to cause massive damage with a few clicks. 

Wikipedia has managed the onset of the AI era better than many other websites. It has not been flooded with AI bots or disinformation, as social media has been. It largely retains the innocence that characterized the earlier internet age. Wikipedia is open and free for anyone to use, edit, and pull from, and it’s run by the very same community it serves. It is transparent and easy to use. But community-run platforms live and die on the size of their communities. English has triumphed, while Greenlandic has sunk. 

“We need good Wikipedians. This is something that people take for granted. It is not magic,” says Amir Aharoni, a member of the volunteer Language Committee, which oversees requests to open or close Wikipedia editions. “If you use machine translation responsibly, it can be efficient and useful. Unfortunately, you cannot trust all people to use it responsibly.” 

Trosterud has studied the behavior of users on small Wikipedia editions and says AI has empowered a subset that he terms “Wikipedia hijackers.” These users can range widely—from naive teenagers creating pages about their hometowns or their favorite YouTubers to well-meaning Wikipedians who think that by creating articles in minority languages they are in some way “helping” those communities. 

“The problem with them nowadays is that they are armed with Google Translate,” Trosterud says, adding that this is allowing them to produce much longer and more plausible-looking content than they ever could before: “Earlier they were armed only with dictionaries.” 

This has effectively industrialized the acts of destruction—which affect vulnerable languages most, since AI translations are typically far less reliable for them. There can be lots of different reasons for this, but a meaningful part of the issue is the relatively small amount of source text that is available online. And sometimes models struggle to identify a language because it is similar to others, or because some, including Greenlandic and most Native American languages, have structures that make them badly suited to the way most machine translation systems work. (Wehr notes that in Greenlandic most words are agglutinative, meaning they are built by attaching prefixes and suffixes to stems. As a result, many words are extremely context specific and can express ideas that in other languages would take a full sentence.) 

Research produced by Google before a major expansion of Google Translate rolled out three years ago found that translation systems for lower-resourced languages were generally of a lower quality than those for better-resourced ones. Researchers found, for example, that their model would often mistranslate basic nouns across languages, including the names of animals and colors. (In a statement to MIT Technology Review, Google wrote that it is “committed to meeting a high standard of quality for all 249 languages” it supports “by rigorously testing and improving [its] systems, particularly for languages that may have limited public text resources on the web.”) 

Wikipedia itself offers a built-in editing tool called Content Translate, which allows users to automatically translate articles from one language to another—the idea being that this will save time by preserving the references and fiddly formatting of the originals. But it piggybacks on external machine translation systems, so it’s largely plagued by the same weaknesses as other machine translators—a problem that the Wikimedia Foundation says is hard to solve. It’s up to each edition’s community to decide whether this tool is allowed, and some have decided against it. (Notably, English-language Wikipedia has largely banned its use, claiming that some 95% of articles created using Content Translate failed to meet an acceptable standard without significant additional work.) But it’s at least easy to tell when the program has been used; Content Translate adds a tag on the Wikipedia back end. 

Other AI programs can be harder to monitor. Still, many Wikipedia editors I spoke with said that once their languages were added to major online translation tools, they noticed a corresponding spike in the frequency with which poor, likely machine-translated pages were created. 

Some Wikipedians using AI to translate content do occasionally admit that they do not speak the target languages. They may see themselves as providing smaller communities with rough-cut articles that speakers can then fix—essentially following the same model that has worked well for more active Wikipedia editions.  

Google Translate, for instance, says the Fulfulde word for January means June, while ChatGPT says it’s August or September. The programs also suggest the Fulfulde word for “harvest” means “fever” or “well-being,” among other possibilities.  

But once error-filled pages are produced in small languages, there is usually not an army of knowledgeable people who speak those languages standing ready to improve them. There are few readers of these editions, and sometimes not a single regular editor. 

Yuet Man Lee, a Canadian teacher in his 20s, says that he used a mix of Google Translate and ChatGPT to translate a handful of articles that he had written for the English Wikipedia into Inuktitut, thinking it’d be nice to pitch in and help a smaller Wikipedia community. He says he added a note to one saying that it was only a rough translation. “I did not think that anybody would notice [the article],” he explains. “If you put something out there on the smaller Wikipedias—most of the time nobody does.” 

But at the same time, he says, he still thought “someone might see it and fix it up”—adding that he had wondered whether the Inuktitut translation that the AI systems generated was grammatically correct. Nobody has touched the article since he created it.

Lee, who teaches social sciences in Vancouver and first started editing entries in the English Wikipedia a decade ago, says that users familiar with more active Wikipedias can fall victim to this mindset, which he terms a “bigger-Wikipedia arrogance”: When they try to contribute to smaller Wikipedia editions, they assume that others will come along to fix their mistakes. It can sometimes work. Lee says he had previously contributed several articles to Wikipedia in Tatar, a language spoken by several million people mainly in Russia, and at least one of those was eventually corrected. But the Inuktitut Wikipedia is, by comparison, a “barren wasteland.” 

He emphasizes that his intentions had been good: He wanted to add more articles to an Indigenous Canadian Wikipedia. “I am now thinking that it may have been a bad idea. I did not consider that I could be contributing to a recursive loop,” he says. “It was about trying to get content out there, out of curiosity and for fun, without properly thinking about the consequences.” 

 “Totally, completely no future”

Wikipedia is a project that is driven by wide-eyed optimism. Editing can be a thankless task, involving weeks spent bickering with faceless, pseudonymous people, but devotees put in hours of unpaid labor because of a commitment to a higher cause. It is this commitment that drives many of the regular small-language editors I spoke with. They all feared what would happen if garbage continued to appear on their pages.

Abdulkadir Abdulkadir, a 26-year-old agricultural planner who spoke with me over a crackling phone call from a busy roadside in northern Nigeria, said that he spends three hours every day fiddling with entries in his native Fulfulde, a language used mainly by pastoralists and farmers across the Sahel. “But the work is too much,” he said. 

Abdulkadir sees an urgent need for the Fulfulde Wikipedia to work properly. He has been suggesting it as one of the few online resources for farmers in remote villages, potentially offering information on which seeds or crops might work best for their fields in a language they can understand. If you give them a machine-translated article, Abdulkadir told me, then it could “easily harm them,” as the information will probably not be translated correctly into Fulfulde. 

Google Translate, for instance, says the Fulfulde word for January means June, while ChatGPT says it’s August or September. The programs also suggest the Fulfulde word for “harvest” means “fever” or “well-being,” among other possibilities.  

Abdulkadir said he had recently been forced to correct an article about cowpeas, a foundational cash crop across much of Africa, after discovering that it was largely illegible. 

If someone wants to create pages on the Fulfulde Wikipedia, Abdulkadir said, they should be translated manually. Otherwise, “whoever will read your articles will [not] be able to get even basic knowledge,” he tells these Wikipedians. Nevertheless, he estimates that some 60% of articles are still uncorrected machine translations. Abdulkadir told me that unless something important changes with how AI systems learn and are deployed, then the outlook for Fulfulde looks bleak. “It is going to be terrible, honestly,” he said. “Totally, completely no future.” 

Across the country from Abdulkadir, Lucy Iwuala contributes to Wikipedia in Igbo, a language spoken by several million people in southeastern Nigeria. “The harm has already been done,” she told me, opening the two most recently created articles. Both had been automatically translated via Wikipedia’s Content Translate and contained so many mistakes that she said it would have given her a headache to continue reading them. “There are some terms that have not even been translated. They are still in English,” she pointed out. She recognized the username that had created the pages as a serial offender. “This one even includes letters that are not used in the Igbo language,” she said. 

Iwuala began regularly contributing to Wikipedia three years ago out of concern that Igbo was being displaced by English. It is a worry that is common to many who are active on smaller Wikipedia editions. “This is my culture. This is who I am,” she told me. “That is the essence of it all: to ensure that you are not erased.” 

Iwuala, who now works as a professional translator between English and Igbo, said the users doing the most damage are inexperienced and see AI translations as a way to quickly increase the profile of the Igbo Wikipedia. She often finds herself having to explain at online edit-a-thons she organizes, or over email to various error-prone editors, that the results can be the exact opposite, pushing users away: “You will be discouraged and you will no longer want to visit this place. You will just abandon it and go back to the English Wikipedia.”  

These fears are echoed by Noah Ha‘alilio Solomon, an assistant professor of Hawaiian language at the University of Hawai‘i. He reports that some 35% of words on some pages in the Hawaiian Wikipedia are incomprehensible. “If this is the Hawaiian that is going to exist online, then it will do more harm than anything else,” he says. 

Hawaiian, which was teetering on the verge of extinction several decades ago, has been undergoing a recovery effort led by Indigenous activists and academics. Seeing such poor Hawaiian on such a widely used platform as Wikipedia is upsetting to Ha‘alilio Solomon. 

“It is painful, because it reminds us of all the times that our culture and language has been appropriated,” he says. “We have been fighting tooth and nail in an uphill climb for language revitalization. There is nothing easy about that, and this can add extra impediments. People are going to think that this is an accurate representation of the Hawaiian language.” 

The consequences of all these Wikipedia errors can quickly become clear. AI translators that have undoubtedly ingested these pages in their training data are now assisting in the production, for instance, of error-strewn AI-generated books aimed at learners of languages as diverse as Inuktitut and Cree, Indigenous languages spoken in Canada, and Manx, a small Celtic language spoken on the Isle of Man. Many of these have been popping up for sale on Amazon. “It was just complete nonsense,” says Richard Compton, a linguist at the University of Quebec in Montreal, of a volume he reviewed that had purported to be an introductory phrasebook for Inuktitut. 

Rather than making minority languages more accessible, AI is now creating an ever expanding minefield for students and speakers of those languages to navigate. “It is a slap in the face,” Compton says. He worries that younger generations in Canada, hoping to learn languages in communities that have fought uphill battles against discrimination to pass on their heritage, might turn to online tools such as ChatGPT or phrasebooks on Amazon and simply make matters worse. “It is fraud,” he says.

A race against time

According to UNESCO, a language is declared extinct every two weeks. But whether the Wikimedia Foundation, which runs Wikipedia, has an obligation to the languages used on its platform is an open question. When I spoke to Runa Bhattacharjee, a senior director at the foundation, she said that it was up to the individual communities to make decisions about what content they wanted to exist on their Wikipedia. “Ultimately, the responsibility really lies with the community to see that there is no vandalism or unwanted activity, whether through machine translation or other means,” she said. Usually, Bhattacharjee added, editions were considered for closure only if a specific complaint was raised about them. 

But if there is no active community, how can an edition be fixed or even have a complaint raised? 

Bhattacharjee explained that the Wikimedia Foundation sees its role in such cases as about maintaining the Wikipedia platform in case someone comes along to revive it: “It is the space that we provide for them to grow and develop. That is where we are at.”   

Inari Saami, spoken in a single remote community in northern Finland, is a poster child for how people can take good advantage of Wikipedia. The language was headed toward extinction four decades ago; there were only four children who spoke it. Their parents created the Inari Saami Language Association in a last-ditch bid to keep it going. The efforts worked. There are now several hundred speakers, schools that use Inari Saami as a medium of instruction, and 6,400 Wikipedia articles in the language, each one copy-edited by a fluent speaker. 

This success highlights how Wikipedia can indeed provide small and determined communities with a unique vehicle to promote their languages’ preservation. “We don’t care about quantity. We care about quality,” says Fabrizio Brecciaroli, a member of the Inari Saami Language Association. “We are planning to use Wikipedia as a repository for the written language. We need to provide tools that can be used by the younger generations. It is important for them to be able to use Inari Saami digitally.” 

This has been such a success that Wikipedia has been integrated into the curriculum at the Inari Saami–speaking schools, Brecciaroli adds. He fields phone calls from teachers asking him to write up simple pages on topics from tornadoes to Saami folklore. Wikipedia has even offered a way to introduce words into Inari Saami. “We have to make up new words all the time,” Brecciaroli says. “Young people need them to speak about sports, politics, and video games. If they are unsure how to say something, they now check Wikipedia.”

Wikipedia is a monumental intellectual experiment. What’s happening with Inari Saami suggests that with maximum care, it can work in smaller languages. “The ultimate goal is to make sure that Inari Saami survives,” Brecciaroli says. “It might be a good thing that there isn’t a Google Translate in Inari Saami.” 

That may be true—though large language models like ChatGPT can be made to translate phrases into languages that more traditional machine translation tools do not offer. Brecciaroli told me that ChatGPT isn’t great in Inari Saami but that the quality varies significantly depending on what you ask it to do; if you ask it a question in the language, then the answer will be filled with words from Finnish and even words it invents. But if you ask it something in English, Finnish, or Italian and then ask it to reply in Inari Saami, it will perform better. 

In light of all this, creating as much high-quality content online as can possibly be written becomes a race against time. “ChatGPT only needs a lot of words,” Brecciaroli says. “If we keep putting good material in, then sooner or later, we will get something out. That is the hope.” This is an idea supported by multiple linguists I spoke with—that it may be possible to end the “garbage in, garbage out” cycle. (OpenAI, which operates ChatGPT, did not respond to a request for comment.)

Still, the overall problem is likely to grow and grow, since many languages are not as lucky as Inari Saami—and their AI translators will most likely be trained on more and more AI slop. Wehr, unfortunately, seems far less optimistic about the future of his beloved Greenlandic. 

Since deleting much of the Greenlandic-language Wikipedia, he has spent years trying to recruit speakers to help him revive it. He has appeared in Greenlandic media and made social media appeals. But he hasn’t gotten much of a response; he says it has been demoralizing. 

“There is nobody in Greenland who is interested in this, or who wants to contribute,” he says. “There is completely no point in it, and that is why it should be closed.” 

Late last year, he began a process requesting that the Wikipedia Language Committee shut down the Greenlandic-language edition. Months of bitter debate followed between dozens of Wikipedia bureaucrats; some seemed to be surprised that a superficially healthy-seeming edition could be gripped by so many problems. 

Then, earlier this month, Wehr’s proposal was accepted: Greenlandic Wikipedia is set to be shuttered, and any articles that remain will be moved into the Wikipedia Incubator, where new language editions are tested and built. Among the reasons cited by the Language Committee is the use of AI tools, which have “frequently produced nonsense that could misrepresent the language.”   

Nevertheless, it may be too late—mistakes in Greenlandic already seem to have become embedded in machine translators. If you prompt either Google Translate or ChatGPT to do something as simple as count to 10 in proper Greenlandic, neither program can deliver. 

Jacob Judah is an investigative journalist based in London. 

On the ground in Ukraine’s largest Starlink repair shop

Oleh Kovalskyy thinks that Starlink terminals are built as if someone assembled them with their feet. Or perhaps with their hands behind their back. 

To demonstrate this last image, Kovalskyy—a large, 47-year-old Ukrainian, clad in sweatpants and with tattoos stretching from his wrists up to his neck—leans over to wiggle his fingers in the air behind him, laughing as he does. Components often detach, he says through bleached-white teeth, and they’re sensitive to dust and moisture. “It’s terrible quality. Very terrible.” 

But even if he’s not particularly impressed by the production quality, he won’t dispute how important the satellite internet service has been to his country’s defense. 

Starlink is absolutely critical to Ukraine’s ability to continue in the fight against Russia: It’s how troops in battle zones stay connected with faraway HQs; it’s how many of the drones essential to Ukraine’s survival hit their targets; it’s even how soldiers stay in touch with spouses and children back home. 

At the time of my visit to Kovalskyy in March 2025, however, it had begun to seem like this vital support system may suddenly disappear. Reuters had just broken news that suggested Musk, who was then still deeply enmeshed in Trump world, would remove Ukraine’s access to the service should its government fail to toe the line in US-led peace negotiations. Musk denied the allegations shortly afterward, but given Trump’s fickle foreign policy and inconsistent support of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky, the uncertainty of the technology’s future had become—and remains—impossible to ignore.  

a view down at the back of a volunteer working in a corner workbench. Tools and components are piled on every bit of the surface as well as the shelves in front of him.

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a carboard box stuffed with grey cylinders

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Kovalskyy’s unofficial Starlink repair shop may be the biggest of its kind in the world. Ordered chaos is the best way to describe it.

The stakes couldn’t be higher: Another Reuters report in late July revealed that Musk had ordered the restriction of Starlink in parts of Ukraine during a critical counteroffensive back in 2022. “Ukrainian troops suddenly faced a communications blackout,” the story explains. “Soldiers panicked, drones surveilling Russian forces went dark, and long-range artillery units, reliant on Starlink to aim their fire, struggled to hit targets.”

None of this is lost on Kovalskyy—and for now Starlink access largely comes down to the unofficial community of users and engineers of which Kovalskyy is just one part: Narodnyi Starlink.

The group, whose name translates to “The People’s Starlink,” was created back in March 2022 by a tech-savvy veteran of the previous battles against Russia-backed militias in Ukraine’s east. It started as a Facebook group for the country’s infant yet burgeoning community of Starlink users—a forum to share guidance and swap tips—but it very quickly emerged as a major support system for the new war effort. Today, it has grown to almost 20,000 members, including the unofficial expert “Dr. Starlink”—famous for his creative ways of customizing the systems—and other volunteer engineers like Kovalskyy and his men. It’s a prime example of the many informal, yet highly effective, volunteer networks that have kept Ukraine in the fight, both on and off the front line.

A repaired and mounted Starlink terminal standing on a cobbled road

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a Starlink unit mounted to the roof of a vehicle with pink tinted windows

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Kovalskyy and his crew of eight volunteers have repaired or customized more than 15,000 terminals since the war began in February 2022. Here, they test repaired units in a nearby parking lot.

Kovalskyy gave MIT Technology Review exclusive access to his unofficial Starlink repair workshop in the city of Lviv, about 300 miles west of Kyiv. Ordered chaos is the best way to describe it: Spread across a few small rooms in a nondescript two-story building behind a tile shop, sagging cardboard boxes filled with mud-splattered Starlink casings form alleyways among the rubble of spare parts. Like flying buttresses, green circuit boards seem to prop up the walls, and coils of cable sprout from every crevice.

Those acquainted with the workshop refer to it as the biggest of its kind in Ukraine—and, by extension, maybe the world. Official and unofficial estimates suggest that anywhere from 42,000 to 160,000 Starlink terminals operate in the country. Kovalskyy says he and his crew of eight volunteers have repaired or customized more than 15,000 terminals since the war began.

a surface scattered with pieces of used blue tape of various colors and sizes. Two ziploc bags with small metal parts are also taped up.
The informal, accessible nature of the Narodnyi Starlink community has been critical to its success. One military communications officer was inspired by Kovalskyy to set up his own repair workshop as part of Ukraine’s armed forces, but he says that official processes can be slower than private ones by a factor of 10.
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Despite the pressure, the chance that they may lose access to Starlink was not worrying volunteers like Kovalskyy at the time of my visit; in our conversations, it was clear they had more pressing concerns than the whims of a foreign tech mogul. Russia continues to launch frequent aerial bombardments of Ukrainian cities, sometimes sending more than 500 drones in a single night. The threat of involuntary mobilization to the front line looms on every street corner. How can one plan for a hypothetical future crisis when crisis defines every minute of one’s day?


Almost every inch of every axis of the battlefield in Ukraine is enabled by Starlink. It connects pilots near the trenches with reconnaissance drones soaring kilometers above them. It relays the video feeds from those drones to command centers in rear positions. And it even connects soldiers, via encrypted messaging services, with their family and friends living far from the front.  

Although some soldiers and volunteers, including members of Narodnyi Starlink, refer to Starlink as a luxury, the reality is that it’s an essential utility; without it, Ukrainian forces would need to rely on other, often less effective means of communication. These include wired-line networks, mobile internet, and older geostationary satellite technology—all of which provide connectivity that is either slower, more vulnerable to interference, or more difficult for untrained soldiers to set up. 

“If not for Starlink, we would already be counting rubles in Kyiv,” Kovalskyy says.

close up of a Starlink unit on the lap of a volunteer, who is writing notes in a gridded notebook

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a hand holding pieces of shrapnel

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The workshop’s crew has learned to perform adjustments to terminals, especially in adapting them for battlefield conditions. At right, a volunteer engineer shows the fragments of shrapnel he has extracted from the terminals.

Despite being designed primarily for commercial use, Starlink provides a fantastic battlefield solution. The low-latency, high-bandwidth connection its terminals establish with its constellation of low-Earth-orbit satellites can transmit large streams of data while remaining very difficult for the enemy to jam—in part because the satellites, unlike geostationary ones, are in constant motion. 

It’s also fairly easy to use, so that soldiers with little or no technical knowledge can connect in minutes. And the system costs much less than other military technology; while the US and Polish governments pay business rates for many of Ukraine’s Starlink systems, individual soldiers or military units can purchase the hardware at the private rate of about $500, and subscribe for just $50 per month.

No alternatives match Starlink for cost, ease of use, or coverage—and none will in the near future. Its constellation of 8,000 satellites dwarfs that of its main competitor, a service called OneWeb sold by the French satellite operator Eutelsat, which has only 630 satellites. OneWeb’s hardware costs about 20 times more, and a subscription can run significantly higher, since OneWeb targets business customers. Amazon’s Project Kuiper, the most likely future competitor, started putting satellites in space only this year. 


Volodymyr Stepanets, a 51-year-old Ukrainian self-described “geek,” had been living in Krakow, Poland, with his family when Russia invaded in 2022. But before that, he had volunteered for several years on the front lines of the war against Russian-supported paramilitaries that began in 2014. 

He recalls, in those early months in eastern Ukraine, witnessing troops coordinating an air strike with rulers and a calculator; the whole process took them between 30 and 40 minutes. “All these calculations can be done in one minute,” he says he told them. “All we need is a very stupid computer and very easy software.” (The Ukrainian military declined to comment on this issue.)

Stepanets subsequently committed to helping this brigade, the 72nd, integrate modern technology into its operations. He says that within one year, he had taught them how to use modern communication platforms, positioning devices, and older satellite communication systems that predate Starlink. 

a Starlink terminal with leaves inside the housing, seen lit in silhouette and numbered 5566
Narodnyi Starlink members ask each other for advice about how to adapt the systems: how to camouflage them from marauding Russian drones or resolve glitches in the software, for example.
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So after Russian tanks rolled across the border, Stepanets was quick to see how Starlink’s service could provide an advantage to Ukraine’s armed forces. He also recognized that these units, as well as civilian users, would need support in utilizing the new technology. And that’s how he came up with the idea for Narodnyi Starlink, an open Facebook group he launched on March 21, just a few weeks after the full invasion began and the Ukrainian government requested the activation of Starlink.

Over the past few years, the Narodnyi Starlink digital community has grown to include volunteer engineers, resellers, and military service members interested in the satellite comms service. The group’s members post roughly three times per day, often sharing or asking for advice about adaptations, or seeking volunteers to fix broken equipment. A user called Igor Semenyak recently asked, for example, whether anyone knew how to mask his system from infrared cameras. “How do you protect yourself from heat radiation?” he wrote, to which someone suggested throwing special heat-proof fabric over the terminal.

Its most famous member is probably a man widely considered the brains of the group: Oleg Kutkov, a 36-year-old software engineer otherwise known to some members as “Dr. Starlink.” Kutkov had been privately studying Starlink technology from his home in Kyiv since 2021, having purchased a system to tinker with when service was still unavailable in the country; he believes that he may have been the country’s first Starlink user. Like Stepanets, he saw the immense potential for Starlink after Russia broke traditional communication lines ahead of its attack.

“Our infrastructure was very vulnerable because we did not have a lot of air defense,” says Kutkov, who still works full time as an engineer at the US networking company Ubiquiti’s R&D center in Kyiv. “Starlink quickly became a crucial part of our survival.”

Stepanets contacted Kutkov after coming across his popular Twitter feed and blog, which had been attracting a lot of attention as early Starlink users sought help. Kutkov still publishes the results of his own research there—experiments he performs in his spare time, sometimes staying up until 3 a.m. to complete them. In May, for example, he published a blog post explaining how users can physically move a user account from one terminal to another when the printed circuit board in one is “so severely damaged that repair is impossible or impractical.” 

“Oleg Kutkov is the coolest engineer I’ve met in my entire life,” Kovalskyy says.

a volunteer holding a Starlink vertically to pry it open

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two volunteers at workbenches repairing terminals

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When the fighting is at its worst, the workshop may receive 500 terminals to repair every month. The crew lives and sometimes even sleeps there.

Supported by Kutkov’s technical expertise and Stepanets’s organizational prowess, Kovalskyy’s warehouse became the major repair hub (though other volunteers also make repairs elsewhere). Over time, Kovalskyy—who co-owned a regional internet service provider before the war—and his crew have learned to perform adjustments to Starlink terminals, especially to adapt them for battlefield conditions. For example, they modified them to receive charge at the right voltage directly from vehicles, years before Starlink released a proprietary car adapter. They’ve also switched out Starlink’s proprietary SPX plugs—which Kovalskyy criticized as vulnerable to moisture and temperature changes—with standard ethernet ports. 

Together, the three civilians—Kutkov, Stepanets, and Kovalskyy—effectively lead Narodnyi Starlink. Along with several other members who wished to remain anonymous, they hold meetings every Monday over Zoom to discuss their activities, including recent Starlink-related developments on the battlefield, as well as information security. 

While the public group served as a suitable means of disseminating information in the early stages of the war when speed was critical, they have had to move a lot of their communications to private channels after discovering Russian surveillance; Stepanets says that at least as early as 2024, Russians had translated a 300-page educational document they had produced and shared online. Now, as administrators of the Facebook group, the three men block the publication of any posts deemed to reveal information that might be useful to Russian forces. 

Stepanets believes the threat extends beyond the group’s intel to its members’ physical safety. When we talked, he brought up the attempted assassination of the Ukrainian activist and volunteer Serhii Sternenko in May this year. Although Sternenko was unaffiliated with Narodnyi Starlink, the event served as a clear reminder of the risks even civilian volunteers undertake in wartime Ukraine. “The Russian FSB and other [security] services still understand the importance of participation in initiatives like [Narodnyi Starlink],” Stepanets says. He stresses that the group is not an organization with a centralized chain of command, but a community that would continue operating if any of its members were no longer able to perform their roles. 

closeup of a Starlink board with light shining through the holes
“We have extremely professional engineers who are extremely intelligent,” Kovalskyy told me. “Repairing Starlink terminals for them is like shooting ducks with HIMARS [a vehicle-borne GPS-guided rocket launcher].”
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The informal, accessible nature of this community has been critical to its success. Operating outside official structures has allowed Narodnyi Starlink to function much more efficiently than state channels. Yuri Krylach, a military communications officer who was inspired by Kovalskyy to set up his own repair workshop as part of Ukraine’s armed forces, says that official processes can be slower than private ones by a factor of 10; his own team’s work is often interrupted by other tasks that commanders deem more urgent, whereas members of the Narodnyi Starlink community can respond to requests quickly and directly. (The military declined to comment on this issue, or on any military connections with Narodnyi Starlink.)


Most of the Narodnyi Starlink members I spoke to, including active-duty soldiers, were unconcerned about the report that Musk might withdraw access to the service in Ukraine. They pointed out that doing so would involve terminating state contracts, including those with the US Department of Defense and Poland’s Ministry of Digitalization. Losing contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars (the Polish government claims to pay $50 million per year in subscription fees), on top of the private subscriptions, would cost the company a significant amount of revenue. “I don’t really think that Musk would cut this money supply,” Kutkov says. “It would be quite stupid.” Oleksandr Dolynyak, an officer in the 103rd Separate Territorial Defense Brigade and a Narodnyi Starlink member since 2022, says: “As long as it is profitable for him, Starlink will work for us.”

Stepanets does believe, however, that Musk’s threats exposed an overreliance on the technology that few had properly considered. “Starlink has really become one of the powerful tools of defense of Ukraine,” he wrote in a March Facebook post entitled “Irreversible Starlink hegemony,” accompanied by an image of the evil Darth Sidious from Star Wars. “Now, the issue of the country’s dependence on the decisions of certain eccentric individuals … has reached [a] melting point.”

Even if telecommunications experts both inside and outside the military agree that Starlink has no direct substitute, Stepanets believes that Ukraine needs to diversify its portfolio of satellite communication tools anyway, integrating additional high-speed satellite communication services like OneWeb. This would relieve some of the pressure caused by Musk’s erratic, unpredictable personality and, he believes, give Ukraine some sense of control over its wartime communications. (SpaceX did not respond to a request for comment.) 

The Ukrainian military seems to agree with this notion. In late March, at a closed-door event in Kyiv, the country’s then-deputy minister of defense Kateryna Chernohorenko announced the formation of a special Space Policy Directorate “to consolidate internal and external capabilities to advance Ukraine’s military space sector.” The announcement referred to the creation of a domestic “satellite constellation,” which suggests that reliance on foreign services like Starlink had been a catalyst. “Ukraine needs to transition from the role of consumer to that of a full-fledged player in the space sector,” a government blog post stated. (Chernohorenko did not respond to a request for comment.)

Ukraine isn’t alone in this quandary. Recent discussions about a potential Starlink deal with the Italian government, for example, have stalled as a result of Musk’s behavior. And as Juliana Süss, an associate fellow at the UK’s Royal United Services Institute, points out, Taiwan chose SpaceX’s competitor Eutelsat when it sought a satellite communications partner in 2023.

“I think we always knew that SpaceX is not always the most reliable partner,” says Süss, who also hosts RUSI’s War in Space podcast, citing Musk’s controversial comments about the country’s status. “The Taiwan problems are a good example for how the rest of the world might be feeling about this.”

Nevertheless, Ukraine is about to become even more deeply enmeshed with Starlink; the country’s leading mobile operator Kyivstar announced in July that Ukraine will soon become the first European nation to offer Starlink direct-to-mobile services. Süss is cautious about placing too much emphasis on this development though. “This step does increase dependency,” she says. “But that dependency is already there.” Adding an additional channel of communications as a possible backup is otherwise a logical action for a country at war, she says.


These issues can feel far away for the many Ukrainians who are just trying to make it through to the next day. Despite its location in the far west of Ukraine, Lviv, home to Kovalskyy’s shop, is still frequently hit by Russian kamikaze drones, and local military-affiliated sites are popular targets. 

Still, during our time together, Kovalskyy was far more worried by the prospect of his team’s possible mobilization. In March, the Ministry of Defense had removed the special status that had otherwise protected his people from involuntary conscription given the nature of their volunteer activities. They’re now at risk of being essentially picked up off the street by Ukraine’s dreaded military recruitment teams, known as the TCK, whenever they leave the house.

A room with walls covered by a grid of patches and Ukrainian flags, and stacks of grey boxes on the floor
The repair shop displays patches from many different Ukrainian military units—each given as a gift for their services. “We sometimes perform miracles with Starlinks,” Kovalskyy said.
COURTESY OF THE AUTHOR

This is true even though there’s so much demand for the workshop’s services that during my visit, Kovalskyy expressed frustration at the vast amount of time they’ve had to dedicate solely to basic repairs. “We have extremely professional engineers who are extremely intelligent,” he told me. “Repairing Starlink terminals for them is like shooting ducks with HIMARS [a vehicle-borne GPS-guided rocket launcher].” 

At least the situation seemed to have become better on the front over the winter, Kovalskyy added, handing me a Starlink antenna whose flat, white surface had been ripped open by shrapnel. When the fighting is at its worst, the team might receive 500 terminals to repair every month, and the crew lives in the workshop, sometimes even sleeping there. But at that moment in time, it was receiving only a couple of hundred.

We ended our morning at the workshop by browsing its vast collection of varied military patches, pinned to the wall on large pieces of Velcro. Each had been given as a gift by a different unit as thanks for the services of Kovalskyy and his team, an indication of the diversity and size of Ukraine’s military: almost 1 million soldiers protecting a 600-mile front line. At the same time, it’s a physical reminder that they almost all rely on a single technology with just a few production factories located on another continent nearly 6,000 miles away.

“We sometimes perform miracles with Starlinks,” Kovalskyy says. 

He and his crew can only hope that they will still be able to for the foreseeable future—or, better yet, that they won’t need to at all.  

Charlie Metcalfe is a British journalist. He writes for magazines and newspapers including Wired, the Guardian, and MIT Technology Review.

How churches use data and AI as engines of surveillance

On a Sunday morning in a Midwestern megachurch, worshippers step through sliding glass doors into a bustling lobby—unaware they’ve just passed through a gauntlet of biometric surveillance. High-speed cameras snap multiple face “probes” per second, isolating eyes, noses, and mouths before passing the results to a local neural network that distills these images into digital fingerprints. Before people find their seats, they are matched against an on-premises database—tagged with names, membership tiers, and watch-list flags—that’s stored behind the church’s firewall.

Late one afternoon, a woman scrolls on her phone as she walks home from work. Unbeknownst to her, a complex algorithm has stitched together her social profiles, her private health records, and local veteran outreach lists. It flags her for past military service, chronic pain, opioid dependence, and high Christian belief, and then delivers an ad to her Facebook feed: “Struggling with pain? You’re not alone. Join us this Sunday.”

These hypothetical scenes reflect real capabilities increasingly woven into places of worship nationwide, where spiritual care and surveillance converge in ways few congregants ever realize. Where Big Tech’s rationalist ethos and evangelical spirituality once mixed like oil and holy water, this unlikely amalgam has given birth to an infrastructure already reshaping the theology of trust—and redrawing the contours of community and pastoral power in modern spiritual life.

An ecumenical tech ecosystem

The emerging nerve center of this faith-tech nexus is in Boulder, Colorado, where the spiritual data and analytics firm Gloo has its headquarters.

Gloo captures congregants across thousands of data points that make up a far richer portrait than any snapshot. From there, the company is constructing a digital infrastructure meant to bring churches into the age of algorithmic insight.

The church is “a highly fragmented market that is one of the largest yet to fully adopt digital technology,” the company said in a statement by email. “While churches have a variety of goals to achieve their mission, they use Gloo to help them connect, engage with, and know their people on a deeper level.” 


Gloo was founded in 2013 by Scott and Theresa Beck. From the late 1980s through the 2000s, Scott was turning Blockbuster into a 3,500-store chain, taking Boston Market public, and founding Einstein Bros. Bagels before going on to seed and guide startups like Ancestry.com and HomeAdvisor. Theresa, an artist, has built a reputation creating collaborative, eco-minded workshops across Colorado and beyond. Together, they have recast pastoral care as a problem of predictive analytics and sold thousands of churches on the idea that spiritual health can be managed like customer engagement.

Think of Gloo as something like Salesforce but for churches: a behavioral analytics platform, powered by church-­generated insights, psychographic information, and third-party consumer data. The company prefers to refer to itself as “a technology platform for the faith ecosystem.” Either way, this information is integrated into its “State of Your Church” dashboard—an interface for the modern pulpit. The result is a kind of digital clairvoyance: a crystal ball for knowing whom to check on, whom to comfort, and when to act.

Thousands of churches have been sold on the idea that spiritual health can be managed like customer engagement.

Gloo ingests every one of the digital breadcrumbs a congregant leaves—how often you attend church, how much money you donate, which church groups you sign up for, which keywords you use in your online prayer requests—and then layers on third-party data (census demographics, consumer habits, even indicators for credit and health risks). Behind the scenes, it scores and segments people and groups—flagging who is most at risk of drifting, primed for donation appeals, or in need of pastoral care. On that basis, it auto-triggers tailored outreach via text, email, or in-app chat. All the results stream into the single dashboard, which lets pastors spot trends, test messaging, and forecast giving and attendance. Essentially, the system treats spiritual engagement like a marketing funnel.

Since its launch in 2013, Gloo has steadily increased its footprint, and it has started to become the connective tissue for the country’s fragmented religious landscape. According to the Hartford Institute for Religion Research, the US is home to around 370,000 distinct congregations. As of early 2025, according to figures provided by the company, Gloo held contracts with more than 100,000 churches and ministry leaders.

In 2024, the company secured a $110 million strategic investment, backed by “mission-aligned” investors ranging from a child-development NGO to a denominational finance group. That cemented its evolution from basic church services vendor to faith-tech juggernaut. 

It started snapping up and investing in a constellation of ministry tools—everything from automated sermon distribution to real-time giving and attendance analytics, AI-driven chatbots, and leadership content libraries. By layering these capabilities onto its core platform, the company has created a one-stop shop for churches that combines back-office services with member-engagement apps and psychographic insights to fully realize that unified “faith ecosystem.” 

And just this year, two major developments brought this strategy into sharper focus.

In March 2025, Gloo announced that former Intel CEO Pat Gelsinger—who has served as its chairman of the board since 2018—would assume an expanded role as executive chair and head of technology. Gelsinger, whom the company describes as “a great long-term investor and partner,” is a technologist whose fingerprints are on Intel’s and VMware’s biggest innovations.

(It is worth noting that Intel shareholders have filed a lawsuit against Gelsinger and CFO David Zinsner seeking to claw back roughly $207 million in compensation to Gelsinger, alleging that between 2021 and 2023, he repeatedly misled investors about the health of Intel Foundry Services.)

The same week Gloo announced Gelsinger’s new role, it unveiled a strategic investment in Barna Group, the Texas-based research firm whose four decades of surveying more than 2 million self-identified Christians underpin its annual reports on worship, beliefs, and cultural engagement. Barna’s proprietary database—covering every region, age cohort, and denomination—has made it the go-to insight engine for pastors, seminaries, and media tracking the pulse of American faith.

“We’ve been acquiring about a company a month into the Gloo family, and we expect that to continue,” Gelsinger told MIT Technology Review in June. “I’ve got three meetings this week on different deals we’re looking at.” (A Gloo spokesperson declined to confirm the pace of acquisitions, stating only that as of April 30, 2025, the company had fully acquired or taken majority ownership in 15 “mission-aligned companies.”)

“The idea is, the more of those we can bring in, the better we can apply the platform,” Gelsinger said. “We’re already working with companies with decades of experience, but without the scale, the technology, or the distribution we can now provide.”

hands putting their phones in a collection plate

MICHAEL BYERS

In particular, Barna’s troves of behavioral, spiritual, and cultural data offer granular insight into the behaviors, beliefs, and anxieties of faith communities. While the two organizations frame the collaboration in terms of serving church leaders, the mechanics resemble a data-fusion engine of impressive scale: Barna supplies the psychological texture, and Gloo provides the digital infrastructure to segment, score, and deploy the information.

In a promotional video from 2020 that is no longer available online, Gloo claimed to provide “the world’s first big-data platform centered around personal growth,” promising pastors a 360-degree view of congregants, including flags for substance use or mental-health struggles. Or, as the video put it, “Maximize your capacity to change lives by leveraging insights from big data, understand the people you want to serve, reach them earlier, and turn their needs into a journey toward growth.”

Gloo is also now focused on supercharging its services with artificial intelligence and using these insights to transcend market research. The company aims to craft AI models that aren’t just trained on theology but anticipate the moments when people’s faith—and faith leaders’ outreach—matters most. At a September 2024 event in Boulder called the AI & the Church Hackathon, Gloo unveiled new AI tools called Data Engine, a content management system with built-in digital-rights safeguards, and Aspen, an early prototype of its “spiritually safe” chatbot, along with the faith-tuned language model powering that chatbot, known internally as CALLM (for “Christian-Aligned Large Language Model”). 

More recently, the company released what it calls “Flourishing AI Standards,” which score large language models on their alignment with seven dimensions of well-­being: relationships, meaning, happiness, character, finances, health, and spirituality. Co-developed with Barna Group and Harvard’s Human Flourishing Program, the benchmark draws on a thousand-plus-item test bank and the Global Flourishing Study, a $40 million, 22-nation project being carried out by the Harvard program, Baylor University’s Institute for Studies of Religion, Gallup, and the Center for Open Science.

Gelsinger calls the study “one of the most significant bodies of work around this question of values in decades.” It’s not yet clear how collecting information of this kind at such scale could ultimately affect the boundary between spiritual care and data commerce. One thing is certain, though: A rich vein of donation and funding could be at stake.

“Money’s already being spent here,” he said. “Donated capital in the US through the church is around $300 billion. Another couple hundred billion beyond that doesn’t go through the church. A lot of donors have capital out there, and we’re a generous nation in that regard. If you put the flourishing-­related economics on the table, now we’re talking about $1 trillion. That’s significant economic capacity. And if we make that capacity more efficient, that’s big.” In secular terms, it’s a customer data life cycle. In faith tech, it could be a conversion funnel—one designed not only to save souls, but to shape them. 

One of Gloo’s most visible partnerships was between 2022 and 2023 with the nonprofit He Gets Us, which ran a billion-dollar media campaign aimed at rebranding Jesus for a modern audience. The project underlined that while Gloo presents its services as tools for connection and support, their core functionality involves collecting and analyzing large amounts of congregational data. When viewers who saw the ads on social media or YouTube clicked through, they landed on prayer request forms, quizzes, and church match tools, all designed to gather personal details. Gloo then layered this raw data over Barna’s decades of behavioral research, turning simple inputs—email, location, stated interests—into what the company presented as multidimensional spiritual profiles. The final product offered a level of granularity no single congregation could achieve on its own.  

Though Gloo still lists He Gets Us on its platform, the nonprofit Come Near, which has since taken over the campaign, says it has terminated Gloo’s involvement. Still, He Gets Us led to one of Gloo’s most prized relationships by sparking interest from the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, a 229-year-old denomination with deep historical roots in the abolitionist and civil rights movements. In 2023, the church formalized a partnership with Gloo, and in late 2024 it announced that all 1,600 of its US congregations—representing roughly 1.5 million members—would begin using the company’s State of Your Church dashboard

In a 2024 press release issued by Gloo, AME Zion acknowledged that while the denomination had long tracked traditional metrics like membership growth, Sunday turnout, and financial giving, it had limited visibility into the deeper health of its communities.

“Until now, we’ve lacked the insight to understand how church culture, people, and congregations are truly doing,” said the Reverend J. Elvin Sadler, the denomination’s general secretary-auditor. “The State of Your Church dashboards will give us a better sense of the spirit and language of the culture (ethos), and powerful new tools to put in the hands of every pastor.”

The rollout marked the first time a major US denomination had deployed Gloo’s framework at scale. For Gloo, the partnership unlocked a real-time, longitudinal data stream from a nationwide religious network, something the company had never had before. It not only validated Gloo’s vision of data-driven ministry but also positioned AME Zion as what the company hopes will be a live test case, persuading other denominations to follow suit.

The digital supply chain

The digital infrastructure of modern churches often begins with intimacy: a prayer request, a small-group sign-up, a livestream viewed in a moment of loneliness. But beneath these pastoral touchpoints lies a sophisticated pipeline that increasingly mirrors the attention-economy engines of Silicon Valley.

Charles Kriel, a filmmaker who formerly served as a special advisor to the UK Parliament on disinformation, data, and addictive technology, has particular insight into that connection. Kriel has been working for over a decade on issues related to preserving democracy and countering digital surveillance. He helped write the UK’s Online Safety Act, joining forces with many collaborators, including the Nobel Peace Prize–­winning journalist Maria Ressa and former UK tech minister Damian Collins, in an attempt to rein in Big Tech in the late 2010s.

His 2020 documentary film, People You May Know, investigated how data firms like Gloo and their partners harvest intimate personal information from churchgoers to build psychographic profiles, highlighting how this sensitive data is commodified and raising questions about its potential downstream uses.

“Listen, any church with an app? They probably didn’t build that. It’s white label,” Kriel says, referring to services produced by one company and rebranded by another. “And the people who sold it to them are collecting data.”

Many churches now operate within a layered digital environment, where first-party data collected inside the church is combined with third-party consumer data and psychographic segmentation before being fed into predictive systems. These systems may suggest sermons people might want to view online, match members with small groups, or trigger outreach when engagement drops. 


In some cases, monitoring can even take the form of biometric surveillance.

In 2014, an Israeli security-tech veteran named Moshe Greenshpan brought airport-grade facial recognition into church entryways. Face-Six, the surveillance suite from the company he founded in 2012, already protected banks and hospitals; its most provocative offshoot, FA6 Events (also known as “Churchix”), repurposes this technology for places of worship.

Greenshpan claims he didn’t originally set out to sell to churches. But over time, as he became increasingly aware of the market, he built FA6 Events as a bespoke solution for them. Today, Greenshpan says, it’s in use at over 200 churches worldwide, nearly half of them in the US.

In practice, FA6 transforms every entryway into a biometric checkpoint: an instant headcount, a security sweep, and a digital ledger of attendance, all incorporated into the familiar routine of Sunday worship. 

When someone steps into an FA6-equipped place of worship, a discreet camera mounted at eye level springs to life. Behind the scenes, each captured image is run through a lightning-fast face detector that looks at the whole face. The subject’s cropped face is then aligned, resized, and rotated so the eyes sit on a perfect horizontal line before being fed into a compact neural network. 

“To the best of my knowledge, no church notifies its congregants that it’s using facial recognition.”

Moshe Greenshpan, Israeli security-tech veteran

This onboard neural network quickly captures the features of a person’s face in a unique digital signature called an embedding, allowing for quick identification. These embeddings are compared with thousands of others that are already in the church’s local database, each one tagged with data points like a name, a membership role, or even a flag designating inclusion in an internal watch list. If the match is strong enough, the system makes an identification and records the person’s presence on the church’s secure server.

A congregation can pull full attendance logs, time-stamped entry records, and—critically—alerts whenever someone on a watch list walks through the doors. In this context, a watch list is simply a roster of photos, and sometimes names, of individuals a church has been asked (or elected) to screen out: past disruptors, those subject to trespass or restraining orders, even registered sex offenders. Once that list is uploaded into Churchix, the system instantly flags any match on arrival, pinging security teams or usher staff in real time. Some churches lean on it to spot longtime members who’ve slipped off the radar and trigger pastoral check-ins; others use it as a hard barrier, automatically denying entry to anyone on their locally maintained list.

None of this data is sent to the cloud; Greenshpan says the company is actively working on a cloud-based application. Instead, all face templates and logs are stored locally on church-owned hardware, encrypted so they can’t be read if someone gains unauthorized access. 

Churches can export data from Churchix, he says, but the underlying facial templates remain on premises. 

Still, Greenshpan admits, robust technical safeguards do not equal transparency.

“To the best of my knowledge,” he says, “no church notifies its congregants that it’s using facial recognition.”


If the tools sound invasive, the logic behind them is simple: The more the system knows about you, the more precisely it can intervene.

“Every new member of the community within a 20-mile radius—whatever area you choose—we’ll send them a flier inviting them to your church,” Gloo’s Gelsinger says. 

It’s a tech-powered revival of the casserole ministry. The system pings the church when someone new moves in—“so someone can drop off cookies or lasagna when there’s a newborn in the neighborhood,” he says. “Or just say ‘Hey, welcome. We’re here.’”

Gloo’s back end automates follow-up, too: As soon as a pastor steps down from the pulpit after delivering a sermon, it can be translated into five languages, broken into snippets for small-group study, and repackaged into a draft discussion guide—ready within the hour.

Gelsinger sees the same approach extending to addiction recovery ministries. “We can connect other databases to help churches with recovery centers reach people more effectively,” he says. 

But the data doesn’t stay within the congregation. It flows through customer relationship management (CRM) systems, application programming interfaces, cloud servers, vendor partnerships, and analytics firms. Some of it is used internally in efforts to increase engagement; the rest is repackaged as “insights” and resold to the wider faith-tech marketplace—and sometimes even to networks that target political ads.

“We measured prayer requests. Call it crazy. But it was like, ‘We’re sitting on mounds of information that could help us steward our people.’”

Matt Engel, Gloo

 “There is a very specific thing that happens when churches become clients of Gloo,” says Brent Allpress, an academic based in Melbourne, Australia, who was a key researcher on People You May Know. Gloo gets access to the client church’s databases, he says, and the church “is strongly encouraged to share that data. And Gloo has a mechanism to just hoover that data straight up into their silo.” 

This process doesn’t happen automatically; the church must opt in by pushing those files or connecting its church-management software system’s database to Gloo via API. Once it’s uploaded, however, all that first-party information lands in Gloo’s analytics engine, ready to be processed and shared with any downstream tools or partners covered by the church’s initial consent to the terms and conditions of its contract with the company.

“There are religious leaders at the mid and local level who think the use of data is good. They’re using data to identify people in need. Addicts, the grieving,” says Kriel. “And then you have tech people running around misquoting the Bible as justification for their data harvest.” 

Matt Engel, who held the title executive director of ministry innovation at Gloo when Kriel’s film was made, acknowledged the extent of this harvest in the opening scene.  

“We measured prayer requests. Call it crazy. But it was like, ‘We’re sitting on mounds of information that could help us steward our people,’” he said in an on-camera interview. 

According to Engel—whom Gloo would not make available for public comment—uploading data from anonymous prayer requests to the cloud was Gloo’s first use case.

Powering third-party initiatives

But Gloo’s data infrastructure doesn’t end with its own platform; it also powers third-party initiatives.

Communio, a Christian nonprofit focused on marriage and family, used Gloo’s data infrastructure in order to launch “Communio Insights,” a stripped-down version of Gloo’s full analytics platform. 

Unlike Gloo Insights, which provides access to hundreds of demographic, behavioral, health, and psychographic filters, Communio Insights focuses narrowly on relational metrics—indicators of marriage and family stress, involvement in small groups at church—and basic demographic data. 

At the heart of its playbook is a simple, if jarring, analogy.

“If you sell consumer products of different sorts, you’re trying to figure out good ways to market that. And there’s no better product, really, than the gospel,” J.P. De Gance, the founder and president of Communio, said in People You May Know.

Communio taps Gloo’s analytics engine—leveraging credit histories, purchasing behavior, public voter rolls, and the database compiled by i360, an analytics company linked to the conservative Koch network—to pinpoint unchurched couples in key regions who are at risk of relationship strain. It then runs microtargeted outreach (using direct mail, text messaging, email, and Facebook Custom Audiences, a tool that lets organizations find and target people who have interacted with them), collecting contact info and survey responses from those who engage. All responses funnel back into Gloo’s platform, where churches monitor attendance, small-group participation, baptisms, and donations to evaluate the campaign’s impact.

church window over the parishioners has rays of light emanating from a stained glass eye

MICHAEL BYERS

Investigative research by Allpress reveals significant concerns around these operations.  

In 2015, two nonprofits—the Relationship Enrichment Collaborative (REC), staffed by former Gloo executives, and its successor, the Culture of Freedom Initiative (now Communio), controlled by the Koch-affiliated nonprofit Philanthropy Roundtable—funded the development of the original Insights platform. Between 2015 and 2017, REC paid approximately $1.3 million to Gloo and $535,000 to Cambridge Analytica, the consulting firm notorious for harvesting Facebook users’ personal data and using it for political targeting before the 2016 election, to build and refine psychographic models and a bespoke digital ministry app powering Gloo’s outreach tools. Following REC’s closure, the Culture of Freedom Initiative invested another $375,000 in Gloo and $128,225 in Cambridge Analytica. 

REC’s own 2016 IRS filing describes the work in terse detail: “Provide[d] digital micro-targeted marketing for churches and non-profit champions … using predictive modeling and centralized data analytics we help send the right message to the right couple at the right time based upon their desires and behaviors.”

On top of all this documented research, Allpress exposed another critical issue: the explicit use of sensitive health-care data. 

He found that Gloo Insights combines over 2,000 data points—drawing on everything from nationwide credit and purchasing histories to church management records and Christian psychographic surveys—with filters that make it possible to identify people with health issues such as depression, anxiety, and grief. The result: Facebook Custom Audiences built to zero in on vulnerable individuals via targeted ads.

These ads invite people suffering from mental-health conditions into church counseling groups “as a pathway to conversion,” Allpress says.

These targeted outreach efforts were piloted in cities including Phoenix, Arizona; Dayton, Ohio; and Jacksonville, Florida. Reportedly, as many as 80% of those contacted responded positively, with those who joined a church as new members contributing financially at above-­average rates. In short, Allpress found that pastoral tools had covertly exploited mental-health vulnerabilities and relationship crises for outreach that blurred the lines separating pastoral care, commerce, and implicit political objectives.

The legal and ethical vacuum

Developers of this technology earnestly claim that the systems are designed to enhance care, not exploit people’s need for it. They’re described as ways to tailor support to individual needs, improve follow-up, and help churches provide timely resources. But experts say that without robust data governance or transparency around how sensitive information is used and retained, well-­intentioned pastoral technology could slide into surveillance.

In practice, these systems have already been used to surveil and segment congregations. Internal demos and client testimonials confirm that Gloo, for example, uses “grief” as an explicit data point: Churches run campaigns aimed at people flagged for recent bereavement, depression, or anxiety, funneling them into support groups and identifying them for pastoral check-ins. 

Examining Gloo’s terms and conditions reveals further security and transparency concerns. From nearly a dozen documents, ranging from “click-through” terms for interactive services to master service agreements at the enterprise level, Gloo stitches together a remarkably consistent data-­governance framework. Limits are imposed on any legal action by individual congregants, for example. The click-through agreement corrals users into binding arbitration, bars any class action suits or jury trials, and locks all disputes into New York or Colorado courts, where arbitration is particularly favored over traditional litigation. Meanwhile, its privacy statement carves out broad exceptions for service providers, data-­enrichment partners, and advertising affiliates, giving them carte blanche to use congregants’ data as they see fit. Crucially, Gloo expressly reserves the right to ingest “health and wellness information” provided via wellness assessments or when mental-health keywords appear in prayer requests. This is a highly sensitive category of information that, for health apps, is normally covered by stringent medical-privacy rules like HIPAA.

In other words, Gloo is protected by sprawling legal scaffolding, while churches and individual users give up nearly every right to litigate, question data practices, or take collective action. 

“We’re kind of in the Wild West in terms of the law,” says Adam Schwartz, the director of privacy litigation at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the nonprofit watchdog that has spent years wrestling tech giants over data abuses and biometric overreach. 

In the United States, biometric surveillance like that used by growing numbers of churches inhabits a legal twilight zone where regulation is thin, patchy, and often toothless. Schwartz points to Illinois as a rare exception for its Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), one of the nation’s strongest such laws. The statute applies to any organization that captures biometric identifiers—including retina or iris scans, fingerprints, voiceprints, hand scans, facial geometry, DNA, and other unique biological information. It requires entities to post clear data-collection policies, obtain explicit written consent, and limit how long such data is retained. Failure to comply can expose organizations to class action lawsuits and steep statutory damages—up to $5,000 per violation.

But beyond Illinois, protections quickly erode. Though Texas and Washington also have biometric privacy statutes, their bark is stronger than their bite. Efforts to replicate Illinois’s robust protections have been made in over a dozen states—but none have passed. As a result, in much of the country, any checks on biometric surveillance depend more on voluntary transparency and goodwill than any clear legal boundary.

“There is a real potential for information gathered about a person [to] be used against them in their life outside the church.”

Emily Tucker, Center on Privacy & Technology at Georgetown Law

That’s especially problematic in the church context, says Emily Tucker, executive director of the Center on Privacy & Technology at Georgetown Law, who attended divinity school before becoming a legal scholar. “The necessity of privacy for the possibility of finding personal relationship to the divine—for engaging in rituals of worship, for prayer and penitence, for contemplation and spiritual struggle—is a fundamental principle across almost every religious tradition,” she says. “Imposing a surveillance architecture over the faith community interferes radically with the possibility of that privacy, which is necessary for the creation of sacred space.”

Tucker researches the intersection of surveillance, civil rights, and marginalized communities. She warns that the personal data being collected through faith-tech platforms is far from secure: “Because corporate data practices are so poorly regulated in this country, there are very few limitations on what companies that take your data can subsequently do with it.”

To Tucker, the risks of these platforms outweigh the rewards—especially when biometrics and data collected in a sacred setting could follow people into their daily lives. “Many religious institutions are extremely large and often perform many functions in a given community besides providing a space for worship,” she says. “Many churches, for example, are also employers or providers of social services. There is a real potential for information gathered about a person in their associational activities as a member of a church to then be used against them in their life outside the church.”  

She points to government dragnet surveillance, the use of IRS data in immigration enforcement, and the vulnerability of undocumented congregants as examples of how faith-tech data could be weaponized beyond its intended use: “Religious institutions are putting the safety of those members at risk by adopting this kind of surveillance technology, which exposes so much personal information to potential abuse and misuse.” 

Schwartz, too, says that any perceived benefits must be weighed carefully against the potential harms, especially when sensitive data and vulnerable communities are involved.

“Churches: Before doing this, you ought to consider the downside, because it can hurt your congregants,” he says.  

With guardrails still scarce, though, faith-tech pioneers and church leaders are peering ever more deeply into congregants’ lives. Until meaningful oversight arrives, the faithful remain exposed to a gaze they never fully invited and scarcely understand.

In April, Gelsinger took the stage at a sold-out Missional AI Summit, a flagship event for Christian technologists that this year was organized around the theme “AI Collision: Shaping the Future Together.” Over 500 pastors, engineers, ethicists, and AI developers filled the hall, flashing badges with logos from Google DeepMind, Meta, McKinsey, and Gloo.

“We want to be part of a broader community … so that we’re influential in creating flourishing AI, technology as a force for good, AI that truly embeds the values that we care about,” Gelsinger said at the summit. He likened such tools to pivotal technologies in Christian history: the Roman roads that carried the gospel across the empire, or Martin Luther’s printing press, which shattered monolithic control over scripture. A Gloo spokesperson later confirmed that one of the company’s goals is to shape AI specifically to “contribute to the flourishing of people.”

“We’re going to see AI become just like the internet,” Gelsinger said. “Every single interaction will be infused with AI capabilities.” 

He says Gloo is already mining data across the spectrum of human experience to fuel ever more powerful tools.

“With AI, computers adapt to us. We talk to them; they hear us; they see us for the first time,” he said. “And now they are becoming a user interface that fits with humanity.”

Whether these technologies ultimately deepen pastoral care or erode personal privacy may hinge on decisions made today about transparency, consent, and accountability. Yet the pace of adoption already outstrips the development of ethical guardrails. Now, one of the questions lingering in the air is not whether AI, facial recognition, and other emerging technologies can serve the church, but how deeply they can be woven into its nervous system to form a new OS for modern Christianity and moral infrastructure. 

“It’s like standing on the beach watching a tsunami in slow motion,” Kriel says. 

Gelsinger sees it differently.  

“You and I both need to come to the same position, like Isaiah did,” he told the crowd at the Missional AI Summit. “‘Here am I, Lord. Send me.’ Send me, send us, that we can be shaping technology as a force for good, that we could grab this moment in time.” 

Alex Ashley is a journalist whose reporting has appeared in Rolling Stone, the Atlantic, NPR, and other national outlets.

Taiwan’s “silicon shield” could be weakening

One winter afternoon in a conference room in Taipei, a pair of twentysomething women dragged their friend across the floor. Lying on the ground in checkered pants and a brown sweatshirt, she was pretending to be either injured or dead. One friend picked her up by her arms, the other grabbed hold of her legs, and they managed to move her, despite momentarily breaking character to laugh at the awkwardness of the exercise. The three women had paid approximately $40 to spend their Sunday here, undergoing basic training to prepare for a possibility every Taiwanese citizen has an opinion about: Will China invade? 

Taiwanese politics increasingly revolves around that question. China’s ruling party has wanted to seize Taiwan for more than half a century. But in recent years, China’s leader, Xi Jinping, has placed greater emphasis on the idea of “taking back” the island (which the Chinese Communist Party, or CCP, has never controlled). As China’s economic and military might has grown, some analysts believe the country now has the capacity to quarantine Taiwan whenever it wants, making the decision a calculation of costs and benefits.

Many in Taiwan and elsewhere think one major deterrent has to do with the island’s critical role in semiconductor manufacturing. Taiwan produces the majority of the world’s semiconductors and more than 90% of the most advanced chips needed for AI applications. Bloomberg Economics estimates that a blockade would cost the global economy, including China, $5 trillion in the first year alone.

“The international community must certainly do everything in its power to avoid a conflict in the Taiwan Strait; there is too great a cost.”

Lai Ching-te, Taiwanese president

The island, which is approximately the size of Maryland, owes its remarkably disproportionate chip dominance to the inventiveness and prowess of one company: Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, or TSMC. The chipmaker, which reached a market capitalization of $1 trillion in July, has contributed more than any other to Taiwan’s irreplaceable role in the global semiconductor supply chain. Its clients include Apple and the leading chip designer Nvidia. Its chips are in your iPhone, your laptop, and the data centers that run ChatGPT. 

For a company that makes what amounts to an invisible product, TSMC holds a remarkably prominent role in Taiwanese society. I’ve heard people talk about it over background noise in loud bars in the southern city of Tainan and listened to Taipei cab drivers connect Taiwan’s security situation to the company, unprompted. “Taiwan will be okay,” one driver told me as we sped by the national legislature, “because TSMC.” 

The idea is that world leaders (particularly the United States)—aware of the island’s critical role in the semiconductor supply chain—would retaliate economically, and perhaps militarily, if China were to attack Taiwan. That, in turn, deters Beijing. “Because TSMC is now the most recognizable company of Taiwan, it has embedded itself in a notion of Taiwan’s sovereignty,” says Rupert Hammond-Chambers, president of the US-Taiwan Business Council. 

Now some Taiwan specialists and some of the island’s citi­zens are worried that this “silicon shield,” if it ever existed, is cracking. Facing pressure from Washington, TSMC is investing heavily in building out manufacturing capacity at its US hub in Arizona. It is also building facilities in Japan and Germany in addition to maintaining a factory in mainland China, where it has been producing less advanced legacy chips since 2016. 

In Taiwan, there is a worry that expansion abroad will dilute the company’s power at home, making the US and other countries less inclined to feel Taiwan is worthy of defense. TSMC’s investments in the US have come with no guarantees for Taiwan in return, and high-ranking members of Taiwan’s opposition party have accused the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of gambling with the future of the island. It doesn’t help that TSMC’s expansion abroad coincides with what many see as a worrying attitude in the White House. On top of his overarching “America First” philosophy, Donald Trump has declined to comment on the specific question of whether the US would intervene if China attempted to take Taiwan by force. “I don’t want to ever put myself in that position,” he said in February. 

At the same time, Beijing’s interest in Taiwan has continued unabated. While China is making progress toward semiconductor self-­sufficiency, it’s currently in a transition period, with companies relying on foreign-made chips manufactured in Taiwan—some in compliance with export controls and some smuggled in. Meanwhile, the CCP persistently suggests that seizing the island would bring about a kind of family reunion. “It is the common aspiration and sacred responsibility of all Chinese sons and daughters to realize the complete reunification of the motherland,” reads a statement released by the foreign ministry after Nancy Pelosi’s controversial 2022 visit to Taiwan. Though it’s impossible to know the full scope of Beijing’s motivations, there is also obvious strategic appeal: Controlling the island would give China deep-water access, which is critical for naval routes and submarines. Plus, it could significantly disrupt American AI firms’ access to advanced chips.  

While China ramps up militarily, Taiwan is trying to make itself hard to ignore. The government is increasingly portraying the island as strategically essential to the global community, with semiconductors as its primary offering. “The international community must certainly do everything in its power to avoid a conflict in the Taiwan Strait; there is too great a cost,” Taiwanese president Lai Ching-te said in an interview earlier this year with Japan’s Nippon Television. Parts of the international community are hearing that message—and seizing the opportunity it presents: earlier this month, defense tech company Anduril Industries announced it is opening a new office in Taiwan, where it will be expanding partnerships and selling autonomous munitions. 

For its part, the chip industry is actively showing its commitment to Taiwan. While other tech CEOs attended Trump’s second inauguration, for instance, Nvidia chief executive Jensen Huang met instead with TSMC’s chairman, and the company announced in May that its overseas headquarters would be in Taipei. In recent years, US government officials have also started paying more attention to Taiwan’s security situation and its interconnectedness with the chip industry. “There was a moment when everybody started waking up to the dependence on TSMC,” says Bonnie Glaser, managing director of the German Marshall Fund’s Indo-Pacific Program. The realization emerged, she says, over the last decade but was underscored in March of 2021, when Phil Davidson, then leader of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that there could be an invasion by 2027. Parallel to the security threat is the potential issue of overdependence, since so much chipmaking capability is concentrated in Taiwan.

For now, Taiwan is facing a tangle of interests and time frames. China presents its claim to Taiwan as a historical inevitability, albeit one with an uncertain timeline, while the United States’ relationship with the island is focused on an AI-driven future. But from Taiwan’s perspective, the fight for its fate is playing out right now, amid unprecedented geopolitical instability. The next few years will likely determine whether TSMC’s chipmaking dominance is enough to convince the world Taiwan is worth protecting.

Innovation built on interconnectivity 

TSMC is an uncontested success story. Its founder, Morris Chang, studied and worked in the United States before he was lured to Taiwan to start a new business on the promise of state support and inexpensive yet qualified labor. Chang founded TSMC in 1987 on the basis of his innovative business model. Rather than design and produce chips in-house, as was the norm, TSMC would act as a foundry: Clients would design the chips, and TSMC would make them. 

This focus on manufacturing allowed TSMC to optimize its operations, building up process knowledge and, eventually, outperforming competitors like Intel. It also freed up other businesses to go “fabless,” meaning they could stop maintaining their own semiconductor factories, or fabs, and throw their resources behind other parts of the chipmaking enterprise. Tapping into Taiwan’s domestic electronics supply chain proved effective and efficient for TSMC. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, global demand for semiconductors powering personal computers and other devices continued to grow. TSMC thrived.

Then, in 2022, the US imposed export controls on China that restricted its access to advanced chips. Taiwan was forced to either comply, by cutting off Chinese clients, or risk losing the support of the country that was home to 70% of its client base—and, possibly, 100% of its hopes for external military support in the event of an attack. 

Soon after, Chang announced that he believed globalization and free markets were “almost dead.” The nearly three years since have shown he was onto something. For one thing, in contrast to President Biden’s pursuit of supply chain integration with democratic allies, President Trump’s foreign policy is characterized by respect for big, undemocratic powers and punitive tariffs against both America’s rivals and its friends. Trump has largely abandoned Biden’s economic diplomacy with European and Asian allies but kept his China-targeted protectionism—and added his trademark transactionalism. In an unprecedented move earlier this month, the administration allowed Nvidia and AMD to sell previously banned chips to China on the condition that the companies pay the government 15% of revenues made from China sales. 

Protectionism, it turns out, spurs self-reliance. China’s government has been making a massive effort to build up its domestic chip production capabilities—a goal that was identified at the beginning of Xi’s rise but has been turbocharged in the wake of Washington’s export controls. 

Any hope the US has for significantly expanding domestic chip production comes from its friends—TSMC first among them. The semiconductor industry developed as a global endeavor out of practicality, playing to the strengths of each region: design in the US and manufacturing in Asia, with key inputs from Europe central to the process. Yet the US government, entrenched in its “tech war” with China, is now dead set on deglobalizing the chip supply chain, or at least onshoring as much of it as possible. There’s just one hiccup: The best chip manufacturer isn’t American. It’s TSMC. Even if some manufacturing happens in Arizona, the US still relies on Taiwan’s chipmaking ecosystem. And copying that supply chain outside Taiwan could be harder than the current administration imagines.

Squarely in the middle

Taiwan’s modern security uncertainties stem from the long-­contested issue of the island’s sovereignty. After losing the first Sino-Japanese War in the late 1800s, the Qing dynasty forfeited Taiwan to Japanese imperial control. It was Japan’s “model colony” until 1945, when postwar negotiations resulted in its transfer to the Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek of the Nationalist Party, known as the KMT. The insurgent CCP under Mao Zedong ultimately defeated the Nationalists in a civil war fought on the mainland until 1949. Chiang and many of his party’s defeated generals decamped to Taiwan, controlling it under martial law for nearly 40 years. 

Taiwan held its first free democratic elections in 1996, kicking off a two-party rivalry between the KMT, which favors closer relations with Beijing, and the DPP, which opposes integration with China. Kitchen-table issues like economic growth are central to Taiwanese elections, but so is the overarching question of how best to handle the threat of invasion, which has persisted for nearly 80 years. The DPP is increasingly calling for raising defense spending and civilian preparedness to make sure Taiwan is ready for the worst, while the KMT supports direct talks with Beijing.  

cactus and the sign in front of the TSMC plant in Arizona
In March 2025, President Trump and TSMC CEO C.C. Wei jointly announced that the firm will make an additional $100 billion investment (on top of a previously announced $65 billion) in TSMC’s US hub in Arizona.
REBECCA NOBLE/BLOOMBERG VIA GETTY IMAGES

Meanwhile, Chinese military incursions around Taiwan—known as “gray zone” tactics because they fall short of acts of war—are increasingly frequent. In May, Taiwan’s defense ministry reportedly estimated that Chinese warplanes were entering Taiwan’s air defense zone more than 200 times a month, up from fewer than 10 times per month five years ago. China has conducted drills mirroring the actions needed for a full-scale invasion or a blockade, which would cut Taiwan off from the outside world. Chinese military officials are now publicly talking about achieving a blockade, says Lyle Morris, an expert on foreign policy and national security at the Asia Society Policy Institute. “They’re punishing Lai and the DPP,” Morris says. Meanwhile, the CCP has its own people to answer to: When it comes to the Taiwan issue, Morris says, “Beijing is probably quite worried about the people of China being upset if they aren’t hawkish enough or if they come out looking weak.” Indeed, in response to Lai’s recent policy statements, including one declaring that China is a “hostile foreign force,” Gao Zhikai, a prominent scholar in China who opposes Taiwanese independence, recently wrote, “The reunification with the motherland cannot be endlessly delayed. Decisive action must be taken.” 

Intimidation from China has made some ordinary Taiwanese citizens more concerned; according to a recent poll conducted by a defense-focused think tank, 51% think defense spending should be increased (although 65% of respondents said they thought an attack within five years was “unlikely”). No matter how much money Taipei spends, the sheer military imbalance between China and Taiwan means Taiwan would need help. But especially in the wake of Ukraine’s experience, many believe US aid would be contingent on whether Taiwan demonstrates the will to defend itself. “Based on war games, Taiwan would have to hold out for a month before the US could potentially intervene,” says Iris Shaw, director of the DPP mission in the US. And support from Taiwan’s neighbors like Japan might be contingent on US involvement.

But how likely is the US to intervene in such a scenario? The author Craig Addison popularized the argument that Taiwan’s fate is tied to its chip production prowess in his 2001 book Silicon Shield: Taiwan’s Protection Against Chinese Attack. Back then, Addison wrote that although the US had been intentionally vague about whether it would go to war to protect the island, America’s technological reliance on “a safe and productive Taiwan” made it highly probable that Washington would intervene. President Joe Biden deviated from those decades of calculated ambiguity by asserting multiple times that America would defend the island in the event of an attack. Yet now, Trump seems to have taken the opposite position, possibly presenting an opportunity for Beijing. 

TSMC in the Trump era 

In many ways, Taiwan finds itself in a catch-22. It feels the need to cozy up to the US for protection, yet that defensive maneuver is arguably risky in itself. It’s a common belief in Taiwan that forging stronger ties to the US could be dangerous. According to a public opinion poll released in January, 34.7% of Taiwanese believe that a “pro-US” policy provokes China and will cause a war. 

But the Lai administration’s foreign policy is “inexorably intertwined with the notion that a strong relationship with the US is essential,” says Hammond-Chambers.

Bolstering US support may not be the only reason TSMC is building fabs outside Taiwan. As the company readily points out, the majority of its customers are American. TSMC is also responding to its home base’s increasingly apparent land and energy limitations: finding land to build new fabs sometimes causes rifts with Taiwanese people who, for example, don’t want their temples and ancestral burial sites repurposed as science parks. Taiwan also relies on imports to meet more than 95% of its energy needs, and the dominant DPP has pledged to phase out nuclear, Taiwan’s most viable yet most hotly contested renewable energy source. Geopolitical tensions compound these physical restraints: Even if TSMC would never say as much, it’s fairly likely that if China did attack Taiwan, the firm would rather remain operational in other countries than be wiped out completely. 

However, building out TSMC’s manufacturing capabilities outside Taiwan will not be easy. “The ecosystem they created is truly unique. It’s a function of the talent pipeline, the culture, and laws in Taiwan; you can’t easily replicate it anywhere,” says Glaser. TSMC has 2,500 Taiwan-based suppliers. Plenty are within a couple of hours’ drive or an even shorter trip on high-speed rail. Taiwan has built a fully operational chip cluster, the product of four decades of innovation, industrial policy, and labor.

In many ways, Taiwan finds itself in a catch-22. It feels the need to cozy up to the US for protection, yet that defensive maneuver is arguably risky in itself.

As a result, it’s unclear whether TSMC will be able to copy its model and paste it into the suburbs of Phoenix, where it has 3,000 employees working on chip manufacturing. “Putting aside the geopolitical factor, they wouldn’t have expanded abroad,” says Feifei Hung, a researcher at the Asia Society. Rather than standalone facilities, the Arizona fabs are “appendages of TSMC that happen to be in Arizona,” says Paul Triolo, partner and tech policy lead at the international consulting firm DGA-Albright Stonebridge Group. When the full complex is operational, it will represent only a small percentage of TSMC’s overall capacity, most of which will remain in Taiwan. Triolo doubts the US buildout will yield results similar to what TSMC has built there: “Arizona ain’t that yet, and never will be.” 

Still, the second Trump administration has placed even more pressure on the company to “friendshore”—without providing any discernible signs of friendship. During this spring’s tariff frenzy, the administration threatened to hit Taiwan with a 32% “reciprocal” tariff, a move that was then paused and revived at 20% in late July (and was still being negotiated as of press time). The administration has also announced a 100% tariff on semiconductor imports, with the caveat that companies with US-based production, like TSMC, are exempt—though it’s unclear whether imports from critical suppliers in Taiwan will be tariffed. And the threat of a chip-specific tariff remains. “This is in line with [Trump’s] rhetoric of restoring manufacturing in the US and using tariffs as a one size fits all tool to force it,” says Nancy Wei, a trade and supply chain analyst at the Eurasia Group. The US is also apparently considering levying a $1 billion fine against TSMC after TSMC-made chips were reportedly found in some Huawei devices.

Despite these kinds of maneuvers, TSMC has been steadfast in its attempts to get on Washington’s good side. In March, Trump and TSMC’s CEO, C.C. Wei, jointly announced that the firm will make an additional $100 billion investment (on top of a previously announced $65 billion) in TSMC’s US hub in Arizona. The pledge represents the largest single source of foreign direct investment into the US, ever. While the deal was negotiated during Biden’s term, Trump was happy to take credit for ensuring that “the most powerful AI chips will be made right here in America.” 

The Arizona buildout will also include an R&D facility—a critical element for tech transfer and intellectual-property development. Then there’s the very juicy cherry on top: TSMC announced in April that once all six new fabs are operational, 30% of its most advanced chips will be produced in Arizona. Up until then, the thinking was that US-based production would remain a generation or two behind. It looks as if the administration’s public and, presumably, private arm-twisting has paid off. 

Meanwhile, as Trump cuts government programs and subsidies while demanding the “return” of manufacturing to the US, it’s TSMC that is running a technician apprenticeship program in Arizona to create good American jobs. TSMC’s leaders, Triolo says, must question how serious the Trump administration is about long-term industrial policy. They’re probably asking themselves, he says, “Do they understand what it takes to support the semiconductor industry, like our government does?” 

Dealing with an administration that is so explicitly “America first” represents “one of the biggest challenges in history for Taiwanese companies,” says Thung-Hong Lin, a sociology researcher at the Taipei-based Academia Sinica. Semiconductor manufacturing relies on reliability. Trump has so far offered TSMC no additional incentives supporting its US expansion—and started a trade war that has directly affected the semiconductor industry, partly by introducing irrevocable uncertainty. “Trump’s tariffs have set off a new, more intensified bifurcation of semiconductor supply chains,” says Chris Miller, author of Chip War. For now, Miller says, TSMC must navigate a world in which the US and China are both intense competitors and, despite trade restrictions, important clients. 

Warring narratives

China has been taking advantage of these changes to wage a war of disinformation. In response to Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022, when she was US Speaker of the House, Beijing sent warships, aircraft, and propaganda across the Taiwan Strait. Hackers using Chinese software infiltrated the display screens in Taiwan’s 7-Eleven stores to display messages telling “warmonger Pelosi” to “get out of Taiwan.” That might not be an act of war, but it’s close; “7” is an institution of daily life on the island. It is not difficult to imagine how a similar tactic might be used to spread more devastating disinformation, falsely alleging, for example, that Taiwan’s military has surrendered to China during a future crisis. 

Taiwan is “perpetually on the front lines” of cyberattacks from China, says Francesca Chen, a cybersecurity systems analyst at Taiwan’s Ministry of Digital Affairs. According to Taiwan’s National Security Bureau, instances of propaganda traceable to China grew by 60% in 2024 over the previous year, reaching 2.16 million. 

Visitors take selfies outside the TSMC Museum of Innovation in Hsinchu, Taiwan.
ANNABELLE CHIH/GETTY IMAGES

Over the last few years, online discussion of TSMC’s investments in the US “has become a focal point” of China’s state-­sponsored disinformation campaigns aimed at Taiwan, Chen says. They claim TSMC is transferring its most advanced technology, talent, and resources to the US, “weakening Taiwan’s economic lifeline and critical position in global supply chains.” Key terms include “hollowing out Taiwan” and “de-Taiwanization.” This framing depicts TSMC’s diversification as a symbol of Taiwan’s vulnerability, Chen says. The idea is to exploit real domestic debates in Taiwan to generate heightened levels of internal division, weakening social cohesion and undermining trust in the government.

Chinese officials haven’t been shy about echoing these messages out in the open: After the most recent US investment announcement in March, a spokesperson from China’s Taiwan Affairs Council accused Taiwan’s DPP of handing over TSMC as a “gift” to the US. (“TSMC turning into USMC?” asked a state media headline.) Former Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou posted an eerily similar criticism, alleging that TSMC’s US expansion amounted to “selling” the chipmaker in exchange for protection.

TSMC’s expansion abroad could become a major issue in Taiwan’s 2028 presidential election. It plays directly into party politics: The KMT can accuse the DPP of sacrificing Taiwan’s technology assets to placate the US, and the DPP can accuse the KMT of cozying up with China, even as Beijing’s military incursions become a more evident part of daily life. It remains to be seen whether TSMC’s shift to the US will ultimately protect or weaken Taiwan—or have no effect on the island’s security and sovereignty. For now at least, China’s aspirations loom large. 

To Beijing, unequivocally, Taiwan does not equal TSMC. Instead, it represents the final, unfulfilled stage of the Communist Party’s revolutionary struggle. Framed that way, China’s resolve to take the island could very well be nonnegotiable. That would mean if Taiwan is going to maintain a shield that protects it from the full weight of China’s political orthodoxy, it may need to be made of something much stronger than silicon. 

Johanna M. Costigan is a writer and editor focused on technology and geopolitics in the US, China, and Taiwan. She writes the newsletter The Long Game.

Why Trump’s “golden dome” missile defense idea is another ripped straight from the movies

In 1940, a fresh-faced Ronald Reagan starred as US Secret Service agent Brass Bancroft in Murder in the Air, an action film centered on a fictional “superweapon” that could stop enemy aircraft midflight. A mock newspaper in the movie hails it as the “greatest peace argument ever invented.” The experimental weapon is “the exclusive property of Uncle Sam,” Reagan’s character declares.

More than 40 years later, this cinematic vision—an American superweapon capable of neutralizing assaults and ushering in global peace—became a real-life centerpiece of Reagan’s presidency. Some have suggested that Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a quixotic plan for a space-based missile shield, may have been partly inspired by his silver-screen past; indeed, the concept was so fantastical it’s now better known by its Hollywood-referencing nickname, “Star Wars.”

In January 2024, Donald Trump revived the space-shield dream at a primary campaign rally in Laconia, New Hampshire, using the Star Wars nickname that Reagan hated. It didn’t work in the 1980s, Trump said, because the technology wasn’t there. But times have changed. 

Whether in Golden Age Hollywood or Trump’s impromptu dramatizations, the dream of a missile shield is animated by its sheer cinematic allure.

“I’ve seen so many things. I’ve seen shots that you wouldn’t even believe,” Trump said. He acted out a scene of missile defense experts triangulating the path of an incoming weapon. “Ding, ding, ding, ding,” he said, as he mimed typing on a keyboard. “Missile launch? Psshing!!” He raised his hand to indicate the rising missile, then let it fall to signal the successful interception: “Boom.” 

Trump has often expressed admiration for Israel’s Iron Dome, an air defense system that can intercept short-range rockets and artillery over the small nation and that is funded in part by the United States. At the rally, he pledged to “build an Iron Dome over our country, a state-of-the-art missile defense shield made in the USA … a lot of it right here in New Hampshire, actually.” 

Within a week of his inauguration, President Trump began working toward this promise by issuing an executive order to develop “The Iron Dome for America,” which was rebranded the “Golden Dome” a month later. The eruption of a revived conflict between Israel and Iran in June—including Trump’s decision to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities—has only strengthened the case for an American version of the Iron Dome in the eyes of the administration.

CHIP SOMODEVILLA/GETTY IMAGES

The Golden Dome has often been compared to SDI for its futuristic sheen, its aggressive form of protection, and its reflection of the belief that an impenetrable shield is the cheat code to global peace. Both efforts demonstrate the performative power of spectacle in defense policy, especially when wielded by deft showmen like Reagan and Trump. Whether in Golden Age Hollywood or Trump’s impromptu dramatizations, the dream of a missile shield is animated by its sheer cinematic allure, often rendered in deceptively simple concept art depicting a society made immune to catastrophic strikes. 

But in the complicated security landscape confronting the world today, is spectacle the same as safety?

“Missile defense is an area where facts and fiction blend,” says Anette Stimmer, a lecturer in international relations at the University of St Andrews who has researched SDI. “A lot is up to interpretation by all the actors involved.”


Trump’s view is simple: Space is as much a warfighting domain as land, air, and ocean, and therefore the US must assert its dominance there with advanced technologies. This position inspired the creation of the US Space Force in his first term, and Trump has now redoubled his efforts with the ongoing development of the Golden Dome.  

General Michael Guetlein, who Trump has appointed to lead the Golden Dome project, argued that America’s foes, including China and Russia, have forced the nation’s hand by continually pushing limits in their own weapons programs. “While we have been focused on peace overseas, our adversaries have been quickly modernizing their nuclear forces, building out ballistic missiles capable of hosting multiple warheads; building out hypersonic missiles capable of attacking the United States within an hour and traveling at 6,000 miles an hour; building cruise missiles that can navigate around our radar and our defenses; and building submarines that can sneak up on our shores; and, worse yet, building space weapons,” Guetlein said in May.

“It is time that we change that equation and start doubling down on the protection of the homeland,” he said. “Golden Dome is a bold and aggressive approach to hurry up and protect the homeland from our adversaries. We owe it to our children and our children’s children to protect them and afford them a quality of life that we have all grown up enjoying.”

With that vision in mind, Trump’s executive order outlines a host of goals for missile defense, some of which support bipartisan priorities like protecting supply chains and upgrading sensor arrays. The specific architecture of the Golden Dome is still being hammered out, but the initial executive order envisions a multi-tiered system of new sensors and interceptors—on the ground, in the air, and in space—that would work together to counter the threat of attacks from ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles. The system would be coordinated in part by artificial-intelligence models trained for real-time threat detection and response. 

The technology that links the Golden Dome directly to SDI hinges on one key bullet point in the order that demands the “development and deployment of proliferated space-based interceptors capable of boost-phase intercept.” This language revives Reagan’s dream of deploying hundreds of missile interceptors in orbit to target missiles in the boost phase right after liftoff, a window of just a few minutes when the projectiles are slower and still near the attacker’s territory.

Space weapons are an attractive option for targeting the boost phase because interceptors need to be close enough to the launching missile to hit it. If a nation fired off long-range missiles from deep in its territory, the nearest ground- or air-based interceptors could be thousands of miles from the launch site. Space interceptors, in contrast, would be just a few hundred miles overhead of the ascending missiles, allowing for a much faster reaction time. But though the dream of boost-phase interception dates back decades, these maneuvers have never been operationally demonstrated from ground, air, or space.

“It’s a really hard problem that hasn’t been solved,” says Laura Grego, senior scientist and research director at the Union of Concerned Scientists’ global security program.

The US is currently protected by the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD), which consists of 44 interceptor missiles split between bases in Alaska and California, along with a network of early-­warning sensors on the ground, at sea, and in orbit. Tests suggest that the GMD would have about a 50% success rate at intercepting missiles.

Initiated by President Bill Clinton in the late ’90s and accelerated by President George W. Bush in the 2000s, the GMD is intended mainly to defend against rogue states like North Korea, which has nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the US. A secondary focus is Iran, which does not currently have a nuclear weapon or ICBMs. Still, the GMD is built to anticipate a possible future where it develops those capabilities. 

The GMD is not designed to protect the US from the sort of large-scale and coordinated missile attacks that Russia and China could lob across the world. The Bush administration instead favored a focus on strategic deterrence with these peer nations, an approach that the Obama and Biden administrations continued. In addition to the GMD, the Pentagon and its international partners maintain regional defense systems to counter threats in conflict hot spots or attacks on critical infrastructure. All these networks are designed to intercept missiles during their midcourse cruise phase, as they hurtle through the sky or space, or during their terminal or reentry phase, as they approach their targets. The GMD has cost upward of $63 billion since it was initiated, and the US spends about an additional $20 billion to $30 billion annually on its array of other missile defense systems. 

In May, Trump was presented with several design options for the Golden Dome and selected a plan with a price tag of $175 billion and a schedule for full deployment by the end of his term. The One Big Beautiful Bill, signed into law on July 4, approved an initial $24.4 billion in funding for it. Space technologies and launch access have become much more affordable since the 1980s, but many analysts still think the projected cost and timeline are not realistic. The Congressional Budget Office, a nonpartisan federal agency, projected that the cost of the space-based interceptors could total from $161 billion to $542 billion over the course of 20 years. The wide range can be explained by the current lack of specifics on those orbital interceptors’ design and number.

Reintroducing the idea of space-based interceptors is “probably the most controversial piece of Golden Dome,” says Leonor Tomero, who served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy in the Biden administration. 

“There are a lot of improvements that we can and should make on missile defense,” she continues. “There’s a lot of capability gaps I think we do need to address. My concern is the focus on reviving Star Wars and SDI. It’s got very significant policy implications, strategic stability implications, in addition to cost implications and technology feasibility challenges.” 

Indeed. Regardless of whether the Golden Dome materializes, the program is already raising geopolitical anxieties reminiscent of the Cold War era. Back then, the US had one main adversary: the Soviet Union. Now, it confronts a roiling multipolarity of established and nascent nuclear powers. Many of them have expressed dismay over the about-face on American missile defense strategy, which was previously predicated on arms reduction and deterrence.

“Here we are, despite years of saying we are not going to do this—that it is technically out of reach, economically unsustainable, and strategically unwise,” Grego says. “Overnight, we’re like, ‘No, actually, we’re doing it.’” 

The fact that we “blew up that logic” will “have a big impact on whether or not the program actually succeeds in creating the vision that it lays out,” she adds.

Russian and Chinese officials called the Golden Dome “deeply destabilizing in nature” in a joint statement in May, and North Korea’s foreign ministry warned it could “turn outer space into a potential nuclear war field.”  

Reagan, by all accounts, believed that SDI would be the ultimate tool of peace for all nations, and he even offered to share the technology with the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev. Trump, in contrast, sees Golden Dome as part of his “America First” brand. He has lamented that past American leaders supported the development of other missile defense projects abroad while neglecting to build similar security measures for their own country. The Golden Dome is both an expression of Trump’s belief that the world is leeching off America and a bargaining chip in negotiations toward a new power balance; Canada could be covered by the shield for free, he has said—in exchange for becoming the 51st state.

Trump has argued that America has been both demographically diluted by unchecked immigration and financially depleted by freeloading allied nations—undermining its security on both internal and external fronts. His first term’s marquee promise to build a wall on the southern US border, paid for by Mexico, aimed to address the former problem. That administration did build more physical barriers along the border (though US taxpayers, not Mexico, footed the bill). But just as important, the wall emerged as a symbolic shorthand for tougher immigration control. 

The Golden Dome is the second-term amplification of that promise, a wall that expands the concept of the “border” to the entire American airspace. Trump has projected an image of his envisioned space missile shield as a literal dome that could ward off coordinated attacks, including boost-phase interceptors from space and cruise- and terminal-phase interception by ground and air assets. When he announced the selected plan from the Resolute Desk in May, he sat in front of a mockup that depicted a barrage of incoming missiles being thwarted by the nationwide shield, depicted with a golden glow.

The Golden Dome’s orbital interceptors are supposedly there to target the early boost phase of missiles on or near the launch site, not over the United States. But the image of a besieged America, repelling enemy fire from the heavens, provides the visual and cinematic idea of both threat and security that Trump hopes to impress on the public.  

“This administration, and MAGA world, thinks about itself as being victimized by immigrants, government waste, leftist professors, and so on,” says Edward Tabor Linenthal, a historian who examined public narratives about SDI in his 1989 book Symbolic Defense: The Cultural Significance of the Strategic Defense Initiative. “It’s not much of a jump to be victimized by too many nations getting nuclear weapons.” 


Even in our era of entrenched political polarization, there is support across party lines for upgrading and optimizing America’s missile defense systems. No long-range missile has ever struck US soil, but an attack would be disastrous for the nation and the world. 

“We’ve come a long way in terms of missile defense,” says Tomero. “There has been a lot of bipartisan consensus on increasing regional missile defense, working with our allies, and making sure that the missile defense interceptors we have work.”

outline of the United States inside a corked glass bottle with scorpions

SHOUT

Trump has challenged that consensus with his reversion to the dream of a space shield. He is correct that SDI failed to materialize in part because its envisioned technologies were out of reach, from a financial and engineering standpoint, in the 1980s. But the controversy that erupted around SDI—and that tarnished it with the derisive name “Star Wars”—stemmed just as much from its potential geopolitical disruptiveness as from its fantastical techno-optimism. 

“This idea of a missile shield, also back when Reagan proposed it, has a huge popular appeal, because who wouldn’t want to be able to defend your country from nuclear weapons? It is a universal dream,” says Stimmer. “It requires a bit more digging in and understanding to see that actually, this vision depends a lot on technological feasibility and on how others perceive it.” 

Reagan maintained a steadfast conviction that this shield of space-based interceptors would render nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete,” ushering in “world peace,” as he said in his March 1983 speech announcing SDI. The doctrine of mutually assured destruction could be replaced by mutually assured survival, he argued.

Amid nuclear tensions, J. Robert Oppenheimer compared the US and the Soviet Union to “two scorpions in a bottle.” Now there are many more scorpions.

But Gorbachev saw the space-based shield as an offensive weapon, since it would give the US a first-strike advantage. The imbalance, he warned, could spark a weapons race in space, a domain that had been spared from overt military conflicts. As a result, the initiative would only destabilize the world order and interrupt the progress of arms control and nuclear de-proliferation efforts. 

Reagan’s insistence on SDI as the only route to world peace may have blocked opportunities to advance that goal through more practical and cost-effective avenues, such as diplomacy and arms control. At the 1986 Reykjavik Summit, Reagan and Gorbachev came very close to an arms control agreement that might have eliminated all ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. The sticking point was Reagan’s refusal to give up SDI. 

“It is not the Strategic Defense Initiative; it’s a strategic defense ideology,” says Linenthal. He mentions the famous metaphor used by J. Robert Oppenheimer, a central figure of the Manhattan Project, who compared the United States and the Soviet Union to “two scorpions in a bottle.” Either scorpion could kill the other, but only at the probable cost of its own life. 

Reagan felt a “tremendously powerful impetus” to escape Oppenheimer’s metaphor, Linenthal noted: “It was a new kind of deliverance that would resolve it all. Of course, now there are many more scorpions, so it has to be a bigger bottle.”

A true believer, Reagan never abandoned SDI in spite of cost overruns and public backlash. President Bill Clinton redirected the program in 1993 by shifting gears from global to regional missile defense, a focus that remained fairly consistent for decades—until Trump took center stage. Now, the Golden Dome has flipped that logic on its head, risking a possible escalation of military tensions in outer space.

Tomero describes a “nightmare scenario” in which adversaries attack the Golden Dome’s space infrastructure, leaving the orbital environment filled with debris that renders the defense system, among countless other space assets, inoperable. 

“Having a one-sided capability that is very threatening to our adversaries is obviously going to create very dangerous stability issues,” she says. It could “lead to inadvertent escalation and miscalculation and, I think, lower the threshold to conflict and nuclear war.” 


As president, Trump has channeled the boardroom antics that once resuscitated his celebrity status on The Apprentice. But armed adversaries, long wary of America’s position on missile defense, don’t have the luxury of wondering whether it’s all real or just more stagecraft. 

“What makes Trump so difficult to read for others is his unpredictability,” Stimmer says. “This, just by itself, destabilizes things, because no one knows what he’ll actually do.”

Trump has described the Golden Dome as nearly impenetrable by missile attacks, evoking a clear symbolic return to an American golden age where we can all feel safe again.

“All of them will be knocked out of the air,” as “the success rate is very close to 100%,” he said at the project’s official launch in May. “We will truly be completing the job that President Reagan started 40 years ago, forever ending the missile threat to the American homeland.”

Becky Ferreira is a science reporter based in upstate New York, and author of First Contact, a book about the search for alien life, which will be published in September.