The Best Ecommerce Business Model

In this year’s “Ecommerce Conversations,” I’ve occasionally shared my experiences owning and operating Beardbrand, the direct-to-consumer brand I launched a decade ago. To date, I’ve addressed hiring, branding, profit-building, priority-setting, exiting, and overcoming a million-dollar loss.

In this installment, I share what I believe is the best bootstrapped ecommerce model and why others should consider it.

My entire audio dialog is embedded below. The transcript is condensed and edited for clarity.

Building a D2C brand is hard. Developing and selling products is a grind. A better path is a bootstrapped, sustainable business where you spend less than you make and enjoy the journey.

The purpose is not chasing giant exits or reinventing the world. It’s about building a lifestyle business — likely under a few million in annual revenue — that trades rapid top-line growth for lower stress, profitability, and freedom. It may never go mass market, but it can deliver a great life.

Agile Structure

When building an ecommerce business, aim to keep fixed, internal costs to a minimum. Take inspiration from Will Nitze of IQ Bar, who runs a lean team and outsources marketing, design, video, packaging, operations, and manufacturing. Outsourcing creates flexibility. Vendors that underperform are easily replaced.

In-house manufacturing ties you to equipment, facilities, and local employees. All reduce mobility. With an outsourced model, you can work from anywhere — even Denmark, where I am now — and still receive prototypes and manage operations. A remote setup opens the talent pool worldwide.

There are trade-offs. In-person collaboration can be valuable, but physical offices create obligations. I learned this the hard way with a five-year lease in Austin, Texas, that became unnecessary during Covid, costing us over $100,000 annually.

Local teams and on-site operations may suit folks who prefer a traditional setup. But if freedom matters — to travel, hire globally, pivot quickly — consider outsourcing from the start. I prefer flexibility, partnering with both in-house staff and external providers to keep my business agile.

Smart Niches

An ideal ecommerce product is small, lightweight, and consumable, serving a large audience with an average order value of $75–$125. This price range makes customer acquisition easier and ad testing faster. The challenge: It’s highly competitive, especially in the supplements, beauty, and premium beverage sectors, such as specialty coffee or tea.

Other strong options are non-consumables that share those traits, such as a Ridge pocket knife — easy to ship, high perceived value. Consider untapped luxury niches. Affluent customers value convenience, presentation, and uniqueness far more than price.

For inspiration, visit luxury department stores such as Neiman Marcus and Saks Fifth Avenue. Observe what sells and why someone might pay 10 times more than a viable alternative. Avoid trend-driven categories, such as fashion, which require constant reinvention. Instead, focus on evergreen household goods with a unique twist for a small but willing-to-pay market.

While these niches won’t create billion-dollar companies, they can deliver low-stress, highly profitable businesses — think $750,000 in annual revenue with $250,000 in profit — without the complexity of endless SKUs, large teams, or operational headaches.

Margin Power

It’s possible to build a $750,000 ecommerce business that nets $250,000, but only if you manage gross margins — aim for 90%. For example, sell an item costing $6 for $60. You’ll still retain around 80% after shipping, taxes, and delivery costs. High margins are non-negotiable for a low-stress operation.

Conversely, products with tighter margins attract price-sensitive customers, which leads to increased returns, complaints, and support tickets. Serving customers with disposable income reduces friction because they’re less likely to demand refunds.

At a $115 average sale, $750,000 in annual revenue equates to roughly 6,520 orders — just 18 per day. One person can fulfill this volume, or with minimal help, generating perhaps only a few support tickets per week.

If margins leave $650,000 after cost of goods, and you spend $400,000 on marketing, you’ll retain $250,000 profit. The model works, but launching it — higher-priced products in a niche — requires time and testing. It won’t be easy to stand out, but with the right offer, it’s a manageable, profitable, and less stressful way to run a business.

Trusted Voice

Every high-end ecommerce brand needs a trusted public advocate — someone who can vouch for the quality, experience, and value of the product. It doesn’t have to be a celebrity. It can be the owner, provided she’s willing to be the face of the brand.

The advocate’s role is to build trust, communicate the product’s value, and demonstrate how it improves customers’ lives. Titles alone aren’t enough. An advocate must have influence and sales ability. Without this trust, it’s nearly impossible to command premium prices.

You may need to sell to an audience you’re not part of. That requires shedding your own “value shopper” mindset to learn how target customers buy. Experience their lifestyle, understand why they pay more, and embrace their perspective. This shift in thinking can be the key to unlocking growth.

Creative Edge

Innovation is essential. If you can’t create something unique, this model may not work. Competitors will copy your ideas and undercut your prices. Success requires loyalty and brand affinity, and thus customers who won’t switch to save $30 — or $100.

Luxury beauty brands such as La Mer skincare succeed not only from functional superiority, but also because of their storytelling, perceived exclusivity, and trust. The challenge for like-minded entrepreneurs is to create an experience and narrative so compelling that customers believe no substitute can match it.

In premium markets, even a few thousand loyal customers can sustain a profitable, low-stress business — if your innovation keeps them hooked.

How to Achieve Negative CAC

Customer acquisition costs can ruin a business. Some merchants limit acquisition spend to the gross margin of the first sale. Others look to customers’ lifetime value.

Yet Taylor Holiday, CEO of the agency Common Thread Collective, profits from acquisition marketing. He calls it “negative CAC.”

Taylor first appeared on the podcast in 2020. In our recent conversation, he explained his acquisition strategy, experiences with employee ownership, and more.

The audio from our entire discussion is embedded below. The transcript is condensed and edited for clarity.

Eric Bandholz: Give us the rundown.

Taylor Holiday: I’m the CEO of Common Thread Collective, an ecommerce marketing agency that helps brands grow predictably and profitably. We’ve been at it for over a decade. Recently, we partnered with Acacia, a private equity firm, to expand our platform and pursue the next phase of growth.

We operate with an employee stock ownership plan, an ESOP. Our company took a bank loan to buy 20% of equity from existing shareholders and placed it in a trust for employees. Shares are allocated annually based on each employee’s salary as a percentage of total payroll. For example, if payroll is $1 million and you earn $100,000, you’d get 10% of each share allocation.

Employees receive shares tax-free, with no purchase cost. If they leave, the company must buy back their shares, making them relatively liquid. ESOPs can buy out partners or provide owner liquidity, but they require education, vesting schedules, and carry liabilities on the balance sheet. Well-known companies like King’s Hawaiian are fully employee-owned.

Bandholz: Would you do it again?

Holiday: Probably not. Employees didn’t fully understand the ESOP, and it didn’t change behavior as I’d hoped. Plus, it complicates an eventual sale of a business, and the operational challenges are significant.

There’s a book on “community capitalism” that explores alternatives to pure capitalism and socialism. Capitalism can overly concentrate wealth, while socialism has its flaws. Many people sense the shortcomings of both systems but haven’t found a perfect alternative. For me, the ESOP wasn’t that solution. It was a noble attempt, but I don’t believe it resolves the core issues — and maybe nothing fully can, given human nature.

Bandholz: Before this interview, you referenced negative customer acquisition costs. Can you talk about that?

Holiday: Negative CAC means our marketing generates profit instead of being a cost. Initially, our podcast, videos, and email newsletter were purely for lead generation — effective but costly to scale. We realized these were valuable media assets for which companies, especially software vendors in our space, would pay to access our audience.

By selling sponsorships to our podcast, email list, YouTube channel, and social content, we offset production costs and, in some cases, made them profitable. This shift turned marketing into a profit center, improving margins and fueling growth.

There’s currently high advertiser demand, but a limited supply of quality, ecommerce-focused media. A small group of creators dominates sponsorships because they have niche authority. However, most operate independently with fragmented sales processes and no funding for new content creation.

I see an opportunity to unite strong content creators, build a shared sales engine, and package sponsorship offerings, similar to how The Ringer network scaled before being acquired by Spotify. Whether it’s launching new shows or helping others monetize existing ones, it’s about building the pipeline, finding sponsors, and providing the resources many creators lack.

Many brands turn costly activities into content that drives sales. For example, Vktry (pronounced “victory”), a performance insole company, outfits entire sports teams, such as UCLA volleyball. Vktry films the training sessions and uses that authentic, authority-rich footage as ad content. What would typically be a sales or training expense becomes a marketing asset, fueling ads and reducing acquisition costs.

Another example is Alex Hormozi, co-founder of Acquisition.com, a business education firm, who hosts high-ticket weekend seminars. Attendees pay to learn, and he films the sessions for ongoing distribution. He’s essentially getting paid to produce content that generates more revenue, creating a self-sustaining cycle.

In contrast, most ecommerce brands spend heavily on production, then on distribution, and hope the ads meet their CAC goals. Finding ways to subsidize or monetize production upfront can turn marketing into a profit driver rather than a cost center.

Bandholz: Where can people follow you, learn from you, and use your services?

Holiday: Our website is CommonThreadCo.com. I’m on X (with open DMs) and LinkedIn.

The No-Surprise 3PL Pricing Model

John Melizanis believes third-party logistics fees often produce surprise charges. Per-item pricing for picks, packs, and receiving can turn an anticipated $1 per order fee into $2.50 or more, he says.

John is the co-founder of ShipDudes, a New Jersey-based 3PL launched in 2020. His company uses flat-rate pricing for pick-and-pack and warehousing, and no markup for shipping. “Brands appreciate knowing their exact costs,” he told me.

In our recent conversation, John addressed the origins of ShipDudes, in-store retail, warehouse automation, and more.

The entire audio of our conversation is embedded below. The transcript is edited for clarity and length.

Eric Bandholz: What do you do?

John Melizanis: I’m a co-founder of ShipDudes, an omnichannel fulfillment company in New Jersey. We help ecommerce brands ship worldwide and break into physical retail. We’re the behind-the-scenes engine for many companies sold in Sephora, GNC, and Vitamin Shoppe.

Beyond shipping, we support brands with EDI integrations, labeling, and compliance, essential for clients entering retail for the first time. Retail logistics can be demanding; missed labels or late deliveries can result in chargebacks. We’ve built systems to handle these challenges both operationally and technologically.

We serve three primary channels: direct-to-consumer, marketplaces such as Amazon and Chewy, and in-store retail. Our tech stack integrates across all of them. We initially developed custom software, but now utilize a white-labeled platform that we’ve heavily customized.

I began fulfilling orders in a garage, using shipping software Pirate Ship and dropping off hundreds of packages at the post office. As we evolved into a full 3PL, it became clear that some fulfillment platforms fall short in terms of inventory tracking and order verification. Our system tracks everything — pick, pack, and ship — down to barcode scans.

Bandholz: How do you handle custom packaging?

Melizanis: We understand that some brands require custom inserts, folded boxes, or more intricate packaging. Internally, we group clients into three phases: startup, scale-up, and enterprise. It’s not just about size but also how operationally mature the brand is.

We support complex packaging needs but also offer guidance on ways to simplify without sacrificing brand identity. Some brands follow our advice, others don’t, but we always offer it.

Bandholz: What about employee training?

Melizanis: It all starts with a process. If the process is solid and an employee still struggles, he’s likely not a good fit.

Every pack station has printed standard operating procedures in English and Spanish, with visuals — key for our Spanish-speaking staff. We emphasize the importance of their work: “Someone paid $100 for this order. How would you feel getting the wrong item?”

We instill that mindset daily to build pride and ownership. Cameras at each station provide accountability. If there’s a customer issue, we review the footage. If it’s a recurring mistake, we coach, revisit SOPs, and retrain.

It’s not perfect. Some hires won’t work out. But we give everyone a fair shot. If they can’t follow the process, they’re not right for the team.

Bandholz: What’s the future of robotic picking?

Melizanis: I’ve seen hybrid systems with robots retrieving from bins like giant vending machines. They’re not as expensive as you’d think and can run 24/7. We’ll likely invest in something like that for picking in the next few years.

Still, people aren’t going away entirely. Many of our clients expect a high-touch experience, including custom tissue paper, inserts, and folded boxes. That level of care still needs a human. I see automation handling repetitive tasks such as picking, while packing remains more manual for brands that value the unboxing experience.

Picking is a major expense. In a 50,000-square-foot warehouse, walking from one item to another adds up quickly. Automation could significantly reduce those costs.

But packing is also expensive, especially for premium brands. It requires someone who understands the brand and packs thoughtfully. Ever get a small item in a giant Amazon box? That’s what happens when automation replaces human oversight.

Automation can optimize picking, but humans remain vital for packing, especially when presentation matters.

Bandholz: How can brands reduce 3PL and shipping costs?

Melizanis: It starts with product design. Size, weight, and fragility all impact expense. Bigger items cost more to ship and pack. Brands with low SKU variation and simple products are far easier and cheaper to fulfill at scale.

The ideal ecommerce product is small, lightweight, durable, and fits in a bubble mailer. That minimizes fulfillment costs and maximizes margins. Not every brand can do that, but if you’re developing products, it’s worth giving serious thought to.

As for shipping costs, we use different carriers for different needs. For small, lightweight, durable products, DHL and regional carriers such as Lone Star Overnight, TForce Freight, and OSM can be cost-effective.

For larger or heavier items, USPS has robust programs, and FedEx and UPS offer solid, reliable service, although they tend to be more expensive. For customer experience, FedEx or UPS Ground is probably your best bet.

People often forget about injection points. Where your package enters the carrier network matters. A rural USPS drop-off might be slower (or faster) than one in a metro hub, depending on the volume and routing.

There’s no one-size-fits-all. You need to match the right carrier to your product type, ship-from location, and customer expectations.

Bandholz: Does ShipDudes use itemized pricing like most 3PLs, or flat rates?

Melizanis: We avoid itemized pricing. Most 3PLs have multiple fees — picks, inserts, receiving, spot checks. Brands sometimes think they’re paying $1 per order but end up paying $2.50 or more.

We use a flat pick-and-pack rate. Multiply your orders by that rate, and that’s what you pay — no surprises. We calculated it based on the average number of picks per order.

We handle storage the same way: one all-in pallet fee, no added spot check or counting charges. We’re not the cheapest or most expensive, but we’re the simplest. Brands appreciate knowing their exact costs.

We also eliminated the typical 3PL communication mess. Every brand gets a dedicated Slack channel with on-site support and account managers.

Shipping is our third and final billing item, and it’s a pass-through. We negotiate competitive rates, calculate all surcharges, and pass them along directly. It saves clients time, money, and confusion.

Bandholz: How can people connect with you?

Melizanis: Our website is ShipDudes.com. Check out our podcast, “New Money Talks.” I’m on LinkedIn.

Facebook ‘Megaphone’ Powers D2C Watch Brand

Nate Lagos is vice president of marketing for Original Grain, a direct-to-consumer watch maker. He relies on Facebook advertising, but not for immediate customer acquisition.

“Platforms such as Facebook are megaphones, not salespeople,” he says.

In our recent conversation, Nate shared his marketing origins, advertising tactics, influencer management, and more.

Our entire audio conversation is embedded below. The transcript is edited for length and clarity.

Eric Bandholz: Give us a quick rundown of who you are and what you do.

Nate Lagos: I’m the vice president of marketing at Original Grain, a watch company that blends wood and steel to create timepieces that guys want to wear. I’ve been here four years, leading growth through product innovation and creative marketing campaigns. Before that, I served as CMO for a couple of smaller ecommerce brands.

The last four years at OG have been exciting, fast-paced, and at times stressful — but extremely rewarding.

My marketing journey started in college. I fell in love with the subject after my first class, but quickly realized school wouldn’t teach me how to thrive in the real world. I had one great professor, but most classes fell short. I began freelancing during my sophomore year, running organic and paid social campaigns for local businesses, and built from there.

I host a twice-weekly podcast called “Tactical & Practical.” Each episode is 10-12 minutes and delves into a single tactic we’re using or a challenge I’m facing. The goal is to create the kind of honest, tactical content I wish I had at my first CMO job at age 24, when I had no idea what I was doing.

Bandholz: How do you approach media buying and ad strategy?

Lagos: I see advertising as a way to amplify great brands, not as a tool to acquire customers directly. Platforms such as Facebook are megaphones, not salespeople. I pour budget into that megaphone because impressions have long-term value, even if they don’t immediately convert.

Nearly all of our ad budget goes to Facebook, primarily for conversion campaigns. Our average order value for new customers is $360. Their buying decisions often take months. So, we don’t obsess over daily customer acquisition costs — we focus on consistent awareness and brand affinity that pays off during key moments, such as the holidays.

Our performance metric is straightforward: If we spend $10,000 promoting a watch and earn $40,000 from it, the ads are effective, regardless of Facebook’s internal metrics. If we only make $11,000, we cut spend, test new creative, or shift messaging.

We typically advertise our top five watches, not our entire catalog. We structure our campaigns by collection, and we measure success both at the individual product level and the collection-level return-on-ad-spend. Meta accounts for 95% of our spend. The rest goes to Google, YouTube, and influencers, which we’d like to grow, though they’re harder to scale and produce content for.

Bandholz: What’s your strategy for changing ad creative on Meta?

Lagos: I’m still figuring that out. Historically, we didn’t launch a large number of ads — typically around 10–15 per week — even as we grew by over 100% last year from an eight-figure base. This year, we’ve ramped that up to 30–40 ads weekly. It’s not because we need more volume to find winners, but because Facebook won’t allocate spend unless we launch more.

The platform tends to push our top-performing ads, which is fine until those ads plateau. Previously, we could introduce new creative into the same ad set, and Facebook would distribute spend. That’s no longer happening. By increasing volume, we’re now seeing new ads spend faster and find winners more quickly.

Our full-time photographer is also our creative inspiration, handling graphic design and brand direction. We hired an operations lead earlier this year. He focuses on Klaviyo and Postscript scheduling and helps out with social and influencer campaigns. So there are three of us on the team.

Most of our messaging angles come from copy I test directly on our site. Once we see what converts there, we repurpose that language into ads.

Bandholz: Thirty pieces of content weekly takes work.

Lagos: Approximately one-third of our content consists of iterations of past winners — duplicate headlines, graphics, and photography styles. If a creative is performing, we replicate it across our top five watches and underperformers we want to push.

For new content, Chris (our creative lead) and I brainstorm weekly using a shared Canva board. I lean toward old-school inspiration — vintage Rolex and cigarette ads — while he pulls modern ecommerce and consumer-focused examples. We compare notes on what we like and dislike, and adapt our messaging and offers to those styles.

We’re intentional with testing. If we’re trying a new visual format, we’ll pair it with a proven offer, headline, and watch. If it flops, we know it’s the visual that didn’t land, not the copy or the product. It helps us stay efficient and avoid confusion when something doesn’t work.

Bandholz: What makes your top product so successful?

Lagos: We launched our top-selling watch two years ago. It’s an automatic skeleton-dial watch, so you see all the inner mechanics. It’s black-plated stainless steel with charred whiskey barrel wood, and that combo crushes. Since then, we’ve launched other watches using similar elements, and many have worked. Our founders do an incredible job designing them.

I’ve learned it’s not the marketing that determines success. We launched this watch with the same email, ad, and strategy as others. So when one sells out and the other doesn’t, no one blames marketing — it’s all about product-market fit.

Keeping this watch in stock has been the real challenge. We launched 400 units in November 2023, and they sold out quickly. We thought it was holiday timing, but it continued to sell — 500 more, then thousands for Father’s Day, and then a massive run in Q4 2024. Eventually, I raised prices and pulled back ads to slow sales.

Bandholz: You mentioned influencers. What’s your strategy?

Lagos: We’re lucky because we’re our own target audience — 35 to 50-year-old guys who drink whiskey and love outdoorsy, rugged stuff. So we’re already fans of the people we end up working with. We also survey our customers about their music and sports preferences to guide our influencer selection.

Our outreach is mostly manual. We send cold direct messages, and I occasionally reach out to agents on LinkedIn. Having big-name partners such as Jack Daniel’s and Taylor Guitars gives us instant credibility. Influencers take us seriously when they see who we work with.

We don’t do affiliate or revenue share. It doesn’t align with our long purchase cycles. Instead, we pay a flat fee for a set number of posts or YouTube inclusions. Instagram collaborations let us repurpose posts as ads. They aren’t high converters but deliver great impression and click costs.

We use codes and links to track YouTube performance and calculate revenue per thousand impressions. Some audiences, such as whiskey content creators, bring $80 RPMs, while lifestyle comedians bring $20. As long as we pay below those amounts, the channel works. We’ve also had success with truck, outdoors, and even music creators, although music has been hit or miss.

Bandholz: Where can people buy your watches and reach out?

Lagos: OriginalGrain.com. I’m on X and LinkedIn. My podcast is Tactical & Practical.

Shopify POS Exec on Future of Retail

Ray Reddy is a two-time mobile commerce entrepreneur, a Google veteran, and, now, the head of Shopify POS, the company’s in-store platform. He says the future of retail is location-agnostic, where shoppers can easily transition from online to brick-and-mortar without losing account details, order history, and similar info.

That, he says, is the path of Shopify POS.

In our recent conversation, he addressed Shopify’s physical-store penetration, the needs of modern shoppers, backend complexities, and more.

Our entire audio is embedded below. The transcript is edited for length and clarity.

Eric Bandholz: Give us a rundown of what you do.

Ray Reddy: I lead Shopify’s retail product team, focused on evolving Shopify POS into an all-in-one system for in-person commerce, from pop-ups to large multi-store enterprises.

Before Shopify, I built two commerce companies. The first, PushLife, was a mobile commerce platform acquired by Google, which I then joined and led the company’s mobile commerce products. Later, I founded Ritual, a social ordering app for restaurants and businesses. My team and I left Ritual in January this year and joined Shopify.

Shopify serves online and offline merchants in over 170 countries across nearly every vertical.

In online commerce, workflows are largely standardized, including product pages, carts, and checkout flows. But in-person retail varies drastically. A coffee shop operates nothing like a furniture store or a spa. Each vertical has distinct workflows, such as table management, appointment scheduling, or barcode scanning.

Historically, success in physical retail meant focusing on a single niche. However, many verticals also sell online and want one unified system for inventory, customers, and transaction data. They’d rather use a single platform than patch together disconnected tools.

Shopify POS’s flexibility and ecosystem are a long-term fit for many growing businesses.

Bandholz: Tell us about your target audience.

Reddy: Our core point-of-sale customers tend to fall into a few categories: apparel, sporting goods, beauty and cosmetics, and gift or novelty retailers. We’re also seeing growth in pet stores, bike shops, and jewelry retailers.

We now serve brands with over 1,000 stores. That’s been a considerable shift over the last couple of years, from a system that works for a single store to one that also meets the complex needs of large chains.

Point-of-sale capability at Shopify was originally a lightweight add-on to ecommerce. No more. Over 10% of POS users are brick-and-mortar only.

Our vision remains a POS system that’s simple enough for a single store and robust enough to support thousands. We’re making progress, but there’s a lot of work ahead.

Bandholz: How can direct-to-consumer brands use POS?

Reddy: We refer to individuals selling at pop-ups or farmers’ markets as “casual sellers.” That’s often the first offline step for online brands. We’ve seen companies such as Allbirds start small with Shopify and scale into publicly traded businesses with dozens of stores. That kind of journey — from side hustle to national brand — is something we’re proud to support.

Contactless payments — tap to pay — are widespread. We’ve integrated the technology into the entire POS experience. But selling in person is more than taking payments. Sellers need lightweight inventory tools, stock counts, and real-time syncing between online and offline. Something as simple as buying a mattress in-store and having it shipped requires more than a basic payment app.

The key is minimizing friction. A good POS platform shouldn’t force sellers to fumble through screens. It should handle all the backend complexity — inventory, fulfillment, compliance — so sellers can stay present and build relationships with customers.

Bandholz: What’s the POS experience of placing in-person orders for shipment?

Reddy: One of our most recent improvements in Shopify POS is “mixed baskets,” orders that include in-store and shipped items. Merchants previously had to create multiple orders or use workarounds. With the launch of POS 10 in April, in-store staff can process a single mixed-basket order and payment. It simplifies complex workflows.

We look for opportunities to reduce friction by monitoring how customers use POS. For example, POS 10 reduced cart-building times by 5% across the board. Some merchants with complex carts saw up to a 10% improvement in speed.

We’ve also overhauled search. Previously, it required exact text matches, which was frustrating for staff with extensive catalogs. We’ve now introduced fuzzy matching that behaves more like Google Search. One home goods retailer with 47,000 SKUs reported it was a game-changer.

We also focus on ease of use for temporary or seasonal staff. Many stores don’t have time for extensive training. One pop-up apparel brand reported that their seasonal employees were able to learn the POS system in a single shift.

Bandholz: Does Shopify POS link with Shop Pay?

Reddy: Shopify POS integrates with Shop Pay at many retailers, though not all. This integration is a key area of ongoing investment. The future of retail combines the convenience of online shopping with the tangible in-store experience. One common frustration for in-store shoppers is the time it takes to find products or wait for staff assistance, unlike the quick, one-click experience online.

Our goal is to merge online profiles and capabilities with in-store shopping. For example, customers who want items shipped to their homes often have to provide their full address at checkout — information already stored in their Shop Pay profile. Transferring that data instantly to the store system would remove friction and speed up the checkout.

Beyond payment, there’s a huge opportunity to enhance the buyer experience by linking online activity to in-store shopping. Imagine seeing items you added to your online cart just a few feet away in a physical store, ready for purchase. Connecting customers’ online intent with their in-store experience offers a significant advantage and exciting possibilities.

Bandholz: Where can people learn about POS and connect with you?

Reddy: See more at Shopify.com/pos. I’m on X and LinkedIn.

How to Survive a Million-Dollar Loss

This year I’ve sprinkled occasional “Ecommerce Conversations” episodes with real-life master classes from Beardbrand, my company. To date I’ve addressed hiringbrandingprofit-building, priority-setting, and exiting.

For this installment, I’ll share Beardbrand’s experience of losing nearly $1 million across 2023 and 2024. I’ll recap how we managed to survive our worst years in business while remaining 100% bootstrapped.

It got bad. Our cash levels dropped to where they were in year one, 2014. We were hemorrhaging money.

But we’re still here — still building and still learning. We made it through without outside funding.

Here’s what the future holds for Beardbrand. My entire audio dialog is embedded below. The transcript is condensed and edited for clarity.

Ghosted

A big portion of our loss came from Target. The company had been a seven-figure account for us for years, and we thought the relationship was solid. Every year, we pitched Target our plans. Historically, the staff there provided us with clear feedback — what worked, what didn’t, and where there was room for growth.

In 2023, Target had a sustainability initiative. We revamped our packaging, switching from glass and plastic to aluminum. It’s lighter, more recyclable, and aligns with eco-conscious goals. At the same time, we increased the size of our beard oil packaging from 1 oz. bottles to occupy more shelf space and stand out.

We committed early, produced inventory, and delivered Target’s purchase orders on time. Then silence. Nothing. After years of working with us, the staff ghosted us. No feedback, no responses. Worse, they dropped us and left us with nearly $200,000 of unpaid product.

We erred by giving Target exclusivity, which meant we weren’t selling on Amazon or Walmart. That killed our ability to move leftover inventory quickly when they dropped us. By the time we finally got on Amazon, the products had already aged out. We destroyed a large quantity that had expired.

Reserves

We’ve always run Beardbrand conservatively. That means keeping a decent amount of capital in reserve — not because we’re paranoid, but because you never know when a black swan event might hit. Having that runway lets you make clear, intentional decisions rather than panicking. It gives you time to explore solutions, test channels, and get a better night’s sleep.

Thankfully, during our stronger years, we built up a solid cushion. And that cushion is what kept us afloat during the downturn. We essentially burned through all of it. But we never dipped below zero, which meant we didn’t have to take out high-interest loans, open lines of credit, or bring in outside investors.

We did have conversations just in case. I even considered withdrawing money from my personal savings. But that’s a hard decision when things aren’t going well. When you’re in the middle of the storm, it doesn’t feel like a temporary dip — it feels like a freefall. You start wondering: Is this the bottom, or is there more pain ahead?

Writing another personal check to the business, especially after years of building wealth from it, was not something I wanted to do. And neither did my partners. We were determined to find a way forward that didn’t involve doubling down with personal capital or giving up control.

Pileup

In addition to losing Target, we experienced a series of setbacks. First, the state of Texas audited us. We cooperated fully, waited for the final numbers, and instead got slapped with a tax lien. That lien triggered Brex, our corporate credit card provider, to freeze our account, despite our perfect payment history. Thankfully, American Express stood by us and kept things moving.

Then came an ADA lawsuit, a leaked 100% off coupon code, and a $20,000 air conditioner repair at our barbershop. We also faced regulatory changes that forced us to reformulate key fragrances.

We had internal missteps, such as losing a key growth team member and coasting when we should’ve pushed harder. We focused on profitability, but the business slowly declined.

We simplified our product line to meet a manufacturer’s needs, which, in hindsight, proved to be a mistake. The lesson? Partner with vendors who value your business. You don’t want to be too small to matter, or too big to be managed. That relationship needs to be just right.

We also lowered prices to drive volume, but it backfired. Loyal customers just paid less, and those who thought we were expensive still did. Meanwhile, larger packaging reduced purchase frequency, and killing off beloved fragrances hurt loyalty. Top-line revenue got cut in half.

Furthermore, when your business shrinks, fixed costs such as office leases and payroll can become overwhelming. Our $10,000 per month lease that once felt small became a big deal.

Rebuilding

The good news? Beardbrand is alive. We’ve weathered the storm and slowly started turning things around. It hasn’t been a dramatic rebound — it’s been steady, slow progress. We have focused on improving operations, addressing inventory issues, resolving stock-outs, tightening pricing, and enhancing product quality.

We now have the right fulfillment provider, manufacturing partners, and systems in place. Instead of existential crises, we’re dealing with everyday stuff — shipping issues, ad performance, and the occasional bad product batch. That’s a massive shift. It’s not glamorous, but it’s no longer a matter of survival.

We cut costs aggressively — even eliminating $15 per month software. We reestablished healthy margins. Our customer service, returns, and product quality all depend on having room to breathe financially.

The Target fallout is behind us, the tax lien is resolved, and the ADA plaintiff dropped the bogus lawsuit. My business partner stepped out of day-to-day operations, and some team members transitioned to part-time roles, which helped improve our cash flow. We’ve managed all of this without layoffs. My team is the same one that helped us grow, and they’re still incredibly talented and dedicated.

I’ve also cut my own salary and lived off personal savings to keep things afloat. But I’m optimistic. With the business stabilizing, we can rebuild our savings and start exploring new growth opportunities again.

Momentum

Survival mode means focusing on making it through the day. Some entrepreneurs try to grow their way out of problems. For us, it started with stabilizing operations. We can finally think long-term again.

We’ve begun reinvesting in growth, supporting our paid media and Meta efforts, and expanding our creative team to produce more content and ads. More creative output means more chances to connect with customers and fuel a rebound.

We’re also rethinking channels beyond direct-to-consumer. Target was a strong retail partner for years. Retail as a channel still holds potential — perhaps it’s independent salons, boutique pharmacies, and grocery stores. The goal is to diversify. Beardbrand.com will always be our home base, but we’re a business that sells to people, not just an ecommerce brand.

It’s exciting to think ahead instead of looking back. We’re aiming for 7% profitability this year — that’s breakeven in my book. It provides us with a buffer for unpredictable events, such as lawsuits, audits, and air conditioning failures. The real goal is 17% profit — that’s when we can fund growth, hire employees, and breathe easier. Anything beyond that is the sweet spot where the stress and sacrifice start to feel worth it.

I’m excited again — for the team, for the future, and what we’re building.

MNLY’s At-Home AI Powers Men’s Health

Next-gen health and wellness is an apt description of MNLY. Luke Hartelust launched the platform in 2021, pronouncing it “manly,” and then pivoted twice while remaining focused on modern care for men.

The current version combines AI with home-based testing, diagnoses, and nutrition. Customers pay an upfront fee and a monthly subscription afterward.

In our recent conversation, Luke shared the company’s origins, growth, mistakes, and more. The entire audio of that discussion is embedded below. The transcript is condensed and edited for clarity.

Eric Bandholz: Tell us about your work.

Luke Hartelust: I’m the founder and CEO of MNLY, a men’s health and wellness platform. We use at-home diagnostics, AI, and advanced tech to create custom supplement, lifestyle, and nutrition solutions.

My background is in fitness franchising. I led multiple locations across Southern California and worked closely with male entrepreneurs and executives. That experience revealed gaps in men’s healthcare, particularly in the lack of proactive, preventative approaches.

Telehealth has improved access to care, but the model has flaws. Most providers have long waitlists — often up to 90 days for lab results and treatment plans due to backlogged consultations.

At MNLY, we streamlined the process. We removed the practitioner bottleneck and built a scientific advisory board to train a complex AI model. The result is an automated analysis and quick, personalized health recommendations, going from signup to actionable results much faster than traditional telehealth providers.

Bandholz: Walk me through the customer journey.

Hartelust: Customers start by purchasing our at-home blood sample kit — a simple finger prick using dried blood spot sampling, eliminating the friction of in-person visits. Once received, our partner lab processes samples within hours.

While awaiting results, users complete an 86-question health assessment. It focuses on seven areas: concentration, confidence, stamina, mood, sleep, libido, and recovery.

We combine lab and assessment data — roughly 100 data points per user — to generate a clean, easy-to-understand health dashboard. It explains results and provides reference ranges, visuals, and comparison metrics. An overall health score benchmarks the data.

Next, our AI builds a personalized health plan, including nutrition suggestions based on biomarkers and lifestyle hacks such as breathwork and even testicular cooling for hormone support.

Finally, we formulate a custom dietary supplement. Based on the user’s data, our AI prescribes specific nutrients and doses. We then manufacture the supplement and ship every 30 days. It’s fully automated.

Bandholz: What does it cost customers?

Hartelust: The initial lab kit is $199. Supplements are $249 per month.

We recommend retesting with new blood samples every three to five months. Each time new bloodwork is submitted, our system updates all biomarkers, adjusts supplement dosages, and revises the health plan. Users experience clear visual progress, including changes to their overall health score.

We’ve just completed our first year in business. It’s our third iteration under the MNLY brand. We launched in 2021 as a nutritional subscription box provider, with two attempts.

A year ago, with this version, we didn’t prioritize retention. Our small team focused on product development, and we lacked an automated customer journey to guide and remind users about retesting. We started those reminders 90 days ago.

From an ecommerce perspective, not building that journey sooner was one of our biggest missteps. Many customers experienced strong results in the first six weeks — improved libido, mood, sleep, recovery, and focus — but when those effects plateaued, some dropped off around the five- or six-month mark. Even though biological improvements continued, users weren’t always aware without updated data. That’s why consistent testing and communication are now central to our retention strategy.

Bandholz: What’s your growth strategy?

Hartelust: As a startup raising capital in a tough market, I needed a strategic partner to expand our reach. I secured a deal last year with Hyrox, an indoor fitness competition, as its exclusive U.S. men’s health partner. I landed the deal with just a minimal viable product and a pitch deck, right before Hydrox’s U.S. expansion took off.

The company’s events grew in a year from 2,000 athletes to 14,000, and its audience — 50,000 social followers, 30,000 email subscribers, and 200 gym partners — aligned perfectly with our brand. We paid for the sponsorship, but it gave us massive exposure, credibility, and direct access to our core demographic.

We could have taken out, say, $100,000 in Meta Ads. That same $100,000 in a strategic Hyrox sponsorship gets us brand equity, athletes, investors, and a much lower acquisition cost — around $200 per customer, far better than we could achieve with ads alone.

Bandholz: How do you convert Hyrox athletes?

Hartelust: A presence on-site at the competitions is our most effective strategy. We recently wrapped an eight-month national tour where we set up our brand installation inside each venue. Our core leadership team was there to bring deep product knowledge, passion, and real connection.

The sponsorship provided us with access to email lists and social media audiences. Before the competition, we emailed attendees with offers, a discount code, and booth details. We reminded them of the promotion during the event and shared recaps after. We encouraged the participants to show the code at the booth for a lower rate.

Bandholz: How did you raise the capital to fund such a complex launch?

Hartelust: I spent the first six years of my career building wellness and fitness studios and nurturing strategic relationships. When we sold the company in 2021 for several million dollars, I reinvested some capital to start MNLY. But, again, before our current model, MNLY failed twice as a subscription box concept. I lost a lot on those early versions before pivoting to what we have now.

Launching this model required more than just personal funds, so I began raising a true pre-seed round about 18 months ago. I had raised capital before, but never for a startup. I tapped every possible connection — friends, family, clients — and hired a virtual assistant for cold outreach. One of our venture capital partners shared a valuable investor database. I ended up doing roughly 250 pitches and raised just under $800,000.

This round focused on micro angels rather than traditional VCs. Many brands rely heavily on Meta ads and lack a real connection. We leveraged our Hyrox community and offered equity to athlete ambassadors, which provided us with additional operational capital. That blend of brand, relationships, and community has fueled our growth.

Bandholz: Where can people support you?

Hartelust: Our website is getMNLY.com. We’re @getMNLY on Instagram and Facebook. I’m on LinkedIn.

Ecommerce to Real Estate: An Owner’s Story

Shakil Prasla once owned 12 ecommerce consumer brands generating $50 million in combined annual revenue with 50 employees. But he grew weary of the fluctuating revenue and non-stop marketing, so he pivoted during Covid to wholesale personal protective equipment.

That’s when he and I last spoke. The PPE business, Gloves.com, had misgauged demand and lost, initially, a whopping $6 million. He has since recovered and pivoted again, this time to real estate and convenience-store gas stations.

He’s an example of resilience, priorities, and seizing opportunities. He shared those lessons and more in this our latest conversation.

Our entire audio is embedded below. The transcript is condensed and edited for clarity.

Eric Bandholz: Give us a rundown of what you do.

Shakil Prasla: I own Gloves.com. We primarily sell disposable protective gloves for medical, food service, and other industries, mostly wholesale. We import from overseas, store our inventory in warehouses, and have a team of sales representatives who build relationships and sell to large distributors, such as Sysco.

Sysco, in turn, supplies restaurants and businesses like McDonald’s and Taco Bell. Orders flow through backend integrations, and while we use automation, we’re essentially a logistics company: importing, storing, and distributing goods.

I acquired the business with a private equity group. The brand has been around for over 30 years, so it came with an established sales history. When evaluating it, we looked at total market share — disposable gloves are a surprisingly massive, multi-billion-dollar industry. They’re used everywhere: hospitals, nail salons, barber shops, grocery stores, even gardening.

While gloves are our core offering, we also provide other disposable wearables, such as bouffant caps and beard covers. What I learned from ecommerce is that consumables drive strong repeat business. Customers reorder when they run out, which increases lifetime value and makes the business model attractive.

I bought my first online business in 2013, before acquiring ecommerce brands was popular. I enjoyed improving and growing them. By 2018, I owned 12 brands, generating over $50 million in annual revenue with more than 50 employees.

During Covid, I sold most of my brands and transitioned into wholesale distribution of personal protective equipment. Now, I’m also involved in real estate — buying land, building strip centers, and gas stations around Austin, Texas.

Bandholz: You scaled this business quite a bit.

Prasla: We acquired the company with just the inventory — no team, no tech — so we had to rebuild it from the ground up. Fortunately, it had been a large business with strong brand recognition, so we focused on the low-hanging fruit: reactivating old customers.

We reached out to clients from 15 to 20 years ago and informed them that the brand had new ownership, improved service, and the same trusted products. We addressed past issues and emphasized improvements — faster shipping, better pricing, and consistent product quality. That approach worked well, and many customers returned.

Unlike ecommerce, where you’re constantly running ads on Facebook, Google, TikTok, and writing emails, we don’t rely on traditional marketing. Our sales reps do the marketing. They follow KPIs, and their bonuses are tied to performance. That incentive structure has been a key driver of our growth.

Bandholz: How do you find operators and get aligned so they can thrive and help scale the business?

Prasla: I realized early on that operations aren’t my strength — I get bored by the day-to-day details. Back in my ecommerce days, I started outsourcing operations. I hired someone from what was then oDesk (now Upwork) to handle customer service, agency calls, and other tasks. At first, it was messy because I didn’t have proper operating procedures, but I refined the process over time.

Finding great people is hard. A one-hour interview isn’t enough. Candidates are selling themselves, and what they present isn’t always accurate. So there’s a trial-and-error phase.

Today, we use staffing agencies, LinkedIn, and platforms like Monster. My human resources team handles job postings, and we make sure to clearly outline the role — for example, “I need a leader to run a nine-figure business and inspire sales reps.” That clarity helps attract the right people.

Incentives are also critical. Some candidates seek a stable income, while others prefer a lower base pay with high performance bonuses. I try to understand what motivates them and tailor compensation accordingly.

To filter applicants, we include a short questionnaire: “If you were running this company, how would you grow it?” Only thoughtful responses move forward. Then our team conducts interviews, and I speak with the final candidates. That’s the process that’s worked for me.

Bandholz: What is your relationship with the CEOs?

Prasla: I keep it simple. One 30-minute call per week, focused on high-level strategy. We review a dashboard with key metrics, including revenue, what’s working, what’s not, and where the opportunities lie. I get the agenda in advance, and we stick to it.

I don’t micromanage. My job is to empower, not control. I give CEOs guardrails — for example, “Let’s grow from $1 million to $1.2 million this year.” Then I ask how they plan to do it. They break it down into quarterly and monthly KPIs. Maybe the goal is to increase conversion from 1% to 1.5% through home page A/B testing. I guide the direction, but they own the execution.

That ownership is key. When they create the plan, they’re more committed to achieving it.

Compensation for a seven- or eight-figure company typically includes a base salary ranging from $150,000 to $300,000, plus phantom equity that vests over time, profit sharing, and performance bonuses.

If my CEO brings in an extra $1 million in value, I’m happy to share in that. It’s about alignment — when they win, we all win.

Bandholz: Tell us about the shift into real estate and convenience stores, and getting into strip malls.

Prasla: My move into real estate came from two things I noticed in ecommerce. First, the ecommerce revenue was unpredictable. One month it would be up, the next it would drop due to factors such as algorithm changes, underperforming ads, or supply chain issues. It was stressful, and I wanted more stability. Second, I wanted to build long-term wealth through equity, not just profit. Real estate gave me both.

It’s been a fun challenge. I enjoy negotiating land deals and working with brokers, developers, and banks. Once I find a property, the real planning begins — figuring out the building footprint, engineering, architecture, and sometimes dealing with environmental or access issues. It’s rewarding to see a project come to life from the ground up.

I’m not the general contractor — I hire one to manage all the subcontractors, including plumbing, roofing, MEP, and foundation, among others. We also work with about 20 professionals per project, including architects, engineers, and traffic consultants. Financing typically requires a down payment of 20–35%. After construction and getting a certificate of occupancy, it takes about six months to stabilize.

This isn’t a flip strategy for me — I plan to hold the properties long term. Traffic at busy intersections brings consistent footfall, unlike the volatility of ecommerce.

After years of grinding, experiencing burnout, and incurring some losses driven by ego, I’ve reevaluated what truly matters. I have two young kids, and now my priority is time — being present. I built a stable financial base, and now I’m focused on enjoying the next chapter.

Bandholz: Where can people find you?

Prasla: Gloves.com is our business for disposable products. Our convenience stores — called Snack Stop  — are in Austin, Texas, where I live. I’m on LinkedIn.

Faith, Family, and Ecommerce

Michael Simpson is a New Mexico-based father of seven and a National Guard veteran. Returning from a 2021 deployment, he sought a business to acquire, hoping to move on from his previous job. A listing from the Quiet Light brokerage caught his attention.

Discount Catholic Products had launched in 2003 and was for sale. The company’s mission appealed to Michael. Plus it was not reliant on Amazon or a single product or imports from China — all key requirements. He purchased the business.

Fast forward to 2025, and the retailer perseveres. Michael’s role has evolved to part-time oversight. A single employee, his sister-in-law, runs daily operations with help from his kids.

In our recent conversation, he and I discussed financing the acquisition, cash flow challenges, marketing tactics, and more. Our entire audio is embedded below. The transcript is condensed and edited for clarity.

Eric Bandholz: Who are you, and what do you do?

Michael Simpson: I own Discount Catholic Products, an online retailer of spiritual goods, such as prayer cards, decorative crosses, and church supplies. It launched in 2003, and my wife, Catie, and I bought it in 2021. We ran it together for a couple of years, but recently I accepted a job with the National Guard, where I’ve served for 22 years. We have seven kids who help with the business, as does my sister-in-law, our only employee.

I found the business through Quiet Light, a brokerage. I’d been on their email list for a year. I wanted something that wasn’t reliant on Amazon, with its own website, not tied to a single product or imported from China. I also wanted a product I could genuinely care about. This listing was the first that fit my criteria and budget.

I saved about $40,000 for a down payment from a deployment in Africa with the National Guard. After returning, during the pandemic, I didn’t want to go back to my old job.

To acquire the business, we injected our down payment and borrowed from the Small Business Administration, securing a 10-year loan at a 5.5% interest for the first five years. Plus the seller carried 5% of the purchase price on a 10-year loan. I also secured a line of credit early, which I highly recommend.

Four years in, we’ve paid about 25% of the debt.

Bandholz: Has the business met your expectations?

Simpson: There were definitely surprises. The business carried about $75,000 in inventory across thousands of SKUs. I negotiated that down to $65,000, but probably still overpaid by $15,000. A lot of it was stale items that sold maybe one unit a year or not at all.

I also underestimated working capital needs. I figured cash flow would be smooth with immediate revenue from customers and 30-day terms with U.S. suppliers. However, our cash quickly evaporated as we expanded and purchased more inventory.

I assumed only about 10% of products were drop-shipped, mostly larger or more expensive items. In reality, it was a lot more. That became a problem as the global supply chain fell apart during Covid. Products from Italy, China, and even the U.S. were delayed or unavailable, leading to backorders.

So early on we shifted to more in-house inventory. We now run our own warehouse from our base in Albuquerque, New Mexico. We sell and ship low-cost, low-margin, lightweight products. The pick-and-pack fees of a third-party fulfillment provider would wipe out profits.

Bandholz: Did the seller have employees?

Simpson: She ran it with a friend, who handled pick, pack, and ship, as well as customer service. She decided to sell when the friend couldn’t continue. I underestimated the amount of work involved. I assumed my wife and I could handle it easily.

But it turned out to be nearly full-time for both of us. My wife handled fulfillment, while I managed customer service, reordering, website updates, and finances. We hired an employee early on, but she moved away. The next hire didn’t work out. So for about two years, my wife was doing fulfillment a few times a week, and I was managing everything else.

Then we had our seventh baby about a year ago. With a newborn and several homeschooled kids, my wife couldn’t keep working in the business. So we hired her sister, and it has worked out well. She works part-time, from about 9:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. — enough time to handle fulfillment and customer service.

Bandholz: You’re now employed outside the business.

Simpson: Yes. I realized a few months ago I was borrowing from our line of credit to pay myself a modest salary, which made no sense. I’d been praying the business would improve, and soon, an unexpected opportunity came up — working with the National Guard on a local project. It pays double what I was paying myself and has regular hours, so I took it. Now I’m focused on reducing debt and stabilizing the business, which is being run day-to-day by our one employee.

We have a 30% contribution margin, but that wasn’t enough to cover fixed costs and my salary. Once I stepped back, the business became profitable again. Ironically, sales are now up even though I’m barely involved. A mastermind peer joked, “I think you found the problem!”

Now I’m focused on high-impact tasks such as ordering inventory and launching email campaigns. I’m training our employee to take on more responsibilities. My goal is to fully step out of daily operations and focus on long-term growth — working on the business, not in it.

Bandholz: How do sales break down between individuals and churches?

Simpson: About 80% of our sales come from individuals, with the rest from churches and schools. We have amazing customers.

One woman received a broken statue, so we shipped another. She ended up fixing the first one, sold it on eBay, and sent us the money. Another customer purchased a replacement necklace, then found the original and asked to pay for both. We’ve had dozens of stories like that — just honest, kind people.

Churches are great customers. They place large orders — $500 to $1,000 — but without the red tape of big organizations. Often, it’s parish secretaries or priests placing the order, and they tend to buy year after year.

Bandholz: What’s your marketing strategy?

Simpson: We’re primarily a demand capture business, not demand generation. Meta Ads haven’t been profitable — we’re lucky to break even. However, Google Shopping ads consistently deliver a return of 4.0 or higher. We also rely on organic search traffic. Social media has never been a big sales driver.

Email has been critical. The previous owner had a distinct tone, but we’ve since shifted to our own voice, which resonates well. Customers often respond warmly, and many older buyers even call to place their orders directly.

Bandholz: Where can folks buy your products and connect?

Simpson: Our site is DiscountCatholicProducts.com. I’m on X and LinkedIn.

Don’t Exit for the Wrong Reasons

We often frame selling a business as “exiting.” But it’s a decision to walk away, to quit. That’s not negative, but it’s important to examine your reasons. Some are valid, others less so, and many fall into a gray area that deserves deeper thought.

Ideally, founders build a business they love, one that enhances their life. Business is, to me, one of life’s greatest gifts. It offers freedom, wealth, connection, and the ability to serve, create, and leave a mark on the world.

The headphones I use, the tools I carry, the art on my wall — all exist because someone built them. Entrepreneurs shape society. That’s the power of business.

This week’s “Ecommerce Conversations” is my fifth master class on entrepreneurship, following installments on hiring, branding, profit-building, and priority-setting. For this episode, I’ll address the reasons — valid or not — for selling a business.

My entire audio dialog is embedded below. The transcript is condensed and edited for clarity.

Invalid Reasons

The decision to sell a business is of course subjective. My view is owners often sell for invalid reasons, such as the following.

Believing another business is easier

Sure, some businesses may seem simpler, but what’s easy for one person is hard for another. It depends on your skills, team, and experience.

Business is a series of never-ending problems to identify, prioritize, and solve. Jumping to another doesn’t escape problems — it trades one set for another. If you think the next venture will be problem-free, you’re chasing an illusion.

Consider instead how to make your current business more enjoyable. Solving that problem — how to love showing up every day — is a worthwhile pursuit.

Wanting to ‘retire’

Lying on the beach, traveling nonstop, or restoring cars may sound appealing, but they are misguided. Work is a gift, not a burden. The true win is designing work around what you love, with people you enjoy, and on your own terms.

Ask yourself, “How do I create a business that lets me work on what I want, when I want, with people I want to work with?” If you can’t solve it now, you won’t likely solve it with the next venture.

Many entrepreneurs do fulfilling work, enjoy time with their families, and travel the world — not by quitting, but by shaping their businesses to support the life they want.

Valid Reasons

Certainly owners have many legit reasons to sell. Here are a few.

Partner problems

If you aren’t philosophically aligned with your partner(s), it’s nearly impossible to run a successful company. Misalignment in vision, values, or decision-making creates friction, and that tension will eventually stall progress or tear the business apart.

If you’ve made a genuine effort and still can’t find common ground, then it might be time to sell.

Failure of minimum viable product

The idea of an MVP is to test the market at a low cost. If the early results are poor with an uphill battle to gain traction, it may be wiser to quit early rather than sink tens of thousands of dollars into something the market doesn’t want.

The best products solve a specific problem for a targeted audience and generate genuine interest, even in highly competitive markets.

If your product doesn’t build momentum, consider cutting your losses and continue testing, refining, and seeking the ideal market fit.

Bankruptcy

If you’ve exhausted all options — negotiating with creditors, extending credit, selling assets, liquidating inventory — it’s time to step away.

Filing for bankruptcy doesn’t define you. It simply means you took a risk to build something new, and it didn’t work out. Many successful entrepreneurs have declared bankruptcy. It’s not a personal failure — it’s part of the learning process.

Use the experience as a stepping stone. Rebuild your confidence, reflect on the decisions, and learn from the lessons. That knowledge will serve you in the next venture.

Poor health

Serious health issues could signal a time to reassess. No business is worth sacrificing your well-being.

Find a way to integrate healthy habits, such as exercise, nutrition, and stress management, while continuing to build. But protecting your health sometimes means walking away and starting over. You only get one life. Time is your most valuable asset, and if your business is actively shortening it, the cost is too high.

Poor growth outlook

If you’ve hit a long-term growth plateau, selling the company is an option. The key is long-term. A business that has stalled for a few months or even a couple of quarters might have only a temporary setback. Ask yourself, “Are your expectations realistic? Are you experiencing the natural ebb and flow of entrepreneurship, or is this truly a dead end?”

Dive into the root cause. Is your market too small? Is profit razor-thin? Are there operational inefficiencies or overly aggressive growth strategies that aren’t yielding the desired results?

If you’ve exhausted all strategic options, it might be time to consider what’s next.

A life-changing offer

Getting a life-changing offer might tempt you to sell. Maybe you told yourself, “If I ever get $5 million, I’m out.” Then that offer comes. But here’s the catch: If you haven’t figured out what’s next, you might find yourself with time and money, but no direction. Many entrepreneurs discover they actually enjoyed building their business, and that magic doesn’t come back.

Especially if you’ve built it with partners you love and trust, selling is like a divorce. Once the business ends, so might that tight-knit bond. Great partnerships are rare and irreplaceable.

Selling when a strong offer arrives can be a smart move, but be clear on what comes next.

Declining market

Think Blockbuster — once a giant, but eventually overtaken by Netflix and Redbox.

Netflix pivoted — from DVD-by-mail to digital streaming, then to original content creation — completely transforming their business model. Blockbuster did not.

Before selling or closing your business, consider whether there is a pivot opportunity. If beard trends shift, could Beardbrand, my company, expand into men’s grooming or women’s products? An innovative pivot can keep you relevant, no matter how the market changes.